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  1. Donald F. Gustafson (2000). Our Choice Between Actual and Remembered Pain and Our Flawed Preferences. Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):111-119.
    In Stephanie Beardman's discussion of the empirical results of Kahneman and Tversky and Kahneman, et al. on pain preference and rational utility decision she argues that an interpretation of these results does not require that false memory for pain episodes yields irrational preferences for future pain events. I concur with her conclusion and suggest that there are reasons from within the pain sciences for agreeing with Beardman's reinterpretation of the Kahneman, et al. data. I cite some of these theoretical and (...)
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  2. Donald F. Gustafson (2000). On the Supposed Utility of a Folk Theory of Pain. Brain and Mind 1 (2):223-228.
    What follows raises objections to some arguments that claimthat a principle of applicability of ordinary pain talkconstrains developments in the pain sciences. A more apt pictureof lay use of pain language shows its non-theoretic character.Since instrumentalism and eliminativism are philosophical viewsabout the status of theories of pain, neither is a threatto clinical use of standard pain lingo. Perfected pain theoryis likely to enhance and improve pain language in clinicalsettings, should such theory find its way into popular ideasand talk of pain.
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  3. Donald F. Gustafson (1998). Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.
    This paper investigates the status of the purported explanatory gap between pain phenomena and natural science, when the “gap” is thought to exist due to the special properties of experience designated by “qualia” or “the pain quale” in the case of pain experiences. The paper questions the existence of such a property in the case of pain by: (1) looking at the history of the conception of pain; (2) raising questions from empirical research and theory in the psychology of (...)
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  4. Donald F. Gustafson (1995). Belief in Pain. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (3):323-45.
    There is a traditional view of pain as a conscious phenomenon which satisfies the following two principles at least: Pain is essentially a belief- or cognition-independent sensation, given for consciousness in an immediate way, and pain′s unitary physical base is responsible for both its phenomenal or felt qualities and it′s functional, causal features. These are "The Raw Feels Principle" and "The Unity of Pain Principle" . Each is shown to be implausible. Evidence comes from recent pain research in a number (...)
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  5. Donald F. Gustafson (1989). Intention and Agency. Noûs 23 (2):279-281.
     
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  6. Donald F. Gustafson (1979). Pain, Grammar, and Physicalism. In Donald F. Gustafson & Virgil C. Aldrich (eds.), Body, Mind And Method. Dordrecht: Reidel 149--166.
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  7. Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.) (1979). Body, Mind, and Method. Kluwer.
    SIMPLE SEEING I met Virgil Aldrich for the first time in the fall of 1969 when I arrived in Chapel Hill to attend a philosophy conference. My book, Seeing and Knowing,1 had just appeared a few months earlier.
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  8. Donald F. Gustafson (1968). Momentary Intentions. Mind 77 (305):1-13.
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  9. Donald F. Gustafson (1966). Assertions About the Future. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (3):421-426.
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  10. Donald F. Gustafson (1965). Privacy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):140-146.
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  11. Donald F. Gustafson (1965). Part III: Privacy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):140-146.
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  12. Donald F. Gustafson (1964). Explanation in Psychology. Mind 73 (April):280-281.
  13. Donald F. Gustafson (ed.) (1964). Essays In Philosophical Psychology. Anchor Books.
     
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  14. Donald F. Gustafson (1963). On the Identity Theory. Analysis 23 (2):30-32.
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