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Profile: Douglas Husak (Rutgers University - New Brunswick)
  1. Douglas Husak (2009). Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law. OUP Usa.
    Husak's primary goal is to defend a set of constraints to limit the authority of states to enact and enforce criminal offenses. In addition, Husak situates this endeavor in criminal theory as traditionally construed. This book urges the importance of this topic in the real world, while most Anglo-American legal philosophers have neglected it.
     
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  2.  36
    Douglas N. Husak (2010). The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Does criminal liability require an act? -- Motive and criminal liability -- The costs to criminal theory of supposing that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility -- Transferred intent -- The nature and justifiability of nonconsummate offenses -- Strict liability, justice, and proportionality -- The sequential principle of relative culpability -- Willful ignorance, knowledge, and the equal culpability thesis : a study of the significance of the principle of legality -- Rapes without rapists : consent and reasonable mistake -- Mistake of (...)
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  3.  4
    Douglas Husak (2015). Paternalism and Consent. In Thomas Schramme (ed.), New Perspectives on Paternalism and Health Care. Springer International Publishing
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  4.  48
    Douglas Husak (2011). Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):199-218.
    Commentators seemingly agree about what negligence is—and how it is contrasted from recklessness. They also appear to concur about whether particular examples (both real and hypothetical) portray negligence. I am less confident about each of these matters. I explore the distinction between recklessness and negligence by examining a type of case that has generated a good deal of critical discussion: those in which a defendant forgets that he has created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm. Even in this limited (...)
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  5.  31
    Douglas Husak (2013). Retributivism In Extremis. Law and Philosophy 32 (1):3-31.
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  6.  6
    Douglas Husak (2004). The Criminal Law as Last Resort. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24 (2):207-235.
    In this article I examine one condition a minimalist theory of criminalization might contain: the criminal law should be used only as a last resort. I discuss how this principle should be interpreted and the reasons we have to accept it. I conclude that a theory of criminalization should probably include the (appropriately construed) last resort principle. But this conclusion will prove disappointing to those who hope to employ this principle to bring about fundamental reform in the substantive criminal law. (...)
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  7.  22
    Douglas Husak (2009). The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing That Intentions Are Irrelevant to Permissibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):51-70.
    I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal).
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  8.  34
    Douglas Husak (2005). On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse. Law and Philosophy 24 (6):557-594.
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  9.  38
    Douglas Husak (2012). Why Punish Attempts at All? Yaffe on 'The Transfer Principle'. Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):399-410.
    Gideon Yaffe is to be commended for beginning his exhaustive treatment by asking a surprisingly difficult question: Why punish attempts at all? He addresses this inquiry in the context of defending (what he calls) the transfer principle: “If a particular form of conduct is legitimately criminalized, then the attempt to engage in that form of conduct is also legitimately criminalized.” I begin by expressing a few reservations about the transfer principle itself. But my main point is that we are justified (...)
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  10.  60
    Douglas N. Husak (1992). Why Punish the Deserving? Noûs 26 (4):447-464.
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  11.  15
    Douglas Husak (2012). Intoxication and Culpability. Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):363-379.
    I tackle the difficult problem of specifying how voluntary intoxication affects criminal culpability generally and recklessness in particular. I contend that the problem need not be conceptualized as an instance of actio libera in causa, namely the situation in which persons do something at t1 to culpably create the conditions of their own defense at t2. Instead, I argue that we need only consider intoxicated defendants at t2 in order to justify their punishment. In the course of defending my view, (...)
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  12. Douglas N. Husak (1989). Recreational Drugs and Paternalism. Law and Philosophy 8 (3):353 - 381.
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  13.  1
    Douglas N. Husak (1987). Philosophy of Criminal Law. Rowman & Littlefield.
    This volume collects 17 of Douglas Husak's influential essays in criminal law theory. The essays span Husak's original and provocative contributions to the central topics in the field, including the grounds of criminal liability, relative culpability, the role of defences, and the justification of punishment. The volume includes an extended introduction by the author, drawing together the themes of his work, and exploring the goals of criminal theory.
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  14. Douglas Husak (2003). Four Points About Drug Decriminalization. Criminal Justice Ethics 22 (1):21-29.
