Search results for 'Edmund Gettier' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.score: 540.0
    Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.
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  2. Edmund L. Gettier (2003). 11. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge. In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. 104.score: 240.0
     
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  3. Edmund L. Gettier (1990). Czy uzasadnione i prawdziwe przekonanie jest wiedzą? (tłumaczenie i oryginał). Principia 1.score: 240.0
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  4. Robert C. Sleigh Jr (1988). Knowing Edmund Gettier. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers.score: 150.0
     
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  5. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2000). Ist das Gettier-Problem wirklich ein Problem? Conceptus 33 (82):45-56.score: 96.0
    Viele Philosophen Glauben, daß die sogenannte „klassische” Definition des Wissens: -/- (W)Das Subjekt S weiß, daß p =Df. (i) S glaubt (ist überzeugt), daß p; (ii) S hat eine Begründung (eine epistemische Rechtferigung) für seine Überzeugung, daß p; und (iii) es ist der Fall, daß p. -/- durch das berühmte Gegenbeispiel Gettiers endgültig demoliert wurde: Gettier hat die folgende Situation konstruiert: -/- (G)(1) Das Subjekt S hat eine gute induktive Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. (2) S hat die (...)
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  6. Stephen Hetherington, Gettier Problems. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 72.0
    Gettier problems or cases are named in honor of the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who discovered them in 1963. They function as challenges to the philosophical tradition of defining knowledge of a proposition as justified true belief in that proposition. The problems are actual or possible situations in which someone has a belief that is both true and well supported by evidence, yet which — according to almost all epistemologists — fails to be knowledge. Gettier’s original (...)
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  7. Alan Musgrave (2012). Getting Over Gettier. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.score: 72.0
    For centuries tradition had it that knowledge is justified true belief. Then Edmund Gettier produced cases that refute that traditional view – or so most philosophers think. I disagree. The widespread intuition lying behind the so-called ‘Gettier Cases’ is that there is epistemic bad luck (we can unluckily fail to know), but no epistemic good luck (we cannot luckily know). I reject this puritanical intuition. I also question the externalist or reliabilist views of knowledge and/or justification that (...)
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  8. Chad Vance (2014). Truthmaker Theory Does Not Solve The Gettier Problem. Ratio 27 (3):291-305.score: 72.0
    Truthmaker theory has become immensely popular in recent years. So, it is not surprising that we are beginning to see it put to work in other areas of philosophy. Recently, several philosophers have proposed that truthmaker theory is the key to solving the Gettier problem. Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as justified, true belief) was unsatisfactory. The truthmaker solution proposes that knowledge is a justified, true belief, where the source of one's justification is (...)
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  9. Allan Hazlett (2015). The Maturation of the Gettier Problem. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):1-6.score: 60.0
    Edmund Gettier’s paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” first appeared in an issue of Analysis , dated June of 1963, and although it’s tempting to wax hyperbolic when discussing the paper’s importance and influence, it is fair to say that its impact on contemporary philosophy has been substantial and wide-ranging. Epistemology has benefited from 50 years of sincere and rigorous discussion of issues arising from the paper, and Gettier’s conclusion that knowledge is not justified true belief is (...)
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  10. Thomas D. Senor, Why There is No Justified Belief at Demon Worlds.score: 30.0
    The New Demon World Objection claims that reliabilist accounts of justification are mistaken because there are justified empirical beliefs at demon worlds—worlds at which the subjects are systematically deceived by a Cartesian demon. In this paper, I defend strongly verific (but not necessarily reliabilist) accounts of justification by claiming that there are two ways to construct a theory of justification: by analyzing our ordinary concept of justification or by taking justification to be a theoretic term defined by its role in (...)
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  11. Richard Foley, A Trial Separation Between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief.score: 30.0
    In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and (...)
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  12. Thomas D. Senor (2013). Justified Belief and Demon Worlds. Res Philosophica 90 (2):203-214.score: 30.0
    The New Demon World Objection claims that reliabilist accounts of justification are mistaken because there are justified empirical beliefs at demon worlds—worlds at which the subjects are systematically deceived by a Cartesian demon. In this paper, I defend strongly verific (but not necessarily reliabilist) accounts of justification by claiming that there are two ways to construct a theory of justification: by analyzing our ordinary concept of justification or by taking justification to be a theoretic term defined by its role in (...)
