Search results for 'Duane Elgin' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  12
    Duane Elgin (2000). The Paradigm of a Living Universe. World Futures 55 (1):15-36.
    A new perceptual paradigm is emerging that views the universe as a living system that is being regenerated in its totality moment by moment. Scientific evidence for this view is presented as well as complementary insights from the world's spiritual traditions. The implications of this view of reality for our sense of identity, way of living, and evolutionary purpose are considered.
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  2.  5
    Duane Elgin (2000). Promise Ahead: A Vision of Hope and Action for Humanity's Future. W. Morrow.
    Outlines four emerging "opportunity trends," including voluntary simplicity, that readers can utilize to surmount social, economic, and environmental challenges ...
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  3. Catherine Z. Elgin (1998). Catherine Z. Elgin. In Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions. Blackwell 26.
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  4.  1
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). Considered Judgement. Mind 109 (434):334-337.
    Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment, she (...)
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  5.  20
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1997). Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary. Cornell University Press.
    In Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary, Catherine Z. Elgin maps a constructivist alternative to the standard Anglo-American conception of philosophy's ...
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  6.  55
    Nelson Goodman & Catherine Z. Elgin (1986). Interpretation and Identity: Can the Work Survive the World? Critical Inquiry 12 (3):564-575.
    Predictions concerning the end of the world have proven less reliable than your broker’s recommendations or your fondest hopes. Whether you await the end fearfully or eagerly, you may rest assured that it will never come—not because the world is everlasting but because it has already ended, if indeed it ever began. But we need not mourn, for the world is indeed well lost, and with it the stultifying stereotypes of absolutism: the absurd notions of science as the effort to (...)
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  7. Catherine Elgin (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  8.  26
    Catherine Elgin (1996). Considered Judgment. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
    The book contains a unique epistemological position that deserves serious consideration by specialists in the subject."--Bruce Aune, University of Massachusetts.
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  9. Catherine Z. Elgin (2004). True Enough. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.
    Truth is standardly considered a requirement on epistemic acceptability. But science and philosophy deploy models, idealizations and thought experiments that prescind from truth to achieve other cognitive ends. I argue that such felicitous falsehoods function as cognitively useful fictions. They are cognitively useful because they exemplify and afford epistemic access to features they share with the relevant facts. They are falsehoods in that they diverge from the facts. Nonetheless, they are true enough to serve their epistemic purposes. Theories that contain (...)
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  10. Catherine Elgin (2007). Understanding and the Facts. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):33 - 42.
    If understanding is factive, the propositions that express an understanding are true. I argue that a factive conception of understanding is unduly restrictive. It neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. For science uses idealizations and models that do not mirror the facts. Strictly speaking, they are false. By appeal to exemplification, I devise a more generous, flexible conception of understanding that accommodates science, reflects our practices, and shows a sufficient but not slavish sensitivity (...)
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  11. Mehmet Elgin (2006). There May Be Strict Empirical Laws in Biology, After All. Biology and Philosophy 21 (1):119-134.
    This paper consists of four parts. Part 1 is an introduction. Part 2 evaluates arguments for the claim that there are no strict empirical laws in biology. I argue that there are two types of arguments for this claim and they are as follows: (1) Biological properties are multiply realized and they require complex processes. For this reason, it is almost impossible to formulate strict empirical laws in biology. (2) Generalizations in biology hold contingently but laws go beyond describing contingencies, (...)
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  12. Catherine Elgin (2006). From Knowledge to Understanding. In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press 199--215.
     
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  13. Mehmet Elgin & Elliott Sober (2002). Cartwright on Explanation and Idealization. Erkenntnis 57 (3):441 - 450.
    Nancy Cartwright (1983, 1999) argues that (1) the fundamental laws of physics are true when and only when appropriate ceteris paribus modifiers are attached and that (2) ceteris paribus modifiers describe conditions that are almost never satisfied. She concludes that when the fundamental laws of physics are true, they don't apply in the real world, but only in highly idealized counterfactual situations. In this paper, we argue that (1) and (2) together with an assumption about contraposition entail the opposite conclusion (...)
