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  1. E. C. Barnes (2005). Predictivism for Pluralists. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):421-450.
    Predictivism asserts that novel confirmations carry special probative weight. Epistemic pluralism asserts that the judgments of agents (about, e.g., the probabilities of theories) carry epistemic import. In this paper, I propose a new theory of predictivism that is tailored to pluralistic evaluators of theories. I replace the orthodox notion of use-novelty with a notion of endorsement-novelty, and argue that the intuition that predictivism is true has two roots. I provide a detailed Bayesian rendering of this theory and argue that pluralistic (...)
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  2. E. C. Barnes (2002). Neither Truth nor Empirical Adequacy Explain Novel Success. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):418 – 431.
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  3. E. C. Barnes (2002). The Miraculous Choice Argument for Realism. Philosophical Studies 111 (2):97 - 120.
    The miracle argument for scientific realism can be cast in two forms: according to the miraculous theory argument, realism is the only position which does not make the empirical successes of particular theories miraculous. According to the miraculous choice argument, realism is the only position which does not render the fact that empirically successful theories have been chosen a miracle. A vast literature discusses the miraculous theory argument, but the miraculous choice argument has been unjustifiably neglected. I raise two objections (...)
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  4. E. C. Barnes (2000). Ockham's Razor and the Anti-Superfluity Principle. Erkenntnis 53 (3):353-374.
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