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Erik Carlson [44]Elof Axel Carlson [7]Eric Carlson [4]E. Carlson [4]
Elof Carlson [3]Eve Carlson [2]Elof A. Carlson [2]Eric Stener Carlson [1]

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Profile: Elizabeth Ann Carlson (King's College London)
  1.  64
    Erik Carlson (2013). Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):449-463.
    John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails.
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  2.  74
    Erik Carlson (1999). Consequentialism, Alternatives, and Actualism. Philosophical Studies 96 (3):253-268.
  3.  32
    Erik Carlson (2016). ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’. Noûs 50 (1):213-223.
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  4.  87
    Erik Carlson (2004). Broome's Argument Against Value Incomparability. Utilitas 16 (2):220-224.
    John Broome has argued that alleged cases of value incomparability are really examples of vagueness in the betterness relation. The main premiss of his argument is ‘the collapsing principle’. I argue that this principle is dubious, and that Broome's argument is therefore unconvincing. Correspondence:c1 Erik.Carlson@filosofi.uu.se.
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  5.  78
    Erik Carlson (2002). Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action. Erkenntnis 57 (1):71-89.
    In Section 1, I rehearse some arguments for the claim that morality should be ``action-guiding'', and try to state the conditions under which a moral theory is in fact action-guiding. I conclude that only agents who are cognitively and conatively ``ideal'' are in general able to use a moral theory as a guide to action. In Sections 2 and 3, I discuss whether moral ``actualism'' implies that morality cannot be action-guiding even for ideal agents. If actualism is true, an ideal (...)
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  6.  39
    Erik Carlson (2011). The Small-Improvement Argument Rescued. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):171-174.
    Gustafsson and Espinoza have recently argued that the ‘small-improvement argument’, against completeness as a rationality requirement for preference orderings, is defective. They claim that the two main premises of the argument conflict, and hence should not both be accepted. I show that this conflict can be avoided by modifying one of the premises.
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  7.  96
    Erik Carlson (1999). The Oughts and Cans of Objective Consequentialism. Utilitas 11 (1):91-96.
    Frances Howard -Snyder has argued that objective consequentialism violates the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In most situations, she claims, we cannot produce the best consequences available, although objective consequentialism says that we ought to do so. Here I try to show that Howard -Snyder's argument is unsound. The claim that we typically cannot produce the best consequences available is doubtful. And even if there is a sense of ‘producing the best consequences’ in which we cannot do so, objective consequentialism (...)
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  8.  68
    Erik Carlson (2010). Parity Demystified. Theoria 76 (2):119-128.
    Ruth Chang has defended a concept of "parity", implying that two items may be evaluatively comparable even though neither item is better than or equally good as the other. This article takes no stand on whether there actually are cases of parity. Its aim is only to make the hitherto somewhat obscure notion of parity more precise, by defining it in terms of the standard value relations. Given certain plausible assumptions, the suggested definiens is shown to state a necessary and (...)
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  9.  13
    Erik Carlson (2005). The Intrinsic Value of Non-Basic States of Affairs. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Philosophical Studies. Springer 361--370.
  10.  37
    Erik Carlson (2000). Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Power Necessity. Noûs 34 (2):277-290.
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  11.  95
    Erik Carlson (1998). Fischer on Backtracking and Newcomb's Problem. Analysis 58 (3):229–231.
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  12. Elof Axel Carlson (2011). The Body as a Biological and Genetic Entity. Social Research: An International Quarterly 78 (2):349-358.
    What is meant by a genetic disorder? To the biologist, the lack of pigment when the typical situation is pigmentation is an abnormality. An albino alligator, an albino giraffe, or an albino tiger stands out and surprises the beholder, because in the experience of those who have observed populations of alligators, giraffes, or tigers, these are rare. We may have difficulty defining what is normal among humans but there is a huge quantitative distinction between the words "typical" and "atypical." When (...)
     
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  13.  80
    Erik Carlson (1995). Brink's and Pietroski's Obligation Execution Principle. Analysis 55 (4):275 - 279.
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  14.  4
    E. Carlson (1998). Fischer on Backtracking and Newcomb's Problem. Analysis 58 (3):229-231.
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  15.  22
    Erik Carlson (1996). Cyclical Preferences and Rational Choice. Theoria 62 (1-2):144-160.
