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Profile: Donald Levy (Brooklyn College)
  1. Donald Levy (2003). How to Psychoanalyze a Robot: Unconscious Cognition and the Evolution of Intentionality. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 13 (2):203-212.
    According to a common philosophical distinction, the `original' intentionality, or `aboutness' possessed by our thoughts, beliefs and desires, is categorically different from the `derived' intentionality manifested in some of our artifacts –- our words, books and pictures, for example. Those making the distinction claim that the intentionality of our artifacts is `parasitic' on the `genuine' intentionality to be found in members of the former class of things. In Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness, Daniel Dennett criticizes that claim (...)
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  2. Donald Levy (2003). Neural Holism and Free Will. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-229.
    Both libertarian and compatibilist approaches have been unsuccessful in providing an acceptable account of free will. Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience, including the connectionist theory of mind and empirical findings regarding modularity and integration of brain functions, provide the basis for a new approach: neural holism. This approach locates free will in fully integrated behavior in which all of a person's beliefs and desires, implicitly represented in the brain, automatically contribute to an act. Deliberation, the experience of volition, and cognitive (...)
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  3. Donald Levy (2001). A Final Accounting: Philosophical and Empirical Issues in Freudian Psychology. Edward Erwin. Mind 110 (439):740-746.
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  4. Donald Levy (1996). Freud Among the Philosophers: The Psychoanalytic Unconscious and its Philosophical Critics. Yale University Press.
    In this highly original book, Donald Levy considers the most important and persuasive of these philosophical criticisms, as articulated by four figures: Ludwig Wittgenstein, William James, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Adolf Grunbaum.
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  5. Donald Levy (1989). Melvin Feffer, Radical Constructionism Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 9 (7):261-266.
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  6. Donald Levy (1989). Melvin Feffer, Radical Constructionism. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 9:261-266.
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  7. Donald Levy (1988). Gr Nbaum's Freud. Inquiry 31 (2):193 – 215.
    Grünbaum characterizes the foundations of psychoanalysis as consisting primarily of two assertions ? (1) only psychoanalysis can give correct insight into the unconscious causes of neurosis, and (2) only such correct insight can cure neurosis. Grünbaum infers from these that therapeutic success is the only evidence of the correctness of psychoanalytic theories. It is obvious that the two passages in Freud on which Grünbaum relies do not justify his interpretation. Furthermore, Freud thought of therapeutic success as by no means the (...)
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  8. Donald Levy (1983). Post-Hypnotic Suggestion and the Existence of Unconscious Mental Activity. Analysis 43 (October):184-189.
  9. Donald Levy (1980). Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral Categories. Ethics 90 (2):191-202.
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  10. Donald Levy (1980). Philosophical Criticisms of the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis. Dissertation, Cornell University
    Chapter three shows that MacIntyre's misunderstanding of what psychoanalysis means by the unconscious leads him to treat it as unobservable. In any intelligible sense, the unconscious is not absolutely unobservable, or else being unobservable is no stigma unique to it; conscious ideas, wishes, e.g., will have to be classed as unobservable, too. MacIntyre's central error is his failing to see that free-association makes the unconscious observable. The chapter concludes with an examination of the concepts of absolute unobservability and observability in (...)
     
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  11. Donald Levy (1979). The Definition of Love in Plato's "Symposium". Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (2):285.
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  12. Donald Levy (1967). Macrocosm and Microcosm. In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York, Macmillan. 5.
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