14 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Edward T. Cokely [9]Edward Cokely [5]
  1. Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely (2013). Predicting Philosophical Disagreement. Philosophy Compass 8 (10):978-989.
    We review evidence showing that disagreement in folk and expert philosophical intuitions can be predicted by global, heritable personality traits. The review focuses on recent studies of intuitions about free will, ethics, and intentional action. These findings are philosophically important because they suggest that while some projects cannot be done, other projects must take individual differences in philosophical character into account. But care needs to be taken when interpreting the implications of these individual differences. We illustrate one way that these (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely (2012). The Philosophical Personality Argument. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
    Perhaps personality traits substantially influence one’s philosophically relevant intuitions. This suggestion is not only possible, it is consistent with a growing body of empirical research: Personality traits have been shown to be systematically related to diverse intuitions concerning some fundamental philosophical debates. We argue that this fact, in conjunction with the plausible principle that almost all adequate philosophical views should take into account all available and relevant evidence, calls into question some prominent approaches to traditional philosophical projects. To this end, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2012). The Virtues of Ignorance. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):335-350.
    It is commonly claimed that fully virtuous individuals cannot be ignorant and that everyday intuitions support this fact. Others maintain that there are virtues of ignorance and most people recognize them. Both views cannot be correct. We report evidence from three experiments suggesting that ignorance does not rule out folk attributions of virtue. Additionally, results show that many of these judgments can be predicted by one’s emotional stability—a heritable personality trait. We argue that these results are philosophically important for the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2012). Virtue or Consequences: The Folk Against Pure Evaluational Internalism. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):702-717.
    Evaluational internalism holds that only features internal to agency (e.g., motivation) are relevant to attributions of virtue [Slote, M. (2001). Morals from motives. Oxford: Oxford University Press]. Evaluational externalism holds that only features external to agency (e.g., consequences) are relevant to attributions of virtue [Driver, J. (2001). Uneasy virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press]. Many evaluational externalists and internalists claim that their view best accords with philosophically naïve (i.e., folk) intuitions, and that accordance provides argumentative support for their view. Evaluational internalism (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2011). Individual Differences in Theory-of-Mind Judgments: Order Effects and Side Effects. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):343 - 355.
    We explore and provide an account for a recently identified judgment anomaly, i.e., an order effect that changes the strength of intentionality ascriptions for some side effects (e.g., when a chairman's pursuit of profits has the foreseen but unintended consequence of harming the environment). Experiment 1 replicated the previously unanticipated order effect anomaly controlling for general individual differences. Experiment 2 revealed that the order effect was multiply determined and influenced by factors such as beliefs (i.e., that the same actor was (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Angela Merritt, Linnea Karlsson & Edward T. Cokely (2010). Category Learning and Adaptive Benefits of Aging. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Adrien Barton, Edward Cokely, Mirta Galesic, Anna Koehler & Mario Haas (2009). Comparing Risk Reductions: On the Dynamic Interplay of Cognitive Strategies, Numeracy, Complexity and Format. In N. A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (eds.), Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz (2009). Adaptive Diversity and Misbelief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):516.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz (2009). Adaptive Variation in Judgment and Philosophical Intuition. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):356-358.
    Our theoretical understanding of individual differences can be used as a tool to test and refine theory. Individual differences are useful because judgments, including philosophically relevant intuitions, are the predictable products of the fit between adaptive psychological mechanisms (e.g., heuristics, traits, skills, capacities) and task constraints. As an illustration of this method and its potential implications, our target article used a canonical, representative, and affectively charged judgment task to reveal a relationship between the heritable personality trait extraversion and some compatabilist (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2009). Do Judgments About Freedom and Responsibility Depend on Who You Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions About Compatibilism and Incompatibilism. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.
    Recently, there has been an increased interest in folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility from both philosophers and psychologists. We aim to extend our understanding of folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility using an individual differences approach. Building off previous research suggesting that there are systematic differences in folks’ philosophically relevant intuitions, we present new data indicating that the personality trait extraversion predicts, to a significant extent, those who have compatibilist versus incompatibilist intuitions. We argue that identifying groups (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer (2009). Natural Compatibilism Versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board. Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.
    In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Nils Straubinger, Edward T. Cokely & Jeffrey R. Stevens (2009). The Dynamics of Development: Challenges for Bayesian Rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):103-104.
    Oaksford & Chater (O&C) focus on patterns of typical adult reasoning from a probabilistic perspective. We discuss implications of extending the probabilistic approach to lifespan development, considering the role of working memory, strategy use, and expertise. Explaining variations in human reasoning poses a challenge to Bayesian rational analysis, as it requires integrating knowledge about cognitive processes.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Edward Cokely & Adam Feltz (2008). Individual Differences, Judgment Biases, and Theory-of-Mind: Deconstructing the Intentional Action Side Effect Asymmetry. Journal of Research in Personality 43:18-24.
  14. Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely (2007). An Anomaly in Intentional Action Ascription: More Evidence of Folk Diversity. In Proceedings of the 29th Annual Cognitive Science Society.