데카르트가 정의하는 사랑의 정념은 자기 보존과 유용성 중심의이기적인 것으로도 해석될 여지가 있고, 사랑의 대상을 위해 자기희생까지 감수하는 이타적인 것으로 해석될 여지도 있다. 여기서나는 데카르트의 입장을 이기주의에 가까운 것으로 보되, 그가 심신합일의 바탕에 심신이원론을 설정함으로써 이타주의나 공동체주의와 완전히 양립 가능한 독특한 에고이즘을 벼려냄을 보여준다. 이를 위해 나는 첫째, 사랑에 대한 데카르트의 정의가 ‘대상의 좋음’을 사랑의 핵심에 두는 아퀴나스적 관점과 결별하고 있음을 보여준다. 둘째, 사랑의 동기가 대상에서 주체로 옮겨온다고 해서, 데카르트의 사랑 개념이 홉스 류의 생물학적 이기주의를 함축한다고볼 수는 없음을 보여준다. 마지막으로, 사랑이 (...) 주체에게 가져다주는 진정한 이익이 자기 보존이나 욕구 충족이 아니라 감응 자체에서 얻는 영혼의 만족임을 보여주고, 이 만족이 영혼이 자기 신체와합일되어 있으면서도 지적 거리를 가질 수 있다는 점에 기반하고있음을 보여준다. (shrink)

Early Confucian ethics can best be understood as character consequentialism, an ethical theory concerned with the effects actions have upon the cultivation of virtues and which concentrates on certain psychological goods, particularly certain kinship relationships which it regards not only as intrinsically but also instrumentally valuable, as the source of more general social virtues. According to character consequentialism, the way to maximize the good is to maximize the number of virtuous individuals in society, but because human virtues (...) cannot be cultivated by pursuing their good consequences directly, they must be sought as expressions of a life ideal. This ideal entails developing one's nature to fulfill Heaven's design. (shrink)

To the question “What normative ethical theory does early Confucianism best represent?” researchers in the history of early Confucian philosophy respond with more than half a dozen different answers. They include sentimentalism, amoralism, pragmatism, Kantianism, Aristotelian virtue theory, care ethics, and role ethics. The lack of consensus is concerning, as three considerations make clear. First, fully trained, often leading, scholars advocate each of the theories. Second, nearly all participants in the debate believe that the central (...) feature of early Confucianism is its moral thought. However, these normative ethical theories are logically inconsistent with one another, the third point. The entailment is unavoidable: the majority of scholars of early Confucian normative ethics must be incorrect about their attributions of a normative theory to early Confucianism. It would appear, then, that we need a new dao 道 or pathway for the study of early Confucian moral thought. One alternative is to adopt an immersively interdisciplinary research methodology that pivots on the recognition that early Confucianism is a social-functional system the governing purpose of which is to influence cultural leaders. (shrink)

Normative Ethical theory underwent a period of refinement in some areas and proliferation in others during the 20th century. Theories prominent in the 19th century, such as Utilitarianism, underwent refinement in light of criticisms; other approaches, such as normative intuitionism and virtue ethics, were developed in new directions, ones that reflected the sophistication of analytical techniques developed by philosophers in the 20th century, particularly in ordinary language philosophy. The middle of the 20th century was marked by an interest (...) in conceptual analysis and what could be revealed about our concepts in the analysis of ‘ordinary’ language appeals to those concepts. For example, Gilbert Ryle argued that the hope of clearing up our concepts via formalizing them was futile, and instead the task of philosophy was to clear up confusions present in the ordinary use of concepts, concepts employed by ordinary people as well as specialists in a given area. Normative ethicists in the very early part of the 20th century had not yet adopted a ‘scientizing’ attitude to philosophy. They believed, for example, that one could rely on intuition in formulating ethical theories.1 Theorists in the early part of the century were also optimistic about the prospects of systematizing normative ethics in a way that would be faithful to our common sense normative judgments. This began, largely, with a critical look at Utilitarianism. (shrink)

Early Confucian thought is still not completely understood. This is particularly so, I argue, in the case of Mencius , who was the first prominent follower of Confucius. I present a new reading of this early figure. ;The key problem in traditional analyses is in attributing to Mencius the view that a person's motivational capacities, especially her emotions, require cultivation in order for her to act and feel correctly. That reading, combined with certain important passages of the text, (...) make it seem that Mencius is quite simply confused. For he seems in those passages to exhort people to do and feel what is right even though it is clear that they lack the kind of cultivation Mencius's view supposedly requires. What is more, he quite obviously expects such people to be able immediately to do and feel what is right. ;Once we leave the cultivation reading behind, I argue, pieces of Mencius's fall into place and a more or less systematic ethical theory begins to form. Far from being confused, I argue, Mencius combines a psychologically realistic account of the morally virtuous person, i.e. one which recognizes human limitations with respect to our emotional lives, with a plausible account of the control that we have and the responsibility that we bear for how we feel or don't feel toward one another. (shrink)

