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Profile: Fred Dretske (Duke University)
  1. Fred Dretske (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  2. Fred Dretske (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning by viewing meaning as (...)
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  3. Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  4. Fred Dretske (2002). A Recipe for Thought. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Minds and Machines. OUP Usa
     
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  5. Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  6. Fred Dretske (1986). Misrepresentation. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press 17--36.
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  7. Fred Dretske (1993). Conscious Experience. Mind 102 (406):263-283.
  8. Fred I. Dretske (1977). Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
    It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are (...)
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  9. Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1 – 22.
  10. Fred Dretske (2006). Perception Without Awareness. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 147--180.
  11.  72
    Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
  12. Fred Dretske (2003). Experience as Representation. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
  13. Fred Dretske (2005). Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against Closure. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 13-26.
     
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  14. Fred Dretske (2010). What We See : The Texture of Conscious Experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press
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  15. Fred Dretske (1981). The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.
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  16. Fred Dretske (2000). Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
  17.  81
    Fred Dretske (1983). Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):55-90.
    A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the (...)
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  18. Fred I. Dretske (2005). ``The Case Against Closure". In M. Steup & Earnest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell 13--25.
     
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  19. Fred Dretske (2007). What Change Blindness Teaches About Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):215–220.
  20. Fred Dretske (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years. The two areas combine to lay the groundwork for a naturalistic philosophy of mind. The fifteen essays focus on perception, knowledge, and consciousness. Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske's work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links which can be made between the two. The first section (...)
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  21. Fred I. Dretske (1972). Contrastive Statements. Philosophical Review 81 (4):411-437.
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  22. Fred Dretske (2012). Chris Hill's Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 161 (3):497-502.
    Chris Hill’s consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9812-4 Authors Fred Dretske, 212 Selkirk, Durham, NC 27707, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  23. Fred Dretske (1996). Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia? Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.
  24.  58
    Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
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  25.  6
    Fred Dretske (2005). Reply to Hawthorne. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 43--46.
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  26. Fred Dretske (1989). Reasons and Causes. Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.
  27. Fred Dretske (1994). If You Can't Make One, You Don't Know How It Works. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):468-482.
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  28.  20
    Fred I. Dretske (1970). ``Epistemic Operators". Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  29. Fred Dretske (1999). The Mind's Awareness of Itself. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-24.
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  30. Fred Dretske (2006). Information and Closure. Erkenntnis 64 (3):409 - 413.
    Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph Jäger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a way that makes an (...)
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  31. Fred Dretske (2003). How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate 1--14.
  32. Fred Dretske (2004). Change Blindness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.
  33. Fred Dretske (2004). Externalism and Modest Contextualism. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):173 - 186.
    Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes (...)
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  34.  88
    Fred Dretske (1980). The Intentionality of Cognitive States. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):281-294.
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  35.  87
    Fred Dretske (1994). Introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:263-278.
  36. Fred Dretske & JeeLoo Liu, The Nature of Consciousness Handout.
    ___ (i) There is a difference between hearing Clyde play the piano and seeing him play the piano. ___ (ii) A perceptual belief that he is playing the piano must also be distinguished from a perceptual experience of this same event.
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  37. Fred Dretske (2004). Knowing What You Think Vs. Knowing That You Think It. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter
  38. Fred Dretske (2006). Representation, Teleosemantics, and the Problem of Self-Knowledge. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press
  39. Fred Dretske (1999). Mental Causation. In Kevin A. Stoehr (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr 81-88.
    Materialist explanations of cause and effect tend to embrace epiphenomenalism. Those who try to avoid epiphenomenalism tend to deny either the extrinsicness of meaning or the intrinsicness of causality. I argue that to deny one or the other is equally implausible. Rather, I prefer a different strategy: accept both premises, but deny that epiphenomenalism is necessarily the conclusion. This strategy is available because the premises do not imply the conclusion without the help of an additional premise—namely, that behavior explained by (...)
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  40. Fred Dretske (1996). Reply to Commentators: [Horwich, Biro, Kim, Lara]. Philosophical Issues 7:179-183.
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  41. Fred Dretske (1997). What Good is Consciousness? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):1-15.
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  42.  28
    Fred Dretske (2013). Challenging Closure: Is It A Way To Answer The Skeptic? The Harvard Review of Philosophy 19:61-68.
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  43. Fred I. Dretske (1964). Particular Reidentification. Philosophy of Science 31 (2):133-142.
    A certain dilemma is inherent in relational accounts of space and time. If any objects endure through change, then temporal elements other than relations are required to describe them. If, on the other hand, no objects endure through change, no permanent reference system is available in terms of which to define the "same place" at different times. An argument which, by exploiting this latter difficulty, attempts to show that "objects with some endurance through time" must be accepted as fundamental is (...)
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  44.  87
    Fred Dretske (1985). Machines and the Mental. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59 (1):23-33.
  45.  28
    Fred Dretske (1999). Mental Causation. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999 (7):81-88.
    Materialist explanations of cause and effect tend to embrace epiphenomenalism. Those who try to avoid epiphenomenalism tend to deny either the extrinsicness of meaning or the intrinsicness of causality. I argue that to deny one or the other is equally implausible. Rather, I prefer a different strategy: accept both premises, but deny that epiphenomenalism is necessarily the conclusion. This strategy is available because the premises do not imply the conclusion without the help of an additional premise—namely, that behavior explained by (...)
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  46. Fred Dretske (1995). Are Experiences Conscious? In Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press
  47. Fred Dretske (1973). Perception and Other Minds. Noûs 7 (March):34-44.
    We ordinarily speak of being able to see that there are people on the bus, Students in the class, And children playing in the street. If human beings are understood to be conscious entities, Then one of our ways of knowing that there are other conscious entities in the world besides ourselves is by seeing that there are. We also speak of seeing that he is angry, She is depressed, And so on. It is argued that this is, Indeed, One (...)
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  48. Fred Dretske (2003). Externalism and Self-Knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press
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  49. Fred Dretske (2004). Psychological Vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):167-177.
    Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and structuring causes, events that cause a triggering cause to produce its effect. Moving the mouse is the triggering cause of cursor movement; hardware and programming conditions are the structuring causes of cursor movement. I use this distinction to show how representational facts can be structuring causes of behavior even though (...)
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  50. Fred I. Dretske (1999). Machines, Plants and Animals: The Origins of Agency. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (1):523-535.
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