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  1. Edmond Wright, Perception as Epistemic: 'We Perceive Only What We Have Motivationally Selected as Entities'.
    If a sensory field exists as a pure natural sign open to all kinds of interpretation as evidence (see 'Sensing as non-epistemic'), what is it that does the interpreting? Borrowing from the old Gestalt psychologists, I have proposed a gestalt module that picks out wholes from the turmoil, it being the process of noticing or attending to , but the important difference from Koffka and Köhler (Koffka, 1935; Köhler, 1940), the originators of the term 'gestalt' in the psychology of perception (...)
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  2. Edmond Wright, The Story of the Story: Invasions From the Real.
    The title of this paper is 'The Story of the Story'. If its argument is valid, I cannot be speaking to you now, trying to change your view of something without telling a story myself, even about the Story. Over the last two decades there has been an increasing number of people in a variety of disciplines telling us that the story, narrative, is an inescapable feature of human communication. Listen to a few representative voices. from psychology - Theodore Sarbin: (...)
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  3. Edmond L. Wright, The Defence of Qualia.
    In view of the excellent arguments that have been put forth recently in favour of qualia, internal sensory presentations, it would strike an impartial observer - one could imagine a future historian of philosophy - as extremely odd why so many philosophers who are opposed to qualia, that is, sensory experiences internal to the brain, have largely ignored those arguments in their own. There has been a fashionable assumption that any theory of perception which espouses qualia has long since been (...)
     
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  4. Edmond Leo Wright, Perception as Epistemic.
    If a sensory field exists as a pure natural sign open to all kinds of interpretation as _evidence_ (see 'Sensing as non-epistemic'), what is it that does the interpreting? Borrowing from the old Gestalt psychologists, I have proposed a gestalt module that picks out wholes from the turmoil, it being the process of _noticing_ or _attending to_ , but the important difference from Koffka and Khler (Koffka, 1935; Khler, 1940), the originators of the term 'gestalt' in the psychology of perception (...)
     
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  5. Edmond Leo Wright, Sensing as Non-Epistemic.
    A sensory receptor, in any organism anywhere, is sensitive through time to some distribution - energy, motion, molecular shape - indeed, anything that can produce an effect. The sensitivity is rarely direct: for example, it may track changes in relative variation rather than the absolute change of state (as when the skin responds to colder and hotter instead of to cold and hot as such); it may track differing variations under different conditions (the eyes' dark-adaptation; adaptation to sound frequencies can (...)
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  6. Edmond Wright (2010). Habermas as Lacking in Faith? In Colin B. Grant (ed.), Beyond Universal Pragmatics: Studies in the Philosophy of Communication. Peter Lang.
     
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  7. Edmond Wright (ed.) (2008). The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press.
    He is the author of two books: Colours: The Nature and Representation (Cambridge ... He is the author of the entry “Color” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of ..
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  8. Edmond Wright (2008). Why Transparency is Unethical. In , The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press. 341--366.
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  9. Edmond L. Wright (ed.) (2008). The Case for Qualia. MIT Press.
    Philosophical and scientific defenses of Indirect Realism and counterarguments to the attacks of qualiaphobes.
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  10. Edmond Wright (2007). In Trust We Reason. The Philosophers' Magazine 37 (37):31-34.
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  11. Edmond L. Wright (2007). A Theory of Perception. In Narrative, Perception, Language, and Faith. Palgrave Macmillan.
     