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  14.  25
    Catherine Elgin (2005). Non-Foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 156--67.
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  15.  28
    Catherine Elgin (2009). ``Is Understanding Factive?". In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 322--30.
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  16.  5
    Catherine Z. Elgin (forthcoming). Nominalism, Realism and Objectivity. Synthese:1-16.
    I argue that constructive nominalism is preferable to scientific realism. Rather than reflecting without distortion the way the mind-independent world is, theories refract. They provide an understanding of the world as modulated by a particular theory. Truth is defined within a theoretical framework rather than outside of it. This does not undermine objectivity, for an assertion contains a reference to the framework in terms of which its truth is claimed.
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  17. C. Z. Elgin (2008). Emotion and Understanding. In G. Brun, U. Dogluoglu & D. Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions.
  18. Mehmet Elgin (2003). Biology and a Priori Laws. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1380--1389.
    In this paper, I investigate the nature of a priori biological laws in connection with the idea that laws must be empirical. I argue that the epistemic functions of a priori biological laws in biology are the same as those of empirical laws in physics. Thus, the requirement that laws be empirical is idle in connection with how laws operate in science. This result presents a choice between sticking with an unmotivated philosophical requirement and taking the functional equivalence of laws (...)
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  19.  49
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2008). Trustworthiness. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):371-387.
    I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs are often valuable. Such beliefs can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such a belief is (...)
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  20. Catherine Z. Elgin (2010). Keeping Things in Perspective. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 150 (3):439 - 447.
    Scientific realism holds that scientific representations are utterly objective. They describe the way the world is, independent of any point of view. In Scientific Representation, van Fraassen argues otherwise. If science is to afford an understanding of nature, it must be grounded in evidence. Since evidence is perspectivai, science cannot vindicate its claims using only utterly objective representations. For science to do its epistemic job, it must involve perspectivai representations. I explicate this argument and show its power.
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  21.  37
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2002). Art in the Advancement of Understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):1 - 12.
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  22. Mehmet Elgin (2003). Biology and A Priori Laws. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1380-1389.
    Abstract: In this paper, my main objective is to investigate the nature of a priori biological laws in connection with the idea that laws must be empirical. I argue that functions of so-called a priori biological laws in biological sciences are the same as those of empirical physical laws. Thus, the requirement of being empirical makes no difference how laws operate in sciences. This result presents us a choice between sticking with a philosophical requirement of laws being empirical or taking (...)
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  23. Catherine Z. Elgin (2001). The Legacy of Nelson Goodman. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):679-690.
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  24.  84
    Mehmet Elgin (2008). Theory-Laden Observation and Incommensurability. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 15 (1):3-19.
    In this paper, I investigate the logical relation between two claims: observations are theory-laden1 and there is no empirical common ground upon which to evaluate successive scientific theories that belong to different paradigms. I, first, construct an argument where is the main premise and is the conclusion. I argue that the term „theory-laden” has three distinct senses: semantic, psychological and epistemic. If ‘theory-laden’ is understood in either epistemic or psychological senses, then the conclusion becomes a claim about people. If incommensurability (...)
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  25. Catherine Z. Elgin (2010). Persistent Disagreement. In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. OUP Oxford
     
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  26.  97
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2002). Take It From Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):291-308.
    Testimony consists in imparting information without supplying evidence or argument to back one's claims. To what extent does testimony convey epistemic warrant? C. J. A. Coady argues, on Davidsonian grounds, that (1) most testimony is true, hence (2) most testimony supplies warrant sufficient for knowledge. I appeal to Grice's maxims to undermine Coady's argument and to show that the matter is more complicated and context-sensitive than is standardly recognized. Informative exchanges take place within networks of shared, tacit assumptions that affect (...)
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  27. Catherine Elgin (2009). Exemplification, Idealization, and Scientific Understanding. In Mauricio Suárez (ed.), Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization. Routledge 4--77.