BackgroundOur human societies and certainly also (bio) medicine are more and more permeated with technology. There seems to be an increasing awareness among bioethicists that an effective and comprehensive approach to ethically guide these emerging biomedical innovations into society is needed. Such an approach has not been spelled out yet for bioethics, while there are frequent calls for ethical guidance of biomedical innovation, also by biomedical researchers themselves. New and emerging biotechnologies require anticipation of possible effects and implications, meaning (...) the scope is not evaluative after a technology has been fully developed or about hypothetical technologies, but real-time for a real biotechnology.Main textIn this paper we aim to substantiate and discuss six ingredients that we increasingly see adopted by ethicists and that together constitute “ethics parallel research”. This approach allows to fulfil two aims: guiding the development process of technologies in biomedicine and providing input for the normative evaluation of such technologies. The six ingredients of ethics parallel research are: (1) disentangling wicked problems, (2) upstream or midstream ethical analysis, (3) ethics from within, (4) inclusion of empirical research, (5) public participation and (6) mapping societal impacts, including hard and soft impacts. We will draw on gene editing, organoid technology and artificial intelligence as examples to illustrate these six ingredients.ConclusionEthics parallel research brings together these ingredients to ethically analyse and proactively or parallel guide technological development. It widens the roles and judgements from the ethicist to a more anticipatory and constructively guiding role. Ethics parallel research is characterised by a constructive, rather than a purely critical perspective, it focusses on developing best-practices rather than outlining worst practice, and draws on insights from social sciences and philosophy of technology. (shrink)

The theories of Locke, Hume and Kant dominate contemporary philosophical discourse on property rights. This is particularly true of applied ethics, where they are used to settle issues from biotech patents to managerial obligations. Within these theories, however, the usual criticisms of private property aren’t even as much as intelligible. Locke, Hume and Kant, I argue, develop claims about property on a model economy that I call “Frontier Town.” They and contemporary authors then apply these claims to capitalist economies. There (...) are two problems with this application: First, we’ll be considering the wrong kind of property: The only property in Frontier Town are means of life. Critics, however, object to property in concentrated capital because they associate only this kind of property with economic coercion and political power. Second, the two economies differ in central features, so that very different claims about empirical consequences and hence about fairness and merit will be plausible for each. This second problem, I argue, is a consequence of the first. I conclude that Frontier Town theories are more likely to distort than to illuminate property issues in capitalist economies. (shrink)

Mary Astell is best known today as one of the earliest English feminists. This book sheds new light on her writings by interpreting her first and foremost as a moral philosopher—as someone committed to providing guidance on how best to live. The central claim of this work is that all the different strands of Astell’s thought—her epistemology, her metaphysics, her philosophy of the passions, her feminist vision, and her conservative political views—are best understood in light of her ethical objectives. (...) To support that claim, this work examines Astell’s programme to bring about a moral transformation of character in her fellow women. This ethical programme draws on several key aspects of seventeenth-century philosophy, including Cartesian and Neoplatonist epistemologies, ontological and cosmological proofs for the existence of God, rationalist arguments for the soul’s immateriality, and theories about how to regulate the passions in accordance with reason. At the heart of Astell’s philosophical system lies a theory of virtue, including guidelines about how to cultivate generosity of character, a benevolent disposition towards others, and the virtue of moderation. This book explains the foundations of that moral theory, and then examines how it shapes and informs Astell’s response to male tyranny within marriage and to political tyranny in the state. It concludes with some reflections on the historiographical implications of writing Mary Astell back into the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The second edition of Doing Ethics in Media continues its mission of providing an accessible but comprehensive introduction to media ethics, with a theoretical grounding in moral philosophy, to help students think clearly and systematically about dilemmas in the rapidly changing media environment. Each chapter highlights specific considerations, cases, and practical applications for the fields of journalism, advertising, digital media, entertainment, public relations, and social media. Six fundamental decision-making questions - the "5Ws and H" around which the book is organized (...) - provide a path for students to articulate the issues; understand applicable law and ethics codes; consider the needs of stakeholders; work through conflicting values; integrate philosophic principles; and pose a "test of publicity." Students are challenged to be active ethical thinkers through the authors' reader-friendly style and use of critical early-career examples. While most people will change careers several times during their lives, all of us are life-long media consumers, and Doing Ethics in Media prepares readers for that task. Doing Ethics in Media is aimed at undergraduate and graduate students studying media ethics in mass media, journalism, and media studies. It also serves students in rhetoric, popular culture, communication studies, and interdisciplinary social sciences. The book's companion website-doingethicsin.media, or www.doingmediaethics.com-provides continuously updated real-world media ethics examples and collections of essays from experts and students. The site also hosts ancillary materials for students and for instructors, including a test bank and instructor's manual. (shrink)

Going beyond the theory/practice and discourse/matter divides -- Learning and becoming in an onto-epistemology -- The tool of pedagogical documentation -- An intra-active pedagogy and its dual movements -- Transgressing binary practices in early childhood teacher education -- The hybrid-writing-process: going beyond the theory/practice divide in academic writing -- An ethics of immanence and potentialities for early childhood education.

