Search results for 'Dualism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Martina Fürst (2014). A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts. In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge 112-135.
    The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of (...)
     
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  2. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Descartes's Independence Conception of Substance and His Separability Argument for Substance Dualism. Journal of Philosophical Research 39:165-190.
    I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is unacceptably strong. (...)
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    Terence Rajivan Edward (2015). Cartesian Dualism and the Study of Cultural Artefacts. E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 22 (2):12-18.
    This paper evaluates an argument according to which many anthropologists commit themselves to Cartesian dualism, when they talk about meanings. This kind of dualism, it is argued, makes it impossible for anthropologists to adequately attend to material artefacts. The argument is very original, but it is also vulnerable to a range of objections.
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  4. Henry P. Stapp (2005). Quantum Interactive Dualism - an Alternative to Materialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (11):43-58.
    _René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the_ _mind of a human being and some of the matter located in his or her brain. Isaac Newton_ _subsequently formulated a physical theory based exclusively on the material/physical_ _part of Descartes’ ontology. Newton’s theory enforced the principle of the causal closure_ _of the physical, and the classical physics that grew out of it enforces this same principle._ _This classical theory purports to give, in principle, a complete deterministic (...)
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  5. William G. Lycan (2013). Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
    It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
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  6. Henry P. Stapp (2006). Quantum Interactive Dualism: An Alternative to Materialism. Zygon 41 (3):599-615.
    René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the mind of a human being and some of the matter located in his or her brain. Isaac Newton subsequently formulated a physical theory based exclusively on the material/physical part of Descartes’ ontology. Newton’s theory enforced the principle of the causal closure of the physical, and the classical physics that grew out of it enforces this same principle. This classical theory purports to give, in principle, a complete deterministic (...)
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  7. E. J. Lowe (2006). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.
    Non-Cartesian substance dualism maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. A (...)
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  8. Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones (2013). Solitude Without Souls: Why Peter Unger Hasn't Established Substance Dualism. Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.
    Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s (...)
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  9. Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
    The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness. .) (...)
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  10.  15
    Jason Megill (2015). A Metaphysical Dilemma for Dualism. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4):913-926.
    Resumo Os Qualia, ou são “entidades espaciais” – ou seja, estão localizados no espaço como os objectos físicos –, ou não são “entidades espaciais”. Então, o dualismo deve alegar que ou os qualia não-físicos são entidades espaciais, ou que eles não o são. Contudo, qualquer resposta é problemática. Se os qualia não-físicos não são entidades espaciais, então, é difícil de conceber como podem ser atribuídos a cérebros particulares, individualizados uns dos outros, e assim por diante. Mas se os qualia não-físicos (...)
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  11. Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). Chalmers' Conceivability Argument for Dualism. Analysis 61 (3):187-193.
    In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism , is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt.
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  12. Henry P. Stapp (2006). Quantum Interactive Dualism, II: The Libet and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Causal Anomalies. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 65 (1):117-142.
    b>: Replacing faulty nineteenth century physics by its orthodox quantum successor converts the earlier materialist conception of nature to a structure that does not enforce the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The quantum laws possess causal gaps, and these gaps are filled in actual scientific practice by inputs from our streams of consciousness. The form of the quantum laws permits and suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but on psychophysical events, (...)
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  13. Thomas Kroedel (2015). Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem. Noûs 49 (2):357-375.
    The paper argues that dualism can explain mental causation and solve the exclusion problem. If dualism is combined with the assumption that the psychophysical laws have a special status, it follows that some physical events counterfactually depend on, and are therefore caused by, mental events. Proponents of this account of mental causation can solve the exclusion problem in either of two ways: they can deny that it follows that the physical effect of a mental event is overdetermined by (...)
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  14. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Undefeated Dualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By (...)
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  15. Tim Crane (2000). Dualism, Monism, Physicalism. Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85.
    Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism. It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism , but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science. A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both of the following senses: it must identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena or it must give an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms . There is (...)
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  16. Terence Rajivan Edward (2012). The Dualism of Conceptual Scheme and Undifferentiated Reality. E-Logos 19:2-8.