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  12. Edmond L. Wright (2007). Narrative, Perception, Language, and Faith. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  13. Edmond L. Wright (2006). Dennett as Illusionist. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):157-167.
  14. Edmond Wright (2005). The Question of the Assumed Givenness of the Singularity of the Target. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):514-514.
    Interesting as the experiments are, their relevance to the real-life situation is rendered questionable by the unthinking use of given singularities as target objects. The evolutionary process does not respect what one agent takes to be a singular referent. A “singling” from the continuum is rather a varying feature of the necessity to track what is rewarding in it.
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  15. Edmond L. Wright (2005). Perceiving Socially and Morally: A Question of Triangulation. Philosophy 80 (311):53-75.
    One evolutionary advantage is that, because of sensory and perceptual relativity (acknowledged as an empirical fact), the tracking of portions of the real relevant to the living creature can be enhanced if updating from species-member to species-member can take place. In human perception, the structure is therefore in the form of a triangulation (Davidson's metaphor) in which continual mutual correction can be performed. Language, that which distinguishes human beings from other animals, capitalizes on that structure. The means by which updating (...)
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  16. Edmond Wright (2004). A Proper Faith Operates with the Acknowledgement of Risk, and, Hence, a True Religion with That of Sacrifice. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):753-753.
    The authors are working with a limited notion of religion. They have confined themselves to a view of it as superstition, “counterintuitive,” as they put it. What they have not seen is that faith does in a real sense involve a paradox in that it projects an impossibility as a methodological device, a fictive ploy, which in the best interpretation necessarily involves a commitment to the likelihood of self-sacrifice.
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  17. Edmond Wright (2003). Clamping and Motivation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5):643-644.
    Arthur M. Glenberg omits discussion of motivation and this leads him to an underestimation of the part played by pleasure and pain and desire and fear in both the clamping and the updating of percepts. This commentary aims at rectifying this omission, showing that mutual correction plays an important role.
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  18. Edmond Wright (2003). Percepts Are Selected From Nonconceptual Sensory Fields. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):429-430.
    Steven Lehar allows too much to his direct realist opponent in using the word “subjective” of the sensory field per se. The latter retains its nonconceptual, nonmental nature even when explored by perceptual judgement. He also needs to stress the evolutionary value of perceptual differences between person and person, a move that enables one to undermine the direct realist's superstitious certainty about the singular object.
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  19. Edmond Wright (2002). A Visual Registration Can Be Coloured Without Being a Picture. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):214-214.
    Zenon Pylyshyn here repeats the same error as in his original article (1973) in starting with the premiss that all cognition is a matter of perceiving entities already given in their singularity. He therefore fails to acknowledge the force of the evolutionary argument that perceiving is a motivated process working upon a non-epistemic sensory registration internal to the brain.
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  20. Edmond Wright (2001). A Non-Epistemic, Non-Pictorial, Internal, Material Visual Field. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1010-1011.
    The authors O'Regan & Noë (O&N) have ignored the case for the visual field as being non-epistemic evidence internal to the brain, having no pictorial similarity to the external input, and being material in ontological status. They are also not aware of the case for the evolutionary advantage of learning as the perceptual refashioning of such non-epistemic sensory evidence via motivated feedback in sensorimotor activity.
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  21. Edmond Wright (2000). The Joke, the" As If", and the Statement'. In M. Levine (ed.), The Analytic Freud. Routledge. 294--311.
  22. Edmond Wright (1999). Isomorphism: Philosophical Implications. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):975-976.
    The originator of the notion of structural isomorphism was the philosopher Roy Wood Sellars. Many modern philosophers are unaware how this notion vitiates their attacks on the concept of an internal sensory presentation. His view that this allowed for corrective feedback undercuts Palmer's belief that there is a mapping of objects. The privacy of subjective experience is also shown not to be inviolable.
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  23. Edmond Wright (1999). The Game of Reference. Acta Analytica 22:179-196.
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  24. Edmond Wright (1996). ‘What It Isn’T Like’1 (January, 1996), 23-45. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):23-42.
    From an Indirect Realist point of view, the Knowledge Argument in the philosophy of perception has been misdirected by its very title. If it can be argued that sense-fields are at their basis no more than evidence, indeed, a part of existence as brute as what is usually termed the 'external', then, if 'knowing' is not essential to sensing, that argument has to be radically reconstructed. Resistance to there being an non-epistemic or 'raw feel' basis for sensing is very fashionable (...)
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  25. Edmond L. Wright (1996). What It Isn't Like. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):23-42.
  26. Edmond Wright (1994). A New Critical Realism: An Examination of Roy Wood Sellars' Epistemology. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 30 (3):477 - 514.
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  27. Edmond L. Wright (1993). More Qualia Trouble for Functionalism: The Smythies TV-Hood Analogy. Synthese 97 (3):365-82.
    It is the purpose of this article to explicate the logical implications of a television analogy for perception, first suggested by John R. Smythies (1956). It aims to show not only that one cannot escape the postulation of qualia that have an evolutionary purpose not accounted for within a strong functionalist theory, but also that it undermines other anti-representationalist arguments as well as some representationalist ones.
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  28. Edmond L. Wright (ed.) (1993). New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Ashgate.
  29. Edmond Leo Wright (1993). The Irony of Perception. In , New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury. 176--201.
     
