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  1.  45
    Eduardo García-Ramírez & Marilyn Shatz (2011). On Problems with Descriptivism: Psychological Assumptions and Empirical Evidence. Mind and Language 26 (1):53-77.
    We offer an empirical assessment of description theories of proper names. We examine empirical evidence on lexical and cognitive development, memory, and aphasia, to see whether it supports Descriptivism. We show that description theories demand much more, in terms of psychological assumptions, than what the data suggest; hence, they lack empirical support. We argue that this problem undermines their success as philosophical theories for proper names in natural languages. We conclude by presenting and defending a preliminary alternative account of reference (...)
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  2.  73
    Eduardo García-Ramírez (2011). A Cognitive Theory of Empty Names. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):785-807.
    Ordinary use of empty names encompasses a variety of different phenomena, including issues in semantics, mental content, fiction, pretense, and linguistic practice. In this paper I offer a novel account of empty names, the cognitive theory, and show how it offers a satisfactory account of the phenomena. The virtues of this theory are based on its strength and parsimony. It allows for a fully homogeneous semantic treatment of names coped with ontological frugality and empirical and psychological adequacy.
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    Eduardo García-Ramírez (2012). Trans-World Causation? Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):71-83.
    According to Lewis, causal claims must be analysed in terms of counterfactual conditionals, and these in turn are understood in terms of relations of comparative similarity among single concrete possible worlds. Lewis also claims that there is no trans-world causation because there is no way to make sense of trans-world counterfactuals without automatically making them come out to be false. In this paper I argue against this claim. I show how to make sense of trans-world counterfactuals in a non-trivial way (...)
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    Eduardo García-Ramírez (2014). Sobre El Sentido Fregeano y El Contenido Mental. Análisis Filosófico 34 (1):77-100.
    Fregeans follow Frege in accepting informativeness and substitution failure as reliable criteria for the existence of senses as objects of thought. In this paper I show that if we accept this, we must also accept the existence of an infinite hierarchy of senses as objects of thought. This is a bad result since it turns Fregeanism into a doctrine according to which object-related thoughts either have an infinite number of objects as contents or none at all. This shows, against the (...)
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