    This paper evaluates a form of dualism, which is referred to here as the dualism of conceptual scheme and undifferentiated reality. According to this dualism, although reality appears to be divided into distinct things from the perspective of our system of concepts, it is actually not. I justify the view that this dualism is incoherent.
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  17.  42
    Paul L. Allen (2013). An Augustinian Philosopher Between Dualism and Materialism: Ernan McMullin on Human Emergence. Zygon 48 (2):294-304.
    In claiming the independence of theology from science, Ernan McMullin nevertheless saw the danger of separating these disciplines on questions of mutual significance, as his accompanying article “Biology and the Theology of the Human” in this edition of Zygon shows. This paper analyzes McMullin's adoption of emergence as a qualified endorsement of a view that avoids the excesses of both dualism and materialism. I argue that McMullin's distinctive contribution is the conceptual clarification of emergence in the light of a (...)
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  18.  53
    Hao Tang (2014). Wittgenstein and the Dualism of the Inner and the Outer. Synthese 191 (14):3173-3194.
    A dualism characteristic of modern philosophy is the conception of the inner and the outer as two independently intelligible domains. Wittgenstein’s attack on this dualism contains deep insights. The main insight (excavated from §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations) is this: our sensory consciousness is deeply shaped by language and this shaping plays a fundamental role in the etiology of the dualism. I locate this role in the learning of a sensation-language (as described in §244), by (...)
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  19. Xinli Wang (2012). Alternative Conceptual Schemes and A Non-Kantian Scheme-Content Dualism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:267-275.
    D. Davidson argues that the existence of alternative conceptual schemes presupposes the Kantian scheme -content dualism, which requires a scheme -neutral empirical content and a fixed, sharp schemecontent distinction. The dismantlement of such a Kantian scheme -content dualism, which Davidson calls “the third dogma of empiricism”, would render the notion of alternative conceptual schemes groundless. To counter Davidson’s attack on the notion of alternative conceptual schemes, I argue that alternative conceptual schemes neither entail nor presuppose the Kantian scheme (...)
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  20.  49
    Edward Slingerland & Maciej Chudek (2011). The Prevalence of Mind–Body Dualism in Early China. Cognitive Science 35 (5):997-1007.
    We present the first large-scale, quantitative examination of mind and body concepts in a set of historical sources by measuring the predictions of folk mind–body dualism against the surviving textual corpus of pre-Qin (pre-221 BCE) China. Our textual analysis found clear patterns in the historically evolving reference of the word xin (heart/heart–mind): It alone of the organs was regularly contrasted with the physical body, and during the Warring States period it became less associated with emotions and increasingly portrayed as (...)
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  21. Nicholas Everitt (2000). Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence. Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347.
    Substance dualism, that most unpopular of current theories of mind, continues to find interesting and able defenders.1 I shall focus on one set of arguments supplied by one of the current defenders, and I shall argue that these arguments fail. That in itself is a matter of some interest, since it is always reassuring to be able to demonstrate that unpopular doctrines are rightly unpopular. But I hope that a further interest will attach to the refutation, in that it (...)
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  22.  42
    Steven M. Duncan, Objections to Dualism.
    In this essay, I discuss the standard objections to substance dualism and conclude that they are far less formidable than is usually supposed.
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  23.  35
    Eric Yang (2015). The Compatibility of Property Dualism and Substance Materialism. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3211-3219.
    Several philosophers have argued that property dualism and substance materialism are incompatible positions. Recently, Susan Schneider has provided a novel version of such an argument, claiming that the incompatibility will be evident once we examine some underlying metaphysical issues. She purports to show that on any account of substance and property-possession, substance materialism and property dualism turn out incompatible. In this paper, I argue that Schneider’s case for incompatibility between these two positions fails. After briefly laying out her (...)
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  24. Uwe Meixner (2004). The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psychophysical Dualism. Mentis.
    This book is intended as a comprehensive defense of psycho-physical dualism. It gives answers to the question of what dualism may consist in, and inquires into the broadly cultural motivation behind accepting dualism or its opponent physicalism. Arguments for dualism, among them strengthened versions of the famous classical arguments, are presented and defended against objections. Moreover, the various general objections to dualism are criticized in detail, for example, the allegation that dualism is of an (...)