This third volume in the definitive edition of Dewey's early work opens with his tribute to George Sylvester Morris, the former teacher who had brought Dewey to the University of Michigan. Morris's death in 1889 left vacant the Department of Philosophy chairmanship and led to Dewey's returning to fill that post after a year's stay at Minnesota. Appearing here, among all his writings from 1889 through 1892, are Dewey's earliest comprehensive statements on logic and his first book on ethics. (...) Dewey's marked copy of the galley-proof for his important article The Present Position of Logical Theory, recently discovered among the papers of the Open Court Publishing Company, is used as the basis for the text, making available for the first time his final changes and corrections. The textual studies that make The Early Works unique among American philosophical editions are reported in detail. One of these, A Note on Applied Psychology, documents the fact that Dewey did not co-author this book frequently attributed to him. Six brief unsigned articles written in 1891 for a University of Michigan student publication, the Inlander, have been identified as Dewey's and are also included in this volume. In both style and content, these articles reflect Dewey's conviction that philosophy should be used as a means of illuminating the contemporary scene; thus they add a new dimension to present knowledge of his early writing. (shrink)

This third volume in the definitive edition of Dewey's early work opens with his tribute to George Sylvester Morris, the former teacher who had brought Dewey to the University of Michigan.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ethics, Theory and the NovelRichard FreadmanEthics, Theory and the Novel, by David Parker; x & 218 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, $54.95 paper.“The word ‘ethics’ seems to have replaced ‘textuality’ as the most charged term in the vocabulary of contemporary literary and cultural theory”— so writes Steven Connor in the TLS. The claim will strike some as surprising—not least the so-called “humanist” critics who (...) for almost three decades have been defending ethical discourse against attacks from proponents of “literary and cultural theory.” There have been various intellectual sources for these attacks: neo-Marxists have claimed that ethical discourse is intrinsically class-specific and therefore ideological; psychoanalytic critics and theorists have often eschewed ethical inquiry in the belief that human conduct is predominantly determined by amoral unconscious forces; many feminists have argued that traditional ethical discourses are rendered untenable by their “gendered” histories; poststructuralists, while in some cases wanting to keep ethics on the agenda, have found it disconcertingly hard—even impossible—to conjure worthwhile ethical discourse out of a position which denies the existence of “centered” moral agents, and which sees language as inherently slippery and self-contradictory; postcolonialists tend to see Western ethical discourses as culpably ethnocentric. And so on.Yet, whatever the rhetoric of these and other strands of literary and cultural theory, it is too simple to say that they have renounced ethics altogether. Clearly, feminism, postcolonialism, Marxism, and other movements are ethical projects, and one of David Parker’s central points in Ethics, Theory, and the Novel is that the rhetoric of ethical refusal on the part of some proponents of these movements reflects an act of costly and unwarranted cultural repression: “the expansive moment of poststructuralism in the 1970s and early 1980s has suppressed some discursive possibilities which, constituted as we are partly by [End Page 519] various religious and humanistic traditions, we stand in abiding need of, and are poorer without” (pp. 3–4). Another casualty of the process, he argues, has been literature itself: it has been downgraded by the proponents of cultural studies, relegated to secondary, evidential status. Parker wants to retrieve cultural centrality and prestige for literature, and to insist that literary theory needs a rich conception of canonical literature, which “ought to be regarded as Theory’s resistant Other” (p. 6). Together with humanist criticism itself, such texts should function as the “subversive Other to the suppressive will of hegemonic Theory” (p. 146).The sense of regret at suppressed human richness and possibility is everywhere apparent in this subtle, deeply considered book. Parker’s characterization of our ethical and broader cultural predicament owes much to Charles Taylor’s monumental Sources of the Self; in particular, to Taylor’s claim that we need to “acknowledge the full range of goods we live by” (p. 20), and his three-fold account of our ethical traditions: Kantian/Judeo-Christian, Enlightenment, Romantic. Out of the cultural pluralism inherent in Taylor’s project Parker fashions a critical pluralism which reads, and also evaluates, novels in the light of their treatment of the “various goods”—the ethical strands—they explore, dramatize, and embody. His principle texts are Middlemarch, Anna Karenina, The White Peacock, and Women in Love. It is central to his case that with variousness comes tension and conflict, and that the greatest literature is that which gives ethical complexity and diversity the least reductive, “the fullest, most engaged and most intelligent examination” (p. 197). Such writing constitutes a canon—an institution for which Parker offers a courageous and compelling defense. He argues that some texts just are better than others at reflecting “the full range of good we live by,” and that, far from being merely an expression of supremacist cultural bias, the ethnocentrism of the Western canon actually schools us in “a long ethical tradition of self-reflection precisely on the tendency to self-righteous superiority” (p. 50).Literature’s contribution to “self-reflection” is crucial precisely because we are so prone to repress, to forget: the cultural selectivity against which Taylor warns is mirrored and enacted in the individual psyche. Parker is particularly concerned with two kinds of forgetting: a righteousness which blinds us... (shrink)

In The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5) Paul Linjamaa offers the first full length thematical monograph on the longest Valentinian text extant today. By investigating the ethics of The Tripartite Tractate, this study offers in-depth exploration of the text's ontology, epistemology, theory of will, and passions, as well as the anthropology and social setting of the text. Valentinians have often been associated with determinism, which has been presented as "Gnostic" and then not taken seriously, or disregarded (...) as an invention of ancient intra-Christian polemics. Linjamaa challenges this conception and presents insights into how early Christian determinism actually worked, and how it effectively sustained viable and functioning ethics. (shrink)

