Franck Grammont, Dorothée Legrand, and Pierre Livet (eds): Naturalizing Intention in Action Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s10746-012-9217-1 Authors Brian W. Dunst, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA Journal Human Studies Online ISSN 1572-851X Print ISSN 0163-8548.
Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich: Was es bedeutet, gesund zu sein. Philosophie der Medizin Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 57-59 DOI 10.1007/s10202-011-0096-8 Authors Dorothee Dörr, Europäische Akademie GmbH, Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, Germany Journal Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science Online ISSN 1615-6617 Print ISSN 1615-6609 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 1.
This paper is about one of the puzzles of bodily self-consciousness: can an experience be both and at the same time an experience of one′s physicality and of one′s subjectivity ? We will answer this question positively by determining a form of experience where the body′s physicality is experienced in a non-reifying manner. We will consider a form of experience of oneself as bodily which is different from both “prenoetic embodiment” and “pre-reflective bodily consciousness” and rather corresponds to a form (...) of reflective access to subjectivity at the bodily level. In particular, we argue that subjectivity is bodily expressed, thereby allowing the experience of the body′s subjectivity directly during perceptual experiences of the body. We use an interweaving of phenomenological explorations and ethnographical methods which allows validating this proposal by considering the experience of body experts (dancers). (shrink)
In this paper we characterize the body as constitutively open. We fi rst consider the notion of bodily openness at the basic level of its organic constitution. This will provide us a framework relevant for the understanding of the body open to its intersubjective world. We argue that the notion of “bodily openness” captures a constitutive dimension of intersubjectivity. Generally speaking, there are two families of theories intending to characterize the constitutive relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity: either the self is (...) considered as (1) being constituted prior to, and as a condition of, its potential relation to the outside (intersubjective) world, or, contrastively, (2) the self is considered as being constituted as a result of its (intersubjective) relations with the outside world. Here, we pursue a conciliatory path, as we intend to show that these two positions are not necessarily in opposition to each other. But how can selfhood/subjectivity be both and at the same time primary and secondary, relative to otherness/ intersubjectivity? Stated thusly, the question seems to border on incoherence but our intention here is to reconsider it in a framework that allows for the dissolution of this opposition. In particular, we will characterize the relational autonomy of the self: neither fully enclosed “inside” nor fully dissolved in or determined by what’s “outside”, the bodily self is best characterized by its fundamental “openness”, which we will explore in a framework where autonomy and relationality are not contradictory but co-constitutive dimensions. (shrink)
Joel Krueger & Dorothee Legrand (2009). The Open Body. In Antonella Carassa, Francesca Morganit & Giuseppe Riva (eds.), Enacting Intersubjectivity: Paving the Way for a Dialogue Between Cognitive Science, Social Cognition, and Neuroscience. Università della Svizzera Italiana.score: 3.0
The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree, however about (...) which modes of givenness are involved. (shrink)
We discuss the justification of Bickle's “ruthless” reductionism. Bickle intends to show that we know enough about neurons to draw conclusions about the “whole” brain and about the mind. However, his reductionism does not take into account the complexity of the nervous system and the fact that new properties emerge at each significant level of integration from the coupled functioning of elementary components. From a methodological point of view, we argue that neuronal and cognitive models have to exert a mutual (...) constraint(MC) on each other. This approach would refuse to award any priority of cognitive approaches over neuroscience, and reciprocally, to refuse any priority of neuroscience over cognitive approaches. MC thus argues against radicalreductionism at the methodological level. (shrink)
This paper considers critically the enterprise of naturalizing the subjective experience of acting intentionally. I specifically expose the limits of the model that conceives of agency as composed of two stages. The first stage consists in experiencing an anonymous intention without being conscious of it as anybody's in particular. The second stage disambiguates this anonymous experience thanks to a mechanism of identification and attribution answering the question: "who is intending to act?" On the basis of phenomenological, clinical, methodological and empirical (...) considerations, I contrast the two-stage anonymity-attribution model of agency with an alternative view that intends to bypass these problems by defining agency as intrinsically subjective at the pre-reflective level. (shrink)
