15 found
Sort by:
  1. Dwayne Moore (2014). On the Constitutive Property Reply: Commentary on Campbell. Theoria 80 (1):4-25.
    For the nonreductive physicalist, behavioural effects have a complete physiological explanation and a distinct psychological explanation. In a series of papers Jaegwon Kim argues that there can be no more than a single complete and independent explanation of any one event, thereby excluding the psychological explanation. For his own part, Kim includes psychological explanations through the use of an extensional model of explanatory individuation. Numerous critics have pointed out the counterintuitive results of this extensional model of explanatory individuation. In a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Dwayne Moore (2013). Counterfactuals, Autonomy and Downward Causation: Reply to Zhong. Philosophia 41 (3):831-839.
    In recent papers, Lei Zhong argues that the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem is unavailable to anyone that endorses the counterfactual model of causation. The linchpin of his argument is that the counterfactual theory entails the downward causation principle, which conflicts with the autonomy solution. In this note I argue that the counterfactual theory does not entail the downward causation principle, so it is possible to advocate for the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem from within the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Dwayne Moore (2012). A Non-Reductive Model of Component Forces and Resultant Force. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (4):359-380.
    While there are reasons to believe that both component forces and a resultant force operate on a body in combined circumstances, the threat of overdetermination largely prevents adoption of this view. Accordingly, a lively debate has arisen over which force actually exists and which force is eliminated in combined circumstances, the components or the resultant. In this article I present a non-reductive model of resultant force which ensures the existence of both the resultant force and the component forces without overdetermination. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Dwayne Moore (2012). Causal Exclusion and Dependent Overdetermination. Erkenntnis 76 (3):319-335.
    Jaegwon Kim argues that unreduced mental causes are excluded from efficacy because physical causes are sufficient in themselves. One response to this causal exclusion argument is to embrace some form of overdetermination. In this paper I consider two forms of overdetermination. Independent overdetermination suggests that two individually sufficient causes bring about one effect. This model fails because the sufficiency of one cause renders the other cause unnecessary. Dependent overdetermination suggests that a physical cause is necessary and sufficient for a given (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Dwayne Moore (2012). Jaegwon Kim , Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 32 (1):33-36.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Dwayne Moore (2012). On Robinson's Response to the Self-Stultifying Objection. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):627-641.
    Qualia Epiphenomenalism is the view that qualitative events lack causal efficacy. A common objection to qualia epiphenomenalism is the so-called Self-Stultifying Objection, which suggests that justified, true belief about qualitative events requires, among other things, the belief to be caused by the qualitative event—the very premise that qualia epiphenomenalism denies. William Robinson provides the most sustained response to the self-stultification objection that is available. In this paper I argue that Robinson's reply does not sufficiently overcome the self-stultification objection.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Dwayne Moore (2012). Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying Causes. Dialogue 51 (3):397-418.
    Qualia epiphenomenalism is the view that qualitative properties of events, such as the raw feel of tastes or painfulness, lack causal efficacy. One common objection to qualia epiphenomenalism is the epistemic argument, which states that this loss of causal efficacy undermines our capacity to know about these epiphenomenal qualitative properties (Sterjnberg, 1999; Watkins, 1989). A number of rejoinders have been offered up to insulate qualia epiphenomenalism from the epistemic argument. In this paper I consider and ultimately reject two such replies, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Dwayne Moore (2011). Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 39 (3):511-525.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Dwayne Moore (2010). Reconciling Anomalous Monism with Scheme-Content Dualism: A Reply to Manuel de Pinedo. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 29 (1):51-62.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Dwayne Moore (2010). The Generalization Problem and the Identity Solution. Erkenntnis 72 (1):57 - 72.
    For some time now, Jaegwon Kim has argued that irreducible mental properties face the threat of causal inefficacy. The primary weapon he deploys to sustain this charge is the supervenience/exclusion argument. This argument, in a nutshell, states that any mental property that irreducibly supervenes on a physical property is excluded from causal efficacy because the underlying physical property takes care of all of the causal work itself. Originally intended for mental properties alone, it did not take long for his (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Dwayne Moore & Neil Campbell (2010). Functional Reduction and Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 25 (4):435-446.
    Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism—the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim’s goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his position implies eliminativism about mental properties or (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Neil Campbell & Dwayne Moore (2009). On Kim's Exclusion Principle. Synthese 169 (1):75 - 90.
    In this paper we explore Jaegwon Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion. Kim’s support for the principle is clarified and we critically evaluate several versions of the dual explananda response authors have offered to undermine it. We argue that none of the standard versions of the dual explananda reply are entirely successful and propose an alternative approach that reveals a deep tension in Kim’s metaphysics. We argue that Kim can only retain the principle of explanatory exclusion if he abandons his longstanding (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Dwayne Moore (2009). Ancient Epistemology Lloyd Gerson Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, XI + 179 Pp ISBN-10: 0521691893 ISBN-13: 978-0521691895. [REVIEW] Dialogue 48 (03):689-.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Dwayne Moore (2009). Explanatory Exclusion and Extensional Individuation. Acta Analytica 24 (3):211-222.
    Jaegwon Kim’s principle of Explanatory Exclusion says there can be no more than a single complete and independent explanation of any one event. Accordingly, if we have a complete neurological explanation for some piece of human behavior, the mental explanation must either be excluded, or it must not be distinct from the neurological explanation. Jaegwon Kim argues that mental explanations are not distinct from neurological explanations on account of the fact that they refer to the same objective causal relation between (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Dwayne Moore (2009). Mental Causation: A Nonreductive Approach Neil Campbell New York: Peter Lang, 2008, 113 Pp. [REVIEW] Dialogue 48 (02):442-.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation