Whether any beliefs are justified nonempirically is important in a debate with sceptics who deny empirical justification, if the parties involved in the debate claim that their position is justified. Sceptics must assume that their premises are justified nonempirically, to avoid begging the question. The main problem with advocating nonempirical justification is that accounts tend to be either too niggardly or too generous, implying either that nonempirical justification is impossible or that peer adversaries must be equally justified. The way to (...) solve this problem is to recognize that justification involves satisfying two conditions: having reason to hold a belief and having a ground for being confident about one's reason. The reason can be nonempirical even though the ground is almost always empirical. This distinction can be used to resolve a number of familiar concerns. (shrink)
Applying truth-conditions to sentences about the world seems to generate paradoxes unless their application is restricted. We can avoid such restrictions by refusing to apply logical laws to sentences the truth-values of which cannot possibly be established by applying truth-conditions. Such a refusal is reasonable, since the point of logic is to help us make justified truth claims. And the basis for the refusal allows us to avoid a surprisingly wide range of contradictions, without having to exclude more than we (...) want. (shrink)
Almeder effectively defends his view that justification entails truth against some earlier objections and offers new arguments for the entailment. Although the arguments make clear that truth claims depend on justification claims, They still fail to establish an entailment.
Descartes' attempt to avoid the charge of circularity is unconvincing, And more recent efforts by scholars such as frankfurt and kenny to defend him on this point have not been entirely successful. The only way to remove the circle is to replace the search for perfect knowledge by a search for knowledge that is less than perfect, Yet not obviously attainable. Philosophers can then defend knowledge claims against metaphysical doubts without fear of having to beg the question, Indeed can even (...) adopt the cartesian principle that defending knowledge claims is impossible without engaging in this type of epistemology. (shrink)
EVEN IF ’MIRACLE’ MEANS A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE, A CASE CAN BE MADE FOR THINKING THAT MIRACLES ARE POSSIBLE, DETECTABLE, AND COMPATIBLE WITH SCIENCE. THE CASE WORKS BY DEFINING A LAW-VIOLATION AS AN EVENT OF A KIND THAT IS EPISTEMICALLY IMPOSSIBLE UNLESS THERE IS GOOD EVIDENCE OF A GOD’S PRODUCING AN INSTANCE. HUMAN AND NON-HUMAN OBJECTIONS ARE CONSIDERED AND ANSWERED.
Some moral philosophers, Such as ross and moore, Think that, Whereas we can be sure of limited judgments concerning "prima facie" duties and intrinsic values, We cannot be sure of judgments of rightness or wrongness. Two arguments for this type of scepticism are examined. The first works only if we assume, With ross, That '"prima facie" duty' is a moral notion, Not an epistemic notion. The second works only if we assume that there is no difference between uncertainty about a (...) moral judgment and uncertainty about the evidence that bears on the judgment. Since neither assumption is sound, Neither argument works. (shrink)