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Eric Schwitzgebel [80]E. Schwitzgebel [2]
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Profile: Eric Schwitzgebel (University of California, Riverside)
Profile: Eric Schwitzgebel (University of California, Riverside)
  1. Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman (2012). Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers. Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.
    We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar-sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action-omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the stability (...)
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  2.  9
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Perplexities of Consciousness. A Bradford Book.
    Do you dream in color? If you answer Yes, how can you be sure? Before you recount your vivid memory of a dream featuring all the colors of the rainbow, consider that in the 1950s researchers found that most people reported dreaming in black and white. In the 1960s, when most movies were in color and more people had color television sets, the vast majority of reported dreams contained color. The most likely explanation for this, according to the philosopher Eric (...)
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  3. Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Knowing That P Without Believing That P. Noûs 47 (2):371-384.
    Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, (...)
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  4. Eric Schwitzgebel (2008). The Unreliability of Naive Introspection. Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
    We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. Examples highlighted in this paper include: emotional experience, peripheral vision, and the phenomenology of thought. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward.
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  5. Eric Schwitzgebel (2010). Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.
    People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as ‘in-between’ cases of believing, in which it's neither quite right to ascribe the belief in question nor quite right (...)
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  6.  47
    Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman (2015). Philosophers’ Biased Judgments Persist Despite Training, Expertise and Reflection. Cognition 141:127-137.
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  7.  55
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2008). The Unreliability of Naive Introspection. Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
    We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. We are not simply fallible at the margins but broadly inept. Examples highlighted in this essay include: emotional experience (for example, is it entirely bodily; does joy have a common, distinctive phenomenological core?), peripheral vision (how broad and stable is the region of visual clarity?), and the (...)
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  8. Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief. Noûs 36 (2):249-275.
    This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle's dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well-suited to handle what might be called "in-between" cases of believing - cases in (...)
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  9.  76
    Eric Schwitzgebel, Introspection. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  10.  46
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2015). If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.
    If you’re a materialist, you probably think that rabbits are conscious. And you ought to think that. After all, rabbits are a lot like us, biologically and neurophysiologically. If you’re a materialist, you probably also think that conscious experience would be present in a wide range of naturally-evolved alien beings behaviorally very similar to us even if they are physiologically very different. And you ought to think that. After all, to deny it seems insupportable Earthly chauvinism. But a materialist who (...)
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  11.  67
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2001). In-Between Believing. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.
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  12.  30
    Russell T. Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic. MIT Press.
    On a remarkably thin base of evidence – largely the spectral analysis of points of light – astronomers possess, or appear to possess, an abundance of knowledge about the structure and history of the universe. We likewise know more than might even have been imagined a few centuries ago about the nature of physical matter, about the mechanisms of life, about the ancient past. Enormous theoretical and methodological ingenuity has been required to obtain such knowledge; it does not invite easy (...)
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  13.  11
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2015). 1% Skepticism. Noûs 50 (2).
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  14.  27
    Eric Schwitzgebel & Mara Garza (2015). A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):98-119.
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  15.  39
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2009). Do Ethicists Steal More Books? Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):711-725.
    If explicit cognition about morality promotes moral behavior then one might expect ethics professors to behave particularly well. However, professional ethicists' behavior has never been empirically studied. The present research examined the rates at which ethics books are missing from leading academic libraries, compared to other philosophy books similar in age and popularity. Study 1 found that relatively obscure, contemporary ethics books of the sort likely to be borrowed mainly by professors and advanced students of philosophy were actually about 50% (...)
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  16.  62
    Eric Schwitzgebel & Joshua Rust (2013). The Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors: Relationships Among Self-Reported Behavior, Expressed Normative Attitude, and Directly Observed Behavior. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-35.
