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Profile: Edmund Henden
  1. Edmund Henden & Bærøe Kristine (2014). Providing Free Heroin to Addicts Participating in Research - Ethical Concerns and the Question of Voluntariness. The Psychiatric Bulletin 38 (4):1-4.
    Providing heroin to heroin addicts taking part in medical trials to assess the effectiveness of the drug as a treatment alternative, breaches ethical research standards, some ethicists maintain. Heroin addicts, they say, are unable to consent voluntarily to take part in these trials. Other ethicists disagree. In our view, both sides of the debate have an inadequate understanding of voluntariness. In this article we therefore offer a fuller conception, one which allows for a more flexible, case-to-case approach in which some (...)
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  2. Edmund Henden (2013). Heroin Addiction and Voluntary Choice: The Case of Informed Consent. Bioethics 27 (7):395-401.
    Does addiction to heroin undermine the voluntariness of heroin addicts' consent to take part in research which involves giving them free and legal heroin? This question has been raised in connection with research into the effectiveness of heroin prescription as a way of treating dependent heroin users. Participants in such research are required to give their informed consent to take part. Louis C. Charland has argued that we should not presume that heroin addicts are competent to do this since heroin (...)
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  3. Edmund Henden, Hans Olav Melberg & Ole Rogeberg (2013). Addiction: Choice or Compulsion? Frontiers in Addictive Disorders and Behavioral Dyscontrol 4 (77):11.
    Normative thinking about addiction has traditionally been divided between, on the one hand, a medical model which sees addiction as a disease characterized by compulsive and relapsing drug use over which the addict has little or no control and, on the other, a moral model which sees addiction as a choice characterized by voluntary behaviour under the control of the addict. Proponents of the former appeal to evidence showing that regular consumption of drugs causes persistent changes in the brain structures (...)
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  4. Hans Olav Melberg, Edmund Henden & Olav Gjelsvik (2013). Addiction and Responsibility: A Survey of Opinions. Inquiry 56 (5):558 - 570.
    ABSTRACT This article reports the result of a survey about causal beliefs, normative conceptions and moral evaluations of addicts and addiction in the general population. Specifically, we focused on four issues: To what extent are the normative conceptions of addiction current in the philosophical and scientific literature reflected in laypersons' conception of addiction? How do laypersons rate addicts on perceived responsibility? Which factors influence laypersons' responsibility attributions in the context of addiction? What feelings and attitudes (anger/sympathy/help-giving intentions) do laypersons have (...)
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  5. Edmund Henden (2012). Addictive Actions. Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):362-382.
    It is common to think of addiction as involving behavior which in some sense is ?out of control.? But does this mean addictive actions occur because of compulsion or because of ordinary weakness of will? Many philosophers argue that addictive actions occur because of weakness of will, since there is plenty of evidence suggesting that they are not caused by irresistible desires. In fact, addicts seem, in general, to perform these actions freely in the sense of having the ability to (...)
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  6. Edmund Henden (2010). Deliberation Incompatibilism. Dialectica 64 (3):313-333.
    Deliberation incompatibilism is the view that an agent being rational and deliberating about which of (mutually excluding) actions to perform, is incompatible with her believing that there exist prior conditions that render impossible the performance of either one of these actions. However, the main argument for this view, associated most prominently with Peter van Inwagen, appears to have been widely rejected by contemporary authors on free will. In this paper I argue first that a closer examination of van Inwagen's argument (...)
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  7. Edmund Henden (2008). What is Self-Control? Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.
    What is self-control and how does the concept of self-control relate to the notion of will-power? A widespread philosophical opinion has been that the notion of will-power does not add anything beyond what can be said using other motivational notions, such as strength of desire and intention. One exception is Richard Holton who, inspired by recent research in social psychology, has argued that will-power is a separate faculty needed for persisting in one's resolutions, what he calls 'strength of will'. However, (...)
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  8. Edmund Henden (2007). Is Genuine Satisficing Rational? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):339 - 352.
    There have been different interpretations of satisficing rationality. A common view is that it is sometimes rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when one does not know that it is the best option. But there is available a more radical view of satisficing. On this view, it is rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when a better option is known to be available. In this paper I distinguish between (...)
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  9. Edmund Henden (2007). Restrictive Consequentialism and Real Friendship. Ratio 20 (2):179–193.
    A familiar objection to restrictive consequentialism is that a restrictive consequentialist is incapable of having true friendships. In this paper I distinguish between an instrumentalist and a non-instrumentalist version of this objection and argue that while the restrictive consequentialist can answer the non-instrumentalist version, restrictive consequentialism may still seem vulnerable to the instrumentalist version. I then suggest a consequentialist reply that I argue also works against this version of the objection. Central to this reply is the claim that a restrictive (...)
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  10. Edmund Henden (2006). The Role of All Things Considered Judgements in Practical Deliberation. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):295 – 308.
    Suppose an agent has made a judgement of the form, 'all things considered, it would be better for me to do a rather than b (or any range of alternatives to doing a)' where a and b stand for particular actions. If she does not act upon her judgement in these circumstances would that be a failure of rationality on her part? In this paper I consider two different interpretations of all things considered judgements which give different answers to this (...)
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  11. Edmund Henden (2004). Er interpretasjonisme forenlig med kausalisme? Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 39.
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  12. Edmund Henden (2004). Intentions, All-Out Evaluations and Weakness of the Will. Erkenntnis 61 (1):53-74.
    The problem of weakness of the will is often thought to arise because of an assumption that freely, deliberately and intentionally doing something must correspond to the agent's positive evaluation of doing that thing. In contemporary philosophy, a very common response to the problem of weakness has been to adopt the view that free, deliberate action does not need to correspond to any positive evaluation at all. Much of the support for this view has come from the difficulties the denial (...)
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  13. Edmund Henden (2004). Weakness of Will and Divisions of the Mind. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):199–213.
    Some authors have argued that, in order to give an account of weakness of the will, we must assume that the mind is divisible into parts. This claim is often referred to as the partitioning claim. There appear to be two main arguments for this claim. While the first is conceptual and claims that the notion of divisibility is entailed by the notion of non-rational mental causation (which is held to be a necessary condition of weakness of the will), the (...)
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