Search results for 'Duane Elgin' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Duane Elgin (2000). Promise Ahead: A Vision of Hope and Action for Humanity's Future. W. Morrow.score: 240.0
    Outlines four emerging "opportunity trends," including voluntary simplicity, that readers can utilize to surmount social, economic, and environmental challenges ...
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  2. Duane Elgin (2000). The Paradigm of a Living Universe. World Futures 55 (1):15-36.score: 240.0
    A new perceptual paradigm is emerging that views the universe as a living system that is being regenerated in its totality moment by moment. Scientific evidence for this view is presented as well as complementary insights from the world's spiritual traditions. The implications of this view of reality for our sense of identity, way of living, and evolutionary purpose are considered.
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  3. Catherine Z. Elgin (1998). Catherine Z. Elgin. In Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions. Blackwell. 26.score: 180.0
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  4. Catherine Z. Elgin (1997). Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary. Cornell University Press.score: 60.0
    In Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary, Catherine Z. Elgin maps a constructivist alternative to the standard Anglo-American conception of philosophy's ...
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  5. Catherine Z. Elgin (2004). True Enough. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.score: 30.0
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  6. Mehmet Elgin (2006). There May Be Strict Empirical Laws in Biology, After All. Biology and Philosophy 21 (1):119-134.score: 30.0
    This paper consists of four parts. Part 1 is an introduction. Part 2 evaluates arguments for the claim that there are no strict empirical laws in biology. I argue that there are two types of arguments for this claim and they are as follows: (1) Biological properties are multiply realized and they require complex processes. For this reason, it is almost impossible to formulate strict empirical laws in biology. (2) Generalizations in biology hold contingently but laws go beyond describing contingencies, (...)
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  7. Catherine Z. Elgin (2010). Keeping Things in Perspective. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 150 (3):439 - 447.score: 30.0
    Scientific realism holds that scientific representations are utterly objective. They describe the way the world is, independent of any point of view. In Scientific Representation, van Fraassen argues otherwise. If science is to afford an understanding of nature, it must be grounded in evidence. Since evidence is perspectivai, science cannot vindicate its claims using only utterly objective representations. For science to do its epistemic job, it must involve perspectivai representations. I explicate this argument and show its power.
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  8. Mehmet Elgin (2003). Biology and a Priori Laws. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1380--1389.score: 30.0
    In this paper, I investigate the nature of a priori biological laws in connection with the idea that laws must be empirical. I argue that the epistemic functions of a priori biological laws in biology are the same as those of empirical laws in physics. Thus, the requirement that laws be empirical is idle in connection with how laws operate in science. This result presents a choice between sticking with an unmotivated philosophical requirement and taking the functional equivalence of laws (...)
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  9. Mehmet Elgin & Elliott Sober (2002). Cartwright on Explanation and Idealization. Erkenntnis 57 (3):441 - 450.score: 30.0
    Nancy Cartwright (1983, 1999) argues that (1) the fundamental laws of physics are true when and only when appropriate ceteris paribus modifiers are attached and that (2) ceteris paribus modifiers describe conditions that are almost never satisfied. She concludes that when the fundamental laws of physics are true, they don't apply in the real world, but only in highly idealized counterfactual situations. In this paper, we argue that (1) and (2) together with an assumption about contraposition entail the opposite conclusion (...)
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  10. Catherine Z. Elgin (2002). Take It From Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):291-308.score: 30.0
    Testimony consists in imparting information without supplying evidence or argument to back one's claims. To what extent does testimony convey epistemic warrant? C. J. A. Coady argues, on Davidsonian grounds, that (1) most testimony is true, hence (2) most testimony supplies warrant sufficient for knowledge. I appeal to Grice's maxims to undermine Coady's argument and to show that the matter is more complicated and context-sensitive than is standardly recognized. Informative exchanges take place within networks of shared, tacit assumptions that affect (...)