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  15.  10
    Douglas N. Husak (1995). [Book Review] Drugs and Rights. [REVIEW] Criminal Justice Ethics 14 (1):63-72.
    This important book was the first serious work of philosophy to address the question: Do adults have a moral right to use drugs for recreational purposes? Many critics of the 'war on drugs' denounce law enforcement as counterproductive and ineffective. Douglas Husak argues that the 'war on drugs' violates the moral rights of adults who want to use drugs for pleasure, and that criminal laws against such use are incompatible with moral rights. This is not a polemical tract but a (...)
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  16. Douglas Husak (2003). Legal Paternalism. In LaFollette H. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics. Oxford University Press 387--388.
     
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  17.  18
    Douglas Husak (2014). Social Engineering as an Infringement of the Presumption of Innocence: The Case of Corporate Criminality. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):353-369.
    I examine how deferred-prosecution agreements employed against suspected corporate criminality amount to a form of social engineering that infringes the presumption. I begin with a broad understanding of the presumption itself. Then I offer a brief description of how these agreements function. Finally I address some of the normative issues that must be confronted if legal philosophers who hold retributivist views on punishment and sentencing hope to assess this device. My judgment tends to be favorable. More importantly, I caution against (...)
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  18.  74
    Douglas N. Husak (2000). Liberal Neutrality, Autonomy, and Drug Prohibitions. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (1):43–80.
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  19.  75
    Douglas N. Husak (1981). Paternalism and Autonomy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1):27-46.
  20.  86
    Douglas N. Husak (2004). Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the Criminal Sanction. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 23 (5):437 - 493.
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  21.  30
    Douglas Husak (2008). Why Criminal Law: A Question of Content? [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (2):99-122.
    I take it as obvious that attempts to justify the criminal law must be sensitive to matters of criminalization—to what conduct is proscribed or permitted. I discuss three additional matters that should be addressed in order to justify the criminal law. First, we must have a rough idea of what degree of deviation is tolerable between the set of criminal laws we ought to have and the set we really have. Second, we need information about how the criminal law at (...)
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  22. Douglas Husak (2002). Limitations on Criminalization and the General Part of Criminal Law,”. In Stephen Shute & A. P. Simester (eds.), Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part. Oxford University Press 13--46.
     
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  23.  45
    Douglas Husak (2010). Mistake of Law and Culpability. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2):135-159.
    When does a defendant not deserve punishment because he is unaware that his conduct breaches a penal statute? Retributivists must radically rethink their answer to this question to do justice to our moral intuitions. I suggest that modest progress on this topic can be made by modeling our approach to ignorance of law on our familiar approach to ignorance of fact. We need to distinguish different levels of culpability in given mistakes and to differentiate what such mistakes may be about. (...)
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  24.  86
    Douglas N. Husak (1994). Is Drunk Driving a Serious Offense? Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1):52–73.
  25. Douglas Husak (2011). Beyond the Justification/Excuse Dichotomy. In Rowan Cruft, Matthew H. Kramer & Mark R. Reiff (eds.), Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff. OUP Oxford
     
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  26.  23
    Douglas Husak (2004). Vehicles and Crashes. Social Theory and Practice 30 (3):351-370.
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  27.  49
    Douglas N. Husak (1984). Why There Are No Human Rights. Social Theory and Practice 10 (2):125-141.
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  28.  7
    Douglas N. Husak (1995). The Sequential Principle of Relative Culpability. Legal Theory 1 (4):493-518.
    A rational defense of the criminal law must provide a comprehensive theory of culpability. A comprehensive theory of culpability must resolve several difficult issues; in this article I will focus on only one. The general problem arises from the lack of a systematic account of relative culpability. An account of relative culpability would identify and defend a set of considerations to assess whether, why, under what circumstances, and to what extent persons who perform a criminal act with a given culpable (...)
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  29.  33
    Douglas Husak (2014). In Favor of Drug Decriminalization. In Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher H. Wellman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Wiley Blackwell 22--335.
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  30.  37
    Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas III (1992). Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes. Law and Philosophy 11 (1/2):95 - 126.
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  31.  46
    Douglas Husak (2006). The Complete Guide to Consent to Sex: Alan Wertheimer's Consent to Sexual Relations. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 25 (2):267-287.