This paper offers a revisionary interpretation of Sartre's early views on human freedom. Sartre articulates a subtle account of a fundamental sense of human freedom as autonomy, in terms of human consciousness being both reasons-responsive and in a distinctive sense self-determining. The aspects of Sartre's theory of human freedom that underpin his early ethics are shown to be based on his phenomenological analysis of consciousness as, in its fundamental mode of self-presence, not an object in the world. (...) Sartre has a multi-level theory of the reasons-sensitivity of consciousness. At one level, consciousness's being alive to reasons is a matter of the affective perception of values and disvalues as features of phenomenal objects. This part of his theory, a development of Scheler's, is, however, situated within a broader phenomenological analysis resulting in the claim that the ultimate reasons acknowledged by consciousness neither are nor justifiably could be values adequately presentable as intentional objects. Consciousness's ultimate reasons are, in this sense, not given by the world but by itself. Section 4 reconstructs and assesses Sartre's argument that consciousness cannot rationally have an ultimate end other than self-transparent freedom itself. (shrink)

Contemporary commentators on the history of ethics have devoted little attention to the ethical theory of Thomas Reid. The main reason for this neglect concerns the perspective from which they are very likely to view his theory. Roughly, this perspective is as follows. Eighteenth century ethics tends to be viewed as consisting mainly in the prolonged dispute concerning the nature of the moral faculty. In identifying Reid’s part in this dispute it should be noted that his Essays (...) on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, his major work on ethics, was published in 1788. It was therefore preceded by the works of such early rational intuitionists as Cudworth, Clarke, Balguy, and Wollaston and by the criticisms directed against them by such defenders of the moral sense position as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume. Moreover, it was preceded by the intuitionistic counterattack directed against the latter by Richard Price, a near contemporary of Reid, who has often been described as the greatest of the intuitionists and whose prominence is such that his ethical theory has tended to eclipse that of Reid. The result is that there are in Reid a large number of pages devoted to restatements of an intuitionistic position which a contemporary reader has already encountered in earlier writers and which he is therefore likely to find rather boring. Even those who have maintained correctly that Reid is the founder of the Scottish school of common sense and that his ethical theory is to be seen in the context of his defense of common sense have added little to this perspective, since, generally speaking, they have found no significant differences between his ethical theory as seen in this context and intuitionism. Viewed from this perspective, Reid’s ethics might well be deserving of neglect and of the comment made by Alasdair MacIntyre that “the successors of Hume and Adam Smith in Scottish philosophy have little to say to us. Thomas Reid was a rationalist in the spirit of Price.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reason and Emotion. Essays in Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical TheoryEve Browning ColeJohn M. Cooper, Reason and Emotion. Essays in Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Pp. xiii + 605. Cloth, $75.00.This collection of essays spans 27 years of John Cooper's career as an interpreter of ancient philosophy. Its earliest essay, "The Magna Moralia and Aristotle's Moral Philosophy," already shows (...) Cooper's distinctive approach; he seeks to discover "a simpler and more natural way" (200) to understand the discrepancies between this small treatise and Aristotle's major ethical works than by the comparatively convoluted theory of Dirlmeier. In seeking this simpler and more natural interpretive route, Cooper attends to "the philosophical content of the work" (202), rather than considerations of style and linguistic usage. He concludes with frank discussion of the problems which his interpretation cannot solve; these are dismissed with characteristic exasperation-italics: "... one must not expect to explain everything..." (210). He confines his rougher polemical points to footnotes (Dirlmeier "doesn't even face the question squarely" in note 19, hence he is "wildly off" in note 28). [End Page 430]These characteristics run through all the essays here collected. Only two of the 23 essays are previously unpublished: a reconsideration of Xenophon as a source on Socrates, and a treatment of pleasure and desire in Epicurus. Other essays take up moral problems examined by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and several Hellenistic philosophers or schools. A theme running through most if not all the discussions is the desire (shared by the ancient philosophers and by Cooper equally, it would seem) to develop and defend a viable eudaimonism. The relation between human goodness and human happiness must be shown to be one of extremely close affinity, such that the virtuous are also the happy, even in adversity. Thus though no attempt is made to connect the essays into a coherent argument leading to a global thesis about ancient moral philosophy, the book nevertheless contains the ingredients for such an argument and thesis. The book presenting such an argument and thesis could in some ways be both more elegant and more helpful than this collection; it could spend fewer of its pages in arguing against other interpreters over minor differences (the standard journal-article format for our time), more of its pages awakening the texts, eliciting their message, and presenting it in a form useful for guiding life. Perhaps Cooper will write such a book soon.But the present volume will certainly be of interest to scholars and students, who will find in it much to enjoy and ponder. Generally what is striking about Cooper's interpretations is their freshness. He is at his best when dislodging some stale orthodoxy. The essay on Xenophon's Socrates is a case in point. The portrait of Socrates which emerges in Xenophon's Memorabilia is usually taken to be far less accurate than that presented in Plato's earlier dialogues. The Memorabilia seldom appear on the required reading lists of Greek philosophy courses, nor does Xenophon's version of Socrates' approach to moral questions receive even a fraction of the scholarly attention devoted to Plato's early work. Cooper convincingly shows this neglect to rest on a prejudice. The Socrates of Xenophon's portrait addresses a different kind of audience than that of Plato; the difference in the style of questioning and in the topics discussed reflects the historical Socrates' sensitivity to his partners in conversation. He addresses them where they live (so to speak), and this makes him "all the more remarkable a person" (14).Two other strengths run throughout the essays here collected. No matter how intense the exegetical quibble may have become on any given page, Cooper is able to make a sudden soaring flight upward and provide a synoptic view of the broader philosophical terrain, both for any given philosopher and for that philosopher's contemporaries, predecessors, and successors. These flights are sometimes dizzying and often unpredictable, but always refreshing.In addition, Cooper is able to make connections with large issues in contemporary moral philosophy, relating the ancient controversies to their modern versions (John Rawls, Bernard Williams, Leo Strauss... (shrink)