    Do philosophy professors specializing in ethics behave, on average, any morally better than do other professors? If not, do they at least behave more consistently with their expressed values? These questions have never been systematically studied. We examine the self-reported moral attitudes and moral behavior of 198 ethics professors, 208 non-ethicist philosophers, and 167 professors in departments other than philosophy on eight moral issues: academic society membership, voting, staying in touch with one's mother, vegetarianism, organ and blood donation, responsiveness to (...)
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  17.  30
    Eric Schwitzgebel, Joshua Rust, Linus Ta-Lun Huang, Alan T. Moore & Justin Coates (2012). Ethicists' Courtesy at Philosophy Conferences. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):331-340.
    If philosophical moral reflection tends to promote moral behavior, one might think that professional ethicists would behave morally better than do socially comparable non-ethicists. We examined three types of courteous and discourteous behavior at American Philosophical Association conferences: talking audibly while the speaker is talking (versus remaining silent), allowing the door to slam shut while entering or exiting mid-session (versus attempting to close the door quietly), and leaving behind clutter at the end of a session (versus leaving one's seat tidy). (...)
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  18.  52
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2012). Mad Belief? Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17.
    “Mad belief” (in analogy with Lewisian “mad pain”) would be a belief state with none of the causal role characteristic of belief—a state not caused or apt to have been caused by any of the sorts of events that usually cause belief and involving no disposition toward the usual behavioral or other manifestations of belief. On token-functionalist views of belief, mad belief in this sense is conceptually impossible. Cases of delusion—or at least some cases of delusion—might be cases of belief (...)
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  19. Eric Schwitzgebel (2014). The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.
    The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind. . ???aop.label???
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  20.  46
    Eric Schwitzgebel & Joshua Rust (2009). The Moral Behaviour of Ethicists: Peer Opinion. Mind 118 (472):1043 - 1059.
    If philosophical moral reflection tends to improve moral behaviour, one might expect that professional ethicists will, on average, behave morally better than non-ethicists. One potential source of insight into the moral behaviour of ethicists is philosophers' opinions about ethicists' behaviour. At the 2007 Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, we used chocolate to entice 277 passers-by to complete anonymous questionnaires without their knowing the topic of those questionnaires in advance. Version I of the questionnaire asked respondents to compare, (...)
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  21.  32
    Eric Schwitzgebel & Joshua Rust (2010). Do Ethicists and Political Philosophers Vote More Often Than Other Professors? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):189-199.
    If philosophical moral reflection improves moral behavior, one might expect ethics professors to behave morally better than socially similar non-ethicists. Under the assumption that forms of political engagement such as voting have moral worth, we looked at the rate at which a sample of professional ethicists—and political philosophers as a subgroup of ethicists—voted in eight years’ worth of elections. We compared ethicists’ and political philosophers’ voting rates with the voting rates of three other groups: philosophers not specializing in ethics, political (...)
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  22.  37
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2012). Introspection, What? In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press 29--48.
  23.  93
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2000). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.
    Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience.
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  24.  96
    Russell Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Little or No Experience Outside of Attention? Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):234.
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  25.  33
    Eric Schwitzgebel, Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  26.  34
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2014). The Problem of Known Illusion and the Resemblance of Experience to Reality. Philosophy of Science 81 (5):954-960.
    Are objects in convex passenger-side mirrors “closer than they appear”? If one adapts to inverting goggles, does the world go back to looking the way it was before, or does the world look approximately the same throughout the course of adaptation, only losing its normative sense of wrongness? The answers to these empirical, introspective questions might help cast light on the classic philosophical debate about the degree of resemblance between our visual experience of reality and things as they are in (...)
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  27.  66
    Russell Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Methodological Pluralism, Armchair Introspection, and DES as the Epistemic Tribunal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):253.
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  28.  51
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2015). 1% Skepticism. Noûs 49 (3).
