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Profile: Don Merrell
Profile: Don Merrell (Northwest Arkansas Community College)
  1. Don A. Merrell (2006). Theoretical Identity, Reference Fixing, and Boyd's Defense of Type Materialism. Philosophia 34 (2):169-172.
    In his Materialism without Reductionism: What Materialism Does not Entail, Richard Boyd answers Kripke’s challenge to materialists to come up with a way to explain away the apparent contingency of mind-brain identities . Boyd accuses Kripke of an imaginative myopia manifesting itself as a failure to realize that the more theoretical term in the identity is fixed by contingent descriptions – descriptions that might pick out otherworldly kinds of neural events where C-fibres are absent. If this is something we can (...)
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  2. Don A. Merrell (2005). Token Physicalism is Not Immune to Kripke's Essentialist Anti-Physicalist Argument. Philosophia 32 (1-4):383-388.
  3. Don A. Merrell (2001). Contemporary Conceivability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind: A Critique. Dissertation, University of Arkansas
    This dissertation assesses the value of Cartesian conceivability arguments, with particular attention given to three contemporary debates surrounding the mind-body problem. ;Saul Kripke's separability argument utilized new developments surrounding the nature of necessity and the reference of proper names. For all its merit, the Kripkean separability argument is open to serious criticisms. I examine several standard objections to Kripke's arguments and maintain that none are successful. I also maintain, however, that it is possible to show, contrary to what Kripke presupposes, (...)
     
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