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  28.  45
    Mehmet Elgin & Elliott Sober (2014). Causal, A Priori True, and Explanatory: A Reply to Lange and Rosenberg. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):167-171.
    Sober [2011] argues that some causal statements are a priori true and that a priori causal truths are central to explanations in the theory of natural selection. Lange and Rosenberg [2011] criticize Sober's argument. They concede that there are a priori causal truths, but maintain that those truths are only ‘minimally causal’. They also argue that explanations that are built around a priori causal truths are not causal explanations, properly speaking. Here we criticize both of Lange and Rosenberg's claims.
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  29.  78
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1995). Unnatural Science. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):289-302.
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  30.  30
    Kathryn S. Plaisance, Thomas A. C. Reydon & Mehmet Elgin (2012). Why the (Gene) Counting Argument Fails in the Massive Modularity Debate: The Need for Understanding Gene Concepts and Genotype-Phenotype Relationships. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):873-892.
    A number of debates in philosophy of biology and psychology, as well as in their respective sciences, hinge on particular views about the relationship between genotypes and phenotypes. One such view is that the genotype-phenotype relationship is relatively straightforward, in the sense that a genome contains the ?genes for? the various traits that an organism exhibits. This leads to the assumption that if a particular set of traits is posited to be present in an organism, there must be a corresponding (...)
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  31. Catherine Z. Elgin (1993). Understanding: Art and Science. Synthese 95 (1):196-208.
    The arts and the sciences perform many of the same cognitive functions, both serving to advance understanding. This paper explores some of the ways exemplification operates in the two fields. Both scientific experiments and works of art highlight, underscore, display, or convey some of their own features. They thereby focus attention on them, and make them available for examination and projection. Thus, the Michelson-Morley experiment exemplifies the constancy of the speed of light. Jackson Pollock'sNumber One exemplifies the viscosity of paint. (...)
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  32.  67
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1988). The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity. Synthese 74 (3):297 - 311.
    I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, (...)
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  33. Catherine Z. Elgin (1999). Epistemology's Ends, Pedagogy's Prospects'. Facta Philosophica 1:39-54.
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  34.  31
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1999). Education and the Advancement of Understanding. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3:131-140.
    Understanding, as I construe it, is holistic. It is a matter of how commitments mesh to form a mutually supportive, independently supported system of thought. It is advanced by bootstrapping. We start with what we think we know and build from there. This makes education continuous with what goes on at the cutting edge of inquiry. Methods, standards, categories and stances are as important as facts. So something like E. D. Hirsch’s list of facts every fourth grader should know is (...)
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  35.  34
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2014). Fiction as Thought Experiment. Perspectives on Science 22 (2):221-241.
    Jonathan Bennett (1974) maintains that Huckleberry Finn’s deliberations about whether to return Jim to slavery afford insight into the tension between sympathy and moral judgment; Miranda Fricker (2007) argues that the trial scene in To Kill a Mockingbird affords insight into the nature of testimonial injustice. Neither claims merely that the works prompt an attentive reader to think something new or to change her mind. Rather, they consider the reader cognitively better off for her encounters with the novels. Nor is (...)
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  36.  11
    Samuel Elgin (2015). The Unreliability of Foreseeable Consequences: A Return to the Epistemic Objection. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):759-766.
    Consequentialists maintain that an act is morally right just in case it produces the best consequences of any available alternative. Because agents are ignorant about some of their acts’ consequences, they cannot be certain about which alternative is best. Kagan contends that it is reasonable to assume that unforeseen good and bad consequences roughly balance out and can be largely disregarded. A statistical argument demonstrates that Kagan’s assumption is almost always false. An act’s foreseeable consequences are an extremely poor indicator (...)
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  37.  72
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2002). Creation as Reconfiguration: Art in the Advancement of Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (1):13 – 25.