    A 1% skeptic is someone who has about a 99% credence in non-skeptical realism and about a 1% credence in the disjunction of all radically skeptical scenarios combined. The first half of this essay defends the epistemic rationality of 1% skepticism, appealing to dream skepticism, simulation skepticism, cosmological skepticism, and wildcard skepticism. The second half of the essay explores the practical behavioral consequences of 1% skepticism, arguing that 1% skepticism need not be behaviorally inert.
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  29.  90
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or is Experience Limited to What's in Attention? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):5-35.
    According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep sounded, they (...)
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  30.  30
    Joshua Rust & Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Ethicists' and Nonethicists' Responsiveness to Student E‐Mails: Relationships Among Expressed Normative Attitude, Self‐Described Behavior, and Empirically Observed Behavior. Metaphilosophy 44 (3):350-371.
    Do professional ethicists behave any morally better than other professors do? Do they show any greater consistency between their normative attitudes and their behavior? In response to a survey question, a large majority of professors (83 percent of ethicists, 83 percent of nonethicist philosophers, and 85 percent of nonphilosophers) expressed the view that “not consistently responding to student e-mails” is morally bad. A similarly large majority of professors claimed to respond to at least 95 percent of student e-mails. These professors, (...)
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  31. Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):35-53.
    Philosophers tend to assume that we have excellent knowledge of our own current conscious experience or 'phenomenology'. I argue that our knowledge of one aspect of our experience, the experience of visual imagery, is actually rather poor. Precedent for this position is found among the introspective psychologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two main arguments are advanced toward the conclusion that our knowledge of our own imagery is poor. First, the reader is asked to form a visual (...)
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  32. Russell Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Presuppositions and Background Assumptions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):206-233.
     
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  33.  30
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2006). Do Things Look Flat? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):589-599.
    Does a penny viewed at an angle in some sense look elliptical, as though projected on a two-dimensional surface? Many philosophers have said such things, from Malebranche (1674/1997) and Hume (1739/1978), through early 20th-century sense-data theorists, to Tye (2000) and Noë (2004). I confess that it doesn't seem this way to me, though I'm somewhat baffled by the phenomenology and pessimistic about our ability to resolve the dispute. I raise geometrical complaints against the view and conjecture that views of this (...)
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  34.  2
    Eric Schwitzgebel (forthcoming). Is the United States Phenomenally Conscious? Reply to Kammerer. Philosophia:1-7.
    In Schwitzgebel I argued that the United States, considered as a concrete entity with people as some or all of its parts, meets plausible materialistic criteria for consciousness. Kammerer defends materialism against this seemingly unintuitive conclusion by means of an “anti-nesting principle” according to which group entities cannot be literally phenomenally conscious if they contain phenomenally conscious subparts who stand in a certain type of functional relation to the group as a whole. I raise three concerns about Kammerer’s view. First, (...)
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  35.  40
    Eric Schwitzgebel, Joshua Rust, Linus Ta-Lun Huang, Alan T. Moore & D. Justin Coates (2011). Ethicists' Courtesy at Philosophy Conferences. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):331 - 340.
    If philosophical moral reflection tends to promote moral behavior, one might think that professional ethicists would behave morally better than do socially comparable non-ethicists. We examined three types of courteous and discourteous behavior at American Philosophical Association conferences: talking audibly while the speaker is talking (versus remaining silent), allowing the door to slam shut while entering or exiting mid-session (versus attempting to close the door quietly), and leaving behind clutter at the end of a session (versus leaving one's seat tidy). (...)
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  36.  2
    Eric Schwitzgebel & Alan T. Moore (2015). Experimental Evidence for the Existence of an External World. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):564--582.
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  37. Alison Gopnik & Eric Schwitzgebel (1998). Whose Concepts Are They, Anyway? The Role of Philosophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology. In M. R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 75--91.
    This chapter examines several ways in which philosophical attention to intuition can contribute to empirical scientific psychology. The authors then discuss one prevalent misuse of intuition. An unspoken assumption of much argumentation in the philosophy of mind has been that to articulate our folk psychological intuitions, our ordinary concepts of belief, truth, meaning, and so forth, is itself sufficient to give a theoretical account of what belief, truth, meaning, and so forth, actually are. It is believed that this assumption rests (...)