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  11. Catherine Elgin (2007). Understanding and the Facts. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):33 - 42.score: 30.0
    If understanding is factive, the propositions that express an understanding are true. I argue that a factive conception of understanding is unduly restrictive. It neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. For science uses idealizations and models that do not mirror the facts. Strictly speaking, they are false. By appeal to exemplification, I devise a more generous, flexible conception of understanding that accommodates science, reflects our practices, and shows a sufficient but not slavish sensitivity (...)
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  12. Catherine Z. Elgin (1993). Understanding: Art and Science. Synthese 95 (1):196-208.score: 30.0
    The arts and the sciences perform many of the same cognitive functions, both serving to advance understanding. This paper explores some of the ways exemplification operates in the two fields. Both scientific experiments and works of art highlight, underscore, display, or convey some of their own features. They thereby focus attention on them, and make them available for examination and projection. Thus, the Michelson-Morley experiment exemplifies the constancy of the speed of light. Jackson Pollock'sNumber One exemplifies the viscosity of paint. (...)
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  13. Catherine Z. Elgin (2002). Creation as Reconfiguration: Art in the Advancement of Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (1):13 – 25.score: 30.0
    Cognitive advancement is not always a matter of acquiring new information. It often consists in reconfiguration--in reorganizing a domain so that hitherto overlooked or underemphasized features, patterns, opportunities, and resources come to light. Several modes of reconfiguration prominent in the arts--metaphor, fiction, exemplification, and perspective--play important roles in science as well. They do not perform the same roles as literal, descriptive, perspectiveless scientific truths. But to understand how science advances understanding, we need to appreciate the ineliminable cognitive contributions of non-literal, (...)
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  14. Catherine Z. Elgin (1995). Unnatural Science. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):289-302.score: 30.0
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  15. Catherine Z. Elgin (1988). The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity. Synthese 74 (3):297 - 311.score: 30.0
    I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, (...)
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  16. Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). Reorienting Aesthetics, Reconceiving Cognition. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58 (3):219-225.score: 30.0
  17. Catherine Z. Elgin (ed.) (1997). Nelson Goodman's Theory of Symbols and its Applications. Garland Pub..score: 30.0
    A challenger of traditions and boundaries A pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, Nelson Goodman has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language, with surprising connections that cut across traditional boundaries. In the early 1950s, Goodman, Quine, and White published a series of papers that threatened to torpedo fundamental assumptions of traditional philosophy. They advocated repudiating analyticity, necessity, and prior assumptions. Some philosophers, realizing the seismic effects repudiation would cause, argued that philosophy should retain the (...)
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  18. Catherine Z. Elgin (2001). The Legacy of Nelson Goodman. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):679-690.score: 30.0
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  19. Catherine Z. Elgin (2004). Denying a Dualism: Goodman's Repudiation of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):226–238.score: 30.0
  20. Mehmet Elgin (2010). How Could There Be True Causal Claims Without There Being Special Causal Facts in the World? Philosophia 38 (4):755-771.score: 30.0
    Some philosophers of physics recently expressed their skepticism about causation (Norton 2003b, 2007). However, this is not new. The view that causation does not refer to any ontological category perhaps can be attributed to Hume, Kant and Russell. On the other hand, some philosophers (Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe) view causation as a physical process and some others (Cartwright) view causation as making claims about capacities possessed by objects. The issue about the ontological status of causal claims involves issues concerning (...)
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  21. Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). Interpretation and Understanding. Erkenntnis 52 (2):175-183.score: 30.0
    To understand a term or other symbol, I argue that it is generally neither necessary nor sufficient to assign it a unique determinate reference. Independent of and prior to investigation, it is frequently indeterminate not only whether a sentence is true, but also what its truth conditions are. Nelson Goodman's discussions of likeness of meaning are deployed to explain how this can be so.
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  22. Catherine Z. Elgin (2008). Trustworthiness. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):371-387.score: 30.0
    I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs are often valuable. Such beliefs can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such a belief is (...)