     
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  25.  23
    John Foster (1991). The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind. Routledge.
    Dualism argues that the mind is more than just the brain. It holds that there exists two very different realms, one mental and the other physical. Both are fundamental and one cannot be reduced to the other - there are minds and there is a physical world. This book examines and defends the most famous dualist account of the mind, the cartesian, which attributes the immaterial contents of the mind to an immaterial self. John Foster's new book exposes the (...)
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  26. Gordon Baker & Katherine Morris (1995). Descartes' Dualism. Routledge.
    Was Descartes a Cartesian Dualist? In this controversial study, Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris argue that, despite the general consensus within philosophy, Descartes was neither a proponent of dualism nor guilty of the many crimes of which he has been accused by twentieth century philosophers. In lively and engaging prose, Baker and Morris present a radical revision of the ways in which Descartes' work has been interpreted. Descartes emerges with both his historical importance assured and his philosophical importance (...)
     
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  27.  9
    Friedrich Beck, Carl Johnson, Franz von Kutschera, E. Jonathan Lowe, Uwe Meixner, David S. Oderberg, Ian J. Thompson & Henry Wellman (2008). Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Lexington Books.
    Until quite recently, mind-body dualism has been regarded with deep suspicion by both philosophers and scientists. This has largely been due to the widespread identification of dualism in general with one particular version of it: the interactionist substance dualism of Réné Descartes. This traditional form of dualism has, ever since its first formulation in the seventeenth century, attracted numerous philosophical objections and is now almost universally rejected in scientific circles as empirically inadequate. During the last few (...)
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  28. Robert Francescotti (2001). Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism? Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.
    Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, accepting (...)
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  29.  80
    Emmett L. Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229-56.
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism . In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately.
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  30.  65
    Igor Gasparov (2013). Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1):109-123.
    n this paper I would like to defend the three interconnected claims. The first one is based on that fact that the definition of substance dualism proposed recently by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of this doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for the genuine substance dualism in contrast to quasi-dualisms and provide the definition for the genuine substance dualism which I consider to be more appropriate (...)
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  31. John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Jeffrey K. McDonough (1998). Numbers, Minds, and Bodies: A Fresh Look at Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):349-371.
    In this essay, we explore a fresh avenue into mind-body dualism by considering a seemingly distant question posed by Frege: "Why is it absurd to suppose that Julius Caesar is a number?". The essay falls into three main parts. In the first, through an exploration of Frege’s Julius Caesar problem, we attempt to expose two maxims applicable to the mind-body problem. In the second part, we draw on those maxims in arguing that “full blown dualism” is preferable to (...)
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  32. Andrew Botterell (2003). The Property Dualism Argument Against Physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.
    Many contemporary philosophers of mind are concerned to defend a thesis called a posteriori physicalism. This thesis has two parts, one metaphysical, and the other epistemological. The metaphysical part of the thesis—the physicalist part—is the claim that the psychological nature of the actual world is wholly physical. The epistemological part of the thesis—the a posteriori part—is the claim that no a priori connection holds between psychological nature and physical nature. Despite its attractiveness, however, a familiar argument alleges that a posteriori (...)
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  33.  93
    David S. Oderberg (2005). Hylemorphic Dualism. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):70-99.
    To the extent that dualism is even taken to be a serious option in contemporary discussions of personal identity and the philosophy of mind, it is almost exclusively either Cartesian dualism or property dualism that is considered. The more traditional dualism defended by Aristotelians and Thomists, what I call hylemorphic dualism, has only received scattered attention. In this essay I set out the main lines of the hylemorphic dualist position, with particular reference to personal identity. (...)
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  34. Corbin Collins (1997). Searle on Consciousness and Dualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):15-33.
    In this article, I examine and criticize John Searle's account of the relation between mind and body. Searle rejects dualism and argues that the traditional mind-body problem has a 'simple solution': mental phenomena are both caused by biological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. More precisely, mental states and events are macro-properties of neurons in much the same way that solidity and liquidity are macro-properties of molecules. However, Searle also maintains that the mental is (...)