    Cognitive advancement is not always a matter of acquiring new information. It often consists in reconfiguration--in reorganizing a domain so that hitherto overlooked or underemphasized features, patterns, opportunities, and resources come to light. Several modes of reconfiguration prominent in the arts--metaphor, fiction, exemplification, and perspective--play important roles in science as well. They do not perform the same roles as literal, descriptive, perspectiveless scientific truths. But to understand how science advances understanding, we need to appreciate the ineliminable cognitive contributions of non-literal, (...)
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  38.  1
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1984). With Reference to Reference. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 42 (4):448-451.
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  39.  5
    James W. McAllister, Lars Bergström, James Robert Brown, Martin Carrier, Nancy Cartwright, Jiwei Ci, David Davies, Catherine Elgin, Márta Fehér & Michel Ghins (2010). First Page Preview. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (4).
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  40.  10
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1993). Scheffler's Symbols. Synthese 94 (1):3 - 12.
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  41.  44
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2009). Construction and Cognition. Theoria 24 (2):135-146.
    The Structure of Appearance presents a phenomenalist system, constructing enduring visible objects out of qualia. Nevertheless Goodman does not espouse phenomenalism. This is not because he considers his system inadequate. Although details remain to be filled in, he considers his system viable. And he believes his constructional methods could readily yield extensions to other sensory realms. Why isn’t Goodman a phenomenalist? This paper suggests an answer that illuminates Goodman’s views about the nature and functions of constructional systems, the prospects of (...)
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  42.  41
    Mehmet Elgin (2007). Falsificationism Revisited. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:101-106.
    Much ink has been spent on Popper's falsificationism. Why, then, am I writing another paper on this subject? This paper is neither a new kind of criticism nor a new kind of defense of falsificationism. Recent debate about the legitimacy of adaptationism among biologists centers on the question of whether Popper's falsificationism or Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programs (SRP) is adequate in understanding science. S. Jay Gould and Richard C. Lewontin (1978) argue that adaptationism is unfalsifiable since it easily (...)
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  43.  72
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). Reorienting Aesthetics, Reconceiving Cognition. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58 (3):219-225.
  44.  10
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2008). Philosophical Papers 27 (2008), 371-387. Trustworthiness. Philosophical Papers 27:371-387.
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  45.  19
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2005). Review: Williams on Truthfulness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):343 - 352.
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  46.  69
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). Interpretation and Understanding. Erkenntnis 52 (2):175-183.
    To understand a term or other symbol, I argue that it is generally neither necessary nor sufficient to assign it a unique determinate reference. Independent of and prior to investigation, it is frequently indeterminate not only whether a sentence is true, but also what its truth conditions are. Nelson Goodman's discussions of likeness of meaning are deployed to explain how this can be so.
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  47.  18
    Catherine Z. Elgin (1997). The Power of Parsimony. Philosophia Scientiae 2 (1):89-104.
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  48.  51
    C. Z. Elgin (2011). Language, Partial Truth, and Logic. [REVIEW] Analysis 71 (2):313-322.
    In Hard Truths, Elijah Millgram maintains that analytic philosophy rests on a mistake. 1 It is committed to bivalence – the contention that every truth bearer is either true or false. As a result of this commitment, its views about logic and metaphysics are profoundly misguided. He believes that rather than restricting ourselves to two truth values, we should recognize a plethora of partial truths – sentences, beliefs and opinions that are partly true or true in a way. These are (...)
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  49.  30
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2012). Making Manifest: The Role of Exemplification in the Sciences and the Arts. Principia 15 (3):399-413.
    Exemplification is the relation of an example to whatever it is an example of. Goodman maintains that exemplification is a symptom of the aesthetic: although not a necessary condition, it is an indicator that symbol is functioning aesthetically. I argue that exemplification is as important in science as it is in art. It is the vehicle by which experiments make aspects of nature manifest. I suggest that the difference between exemplars in the arts and the sciences lies in the way (...)
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  50.  65
    Catherine Z. Elgin (2004). Denying a Dualism: Goodman's Repudiation of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):226–238.
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