7 found
See also:
  1. Douglas E. Ehring (1996). Mental Causation, Determinables, and Property Instances. Noûs 30 (4):461-80.
  2. Douglas E. Ehring (1999). Fission, Fusion, and the Parfit Revolution. Philosophical Studies 94 (3):329-32.
  3.  75
    Douglas E. Ehring (2003). Part-Whole Physicalism and Mental Causation. Synthese 136 (3):359-388.
    A well-known ``overdetermination''argument aims to show that the possibility of mental causes of physical events in a causally closed physical world and the possibility of causally relevant mental properties are both problematic. In the first part of this paper, I extend an identity reply that has been given to the first problem to a property-instance account of causal relata. In the second, I argue that mental types are composed of physical types and, as a consequence, both mental and physical types (...)
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  4.  85
    Douglas E. Ehring (1995). Personal Identity and the R-Relation: Reconciliation Through Cohabitation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):337-346.
  5.  90
    Douglas E. Ehring (1987). Survival and Trivial Facts. Analysis 47 (January):50-54.
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    Douglas E. Ehring (1985). Dispositions and Functions: Cummins on Functional Analysis. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 23 (November):243-249.
  7.  12
    Douglas E. Ehring (1984). Mental Identity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):189-194.
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