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Profile: Edmund Dain (Providence College)
  1. Edmund Dain (2006). Contextualism and Nonsense in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):91-101.
    Central to a new, or 'resolute', reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus is the idea that Wittgenstein held there an 'austere' view of nonsense: the view, that is, that nonsense is only ever a matter of our failure to give words a meaning, and so that there are no logically distinct kinds of nonsense. Resolute readers tend not only to ascribe such a view to Wittgenstein, but also to subscribe to it themselves; and it is also a feature of some (...)
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    Edmund Dain (2012). Ethical Eliminativism and the Sense of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 35:49-50.
    This paper argues that Wittgenstein holds that ethical propositions are nonsense, in that they lack any meaning whatsoever, that they are redundant, in that the work they are intended to do is already being done by other features of our language, and that they are harmful, insofar as they prevent us from appreciating what is of genuine ethical significance in our lives. Its aim is to outline a sense in which Wittgenstein can be seen to be trying, through the elimination (...)
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  3.  14
    Edmund Dain (2015). Review of Chon Tejedor, The Early Wittgenstein on Metaphysics, Natural Science, Language and Value. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Review 2015.
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  4.  40
    Edmund Dain (2008). Wittgenstein, Contextualism, and Nonsense. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:101-125.
    What nonsense might be, and what Wittgenstein thought that nonsense might be, are two of the central questions in the current debate between those—such as Cora Diamond, James Conant and Michael Kremer—who favour a “resolute” approach to Wittgenstein’s work, and those—such as P. M. S. Hacker and Hans-Johann Glock—who instead favour a more “traditional” approach. What answer we give to these questions will determine the nature and force of his criticisms of traditional philosophy, and so the very shape Wittgenstein’s work (...)
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  5.  41
    Edmund Dain (2012). Projection and Pretence in Ethics. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):181 - 208.
    Abstract Suppose one is persuaded of the merits of noncognitivism in ethics but not those of expressivism: in such a case, a form of moral fictionalism, combining a descriptivist account of moral sentences with a noncognitivist account of the attitudes involved in their acceptance or rejection, might seem an attractive alternative. This paper argues against the use of moral fictionalism as a strategy for defending noncognitivism in ethics. It argues, first, that the view is implausible as it stands and, second, (...)
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  6.  21
    Edmund Dain (2006). Nonsense and the New Wittgenstein. Dissertation, Cardiff University
    This thesis focuses on 'New' or 'Resolute' readings of Wittgenstein's work, early and later, as presented in the work of, for instance, Cora Diamond and James Conant. One of the principal claims of such readings is that, throughout his life, Wittgenstein held an 'austere' view of nonsense. That view has both a trivial and a non-trivial aspect. The trivial aspect is that any string of signs could, by appropriate assignment, be given a meaning, and hence that, if such a string (...)
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  7.  5
    Edmund Dain (2007). Review of Mark Kalderon, Moral Fictionalism. [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):146-9.
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  8. Edmund Dain (2009). On Interpreting Wittgenstein. [REVIEW] Norsk Filosofisk Tiddskrift 3:316-321.
     
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  9.  25
    Edmund Dain & Gideon Calder (2007). Not Cricket? Ethics, Rhetoric and Sporting Boycotts. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):95–109.
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  10. Edmund Dain (forthcoming). Eliminating Ethics: Wittgenstein, Ethics and the Limits of Sense. Philosophical Topics.
    This paper is about what might be called the philosophical tradition of ethics, and Wittgenstein’s opposition or hostility to that tradition. My aim will be to argue that ethics, or a large part of what we think of as ethics, is nonsense, and in doing so I shall be developing the line of argument that I take to lie behind Wittgenstein’s claim in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that there can be no ethical propositions. That argument has its basis in the simple (...)
     
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  11. Edmund Dain (2005). Austerity and Ineffability. Philosophical Writings 30 (3):49-58.
    Two views are central to ‘New’ or ‘Resolute’ readings of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: that Wittgenstein did not hold that some insights are ineffable; and that Wittgenstein did hold an austere view of nonsense . Adrian Moore, in his paper ‘Ineffability and Nonsense’, offers an argument that seems to show that austerity in fact involves a commitment to the existence of ineffable understanding, and so that Resolute readers cannot hold both and . Hence, Resolute readers would have to give up one or (...)
     
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  12. Edmund Dain (2014). Eliminating Ethics. Philosophical Topics 42 (2):1-11.
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  13. Edmund Dain (2009). Review of Marie McGinn, Elucidating the Tractatus. [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (1):134-8.
     
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