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Profile: Donelson Dulany
Profile: Donelson Edwin Dulany (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
  1. Donelson E. Dulany (1968). Awareness, Rules, and Propositional Control: A Confrontation with s-R Behavior Theory. In T. Dixon & Deryck Horton (eds.), Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory. Prentice-Hall
  2. Donelson E. Dulany, Richard A. Carlson & G. I. Dewey (1984). A Case of Syntactical Learning and Judgment: How Conscious and How Abstract? Journal of Experimental Psychology 113:541-555.
  3. Donelson E. Dulany (1997). Consciousness in the Explicit (Deliberative) and Implicit (Evocative). In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum 179--211.
  4. Donelson E. Dulany (2003). Strategies for Putting Consciousness in its Place. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (1):33-43.
     
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  5.  26
    Donelson Dulany (2008). How Well Are We Moving Toward a Most Productive Science of Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):75-98.
    Commentary on the Toward a Science of Consciousness Conference, Tucson 2008.
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  6.  33
    Donelson E. Dulany (1999). Consciousness, Connectionism, and Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):154-155.
    Connectionism can provide useful theories in which consciousness is the exclusive vehicle of explicit representation. The theories may not, however, handle some phenomena adequately: sense of agency, modes and contents of awareness, propositional and deliberative thought, metacognitive awareness and consciousness of self. They should, however, be useful in describing automatic, activational relations among nonpropositional conscious contents.
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  7. Donelson E. Dulany (2001). Inattentional Awareness. Psyche 7 (5).
    The authors report "priming" effects for subjects they classify as "inattentionally blind" and interpret this as evidence for unconscious perception--an interpretation consistent with deeply entrenched metatheory. I question that interpretation, however, on methodological grounds. On these assessment procedures, some subjects could be classified as "inattentionally blind" despite representing the critical stimulus in conscious attention. Still others--presenting a more interesting challenge--could be so classified despite representing the stimulus literally in inattentional awareness. The study is illuminated, I believe, by seeing it in (...)
     
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  8.  3
    DonelsonE Dulany (2014). What Explains Consciousness? Or...What Consciousness Explains? Mens Sana Monographs 12 (1):11.
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    Donelson E. Dulany (2002). Mentalistic Metatheory and Strategies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):337-338.
    Mentalism (Dulany 1991; 1997) provides a metatheoretical alternative to the dominant cognitive view. This commentary briefly outlines its main propositions and what I see as strategies for its use and support at this stage. These propositions represent conscious states as the sole carriers of symbolic representations, and mental episodes as consisting exclusively of conscious states interrelated by nonconscious operations.
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  10.  14
    Donelson E. Dulany (2005). Rules and Similarity as Conscious Contents with Distinctive Roles in Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):24-24.
    Difficulty of distinguishing rules and similarity in categorization comes from reliance on relatively simple manipulation-response designs and a style of modeling with abstract parameters, rather than assessment of intervening and controlling mental states. This commentary proposes a strategy in which rules and similarity would be distinguished by their different roles in a theory interrelating reportable conscious contents in deliberative categorization.
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  11. Donelson E. Dulany (1991). Conscious Representation and Thought Systems. In R. Wyer & T. Srull (eds.), The Content, Structure, and Operation of Thought Systems. Lawrence Erlbaum
  12. Richard A. Carlson & Donelson E. Dulany (1985). Conscious Attention and Abstraction in Concept Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 11:45-58.
     
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  13. Donelson E. Dulany, Richard A. Carlson & G. I. Dewey (1985). On Consciousness in Syntactic Learning and Judgment: A Reply to Reber, Allen, and Regan. Journal of Experimental Psychology 114:25-32.
  14. Donelson E. Dulany (2004). Higher Order Representation in a Mentalistic Metatheory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins
     
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  15. Donelson E. Dulany (2002). Rationality in Action by John R. Searle. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):280-287.
     
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