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  32.  34
    Douglas N. Husak (1990). “Already Punished Enough”. Philosophical Topics 18 (1):79-99.
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  33.  5
    Douglas Husak (2009). Gardner on the Philosophy of Criminal Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (1):169-187.
    Offences and Defences is an outstanding collection of eleven of John Gardner's previously published papers in the philosophy of criminal law. I briefly examine his views on five central issues: his claims about basic responsibility and whether it should be construed as relational; his positions on agent neutrality; his arguments about whether moral and criminal wrongs are typically strict; his thoughts about the structure of defences, and, finally, what his account of rape reveals about the content of the harm principle.
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  34.  8
    Douglas Husak (1996). The" But-Everyone-Does-That!" Defense. Public Affairs Quarterly 10 (4):307-334.
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  35.  49
    Douglas Husak (2011). Thirty Years of Law and Philosophy. Law and Philosophy 30 (2):141-142.
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  36.  22
    Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas (2001). Rapes Without Rapists: Consent and Reasonable Mistake. Noûs 35 (s1):86 - 117.
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  37.  26
    Douglas N. Husak (1999). Conflicts of Justifications. Law and Philosophy 18 (1):41 - 68.
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  38.  16
    Douglas N. Husak (1989). Motive and Criminal Liability. Criminal Justice Ethics 8 (1):3-14.
  39.  57
    Stephen D. Hudson & Douglas N. Husak (1980). Legal Rights: How Useful is Hohfeldian Analysis? Philosophical Studies 37 (1):45 - 53.
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  40.  12
    Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas (1992). Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes. Law and Philosophy 11 (1):95-126.
  41.  31
    Douglas N. Husak (1980). Omissions, Causation and Liability. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (121):318-326.
  42.  34
    Douglas N. Husak (1979). Ronald Dworkin and the Right to Liberty. [REVIEW] Ethics 90 (1):121 - 130.
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  43.  38
    Douglas N. Husak (1985). What is so Special About [Free] Speech? Law and Philosophy 4 (1):1 - 15.
    Legal and political philosophers (e.g., Scanlon, Schauser, etc.) typically regard speech as special in the sense that conduct that causes harm should be less subject to regulation if it involves speech than if it does not. Though speech is special in legal analysis, I argue that it should not be given comparable status in moral theory. I maintain that most limitations on state authority enacted on behalf of a moral principle of freedom of speech can be retained without supposing that (...)
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  44.  15
    Douglas N. Husak (1985). The Motivation for Human Rights. Social Theory and Practice 11 (2):249-255.
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  45.  36
    Douglas N. Husak (1999). Addiction and Criminal Liability. Law and Philosophy 18 (6):655 - 684.
  46.  17
    Douglas N. Husak (1985). Is the Distinction Between Positive Actions and Omissions Value-Neutral? Tulane Studies in Philosophy 33:83-92.
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  47.  14
    Douglas Husak (2014). Abetting a Crime. Law and Philosophy 33 (1):41-73.
    I focus on the set of problems that arise in identifying both the actus reus and (to an even greater extent) the mens rea needed by an abettor before she should be criminally liable for complicity in a crime. No consensus on these issues has emerged in positive law; commentators are enormously dissatisfied with the decisions courts have reached; and critics disagree radically about what reforms should be implemented to rectify this state of affairs. I explicitly deny that I will (...)
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  48.  2
    Douglas Husak (1998). Require an Act? In Antony Duff (ed.), Philosophy and the Criminal Law: Principle and Critique. Cambridge University Press 60.
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  49.  16
    Douglas Husak (2013). The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Extending the Debates. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2):351-365.
    Larry Alexander and Peter Westen each critically examine different topics from my recent collection of essays, The Philosophy of Criminal Law. Alexander focuses on my “Rapes Without Rapists,” “Mistake of Law and Culpability,” and “Already Punished Enough.” Westen offers a more extended commentary on my “Transferred Intent.” I briefly reply to each critic in turn and try to extend the debates in new directions.
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  50.  12
    Douglas N. Husak (1980). Applied Ethics for Prospective Law Students. Teaching Philosophy 3 (3):301-306.
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