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  13. Ernest Sosa (1969). Propositional Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 20 (3):33 - 43.score: 30.0
    The received definition of knowledge (as true, evident belief) has recently been questioned by Edmund Gettier with an example whose principle is as follows. A proposition, p, is both evident to and accepted by someone S, who sees that its truth entails (would entail) (that either p is true or q is true). This last is thereby made evident to him, and he accepts it, but it happens to be true only because q is true, since p is (...)
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  14. Peter H. Hess (1981). Justified True Belief is Knowledge. Dialogue 20 (04):665-673.score: 30.0
    Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.
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  15. Frank Hammonds (2010). Is Justified True Behavior Knowledge?. Behavior and Philosophy 38:49-59.score: 30.0
    Edmund Gettier (1963) argued against defining knowledge as justified true belief. Using two examples, he demonstrated that (a) believing a proposition to be true, (b) having justification for that belief, and (c) the proposition in fact being true, do not constitute sufficient conditions for one to be said to know the proposition. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the utility of a behavioral definition of justified true belief. I will define “justified,” “true,” and “belief” in behavioral (...)
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  16. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.score: 24.0
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant (...)
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  17. Jennifer Nagel (2012). Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    To what extent should we trust our natural instincts about knowledge? The question has special urgency for epistemologists who want to draw evidential support for their theories from certain intuitive epistemic assessments while discounting others as misleading. This paper focuses on the viability of endorsing the legitimacy of Gettier intuitions while resisting the intuitive pull of skepticism – a combination of moves that most mainstream epistemologists find appealing. Awkwardly enough, the “good” Gettier intuitions and the “bad” skeptical intuitions (...)
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  18. Qilin Li, Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology, Epistemic Normativity and the Gettier Problem.score: 24.0
    In this paper, it is argued that there are (at least) two different kinds of ‘epistemic normativity’ in epistemology, which can be scrutinized and revealed by some comparison with some naturalistic studies of ethics. The first kind of epistemic normativity can be naturalized, but the other not. The doctrines of Quine’s naturalized epistemology is firstly introduced; then Kim’s critique of Quine’s proposal is examined. It is argued that Quine’s naturalized epistemology is able to save some room for the concept of (...)
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  19. Jennifer Nagel (2013). Motivating Williamson's Model Gettier Cases. Inquiry 56 (1):54-62.score: 24.0
    Williamson has a strikingly economical way of showing how justified true belief can fail to constitute knowledge: he models a class of Gettier cases by means of two simple constraints. His constraints can be shown to rely on some unstated assumptions about the relationship between reality and appearance. These assumptions are epistemologically non-trivial but can be defended as plausible idealizations of our actual predicament, in part because they align well with empirical work on the metacognitive dimension of experience.
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  20. Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond Mar (2013). Authentic Gettier Cases: A Reply to Starmans and Friedman. Cognition 129 (3):666-669.score: 24.0
    Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maintain that laypeople differ from philosophers in taking ‘authentic evidence’ Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge. Their reply helpfully clarifies the distinction between ‘authentic evidence’ and ‘apparent evidence’. Using their sharpened presentation of this distinction, we contend that the argument of our original paper still stands.
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  21. Jianbo Cao (2006). A Critique to the Significance of Gettier Counter-Examples. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):675-687.score: 24.0
    Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about (...)
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  22. Brent G. Kyle (2013). Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.score: 24.0
    The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. But, whether or not this problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does the Gettier problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen it as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. But I would like to steer a middle course. I argue that the Gettier problem arises because knowledge is a (...)
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  23. Yuri Cath (2015). Revisionary Intellectualism and Gettier. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):7-27.score: 24.0
    How should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley offers an orthodox response which rejects the claim that the subjects in such scenarios possess knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists should embrace a revisionary response according to which knowledge-how is a distinctively practical species of knowledge-that that is compatible with Gettier-style luck.
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  24. Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier's Challenge: A Case Study. Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.score: 24.0
    Taking his conceptual cue from Ernest Sosa, John Turri has offered a putative conceptual solution to the Gettier problem: Knowledge is cognitively adept belief, and no Gettiered belief is cognitively adept. At the core of such adeptness is a relation of manifestation. Yet to require that relation within knowing is to reach for what amounts to an infallibilist conception of knowledge. And this clashes with the spirit behind the fallibilism articulated by Gettier when stating his challenge. So, Turri’s (...)