This two-volume work examines far-reaching debates on the concept of courage from Greek antiquity to the Christian and mediaeval periods, as well as the modern era. Volume 1 explains how competing accounts of epistêmê, rational wisdom, and truth dominated classical antiquity. Early Christian and mediaeval thinkers, in contrast, favoured fortitude founded on faith and fear of God over philosophical reasoning left to its own devices. Volume 2 turns to theories of courage from the early modern period to the (...) present. It shows how the twin laws of polis and physis are at the heart of post-medieval thought. Courage is found at the crossroads of love and dread, freedom and fate, happiness and suffering, as well as power and submission to the ruling order. The later influence of evolutionism, existentialism, and the social and natural sciences on moral philosophy is also addressed at some length. The protection of people's best interests, the passions and powers of the human will, and the rule of active energy in all aspects of life supplant courage formerly viewed through the lens of reason or faith, or a combination of the two. These new ideas, paradoxically, herald the end of the ethics of courage. They also undermine the courage of ethical thinking. Courage is no longer an end in itself, nor is it a means to happiness "at the end." Regardless of what Gandhi, Tillich, and Foucault have to say about the topic, late modernity and the global age witness a marked loss of interest in courage as an idea worthy of conceptual investigation. Debates about the moral implications of courage give way to the value-free science of resilience, which studies how people can recover from past trauma and find wellness, primarily in the realm of physis. (shrink)

Early Childhood and Neuroscience is a practical guide to understanding the complex and challenging subject of neuroscience and its use (and misapplication) in early childhood policy and practice. The 2nd edition has been updated throughout and includes three new chapters on: - the effects of childhood trauma - school readiness - neurodiversity It also includes a new Foreword by Laura Jana (Penn State University, USA). The book provides a balanced overview of the debates by weaving discussion on the (...) opportunities of using neuroscience in early childhood practice with examination of the limitations and ethical implications throughout the chapters. This enables students to inform their own opinions about the discipline and its use in their future practice. Clear explanations of the main terms and theories are complemented with illustrative case studies of cutting-edge research from around the world, a glossary of key terms and suggestions for further reading. Reflective discussion questions give students the chance to apply their theoretical knowledge to real-world contexts. (shrink)

There is the world of ideas and the world of practice; the French are often for sup pressing the one and the English the other; but neither is to be suppressed. -Matthew Arnold The Function of Criticism at the Present Time From its inception, bioethics has confronted the need to reconcile theory and practice. At first the confrontation was purely intellectual, as writers on ethical theory (within phi losophy, theology, or other humanistic disciplines) turned their attention to (...) topics from the world of medical practice. Recently the confrontation has grown more intense. The ap pointment of clinical ethicists in hospitals and other health care settings is an accelerating trend in North America. Concomitantly, those institutions involved in training peo ple in clinical ethics have added organized exposure to the world of practice, in the form of placement requirements, to the normal academic course load. In common with other dis ciplines, bioethics has begun to see clinical training as a con dition of didactic theory and apprenticeship. (shrink)

This book reconstructs in detail the older Stoic theory of the psychology of action, discussing it in relation to Aristotelian, Epicurean, Platonic, and some of the more influential modern theories. Important Greek terms are transliterated and explained; no knowledge of Greek is required.

"Throughout the centuries, moral philosophers, both Eastern and Western, considered a permanent and eternal law a necessary requirement for the formulation of a moral principle. If such a law was not empirically given, it had to be determined through reason. In contrast, early Buddhism presented a radical theory of impermanence. Interpreters of early Buddhism have been unable to abandon the presupposition of permanence, however, and hence have persisted in viewing nirvana or freedom as a permanent and eternal (...) state to be contrasted with the impermanent world of sensory experience and bondage. Ethics in Early Buddhism is David J. Kalupahana's balanced and brilliantly concise attempt to place the early Buddhist descriptions of the world of experience, the state of freedom, and the moral principle leading to such freedom within the framework of impermanence."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