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  38.  62
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Knowing Your Own Beliefs. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (supplement):41-62.
    How do you know your own beliefs? And how well do you know them? The two questions are related. I’ll recommend a pluralist answer to the first question. The answer to the second question, I’ll suggest, varies depending on features of the case.
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  39.  7
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Are Ethicists Any More Likely to Pay Their Registration Fees at Professional Meetings? Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):371-380.
    Lists of paid registrants at Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association from 2006–2008 were compared with lists of people appearing as presenters, commentators or chairs on the meeting programme those same years. These were years in which fee payment depended primarily on an honour system rather than on enforcement. Seventy-four per cent of ethicist participants and 76% of non-ethicist participants appear to have paid their meeting registration fees: not a statistically significant difference. This finding of no difference survives (...)
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  40.  66
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). No Unchallengeable Epistemic Authority, of Any Sort, Regarding Our Own Conscious Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).
    Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say (...)
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  41.  93
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). Why Did We Think We Dreamed in Black and White? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (4):649-660.
    In the 1950s, dream researchers commonly thought that dreams were predominantly a black and white phenomenon, although both earlier and later treatments of dreaming assume or assert that dreams have color. The first half of the twentieth century saw the rise of black and white film media, and it is likely that the emergence of the view that dreams are black and white was connected to this change in film technology. If our opinions about basic features of our dreams can (...)
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  42. Eric Schwitzgebel (forthcoming). Consciousness and the Self.
     
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  43.  90
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2012). Self-Ignorance. In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self. Cambridge University Press
    Philosophers tend to be pretty impressed by human self-knowledge. Descartes (1641/1984) thought our knowledge of our own stream of experience was the secure and indubitable foundation upon which to build our knowledge of the rest of the world. Hume – who was capable of being skeptical about almost anything – said that the only existences we can be certain of are our own sensory and imagistic experiences (1739/1978, p. 212). Perhaps the most prominent writer on self-knowledge in contemporary philosophy is (...)
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  44.  47
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2004). Introspective Training Apprehensively Defended: Reflections on Titchener's Lab Manual. In Anthony I. Jack (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic 11--7.
    To study conscious experience we must, to some extent, trust introspective reports; yet introspective reports often do not merit our trust. A century ago, E.B. Titchener advocated extensive introspective training as a means of resolving this difficulty. He describes many of his training techniques in his four-volume laboratory manual of 1901- 1905. This paper explores Titchener's laboratory manual with an eye to general questions about the prospects of introspective training for contemporary consciousness studies, with a focus on the following examples: (...)
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  45.  11
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). No Unchallengeable Epistemic Authority, of Any Sort, Regarding Our Own Conscious Experience – Contra Dennett? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):107-113.
    Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say (...)
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  46. Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Human Nature and Moral Education in Mencius, Xunzi, Hobbes, and Rousseau. History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (2):147 - 168.
    (2007) History of Philosophy Quarterly. 24, 147-168.
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  47.  42
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Reply to Kriegel, Smithies, and Spener. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1195-1206.
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  48.  39
    Eric Schwitzgebel (1999). Children's Theories and the Drive to Explain. Science and Education 8 (5):457-488.
    Debate has been growing in developmental psychology over how much the cognitive development of children is like theory change in science. Useful debate on this topic requires a clear understanding of what it would be for a child to have a theory. I argue that existing accounts of theories within philosophy of science and developmental psychology either are less precise than is ideal for the task or cannot capture everyday theorizing of the sort that children, if they theorize, must do. (...)
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  49.  32
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Précis: Perplexities of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1161-1163.
  50.  43
    Eric Schwitzgebel, On Containers and Content, with a Cautionary Note to Philosophers of Mind. Available on Author's Homepage.
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