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  1. Douglas Lewis (2007). Spinoza on Having a False Idea. Metaphysica 8 (1):17-27.
    Naturalism pervades Spinoza’s doctrines of The Ethics, but the contours of it often bewilder us. In this light, I consider the account of falsity, or having a false idea, as presented by Spinoza in Proposition thirty_five of the Second Part, its demonstration, and the subsequent note. Based on my interpretation I argue for the claim that his account has coherence and makes sense. Further, I examine the significance of what Spinoza says about falsity for comprehension of his philosophy overall, especially (...)
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  2. Douglas Lewis (2003). Locke and the Problem of Slavery. Teaching Philosophy 26 (3):261-282.
  3. Douglas Lewis (1999). Marie de Gournay and the Engendering of Equality. Teaching Philosophy 22 (1):53-76.
  4. Lisa Bergin, Douglas Lewis, Michelle Martinez, Anne Phibbs & Pauline Sargent (1998). Black Elk Speaks, John Locke Listens, and the Students Write. Teaching Philosophy 21 (1):35-59.
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  5. Douglas Lewis (1977). On the Aims and Method of Spinoza's Philosophy. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):217-234.
  6. Douglas Lewis (1976). Spinoza on Extension. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1 (1):26-31.
  7. Christopher Aronson & Douglas Lewis (1970). Locke on Mixed Modes, Knowledge, and Substances. Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (2):193-199.
  8. Douglas Lewis (1970). Some Problems of Perceptions. Philosophy of Science 37 (March):100-113.
    Many philosophers have maintained that secondary qualities are private mental entities. In this paper I use the discussions of H. A. Prichard, Berkeley and G. E. Moore on the status of secondary qualities to bring out the assumptions that underlie this view. One of these is that secondary qualities are particular. I show that Prichard holds these assumptions and then I attempt to diagnose why he holds them. In the course of this diagnosis I explore several senses of 'dependent' which (...)
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  9. Douglas Lewis (1969). Quality Individuals? Review of Metaphysics 23 (1):114 - 122.
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  10. Douglas Lewis (1969). The Existence of Substances and Locke's Way of Ideas. Theoria 35 (2):124-146.
  11. L. C. Holborow, Laird Addis & Douglas Lewis (1967). Moore and Ryle: Two Ontologists. Philosophical Quarterly 17 (67):175.
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  12. Laird Addis & Douglas Lewis (eds.) (1965). Ayer and Moore: Two Ontologists. University of Iowa Press.
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  13. Douglas Lewis (1965). Moore's Realism. In Laird Addis & Douglas Lewis (eds.), Ayer and Moore: Two Ontologists. University of Iowa Press.
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  14. Douglas Lewis (1964). 'Good' and Naturalistic Definitions. Analysis 24 (4):144 - 147.
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