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  23. Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). Worldmaker: Nelson Goodman 1906–1998. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31 (1):1-18.score: 30.0
  24. Catherine Z. Elgin (2004). Richard Foley's Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):724–734.score: 30.0
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  25. Catherine Z. Elgin & Nelson Goodman (1987). Changing the Subject. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46:219-223.score: 30.0
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  26. C. Z. Elgin (2011). Language, Partial Truth, and Logic. [REVIEW] Analysis 71 (2):313-322.score: 30.0
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  27. Kathryn S. Plaisance, Thomas A. C. Reydon & Mehmet Elgin (2012). Why the (Gene) Counting Argument Fails in the Massive Modularity Debate: The Need for Understanding Gene Concepts and Genotype-Phenotype Relationships. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):873-892.score: 30.0
    A number of debates in philosophy of biology and psychology, as well as in their respective sciences, hinge on particular views about the relationship between genotypes and phenotypes. One such view is that the genotype-phenotype relationship is relatively straightforward, in the sense that a genome contains the ?genes for? the various traits that an organism exhibits. This leads to the assumption that if a particular set of traits is posited to be present in an organism, there must be a corresponding (...)
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  28. Catherine Z. Elgin (2010). Review of Henk W. De Regt, Sabina Leonelli, Kai Eigner (Eds.), Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1).score: 30.0
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  29. Catherine Z. Elgin & Israel Scheffler (1987). Mainsprings of Metaphor. Journal of Philosophy 84 (6):331-335.score: 30.0
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  30. Catherine Z. Elgin (2002). Art in the Advancement of Understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):1 - 12.score: 30.0
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  31. Catherine Z. Elgin (1979). Quine's Double Standard: Indeterminacy and Quantifying In. Synthese 42 (3):353 - 377.score: 30.0
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  32. Catherine Z. Elgin (2005). Review: Williams on Truthfulness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):343 - 352.score: 30.0
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  33. Catherine Elgin (1996). Considered Judgment. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.score: 30.0
    The book contains a unique epistemological position that deserves serious consideration by specialists in the subject."--Bruce Aune, University of Massachusetts.
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  34. Catherine Z. Elgin (2009). Construction and Cognition. Theoria 24 (2):135-146.score: 30.0
    The Structure of Appearance presents a phenomenalist system, constructing enduring visible objects out of qualia. Nevertheless Goodman does not espouse phenomenalism. This is not because he considers his system inadequate. Although details remain to be filled in, he considers his system viable. And he believes his constructional methods could readily yield extensions to other sensory realms. Why isn’t Goodman a phenomenalist? This paper suggests an answer that illuminates Goodman’s views about the nature and functions of constructional systems, the prospects of (...)
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  35. Catherine Z. Elgin (1999). Education and the Advancement of Understanding. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3:131-140.score: 30.0
    Understanding, as I construe it, is holistic. It is a matter of how commitments mesh to form a mutually supportive, independently supported system of thought. It is advanced by bootstrapping. We start with what we think we know and build from there. This makes education continuous with what goes on at the cutting edge of inquiry. Methods, standards, categories and stances are as important as facts. So something like E. D. Hirsch’s list of facts every fourth grader should know is (...)
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  36. Mehmet Elgin (2007). Falsificationism Revisited. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:101-106.score: 30.0
    Much ink has been spent on Popper's falsificationism. Why, then, am I writing another paper on this subject? This paper is neither a new kind of criticism nor a new kind of defense of falsificationism. Recent debate about the legitimacy of adaptationism among biologists centers on the question of whether Popper's falsificationism or Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programs (SRP) is adequate in understanding science. S. Jay Gould and Richard C. Lewontin (1978) argue that adaptationism is unfalsifiable since it easily (...)
