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  1. Michael L. Anderson & Donald R. Perlis (2005). The Roots of Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):297-333.
    In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account.
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  2. Michael L. Anderson & Donald R. Perlis (2002). Symbol Systems. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
  3. Donald R. Perlis (1997). Consciousness as Self-Function. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):509-25.
    I argue that consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence, hence of its ability to deal adaptively with the world. In particular, it allows for the possibility of noting and correcting the agent's errors, as actions performed by itself. This in turn requires a robust self-concept as part of the agent's world model; the appropriate notion of self here is a special one, allowing for a very strong kind of self-reference. It also requires the capability to come to see (...)
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  4. Donald R. Perlis (1995). Consciousness and Complexity: The Cognitive Quest. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 14:309-21.
  5. Donald R. Perlis (1994). Putting One's Foot in One's Head -- Part 2: How. In Eric Dietrich (ed.), Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press. 435-455.
     
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  6. Patrick Hayes, Stevan Harnad, Donald R. Perlis & Ned Block (1992). Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind. Minds and Machines 2 (3):217-238.
    When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaningful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called "virtual" systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a "virtual (...)
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  7. Donald R. Perlis (1991). Putting One's Foot in One's Head -- Part 1: Why. Noûs 25 (September):435-55.
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