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E. Diaz-Leon [9]Esa Diaz-Leon [2]
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Profile: Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba)
  1. Esa Diaz-Leon, Social Kinds and Conceptual Change: A Reply to Haslanger.
    Sally Haslanger (2006) is concerned with the debate between so-called social constructionists and error theorists about a given category, such as race or gender. For example, social constructionists about race claim that race is socially constructed, that is, the kind or property that unifies all instances of the category is a social feature (not a natural or physical feature, as naturalists about race would hold). On the other hand, error theorists about race claim that the term ‘race’ is an empty (...)
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  2. E. Diaz-Leon (2012). Actors Are Not Like Zombies. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):115-122.
    Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with another influential argument in philosophy of mind, namely, the actor argument against behaviourism, can help to show why recent objections to the zombie argument fail. In this note I want to argue that the zombie argument and the actor argument have important differences, and, because of that, Stoljar's objections to some recent critiques of the zombie argument are not successful.
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  3. E. Diaz-Leon (2012). Are Ghosts Scarier Than Zombies? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):747-748.
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  4. E. Diaz-Leon (2012). Implementing the Canberra Plan. Metascience 21 (3):719-721.
    Implementing the Canberra Plan Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9634-1 Authors E. Diaz-Leon, Department of Philosophy, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB R3T 2N2, Canada Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  5. E. Díaz-León (2011). Consciousness, Phenomenal Concepts, and Acquaintance. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 30 (1):157-167.
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  6. E. Diaz-Leon (2011). Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and a Priori Entailment. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.
    In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> entailment thesis, that is, the claim that microphysical truths a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths such as ‘water covers 60% of the Earth surface’, which they use as a premise for an argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. Their argument relies on a certain view about the possession conditions of macroscopic concepts such as WATER, known as ascriptivism. In the paper I (...)
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  7. E. Diaz-Leon (2010). Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain The Epistemic Gap? Mind 119 (476):933-951.
    The inference from conceivability to possibility has been challenged in numerous ways. One of these ways is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which has become one of the main strategies against the conceivability argument against physicalism. However, David Chalmers has recently presented a dilemma for the phenomenal concept strategy, and he has argued that no version of the strategy can succeed. In this paper, I examine the dilemma, and I argue that there is a way out of it. I conclude (...)
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  8. E. Diaz-Leon (2009). How Many Explanatory Gaps Are There? APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8 (2):33-35.
    According to many philosophers, there is an explanatory gap between physical truths and phenomenal truths. Someone could know all the physical truths about the world, and in particular, all the physical information about the brain and the neurophysiology of vision, and still not know what it is like to see red (Jackson 1982, 1986). According to a similar example, someone could know all the physical truths about bats and still not know what it is like to be a bat (Nagel (...)
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  9. E. Diaz-Leon (2008). Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):597 – 610.
    One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which aims to explain the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths in terms of the special features of phenomenal concepts. Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that the phenomenal concept strategy has failed to provide a successful explanation of this epistemic gap. In this paper my aim is to defend the phenomenal concept strategy from his criticisms. I argue that Stoljar has misrepresented the resources of the (...)
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  10. Esa Diaz-Leon (2008). We Are Living in a Material World (and I Am a Material Girl). Teorema 27 (3):85-101.
    In this paper I examine the question of whether the characterization of physicalism that is presupposed by some influential anti-physicalist arguments, namely, the so-called conceivability arguments, is a good characterization of physicalism or not. I compare this characterization with some alternative ones, showing how it can overcome some problems, and I defend it from several objections. I conclude that any arguments against physicalism characterised in that way are genuine arguments against physicalism, as intuitively conceived.
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