Hegel's reflections depend on the unique semantic richness of the German term Gleichheit, which has a wider range of application than the English term "equality." While Gleichheit can certainly mean equality or "parity" in the sense of sharing the same set of rights or status as another, it can also mean "to resemble" or "to be like" something in a certain respect. For Hegel, however, resemblance is not merely a relation between shared external properties, but rather two things are said (...) to be "equal" or "alike" to the extent they are united within the same horizon of existential conditions. Consequently, Gleichheit can mean both a kind of parity in respect of some external set of shared properties or rights, or to be alike in respect of some fundamental condition of existence. The originality of Hegel's conception of equality is to explicitly segregate these two senses of Gleichheit, so that he may reject the status of mere parity or "equivalence" of individuals before the law, in favor of a conception of complete ethical "likeness" or similarity between moral agents, in which Self and Other are united within the same ethical horizon. (shrink)

Spinoza shares with almost all apologists for forgiveness the idea that laying down one’s resentment of a wrong, contempt for a wrongdoer, and overcoming “bondage” to hatred, must be a primary ethical aim. Yet he denies that doing so authorizes pardoning a penitent wrongdoer. He argues that in civil society, it is actually a matter of charity and piety to collude in punishing a wrongdoer—dragging the wrongdoer before a judge, but not “judging” him oneself. I argue that Spinoza offers (...) no warrant to pardon whatever for those not authorized under civil law to punish. But I argue that the response to others’ hatred and deceit that Spinoza urges his reader to cultivate in Ethics 5p10, along with his argument that one may ‘turn the other cheek’ under conditions of oppression, where no sovereign power prosecutes claims of justice, mandates a broader emergent and reparative view of forgiveness. (shrink)

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a (...) compassionate present-with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us-and-them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in-group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co-creating knowledge in perilous times. (shrink)

Providing an accessible examination of ethics, Doing Ethics in Media, introduces students to ethical theory and provides a grounded discussion of ethics in the context of today's media outlets. Emphasizing the understanding of ethics, the text will help readers 'do ethics' expeditiously, honestly, and efficiently when they enter the workplace and need to make critical ethical decisions on deadline. The text is organized around six decision-making questions, and cases demonstrate the application of these questions to real-world scenarios. (...) Each chapter focuses on a specific ethical theory or issue, with a thorough discussion of the key points accompanied by practical applications, demonstrated through references to classic and contemporary issues in media. Student voices are heard throughout the book, illustrating how they have grappled with and applied the concepts in their own worlds and in the media. Distinctive features include: a new approach to ethical decision making through the "5W's and H" questions that serve as the book's framework; discussions and case studies aimed at five media disciplines: journalism, new media, advertising, public relations, and entertainment. Cases engage students at early stages of their careers, and consider that most students will change careers several times comprehensive materials on classic moral theory and current issues such as truth telling and deception, values, persuasion and propaganda, privacy, diversity, loyalty, moral development, and codes of ethics user-friendly approach throughout the book challenges students to think for themselves rather than imposing answers on them connects the model or theory to every decision-making challenge (44 cases and dozens of practical applications) a Companion Website with ancillary materials for students and for instructors (including a test bank and instructor's manual). This text has been written for undergraduates and graduate students studying media ethics in mass media, journalism, and media studies. It also will serve students in rhetoric, popular culture, communication studies, and interdisciplinary social sciences"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reason and Emotion. Essays in Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical TheoryEve Browning ColeJohn M. Cooper, Reason and Emotion. Essays in Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Pp. xiii + 605. Cloth, $75.00.This collection of essays spans 27 years of John Cooper's career as an interpreter of ancient philosophy. Its earliest essay, "The Magna Moralia and Aristotle's Moral Philosophy," already shows (...) Cooper's distinctive approach; he seeks to discover "a simpler and more natural way" (200) to understand the discrepancies between this small treatise and Aristotle's major ethical works than by the comparatively convoluted theory of Dirlmeier. In seeking this simpler and more natural interpretive route, Cooper attends to "the philosophical content of the work" (202), rather than considerations of style and linguistic usage. He concludes with frank discussion of the problems which his interpretation cannot solve; these are dismissed with characteristic exasperation-italics: "... one must not expect to explain everything..." (210). He confines his rougher polemical points to footnotes (Dirlmeier "doesn't even face the question squarely" in note 19, hence he is "wildly off" in note 28). [End Page 430]These characteristics run through all the essays here collected. Only two of the 23 essays are previously unpublished: a reconsideration of Xenophon as a source on Socrates, and a treatment of pleasure and desire in Epicurus. Other essays take up moral problems examined by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and several Hellenistic philosophers or schools. A theme running through most if not all the discussions is the desire (shared by the ancient philosophers and by Cooper equally, it would seem) to develop and defend a viable eudaimonism. The relation between human goodness and human happiness must be shown to be one of extremely close affinity, such that the virtuous are also the happy, even in adversity. Thus though no attempt is made to connect the essays into a coherent argument leading to a global thesis about ancient moral philosophy, the book nevertheless contains the ingredients for such an argument and thesis. The book presenting such an argument and thesis could in some ways be both more elegant and more helpful than this collection; it could spend fewer of its pages in arguing against other interpreters over minor differences (the standard journal-article format for our time), more of its pages awakening the texts, eliciting their message, and presenting it in a form useful for guiding life. Perhaps Cooper will write such a book soon.But the present volume will certainly be of interest to scholars and students, who will find in it much to enjoy and ponder. Generally what is striking about Cooper's interpretations is their freshness. He is at his best when dislodging some stale orthodoxy. The essay on Xenophon's Socrates is a case in point. The portrait of Socrates which emerges in Xenophon's Memorabilia is usually taken to be far less accurate than that presented in Plato's earlier dialogues. The Memorabilia seldom appear on the required reading lists of Greek philosophy courses, nor does Xenophon's version of Socrates' approach to moral questions receive even a fraction of the scholarly attention devoted to Plato's early work. Cooper convincingly shows this neglect to rest on a prejudice. The Socrates of Xenophon's portrait addresses a different kind of audience than that of Plato; the difference in the style of questioning and in the topics discussed reflects the historical Socrates' sensitivity to his partners in conversation. He addresses them where they live (so to speak), and this makes him "all the more remarkable a person" (14).Two other strengths run throughout the essays here collected. No matter how intense the exegetical quibble may have become on any given page, Cooper is able to make a sudden soaring flight upward and provide a synoptic view of the broader philosophical terrain, both for any given philosopher and for that philosopher's contemporaries, predecessors, and successors. These flights are sometimes dizzying and often unpredictable, but always refreshing.In addition, Cooper is able to make connections with large issues in contemporary moral philosophy, relating the ancient controversies to their modern versions (John Rawls, Bernard Williams, Leo Strauss... (shrink)