As corporations are going global, they are increasingly confronted with human rights challenges. As such, new ways to deal with human rights challenges in corporate operations must be developed as traditional governance mechanisms are not always able to tackle them. This article presents five different views on innovative solutions for the relationships between business and human rights that all build on empowerment, dialogue and constructive engagement. The different approaches highlight an emerging trend toward a more active role for corporations in (...) the protection of human rights. The first examines the need for enhanced dialogue between corporations and their stakeholders. The next three each examine a different facet of empowerment, a critical factor for the respect and protection of human rights: empowerment of the poor, of communities, and of consumers. The final one presents a case study of constructive corporate engagement in Myanmar (Burma). Altogether, these research projects provide insight into the complex relationships between corporate operations and human rights, by highlighting the importance of stakeholder dialogue and empowerment. All the five projects were presented during the Second Swiss Master Class in Corporate Social Responsibility, held in Lausanne, Switzerland on December 12, 2008. The audience for this conference, which examined business and human rights, was composed of researchers, governmental representatives, and business and non-governmental organization practitioners. (shrink)
We discuss the role that transnational corporations (TNCs) should play in developing global governance, creating a frameworkof rules and regulations for the global economy. The central issue is whether TNCs should provide global rules and guarantee individual citizenship rights, or instead focus on maximizing profits. First, we describe the problems arising from the globalization process that affect the relationship between public rules and private firms. Next we consider the position of economic and management theories in relation to the social responsibility (...) of the firm. We argue that instrumental stakeholder theory and business and society research can only partially solve the global governance issue, and that more recent concepts of corporate citizenship and republican business ethics deliver theoretically and practically helpful, fresh insights. However, even these need further development, especially with regard to the legitimacy of corporate political activity. (shrink)
Genomic and neuro-scientific research into the causes and course of antisocial behaviour triggers bioethical debate. Often, these new developments are met with reservation, and possible drawbacks and negative side-effects are pointed out. This article reflects on these scientific developments and the bioethical debate by means of an exploration of the perspectives of one important stakeholder group: juveniles convicted of a serious crime who stay in a juvenile justice institution. The views of juveniles are particularly interesting, as possible applications of current (...) and future scientific findings are considered to be most effective if applied early in life. Based on their statements we come to the following provisional conclusions. Concerns about labelling and stigmatization are recognized and widely shared. Possible effects on one's identity are acknowledged too. Yet, a possible biological underpinning of one's antisocial behaviour is not considered to result in the development of a criminal identity. Nonetheless, psychopharmacological interventions are experienced as endangering one's current self. Concerns regarding the refusal of responsibility and the blaming of one's genes or brain can be put into perspective. Instead, participants emphasize the motive of own choice as underlying their criminal behaviour. Moreover, bioethical debate should pay attention to the role of parents of children at risk and the parent-child relationship in families at-risk. We argue that the short-term and long-term interests of children at risk, as well as their interests and those of society at large, may conflict. In order to deal appropriately with newly arising dilemmas, a normative framework needs to be developed. (shrink)
According to Bowden (20121), anorectics’2 bodily experiences are characterized by a “corporealization,” which has notably been described as follows: “The exchange with the environment is inhibited, excretions cease; processes of . . . shrinking, and drying up prevail” (Fuchs 2005, 99). What is described here is melancholia, but a similar characterization would be applicable to anorexia. I think, however, that the notion of ‘corporealization’ is not fine-grained enough to capture the specificity of anorexic/pathological bodily experiences. To develop this point, I (...) here propose to apply some of Heidegger’s key notions to the conceptualization of bodily experience (Caron 2008). As currently defined, the .. (shrink)
This article explores the implications of cross-border migration for social work's normative commitment to social justice. Specifically, it interrogates Nancy Fraser's conceptualisation of social justice in guiding social work practice with refugees. The paper is grounded in an ethnographic study conducted from 2008 to 2009 in a South African church which had provided shelter to a group of refugees following their displacement by an outbreak of xenophobic violence. The study's findings reveal that various kinds of misframing created multiple forms of (...) voicelessness amongst its foreign participants. These filtered out to justify, perpetuate and deepen other types of injustice, particularly misrecognition and maldistribution. There was some evidence of resistance, solidarity, recognition and small acts of redistribution. However, such positive practices proved difficult to sustain. The paper confirms the central importance of the notion of misframing for conceptualising and responding to social injustice in the absence of citizenship?as required of practitioners in the field of social work with refugees and indeed other groups rendered vulnerable within current economic, social, political and cultural constellations. In this regard, Fraser's contribution looks set to enrich social work's commitment to social justice both in normative and practical terms. (shrink)