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  35.  42
    Yrjö Haila (2000). Beyond the Nature-Culture Dualism. Biology and Philosophy 15 (2):155-175.
    It is commonly accepted that thewestern view of humanity's place in nature isdominated by a dualistic opposition between nature andculture. Historically this has arisen fromexternalization of nature in both productive andcognitive practices; instances of such externalizationhave become generalized. I think the dualism can bedecomposed by identifying dominant elements in eachparticular instantiation and showing that their strictseparation evaporates under close scrutiny. The philosophical challenge this perspective presents isto substitute concrete socioecological analysis forfoundational metaphysics. A review of majorinterpretations of the history (...)
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  36. D. Jehle (2006). Kim Against Dualism. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):565-78.
    This paper presents and evaluates Jaegwon Kim’s recent argument against substance dualism. The argument runs as follows. Causal interaction between two entities requires pairing relations. Pairing relations are spatial relations, such as distance and orientation. Souls are supposedly nonspatial, immaterial substances. So it is hard to see how souls could enter into paired causal relations with material substances. I show that Kim’s argument against dualism fails. I conclude by sketching a way the substance dualist could meet Kim’s central (...)
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  37. Fiona Macpherson (2006). Property Dualism and the Merits of Solutions to the Mind-Body Problem: A Reply to Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):72-89.
    This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a (...)
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  38. Daniel Stoljar & Christian List, Does the Exclusion Argument Put Any Pressure on Dualism?
    The exclusion argument is widely thought to put considerable pressure on dualism if not to refute it outright. We argue to the contrary that, whether or not their position is ultimately true, dualists have a plausible response. The response focuses on the notion of ‘distinctness’ as it occurs in the argument: if 'distinctness' is understood one way, the exclusion principle on which the argument is founded can be denied by the dualist; if it is understood another way, the argument (...)
     
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  39.  25
    Jeff Engelhardt (2015). Property Reductive Emergent Dualism. Philosophia 43 (1):63-75.
    This paper sketches and motivates a metaphysics of mind that is both substance dualist and, to a large extent, property reductive. Call it “property reductive emergent dualism”. Section “Emergent Dualism” gives the broad outlines of the view. Sections “Problems of Mental Causation” and “Theoretical Virtues” argue that it can claim several advantages over non-reductive physicalist theories of mind. Section “Problems of Mental Causation” considers metaphysical challenges to mental causation in detail. Section “Theoretical Virtues” considers overall theoretical virtues: ontological (...)
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  40. Cecilia Wee & Michael Pelczar (2008). Descartes' Dualism and Contemporary Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):145-160.
    After drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism -- numerical dualism (defined in terms of identity) and modal dualism (defined in terms of supervenience) -- we argue that Descartes is a numerical dualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes' views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is commonly assumed.
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  41.  16
    Neeta Mehta (2011). Mind-Body Dualism: A Critique From a Health Perspective. Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):202-209.
    Philosophical theory about the nature of human beings has far reaching consequences on our understanding of various issues faced by them. Once taken as self-evident, it becomes the foundation on which knowledge gets built. The cause of concern is that this theoretical framework rarely gets questioned despite its inherent limitations and self-defeating consequences, leading to crisis in the concerned field. The field, which is facing crisis today, is that of medicine, and the paradigmatic stance that is responsible for the crisis (...)
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  42.  65
    Kirk Ludwig (2013). The Argument for Subject‐Body Dualism From Transtemporal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):684-701.
    Martine Nida-Rümelin has argued recently for subject-body dualism on the basis of reflections on the possibility of survival in fission cases from the literature on personal identity. The argument focuses on the claim that there is a factual difference between the claims that one or the other of two equally good continuers of a person in a fission case is identical with her. I consider three interpretations of the notion of a factual difference that the argument employs, and I (...)
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  43. Marleen Rozemond (1995). Descartes's Case for Dualism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1):29-63.
    Descartes's dualism, and his argument for it, are often understood in terms of the modal notion of separability. I argue that the central notions, substance and real distinction, should not be understood this way. Descartes's well-known argument for dualism relies implicitly on views he spells out in the Principles of Philosophy, where he explains that a substance has a nature that consists in a single attribute, and all its qualities are modes of that nature. The argument relies ultimately (...)