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  16.  19
    Erik Carlson (2005). Intransitivity Without Zeno's Paradox. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer 273--277.
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  17.  43
    Erik Carlson (1996). The Intrinsic Value of Non-Basic States of Affairs. Philosophical Studies 85 (1):95-107.
  18.  91
    Erick Carlson (2005). A New Time Travel Paradox Resolved. Philosophia 33 (1-4):263-273.
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  19.  32
    Erik Carlson (2000). Aggregating Harms - Should We Kill to Avoid Headaches? Theoria 66 (3):246-255.
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  20.  69
    Erik Carlson (2003). On a New Argument for Incompatibilism. Philosophia 31 (1-2):159-164.
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  21.  30
    Erik Carlson (1998). Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics. Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):283.
    A principal aim of the branch of ethics called ‘population theory’ or ‘population ethics’ is to find a plausible welfarist axiology, capable of comparing total outcomes with respect to value. This has proved an exceedingly difficult task. In this paper I shall state and discuss two ‘trilemmas’, or choices between three unappealing alternatives, which the population ethicist must face. The first trilemma is not new. It originates with Derek Parfit's well-known ‘Mere Addition Paradox’, and was first explicitly stated by Yew-Kwang (...)
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  22.  63
    Erik Carlson (2003). Counterexamples to Principle Beta: A Response to Crisp and Warfield. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):730-737.
    The well-known "Consequence Argument" for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism relies on a certain rule of inference; "Principle Beta". Thomas Crisp and Ted Warfield have recently argued that all hitherto suggested counterexamples to Beta can be easily circumvented by proponents of the Consequence Argument. I present a new counterexample which, I argue, is free from the flaws Crisp and Warfield detect in earlier examples.
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  23.  20
    Erik Carlson (2002). In Defence of the Mind Argument. Philosophia 29 (1-4):393-400.
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  24.  58
    Erik Carlson & Erik J. Olsson (2001). The Presumption of Nothingness. Ratio 14 (3):203–221.
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  25.  17
    Erik Carlson (2003). Dynamic Inconsistency and Performable Plans. Philosophical Studies 113 (2):181 - 200.
    An agent may abandon an initiated action plan, although he doesnot acquire new information or encounter unforeseen obstacles.Such dynamic inconsistency can be to the agent'';s guaranteeddisadvantage, and there is a debate on how it should rationallybe avoided. The main contenders are the sophisticated andthe resolute approaches. I argue that this debate is misconceived,since both approaches rely on false assumptions about theperformability of action plans. The debate can be reformulated,so as to avoid these mistaken assumptions. I try to show that sucha (...)
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  26.  3
    Elof Axel Carlson (1974). The Drosophila Group: The Transition From the Mendelian Unit to the Individual Gene. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology 7 (1):31 - 48.
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  27.  6
    Erik Carlson & Rysiek Sliwinski (2001). What Österberg's Population Theory has in Common with Plato's. Philosophical Studies 50:29-44.
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  28.  42
    Erik Carlson (2001). Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 5 (4):335-360.
    Whether or not intrinsic value is additively measurable is often thought to depend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities. I argue that the truth of this principle is, contrary to received opinion, compatible with additive measurement. However, there are other very plausible evaluative claims that are more difficult to combine with the additivity of intrinsic value. A plausible theory of the good should allow that there are certain kinds of states of affairs whose (...)
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  29.  34
    Erik Carlson (1997). Consequentialism, Distribution and Desert. Utilitas 9 (3):307.
    This paper criticizes the consequentialist theory recently put forward by Fred Feldman. I argue that this theory violates two crucial requirements. Another theory, proposed by Peter Vallentyne, is similarly flawed. Feldman's basic ideas could, however, be developed into a more plausible theory. I suggest one possible way of doing this.
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  30.  41
    Erik Carlson (1998). Van Inwagen on Determinism and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (2):219-226.
  31.  29
    Erik Carlson (2007). Higher Values and Non-Archimedean Additivity. Theoria 73 (1):3-27.
