Search results for 'E. Valberg' (try it on Scholar)

  1. E. Valberg (1980). A Theory of Secondary Qualities. Philosophy 55 (October):437-453.score: 150.0
    'color is not "in" objects" makes sense only if 'color "is" in objects' does. But it does not, Because we cannot say what it "would be like" if it "were". 'being green' means 'that which looks green' understood "attributively", Not referentially, I.E., 'that which looks green ("whatever that is")', Not 'that which emits certain light-Waves'. "contra" kripke, Heat is 'that which feels hot ("whatever that is")', Though the only thing whose "existence" it requires is molecular motion. If we ask what (...)
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  2. J. J. Valberg (2013). The Temporal Present. Philosophy 88 (3):369-386.score: 60.0
    It is easy to have about the temporal present, the time that is now, thoughts that seem both true and impossible. E.g., it is always like that', that is: now is always the time that matters. Yet here we seem to be generalizing the ascription to the temporal present of a property that claims uniqueness, viz., being the time that matters. The present paper explores, in the case of the temporal present, the meaning and implications of this kind of impossible (...)
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  3. Roderick Millar (1983). Valberg's Secondary Qualities. Philosophy 58 (January):107-109.score: 33.0
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