Data access and data sharing are vital to advance medicine. A growing number of public private partnerships are set up to facilitate data access and sharing, as private and public actors possess highly complementary health data sets and treatment development resources. However, the priorities and incentives of public and private organizations are frequently in conflict. This has complicated partnerships and sparked public concerns around ethical issues such as trust, justice or privacy—in turn raising an important problem in business and (...) data ethics: how can ethical theory inform the practice of public and private partners to mitigate misaligned incentives, and ensure that they can deliver societally beneficial innovation? In this paper, we report on the development of the Swiss Personalized Health Network’s ethical guidelines for health data sharing in public private partnerships. We describe the process of identifying ethical issues and engaging core stakeholders to incorporate their practical reality on these issues. Our report highlights core ethical issues in health data public private partnerships and provides strategies for how to overcome these in the Swiss health data context. By agreeing on and formalizing ethical principles and practices at the beginning of a partnership, partners and society can benefit from a relationship built around a mutual commitment to ethical principles. We present this summary in the hope that it will contribute to the global data sharing dialogue. (shrink)

Jensen limits himself mainly to the early work of Hutcheson, i.e., Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil and Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with brief mention of his later work. This seems to be quite justified in that the more interesting and perhaps more creative work of Hutcheson appears in his earlier writings. The main thrust of this study is to examine Hutcheson’s theory of motivation and his moral sense theory, first (...) individually and then in their interrelationship. Jensen’s presentation of Hutcheson’s moral sense theory makes use of the work and scholarship of such writers as Broad, Frankena, Blackstone and Peach, although Jensen assesses these authors, and in the last chapter, offers his own suggestions for the improvement of Hutcheson’s theory. The real forte of this book lies in the author’s original examination and reflection upon Hutcheson’s theory of motivation. It is this theory, Jensen declares, which "... constitutes one of his most valuable contributions to moral philosophy." It seems to be by virtue of this theory that Hutcheson can be understood as stressing the practical and dynamic dimensions of morality. Yet coupled with the moral sense theory, the results, as Jensen takes care to show, are somewhat disastrous. Some of the problems arising from this union are the following: how the moral sense influences motivation, how "justifying reasons" relate to action, and how obligation relates to motivation. This book is a scholarly work in philosophy which illumines some perennial philosophical perplexities in the light of recent philosophical work, thus making these problems intelligible and meaningful to philosophers today.—P. R. (shrink)

G.E.M. Anscombe famously claimed that ‘the Hebrew-Christian ethic’ differs from consequentialist theories in its ability to ground the claim that killing the innocent is intrinsically wrong. According to Anscombe, this is owing to its legal character, rooted in the divine decrees of the Torah. Divine decrees confer a particular moral sense of ‘ought’ by which this and other act-types can be ‘wrong’ regardless of their consequences, she maintained. There is, of course, a potentially devastating counter-example. Within the Torah, Abraham is (...) apparently commanded by God to slaughter and set fire to his innocent son, Isaac. For attempting to do so, he is praised in the Biblical passage and by later Jewish and Christian commentators. This paper examines rabbinic and early Christian analyses of the story and finds that it was not unambiguously held by these interpreters that God absolutely prohibits killing the innocent, until the time of Augustine, whose position on the story evolved over time. (shrink)