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  30. Edmond Wright (1992). The Entity Fallacy in Epistemology. Philosophy 67 (259):33 - 50.
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  31. Edmond L. Wright (1992). Gestalt-Switching: Hanson, Aronson and Harre. Philosophy of Science 59 (3):480-86.
    This discussion takes up an attack by Jerrold Aronson (seconded by Rom Harre) on the use made by Norwood R. Hanson of the Gestalt-Switch Analogy in the philosophy of science. Aronson's understanding of what is implied in a gestalt switch is shown to be flawed. In his endeavor to detach conceptual understanding from perceptual identification he cites several examples, without realizing the degree to which such gestalt switches can affect conceptualizing or how conceptualizing can affect gestalts. In particular, he has (...)
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  32. Edmond L. Wright (1990). Inspecting Images: A Reply to Smythies. Philosophy 65 (252):225-228.
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  33. Edmond L. Wright (1990). New Representationalism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 20 (1):65-92.
  34. Edmond L. Wright (1990). Two More Proofs of Present Qualia. Theoria 56 (1-2):3-22.
  35. Edmond L. Wright (1989). Querying "Quining Qualia". Acta Analytica 4 (5):9-32.
     
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  36. Edmond Wright (1987). The New Representationalism: A Reply to Pitson. Philosophical Papers 16 (2):125-139.
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  37. Edmond Leo Wright (1987). The New Representationalism: A Reply to Pitson's the New Representationalism. Philosophical Papers 16 (August):125-139.
     
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  38. Edmond Wright (1986). Wilcox and Katz on Indirect Realism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 16 (1):107-113.
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  39. Edmond L. Wright (1986). Ben-Zeev on the Non-Epistemic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (September):351-359.
  40. Edmond L. Wright (1986). Dialectical Perception: Lenin and Bogdanov on Perception. Radical Philosophy 43:9-16.
     
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  41. Edmond Wright (1985). A Design for a Human Mind. Conceptus 19 (47):21-37.
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  42. Edmond L. Wright (1985). A Defence of Sellars. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (September):73-90.
  43. Edmond Leo Wright (1984). Recent Work in Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (January):17-30.
    This is a survey of the development of the philosophy of perception over the past twelve years. There are four sections. Part I deals largely with arguments for the propositionalizing of perception and for those types of externally founded realism that eschew inner representation. Part ii is devoted to three books that put the case for sense-Data (pennycuick, Jackson, Ginet) and some of the arguments against (pitcher). Part iii outlines james j gibson's psychological theory. Part iv takes up the arguments (...)
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  44. Edmond L. Wright (1983). Inspecting Images. Philosophy 58 (January):57-72.
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  45. Edmond L. Wright (1983). Pre-Phenomenal Adjustments and Sanford's Illusion Objection Against Sense-Data. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (July):266-272.
     
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  46. Edmond L. Wright (1981). Yet More on Non-Epistemic Seeing. Mind 90 (October):586-591.
  47. Edmond L. Wright (1979). Illusion and Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (3):402-432.
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  48. Edmond L. Wright (1977). Words and Intentions. Philosophy 52 (199):45 - 62.
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  49. Edmond L. Wright (1977). Perception: A New Theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (October):273-286.
  50. Edmond Wright (1964). Some Basic Preferences. British Journal of Aesthetics 4 (2):136-137.
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