    Many philosophers have claimed that extensive or additive measurement is incompatible with the existence of "higher values", any amount of which is better than any amount of some other value. In this paper, it is shown that higher values can be incorporated in a non-standard model of extensive measurement, with values represented by sets of ordered pairs of real numbers, rather than by single reals. The suggested model is mathematically fairly simple, and it applies to structures (...)
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  32.  7
    Eric Stener Carlson (2000). The Influence of French “Revolutionary War” Ideology on the Use of Torture in Argentina's “Dirty War”. Human Rights Review 1 (4):71-84.
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  33.  18
    Erik Carlson (2000). Torbjörn Tännsjö Hedonistic Utilitarianism, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1998, Pp. Vi + 185. Utilitas 12 (2):248.
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  34.  3
    Erik Carlson (2001). Review of Brad Hooker: Ideal Code, Real World. [REVIEW] Theoria 67 (3):268-272.
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  35.  25
    Erik Carlson (1997). A Note on Moore's Organic Unities. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (1):55-59.
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  36.  25
    E. Carlson (2002). In Defense of the Mind Argument. Philosophia 29 (1-4):393-400.
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  37.  7
    Elof Axel Carlson (1971). An Unacknowledged Founding of Molecular Biology: H. J. Muller's Contributions to Gene Theory, 1910-1936. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology 4 (1):149 - 170.
  38.  2
    Patrick J. Carroll, James A. Shepperd, Kate Sweeny, Erika Carlson & Joann P. Benigno (2007). Disappointment for Others. Cognition and Emotion 21 (7):1565-1576.
  39.  6
    Josip Balabanić, Damir Barbarić, Boran Berčić, Giovanni Boniolo, Branka Brujić, Alex Byrne, Erik Carlson, Maudemarie Clark, Nadežda Čačinovič & Zvonimir Čuljak (2008). Elvio Baccarini. Prolegomena 7:1.
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  40.  18
    E. Carlson (2001). The Badness of Killing and Letting Die. Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (4):535-539.
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  41.  16
    Erik Carlson (2002). Review of Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (1).
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  42.  7
    Erik Carlson (2004). Review of Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (10).
  43.  3
    Melissa Barry, John Bishop, Benjamin Bradley, Sarah Buss, Ben Caplan, Erik Carlson, John Carriero, Peter Carruthers, C. A. J. Coady & Marian David (2007). The Editors of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Thank the Members of the Editorial Board and the Following Scholars, Who Have Served as Referees During the Period of October 2006 Through July 2007. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3).
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  44. Elof Axel Carlson (1974). The Drosophila Group: The Transition From the Mendelian Unit to the Individual Gene. Journal of the History of Biology 7 (1):31-48.
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  45.  7
    Erik Carlson & Erik J. Olsson (1998). Is Our Existence in Need of Further Explanation? Inquiry 41 (3):255 – 275.
    Several philosophers have argued that our cosmos is either purposely created by some rational being(s), or else just one among a vast number of actually existing cosmoi. According to John Leslie and Peter van Inwagen, the existence of a cosmos containing rational beings is analogous to drawing the winning straw among millions of straws. The best explanation in the latter case, they maintain, is that the drawing was either rigged by someone, or else many such lotteries have taken place. Arnold (...)
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  46.  1
    Erik Maginnes, Judith P. Hallett, Heather Day, Ashish George, Erica Carlson & Ernest Watford (2010). Adam Blistein. Classical World: A Quarterly Journal on Antiquity 103 (4):531-531.
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  47. Lucy Allais, David Archard, Neera Badhwar, Christian Barry, Paul Bloomfield, Campbell Brown, Vittorio Bufacchi, Erik Carlson, Paula Casal & Richard Chappell (2009). Referees for Volume 6. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):549-550.
     
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  48. Elof A. Carlson (2002). Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Vol LXXVII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
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  49. Elof Axel Carlson (1971). An Unacknowledged Founding of Molecular Biology: H. J. Muller's Contributions to Gene Theory, 1910?1936. Journal of the History of Biology 4 (1):149-170.
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  50. E. Carlson (2005). Causal Determinism and Human Freedom Are Incompatible: A New Argument for Incompatibilism (Vol 14, Pg 167, 2000). Philosophia 32 (1-4):443-448.
     
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