In the previous module, I covered the basics of Early Buddhist metaethics. The core ideas here are: (1) linguistic representation is not the same as reality – linguistic representation depicts reality as static, but reality is relational and dynamic; (2) reality can drift away from linguistic representation causing disappointment – duḥkha; (3) choosing wisely now can result in a better future; (4) ethical choice involves appreciating the justifying relations of states of affairs. In this module, I explore the (...) Four Noble Truths and the Eight-Fold Path as efforts to systematise these findings as the basis of a normative theory and applied ethics. Of special concern is its culmination in Buddhist practices of meditation. In the fourth section, we shall examine the relationship between these meditational practices and Buddhist Consequentialism. Indeed, the very practice of meditation is, in large measure, justified by the outcomes that Buddhists meditate upon. This approach to ethics is not only consequentialist, but provides a uniquely Buddhist approach to overcoming personal challenges. This allows us to revisit the issue of rule following in Buddhism. Contrary to those who would claim that Buddhist uses of "dharma" to identify wrong motives is proof that such uses are amoral, or inconsistent with Consequentialism, I show that this is exactly what we would expect if Buddhist ethics is Consequentialist. Such dharmas (ethical ends) are to be treated as ends, and not as means. Mindfulness is the appropriate means justified by such ends. The absurdity arises if we abandon Consequentialism and treat such ends requiring justification or as procedures that are reasonable, and not what confers justification. (shrink)

In this dissertation, the author compares early Confucian ethics with some forms of moral sentimentalism. The ethical views of two Confucian moralists, Kongzi and Mengzi are compared with Michael Slote's agent-based moral sentimentalist virtue ethics and Nel Noddings' feminine relational ethics of caring; the Confucian ethicist Xunzi's theory is compared with David Hume's classical version of moral sentimentalism. Through argumentation and theoretical reconstruction, the author attempts to establish that Kongzi and Mengzi's ethical accounts are agent-based while (...) Xunzi's is agent-prior; Kongzi's notion of shu, Mengzi's concept of ceyin zhi xin, and Xunzi's idea of "inner constitution" represent different forms of empathy. The author proposes the notion of relational virtue to reconcile the virtue ethical conception of caring with the relational ethical conception of caring. Through these comparisons and the reconciliation the author emphasizes the common ground Confucian ethics shares with the moral sentimentalist tradition. This work as the whole, therefore, represents a radical departure from traditional comparative studies that tend to emphasize the affinity between early Confucian ethics and the ancient Greek tradition. (shrink)

This essay examines the role that the the ethical plays in early Confucian political philosophy. By focusing primarily on the political thought of Xunzi, I argue that there is a necessary relationship between ethical ideas and political ideas in texts such as the Analects, Mengzi, and Xunzi. In particular, I argue against a more ‘realist’ reading of the tradition which argues that for early Confucians political order was not only a goal independent of ethical goals (...) but also one in which morality had no role to play. In doing so, I show that interpreting the early Confucians constructing their political thought on top of the scaffolding of their ethical views allows us to make more sense of the broader array of ideas on the political realm appearing throughout these texts. (shrink)

In memory of Anthony C. Yu who read and commented on an early version of this article.In the comparative philosophy of art, there is a widely accepted view that, while classical Western aesthetic theory emphasizes the unity of beauty and truth, classical Chinese aesthetic theory focuses on the unity of beauty and goodness. Indeed, one striking feature of Chinese aesthetics is its emphasis on moral education and didacticism. Although Western tradition also emphasizes the importance of moral education (...) in art as early as Plato, there had appeared, after Horace and Philip Sidney, a dualist paradigm, which, while giving emphasis to both didacticism and entertainment, tends to put priority on the latter. By.. (shrink)

Jensen limits himself mainly to the early work of Hutcheson, i.e., Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil and Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with brief mention of his later work. This seems to be quite justified in that the more interesting and perhaps more creative work of Hutcheson appears in his earlier writings. The main thrust of this study is to examine Hutcheson’s theory of motivation and his moral sense theory, first (...) individually and then in their interrelationship. Jensen’s presentation of Hutcheson’s moral sense theory makes use of the work and scholarship of such writers as Broad, Frankena, Blackstone and Peach, although Jensen assesses these authors, and in the last chapter, offers his own suggestions for the improvement of Hutcheson’s theory. The real forte of this book lies in the author’s original examination and reflection upon Hutcheson’s theory of motivation. It is this theory, Jensen declares, which "... constitutes one of his most valuable contributions to moral philosophy." It seems to be by virtue of this theory that Hutcheson can be understood as stressing the practical and dynamic dimensions of morality. Yet coupled with the moral sense theory, the results, as Jensen takes care to show, are somewhat disastrous. Some of the problems arising from this union are the following: how the moral sense influences motivation, how "justifying reasons" relate to action, and how obligation relates to motivation. This book is a scholarly work in philosophy which illumines some perennial philosophical perplexities in the light of recent philosophical work, thus making these problems intelligible and meaningful to philosophers today.—P. R. (shrink)

Abstract:Although best known to English-speaking readers as the general editor of the Dictionary of Untranslatables, the work of French philologist and philosopher Barbara Cassin is eclectic, encompassing literary studies, ancient philosophy, rhetoric, translation theory, psychoanalysis, politics, and more. From Presocratic philosophy to more recent reflections on Big Tech and democracy, Cassin's work is rooted in "sophistics," an approach that emphasizes the primacy of language in shaping our interactions with the world. Situating this sophistical approach vis-à-vis classical philology (Bollack) and (...) the philosophical tradition (Heidegger, Derrida), this essay explores the contribution of "sophistical reading" to our understanding of philosophical and literary texts. Showing how Cassin uses rhetorical theory to problematize any simple opposition of the latter, the essay concludes with a critical evaluation of Cassin's reading of Helen, Euripides' most sophistical play. (shrink)