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  25. Timothy Williamson (2015). A Note on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):129-140.score: 24.0
    The paper explains how Gettier’s conclusion can be reached on general theoretical grounds within the framework of epistemic logic, without reliance on thought experiments. It extends the argument to permissive conceptions of justification that invalidate principles of multi-premise closure and require neighbourhood semantics rather than semantics of a more standard type. The paper concludes by recommending a robust methodology that aims at convergence in results between thought experimentation and more formal methods. It also warns against conjunctive definitions as sharing (...)
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  26. John Turri (2013). A Conspicuous Art: Putting Gettier to the Test. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (10).score: 24.0
    Professional philosophers say it’s obvious that a Gettier subject does not know. But experimental philosophers and psychologists have argued that laypeople and non-Westerners view Gettier subjects very differently, based on experiments where laypeople tend to ascribe knowledge to Gettier subjects. I argue that when effectively probed, laypeople and non-Westerners unambiguously agree that Gettier subjects do not know.
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  27. Timothy Williamson (2013). Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):1-14.score: 24.0
    The possibility of justified true belief without knowledge is normally motivated by informally classified examples. This paper shows that it can also be motivated more formally, by a natural class of epistemic models in which both knowledge and justified belief (in the relevant sense) are represented. The models involve a distinction between appearance and reality. Gettier cases arise because the agent's ignorance increases as the gap between appearance and reality widens. The models also exhibit an epistemic asymmetry between good (...)
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  28. Jim Stone (2013). 'Unlucky' Gettier Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):421-430.score: 24.0
    This article argues that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases often are not true due to luck. I offer two ‘unlucky’ Gettier cases, and it's easy enough to generate more. Hence even attaching a broad ‘anti-luck’ codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge leaves the Gettier problem intact. Also, two related questions are addressed. First, if epistemic luck isn't distinctive of Gettier cases, what is? Second, what do Gettier cases reveal about knowledge?
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  29. Ian M. Church (2013). Manifest Failure Failure: The Gettier Problem Revived. Philosophia 41 (1):171-177.score: 24.0
    If the history of the Gettier Problem has taught us anything, it is to be skeptical regarding purported solutions. Nevertheless, in “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved” (2011), that is precisely what John Turri offers us. For nearly fifty years, epistemologists have been chasing a solution for the Gettier Problem but with little to no success. If Turri is right, if he has actually solved the Gettier Problem, then he has done something that is absolutely groundbreaking (...)
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  30. Qilin Li, Truth-Maker Theory and the Stopped Clock: Why Heathcote Fails to Solve the Gettier Problem.score: 24.0
    Adrian Heathcote has proposed a truth-making account of knowledge that combines traditional conditions of justified true belief with the truth-making condition, which would jointly provide us with the sufficient condition of knowledge, and this truth-maker account of knowledge in turn explains why a gettiered justified true belief fails to be regarded as a genuine instance of knowledge. In this paper, by the comparison of two different casual models that are illustrated by the thermometer and the clock respectively, however, it will (...)
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  31. Timothy Williamson (2013). Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):77-96.score: 24.0
    The five commentators on my paper ‘Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic’ (GCEL) demonstrate how fruitful the topic can be. Especially in Brian Weatherson's contribution, and to some extent in those of Jennifer Nagel and Jeremy Goodman, much of the material constitutes valuable development and refinement of ideas in GCEL, rather than criticism. In response, I draw some threads together, and answer objections, mainly those in the papers by Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña and by Goodman.
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  32. Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Gettier-Illusion: Gettier-Partialism and Infallibilism. Synthese 188 (2):217-230.score: 24.0
    Could the standard interpretation of Gettier cases reflect a fundamental confusion? Indeed so. How well can epistemologists argue for the truth of that standard interpretation? Not so well. A methodological mistake is allowing them not to notice how they are simply (and inappropriately) being infallibilists when regarding Gettiered beliefs as failing to be knowledge. There is no Gettier problem that we have not merely created for ourselves by unwittingly being infallibilists about knowledge.
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  33. René Jagnow (2006). Edmund Husserl on the Applicability of Formal Geometry. In Emily Carson & Renate Huber (eds.), Intuition and the Axiomatic Method. Springer. 67--85.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I reconstruct Edmund Husserl's view on the relationship between formal inquiry and the life-world, using the example of formal geometry. I first outline Husserl's account of geometry and then argue that he believed that the applicability of formal geometry to intuitive space (the space of everyday-experience) guarantees the conceptual continuity between different notions of space.