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  37. Catherine Z. Elgin (1987). The Cost of Correspondence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (3):475-480.score: 30.0
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  38. Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). In Memoriam: Nelson Goodman. Erkenntnis 52 (2):149 -.score: 30.0
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  39. Mehmet Elgin (2008). Theory-Laden Observation and Incommensurability. Organon F 15 (1):3-19.score: 30.0
  40. David Miller, Catherine Z. Elgin, Jonathan E. Adler & Douglas N. Walton (1980). Critical Notice. Synthese 43 (3):125 – 140.score: 30.0
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  41. Catherine Z. Elgin (1980). Indeterminacy, Underdetermination and the Anomalous Monism. Synthese 45:233-55.score: 30.0
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  42. Catherine Z. Elgin (2012). Making Manifest: The Role of Exemplification in the Sciences and the Arts. Principia 15 (3):399-413.score: 30.0
    Exemplification is the relation of an example to whatever it is an example of. Goodman maintains that exemplification is a symptom of the aesthetic: although not a necessary condition, it is an indicator that symbol is functioning aesthetically. I argue that exemplification is as important in science as it is in art. It is the vehicle by which experiments make aspects of nature manifest. I suggest that the difference between exemplars in the arts and the sciences lies in the way (...)
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  43. Catherine Z. Elgin (2014). Fiction as Thought Experiment. Perspectives on Science 22 (2):221-241.score: 30.0
    Jonathan Bennett (1974) maintains that Huckleberry Finn’s deliberations about whether to return Jim to slavery afford insight into the tension between sympathy and moral judgment; Miranda Fricker (2007) argues that the trial scene in To Kill a Mockingbird affords insight into the nature of testimonial injustice. Neither claims merely that the works prompt an attentive reader to think something new or to change her mind. Rather, they consider the reader cognitively better off for her encounters with the novels. Nor is (...)
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  44. Catherine Z. Elgin (2002). Take It From Me. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):291-308.score: 30.0
    Testimony consists in imparting information without supplying evidence or argument to back one’s claims. To what extent does testimony convey epistemic warrant? C. J. A. Coady argues, on Davidsonian grounds, that (1) most testimony is true, hence (2) most testimony supplies warrant sufficient for knowledge. I appeal to Grice’s maxims to undermine Coady’s argument and to show that the matter is more complicated and context-sensitive than is standardly recognized. Informative exchanges take place within networks of shared, tacit assumptions that affect (...)
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  45. C. Z. Elgin (1980). Lawlikeness and the End of Science. Philosophy of Science 47 (1):56-68.score: 30.0
    Although our theories are not precisely true, scientific realists contend that we should admit their objects into our ontology. One justification--offered by Sellars and Putnam--is that current theories belong to series that converge to ideally adequate theories. I consider the way the commitment to convergence reflects on the interpretation of lawlike claims. I argue that the distinction between lawlike and accidental generalizations depends on our cognitive interests and reflects our commitment to the direction of scientific progress. If the sciences disagree (...)
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  46. Catherine Z. Elgin (1993). Outstanding Problems: Replies to Zif Critics. Synthese 95 (1):129 - 140.score: 30.0
    Answers set the stage for new questions. Reconfigured terrains require new maps. We endedReconceptions with the words constructionalism always has plenty to do. The papers in this volume prove our point. They raise issues and disclose avenues that merit further investigation. In what follows, I venture some brief replies that answer objections and indicate areas that deserve further study.
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  47. Catherine Z. Elgin (2004). Optional Stops, Foregone Conclusions, and the Value of Argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):317-329.score: 30.0
    If the point of argument is to produce conviction, an argument tor a foregone conclusion is pointless. I maintain, however, that an argument makes a variety of cognitive contributions, even when its conclusion is already believed. It exhibits warrant. It affords reasons that we can impart to others. It identifies bases tor agreement among parties who otherwise disagree. It underwrites confidence, by showing how vulnerable warrant is under changes in background assumptions. Multiple arguments for the same conclusion show how our (...)
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  48. Catherine Elgin (1996). The Relativity of Fact and the Objectivity of Value. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 6 (1):4-15.score: 30.0
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  49. Catherine Z. Elgin (2012). Begging to Differ. The Philosophers' Magazine 59 (59):77-82.score: 30.0
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