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Profile: Douglas C. Long (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
  1. Douglas C. Long (2010). Why Life is Necessary for Mind: The Significance of Animate Behavior. In James O'Shea Eric Rubenstein (ed.), Self, Language, and World:Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Ridgeview Publishing Co. 61-88.
    I defend the thesis that psychological states can be literally ascribed only to living creatures and not to nonliving machines, such as sophisticated robots. Defenders of machine consciousness do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of the biological nature of a subject for the psychological significance of its behavior. Simulations of a computer-controlled, nonliving autonomous robot cannot carry the same psychological meaning as animate behavior. Being a living creature is an essential link between genuinely expressive behavior and justified psychological ascriptions.
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  2. Douglas C. Long (2004). E. Maynard Adams, 1919-2003. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (5):159 - 160.
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  3. Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long (2003). Expressing Truths and Knowing Truths. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
     
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  4. Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long (2001). Avowals and First-Person Privilege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):311-35.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I’m thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
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  5. Douglas C. Long (2001). Avowals and First-Person Privilege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311 - 335.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I’m thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
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  6. Douglas C. Long (1996). Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. Review of Metaphysics 49 (3):641-642.
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  7. Douglas C. Long (1994). One More Foiled Defense of Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):373-375.
    In my essay I contend that the three main avenues by which one might plausibly account for one's self-awareness are unavailable to an individual who is restricted to the skeptic's epistemic ground rules. First, all-encompassing doubt about the world cancels our "external" epistemic access via perception to ourselves as material individuals in the world. Second, one does not have direct cpistemic access to one's substantial self through introspection, since the self as such is not a proper object of inner awareness. (...)
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  8. Douglas C. Long (1994). Why Machines Can Neither Think nor Feel. In Dale W. Jamieson (ed.), Language, Mind and Art. Kluwer.
    Over three decades ago, in a brief but provocative essay, Paul Ziff argued for the thesis that robots cannot have feelings because they are "mechanisms, not organisms, not living creatures. There could be a broken-down robot but not a dead one. Only living creatures can literally have feelings."[i] Since machines are not living things they cannot have feelings.
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  9. Douglas C. Long (1992). The Body of a Person. International Studies in Philosophy 24 (3):113-113.
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  10. Douglas C. Long (1992). The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):67-84.
    An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an objective world beyond our subjective experiences. I argue that there is there is a fatal flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "external world." (...)
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  11. Douglas C. Long (1991). The Metaphysics of Mind, by Michael Tye. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):959-961.
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  12. Douglas C. Long (1987). Consciousness and Causality. Teaching Philosophy 10 (1):83-86.
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  13. Douglas C. Long (1984). The Character of Mind. Teaching Philosophy 7 (4):347-349.
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  14. Douglas C. Long (1983). Philosophical Problems and Arguments. Teaching Philosophy 6 (1):82-84.
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  15. Douglas C. Long (1979). Agents, Mechanisms, and Other Minds. In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind And Method. Dordrecht: Reidel. 129--148.
    One of the goals of physiologists who study the detailed physical, chemical,and neurological mechanisms operating within the human body is to understand the intricate causal processes which underlie human abilities and activities. It is doubtless premature to predict that they will eventually be able to explain the behaviour of a particular human being as we might now explain the behaviour of a pendulum clock or even the invisible changes occurring within the hardware of a modern electronic computer. Nonetheless, it seems (...)
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  16. Douglas C. Long (1979). Body, Mind And Method. Dordrecht: Reidel.
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  17. Douglas C. Long (1977). Disembodied Existence, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Studies 31 (May):307-316.
    The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments, the transmigration of souls, and the like. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. It may seem doubtful that anything new could be added to the debate at (...)
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  18. Douglas C. Long (1977). Matter and Mind. International Studies in Philosophy 9:168-170.
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  19. Douglas C. Long (1975). Other Minds. Teaching Philosophy 1 (2):179-181.
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  20. Douglas C. Long (1974). The Bodies of Persons. Journal of Philosophy 71 (10):291-301.
    Much mischief concerning the concept of a human body is generated by the failure of philosophers to distinguish various important senses of the term 'body.' I discuss three of those senses and illustrate the issues they can generate by discussing the concept of a Lockean exchange of bodies as well as the brain-body switch.
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  21. Douglas C. Long (1969). Descartes' Argument for Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophical Forum 1 (3):259-273.
    After claiming on the basis of the Cogito argument that he can assert with certainty that he exists, Descartes turns to an examination of his nature. He concludes that he is a nonmaterial, nonextended entity whose essence is to be conscious. Critics have insisted that this con¬clusion is not justified by the arguments he offers in its support. They object in particular to his attempt to justify the claim that he is a nonmaterial entity merely on the grounds that he (...)
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  22. Douglas C. Long (1968). Particulars and Their Qualities. Philosophical Quarterly 18 (72):193-206.
    Berkeley, Hume, and Russell rejected the traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities which are supported by an "unknowable substratum." To them the proper alternative seemed obvious. Eliminate the substratum in which qualities are alleged to inhere, leaving a bundle of coexisting qualities--a view that we may call the Bundle Theory or BT. I examine two major types of BT developed by Russell and by G. F. Stout with the intention of showing that (1) the seemingly innocuous concept of (...)
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  23. Douglas C. Long (1964). The Philosophical Concept of a Human Body. Philosophical Review 73 (July):321-337.
    I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution.
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  24. Douglas C. Long (1961). Second Thoughts: A Reply to Mr Ginnane's Thoughts. Mind 70 (July):405-411.
  25. Douglas C. Long (1961). Second Thoughts: A Reply to Mr. Ginnane. Mind 70 (279):405-411.
    In his article "Thoughts" (MIND, July 1960) William Ginnane argues that "thought is pure intentionality," and that our thoughts are not embodied essentially in the mental imagery and other elements of phenomenology that cross our minds along with the thoughts. Such images merely illustrate out thoughts. In my discussion I resist this claim pointing out that our thoughts are often embodied in events that can be described in pheno¬menological terms, especially when our reports of our thinking are introduced by the (...)
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