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Earl Conee [72]E. Conee [7]Earl Brink Conee [2]Earl B. Conee [1]
  1. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view ofjustification.
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  2. Earl Brink Conee (2004). Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition. Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of (...)
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  3. E. Conee & R. Feldman (1998). The Generality Problem for Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29.
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  4. Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of the (...)
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  5. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2008). Evidence. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press
     
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  6.  98
    Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2001). Internalism Defended. In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Blackwell 1 - 18.
  7.  88
    Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (2001). Internalism Defended. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.
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  8. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2011). Replies. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press
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  9. Earl Conee, Opposing Skepticism Disjunctively.
    Disjunctivists hold that perceiving external objects is fundamentally different from any experiential state that is not a perception. In fact, roughly speaking, disjunctivists say that they have nothing in common. Suppose that it appears to someone as though she perceives something. Disjunctivists say that there are two disparate sorts of facts that could make this true. Either she is genuinely perceiving something, or she is in an experiential state of merely apparent perception. An apparent perception is fundamentally unlike a perception. (...)
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  10. Earl Conee (2013). The Specificity of the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):751-762.
    In “Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem,” Michael Bishop argues that every theory of justification needs a solution to the generality problem. He contends that a solution is needed in order for any theory to be used in giving an acceptable account of the justificatory status of beliefs in certain examples. In response, first I will describe the generality problem that is specific to process reliabilism and two other sorts of problems that are essentially the same. Then I (...)
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  11. Earl Conee (1994). Phenomenal Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.
  12. Earl Conee (2001). Heeding Misleading Evidence. Philosophical Studies 103 (2):99-120.
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  13.  50
    Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (2002). Typing Problems. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):98-105.
    Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved.
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  14. Earl Conee (2007). Disjunctivism and Anti-Skepticism. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):16–36.
  15.  13
    Earl Conee (2013). Seeming Evidence. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. OUP Usa 52.
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  16. E. Conee (1999). Metaphysics and the Morality of Abortion. Mind 108 (432):619-646.
    Conclusions about the morality of abortion have been thought to receive some support from metaphysical doctrines about persons. The paper studies four instances in which philosophers have sought to draw such morals from metaphysics. It argues that in each instance the metaphysics makes no moral difference, and the manner of failure seems indicative of a general epistemic irrelevance of metaphysics to the moral issue.
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  17. Earl Conee (2010). Rational Disagreement Defended. In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. OUP Oxford
     
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  18.  58
    Earl Conee (1992). The Truth Connection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):657-669.
  19.  51
    Earl Conee (1998). Seeing the Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):847-857.
    Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can `just see' that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied.
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  20.  74
    Earl Conee (2005). The Comforts of Home. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):444–451.
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  21.  35
    Earl Conee (2015). Debasing Skepticism Refuted. Episteme 12 (1):1-11.
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  22.  68
    Earl Conee (1982). Against Moral Dilemmas. Philosophical Review 91 (1):87-97.
    E j lemmon, B a o williams, Bas van fraassen, And ruth marcus have argued on behalf of the existence of moral dilemmas, I.E., Cases where an agent is subject to conflicting absolute moral obligations. The paper criticizes this support and contends that no moral dilemma is possible.
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  23.  91
    Earl Conee (2009). Peerage. Episteme 6 (3):313-323.
    Experts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective strength of the rational support for one side, the special force of details in the case for one side, and a summary impression of truth. All such factors fail to justify any position.
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  24.  95
    Earl Conee (1982). Utilitarianism And Rationality. Analysis 42 (January):55-59.
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  25. Earl Conee (2007). Externally Enhanced Internalism. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press 51--67.
     
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  26. Earl Conee (1980). Propositional Justification. Philosophical Studies 38 (1):65 - 68.
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  27.  60
    Earl Conee (2012). Self—Support. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):419-446.
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  28. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Laurence Bonjour, Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, Peter Klein, Jonathan Kvanvig, Keith Lehrer, William Lycan, Peter Markie, George Pappas, Alvin Plantinga, Ernest Sosa, Marshall Swain & Bas van Fraassen (1996). Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    In his widely influential two-volume work, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga argued that warrant is that which explains the difference between knowledge and true belief. Plantinga not only developed his own account of warrant but also mapped the terrain of epistemology. Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not (...)
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  29.  44
    Earl Conee (1987). Evident, but Rationally Unacceptable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):316 – 326.
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  30. E. Conee (2011). Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and the Possibility of Multiversal Rectitude. Analysis 71 (4):680-684.
    Jim Stone has argued that a multiversal version of Modal Realism together with Counterpart Theory cannot account for a certain intuitive possibility. Roughly, it is the possibility that all free moral choices of a certain sort are the right choices in all cases in the multiverse. The present work offers an explanation of how the metaphysics in question can account for the intuitive possibility in question.
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  31.  25
    Earl Conee (2007). Review of Jonathan Sutton, Without Justification. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (12).
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  32. Earl Conee (2004). Externalism, Internalism, and Skepticism. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):78–90.
  33.  53
    Earl Conee (1994). The Nature and the Impossibility of Moral Perfection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):815-825.
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  34. A. Bumpus, J. Cohen, S. Cohen, E. Conee, C. L. Elder, M. Ridge, M. Sabatés, E. C. Tiffany & D. Vander Laan (2001). Feldman, R., 61 Glanzberg, M., 217 Glymour, B., 271 Lycan, WG, 35 Predelli, S., 145. Philosophical Studies 103 (343).
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  35.  25
    Earl Conee (1988). Why Solve the Gettier Problem? In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers 55--58.
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  36.  30
    Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (2005). Some Virtues of Evidentialism. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):95-108.
    O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemológicas de uma forma que (...)
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  37.  35
    Earl Conee (1988). The Basic Nature of Epistemic Justification. The Monist 71 (3):389-404.
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  38.  48
    Earl Conee (2001). Comments on Bill Lycan's Moore Against the New Skeptics. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):55 - 59.
  39.  40
    Earl Conee (2000). The Moral Value in Promises. Philosophical Review 109 (3):411-422.
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  40.  69
    Eva Bodanszky & Earl Conee (1981). Isolating Intrinsic Value. Analysis 41 (1):51 - 53.
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  41.  38
    Earl Conee (2002). Typing Problems. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):98 - 105.
    Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved.
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  42.  22
    Earl Conee (2002). Innocuous Infallibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):406 - 408.
    Alan Sidelle has offered an argument to show that internalism about justification implies us to have a certain sort of infallibility concerning some internal facts. This is true but harmless to internalism.
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  43.  85
    Earl Conee (2009). Criterial Problems. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (3):417--426.
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  44.  66
    Earl Conee (1985). The Possibility of Absent Qualia. Philosophical Review 94 (July):345-66.
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  45.  47
    Earl Conee (2000). Reply to Timothy Chappell. Mind 109 (434):281-283.
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  46.  27
    Earl Conee (1985). Physicalism and Phenomenal Qualities. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (140):296-302.
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  47.  33
    Earl Conee (1989). Why Moral Dilemmas Are Impossible. American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (2):133 - 141.
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  48.  31
    Earl Conee (2002). Innocuous Infallibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):406-408.
    Alan Sidelle has offered an argument to show that internalism about justification implies us to have a certain sort of infallibility concerning some internal facts. This is true but harmless to internalism.
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  49.  62
    Earl Conee (1985). Physicalism and Phenomenal Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (July):296-302.
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  50.  62
    Earl Conee (2008). Critical Notices: Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):837-840.
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