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  44.  88
    John A. Foster (1993). Dennett's Rejection of Dualism. Inquiry 36 (1-2):17-31.
    In Consciousness Explained, Dennett elaborates and defends a materialist?functionalist account of the human mind, and of consciousness in particular. This defence depends crucially on his prior rejection of dualism. Dennett rejects this dualist alternative on three grounds: first, that its version of mind?to?body causation is in conflict with what we know, or have good reason to believe, from the findings of physical science; second, that the very notion of dualistic psychophysical causation is incoherent; and third, that dualism puts (...)
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  45.  65
    Wolfram Hinzen (2006). Dualism and the Atoms of Thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (9):25-55.
    Contemporary arguments for forms of psycho-physical dualism standardly depart from phenomenal aspects of consciousness. Conceptual aspects of conscious experience, as opposed to phenomenal or visual/perceptual ones, are often taken to be within the scope of functionalist, reductionist, or physicalist theories. I argue that the particular conceptual structure of human consciousness makes this asymmetry unmotivated. The argument for a form of dualism defended here proceeds from the empirical premise that conceptual structure in a linguistic creature like us is a (...)
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  46.  11
    Liam P. Dempsey (2009). Thinking-Matter Then and Now: The Evolution of Mind-Body Dualism. History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (1):43 - 61.
    Since the seventeenth century, mind-body dualism has undergone an evolution, both in its metaphysics and its supporting arguments. In particular, debates in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England prepared the way for the fall of substance dualism—the view that the human mind is an immaterial substance capable of independent existence—and the rise of a much less radical property dualism. The evolution from the faltering plausibility of substance dualism to the growing appeal of property dualism depended on at (...)
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  47.  4
    Christopher Tyler (2015). The Emergent Dualism View of Quantum Physics and Consciousness. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 11 (2):97-114.
    This paper introduces the ontology of Emergent Dualism, which takes the position that the elementary stuff of everything in the universe is energy, that this energy can become structured into a series of levels of emergent organization whose operating principles are not derivable from the previous levels, that one of these levels is the concatenations of neural processes called brains, that brains have some particular emergent process that gives rise to subjective experience from the internal viewpoint of that process, (...)
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  48.  49
    Ludwig van den Hauwe (2011). Hayek, Gödel, and the Case for Methodological Dualism. Journal of Economic Methodology 18 (4):387-407.
    On a few occasions F.A. Hayek made reference to the famous Gödel theorems in mathematical logic in the context of expounding his cognitive and social theory. The exact meaning of the supposed relationship between Gödel's theorems and the essential proposition of Hayek's theory of mind remains subject to interpretation, however. The author of this article argues that the relationship between Hayek's thesis that the human brain can never fully explain itself and the essential insight provided by Gödel's theorems in mathematical (...)
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  49.  81
    Tim van Gelder (1998). Monism, Dualism, Pluralism. Mind and Language 13 (1):76-97.
    1. Consider the basic outlines of the mind-body debate as it is found in contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The central question is “whether mental phenomena are physical phenomena, and if not, how they relate to physical phenomena.”1 Over the centuries, a wide range of possible solutions to this problem have emerged. These are the various “isms” familiar to any student of the debate: Cartesian dualism, idealism, epiphenomenalism, central state materialism, non- reductive physicalism, anomalous monism, and so forth. Each purports (...)
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    Jay F. Rosenberg (1988). On Not Knowing What or Who One Is: Reflections on the Intelligibility of Dualism. Topoi 7 (March):57-63.
    Beginning with Descartes' caution not “imprudently” to “take some other object in place of myself”, I consider first the problems of self-identification confronted by various amnesiacs , both ordinary and Cartesian. Noting that cogitationes as such do not individuate, I proceed to examine conclusions drawn from certain sorts of “body-switching” thought experiments. This, in turn, gives rise to a general critique of “psychological connectedness” or “unity of consciousness” as a candidate criterion of personal identity. I conclude that our ability to (...)
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