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  34. Christian Piller (forthcoming). Practical Philosophy and the Gettier Problem: Is Virtue Epistemology on the Right Track? Philosophical Studies:1-19.score: 24.0
    One of the guiding ideas of virtue epistemology is to look at epistemological issue through the lens of practical philosophy. The Gettier Problem is a case in point. Virtue epistemologists, like Sosa and Greco, see the shortcoming in a Gettier scenario as a shortcoming from which performances in general can suffer. In this paper I raise some doubts about the success of this project. Looking more closely at practical philosophy, will, I argue, show that virtue epistemology misconceives the (...)
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  35. Christoph Schmidt-Petri (2003). Is Gettier’s First Example Flawed? In Winfried Löffler & Weingartner Paul (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. ALWS.score: 24.0
    This paper challenges (in a shorter version than the also listed 2002 LSE discussion paper) the first Gettier counterexample to the tripartite account of knowledge. Noting that 'the man who will get the job' is a description and invoking Donnellan's distinction between their 'referential' and 'attributive' uses, I argue that Smith does not actually believe that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's ignorance about who will get the job shows that the (...)
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  36. Edmund L. Gettier Iii (2006). John Gordon Robison, 1935-2005. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 80 (2):112 - 113.score: 24.0
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  37. Erik J. Olsson (forthcoming). Gettier and the Method of Explication: A 60 Year Old Solution to a 50 Year Old Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-16.score: 24.0
    I challenge a cornerstone of the Gettier debate: that a proposed analysis of the concept of knowledge is inadequate unless it entails that people don’t know in Gettier cases. I do so from the perspective of Carnap’s methodology of explication. It turns out that the Gettier problem per se is not a fatal problem for any account of knowledge, thus understood. It all depends on how the account fares regarding other putative counter examples and the further Carnapian (...)
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  38. James Schmidt (2014). “This New Conquering Empire of Light and Reason”: Edmund Burke, James Gillray, and the Dangers of Enlightenment. Diametros 40:126-148.score: 24.0
    This article examines the use of images of “light” and “enlightenment” in Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France and in the controversy that greeted the book, with an emphasis on caricatures of Burke and his book by James Gillray and others. Drawing on Hans Blumenberg’s discussion of the metaphor of “light as truth,” it situates this controversy within the broader usage of images of light and reason in eighteenth-century frontispieces and (drawing on the work of J. G. (...)
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  39. Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi (2011). Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier. Principia 14 (2):175-200.score: 24.0
    Nós tentamos mostrar neste ensaio que as propostas anulabilistas de Peter Klein e de Marshall Swain não resolvem o problema de Gettier. Klein postula que, para qualquer contra-exemplo de tipo-Gettier, há uma proposição verdadeira que, ao ser conjugada com a evidência e de S, anula de modo legítimo a justificação de p para S. Swain postula que, para qualquer contra-exemplo de tipo-Gettier, há uma proposição verdadeira que, ao ser conjugada com o conjunto de razões R de S, (...)
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  40. Hyung Wook Park (2008). Edmund Vincent Cowdry and the Making of Gerontology as a Multidisciplinary Scientific Field in the United States. Journal of the History of Biology 41 (3):529 - 572.score: 24.0
    The Canadian-American biologist Edmund Vincent Cowdry played an important role in the birth and development of the science of aging, gerontology. In particular, he contributed to the growth of gerontology as a multidisciplinary scientific field in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s. With the support of the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, he organized the first scientific conference on aging at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, where scientists from various fields gathered to discuss aging as a scientific research topic. He (...)
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  41. Luís Estevinha Rodrigues (2012). Uma solução não convencional para o problema de Gettier. Veritas 57 (2):26-50.score: 24.0
    The Gettier Problem (henceforth GP) is a milestone in contemporary epistemology. Half a century after the philosophical earthquake caused by the well-known Gettier article (1963), solutions continue to appear and the discussion resurfaces. Because we, like many, choose to adopt an optimistic stance towards the possibility of finding a plausible answer to the GP, in this paper we present an unconventional solution to solve it. Crucially, we argue that the only plausible and non-falsifiable definition of the propositional knowledge (...)
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  42. Herlinde Studer (1981). Conditions of Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:97-111.score: 24.0
    Since Edmund L. Gettier's famous paper a series of counterexamples has been raised against the traditional analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true belief. Some of these (not only Gettier-type) counterexamples can be ruled out by adding a fourth condition to the traditional account which demands a causal connection between the belief of a person and the fact the person believes. This causal connection is specified in a particular way so that counterexamples put forward against causal (...)
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  43. Raúl E. Zegarra Medina (2012). Dos versiones de psicología fenomenológica. En torno a la influencia de William James en las Investigaciones lógicas de Edmund Husserl. Estudios de Filosofía 9:71-92.score: 24.0
    El artículo constituye una breve investigación histórica y teórica en torno a los principales nexos entre el pensamiento temprano de William James y el trabajo desplegado por Edmund Husserl en las Investigaciones lógicas. A través de un examen preliminar de las relaciones personales entre ambos autores, pasaremos a un estudio sobre el aparato conceptual desarrollado por James, sobre todo en Principios de psicología, con el objetivo de contrastarlo con el planteado por Husserl, mostrando cómo el primer autor esbozó, entre (...)
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  44. John Perry, Michael Bratman & John Martin Fischer (eds.) (2007). Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Introduction to Philosophy, Fourth Edition, is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Building on the exceptionally successful tradition of previous editions, this edition for the first time incorporates the insights of a new coeditor, John Martin Fischer, and has been updated and revised to make it more accessible. Ideal for introductory philosophy courses, the text includes sections on the meaning of life, God and evil, knowledge and reality, the philosophy of science, the mind/body problem, (...)
     
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  45. Carlos Emilio García (2007). Casos Gettier y razonadores normales. Ideas Y Valores 56 (135):77-88.score: 24.0
    Como bien se sabe, la caracterización del conocimiento en términos de "creencia verdadera justificada" (CVJ) se ha considerado fallida desde la popularización de contraejemplos tipo Gettier. En este artículo se revisa el trabajo seminal de Gettier y sus argumentos. Se sostiene que los contraejemplos..
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  46. Daniel Lago Monteiro (2011). Anarquia e Conformação das Coisas: algumas observações sobre revolução, história e linguagem em Edmund Burke. Doispontos 8 (1).score: 24.0
    The present paper begins with an analysis of a letter from Edmund Burke written in January 1790, the moment when the statesman declared himself against the French Revolution, in order to conjoin the letter with other texts from the author where the organic and hereditary aspects of civil society, as well as the forming and deforming role of words in political activity, are discussed. The second part of the text consists in the translation and notes of the aforesaid letter.
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  47. Robert C. Solomon (2005). Introducing Philosophy: A Text with Integrated Readings. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Philosophy is an exciting and accessible subject, and this engaging text acquaints students with the core problems of philosophy and the many ways in which they are and have been answered. Introducing Philosophy: A Text with Integrated Readings, Eighth Edition, insists both that philosophy is very much alive today and that it is deeply rooted in the past. Accordingly, it combines substantial original sources from significant works in the history of philosophy and current philosophy with detailed commentary and explanation that (...)
     
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  48. Mikael Janvid (2012). Knowledge Versus Understanding: The Cost of Avoiding Gettier. Acta Analytica 27 (2):183-197.score: 21.0
    In the current discussion on epistemic value, several philosophers argue that understanding enjoys higher epistemological significance and epistemic value than knowledge—the epistemic state the epistemological tradition has been preoccupied with. By noting a tension between the necessary conditions for understanding in the perhaps most prominent of these philosophers, Jonathan Kvanvig, this paper disputes the higher epistemological relevance of understanding. At the end, on the basis of the results of the previous sections, some alternative comparative contrasts between knowledge and understanding are (...)
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  49. Carlos Diógenes Côrtes Tourinho (2013). Versões da "transcendência na imanência" na fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl. Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 17 (2):107-130.score: 21.0
    The present paper approaches the idea of a "transcendence in immanence" in the phenomenology of Husserl. Shows us that the exercise of phenomenological method in relation to the position of existence of facts imposes a variation of the "transcendent" in Husserl. Initially conceived as a source of doubt and uncertainty, the transcendent is revealed in a second moment in the immanence of transcendental subjectivity: the thing in its originary giving. The paper focuses thus in the polarity between the pure self (...)
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  50. Robert Lockie (2014). The Epistemology of Neo-Gettier Epistemology. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):247-258.score: 21.0
    The paper begins by drawing a number of ‘levels’ distinctions in epistemology. It notes that a theory of knowledge must be an attempt to obtain knowledge . It is suggested that we can make sense of much of the work found in analytic theory of knowledge by seeing three framework assumptions as underpinning this work. First, that to have philosophical knowledge of knowledge requires us to have an analysis. Second, that much of what we require from a theory of knowledge (...)
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