This article presents a theoretical outline of variables for evaluating (long-term) outcomes of revolutions. These outcomes are assessed in four sectors: politics, the economics, the social-cultural realm, and state power. Amongst the set of explanatory variables are factor endowments, the former level of economic development and previous socioeconomic structures, economic and political institutions, policy outputs and various international constraints. Empirical illustrations and some generalizations are provided by drawing on the sixteen or so revolutions that occurred after 1600. Each revolution is (...) briefly characterized both in terms of its own achievements and drawbacks and putting it in perspective vis-a-vis other revolutions. (shrink)
The question of who 'we' are and what vision of humanity 'we' assume in Western culture lies at the heart of hotly debated questions on the role of religion in education, politics, and culture in general. The need for recovering a greater purpose for social practices is indicated, for example, by the rapidly increasing number of publications on the demise of higher education, lamenting the fragmentation of knowledge and university culture's surrender to market-driven pragmatism. The West's cultural rootlessness and lack (...) of cultural identity are also revealed by the failure of multiculturalism to integrate religiously vibrant immigrant cultures. A main cause of the West's cultural malaise is the long-standing separation of reason and faith. -/- Jens Zimmermann suggests that the West can rearticulate its identity and renew its cultural purpose by recovering the humanistic ethos that originally shaped Western culture. In tracing the religious roots of humanism from patristic theology, through the Renaissance into modern philosophy, we find that humanism was originally based on the correlation of reason and faith. In this book, the author combines humanism, religion, and hermeneutic philosophy to re-imagine humanism for our current cultural and intellectual climate. The hope of this recovery is for humanism to become what Charles Taylor has called a 'social imaginary', an internalized vision of what it means to be human. This vision will encourage, once again, the correlation of reason and faith in order to overcome current cultural impasses, such as those posed, for example, by religious and secularist fundamentalisms. (shrink)
David Lewis has complained about the truthmaker theory as a version of the correspondence theory of truth (Lewis 2001a; Lewis 2001b). His main criticism is that the truthmaker theory, if combined with the redundancy theory, is not a theory about truth, but only »about the existential grounding of all manner of other things: the flying of pigs, or what-have-you« (Lewis 2001a: 279; Lewis 2001b: 603-4). In his view, to call such a truthmaker theory a theory of truth is a »misnomer« (...) (Lewis 2001a: 279). Lewis does not claim that the truthmaker theory is false, nor does he reject it. Indeed, he expresses agreement with its spirit. But of course it would be an embarrassment to any defender of the truthmaker theory to find out that it is not about truth at all. Indeed, if it were not about truth we should »forget about the ´correspondence theory of truth´«, as the title of Lewis´ paper suggests. Therefore, it is highly desirable for any adherent of the truthmaker theory to look for an understanding of the truthmaker theory which will let it be about truth, and to see whether anything of what Lewis has said provides an argument against it. We will argue that there is such an understanding and that Lewis has not provided any material for an argument against it. (shrink)
This paper is about the semantic analysis of referentially opaque verbs like seek and owe that give rise to nonspecific readings. It is argued that Montague's categorization (based on earlier work by Quine) of opaque verbs as properties of quantifiers runs into two serious difficulties: the first problem is that it does not work with opaque verbs like resemble that resist any lexical decomposition of the seek ap try to find kind; the second one is that it wrongly predicts de (...) dicto (i.e. narrow scope) readings due to quantified noun phrases in the object positions of such verbs. It is shown that both difficulties can be overcome by an analysis of opaque verbs as operating on properties. This is a strongly modified version of a paper entitled lsquoDo We Bear Attitudes towards Quantifiers?rsquo that I have presented at conferences in Gosen (Gesellschaft für Sprachwissenschaft), Ithaca (SALT I), and Konstanz (Lexikon). I owe a special debt to Hans Kamp and Arnim von Stechow for shaping my views on the subject of this paper during the past ten years or so. Comments from and discussions with the following friends and colleagues have also led to considerable improvements: Heinrich Beck, Steve Berman, David Dowty, Veerle van Geenhoven, Fritz Hamm, Irene Heim, Wolfgang Klein, Angelika Kratzer, Michael Morreau, Barbara Partee, Mats Rooth, Roger Schwarzschild, Wolfgang Sternefeld, Emil Weydert, Henk Zeevat, and three referees. (shrink)
This paper is about the semantic analysis of opaque verbs such as seek and owe, which allow for unspecific readings of their indefinite objects.1 One may be looking for a good car without there being any car that one is looking for; or, one may be looking for a good car in that a specific car exists that one is looking for. It thus appears that there are two interpretations of these verbs – a specific and an unspecific one – (...) and one may wonder how they are related. The present paper is a contribution to this question. (shrink)
The paper is about the interpretation of opaque verbs like “seek”, “owe”, and “resemble” which allow for unspecific readings of their (indefinite) objects. It is shown that the following two observations create a problem for semantic analysis: (a) The opaque position is upward monotone: “John seeks a unicorn” implies “John seeks an animal”, given that “unicorn” is more specific than “animal”. (b) Indefinite objects of opaque verbs allow for higher-order, or “underspecific”, readings: “Jones is looking for something Smith is looking (...) for” can express that there is something unspecific that both Jones and Smith are looking for. Given (a) and (b), it would seem that the following inference is hard to escape, if the premisses are construed unspecifically and the conclusion is taken on its under- specific reading: Jones is looking for a sweater. Smith is looking for a pen. Smith is looking for something Jones is looking for. (shrink)
The paper generalises Goldblatt's completeness proof for Lemmon–Scott formulas to various modal propositional logics without classical negation and without ex falso, up to positive modal logic, where conjunction and disjunction, andwhere necessity and possibility are respectively independent.Further the paper proves definability theorems for Lemmon–Scottformulas, which hold even in modal propositional languages without negation and without falsum. Both, the completeness theorem and the definability theoremmake use only of special constructions of relations,like relation products. No second order logic, no general frames are (...) involved. (shrink)
The paper presents predicate logical extensions of some subintuitionistic logics. Subintuitionistic logics result if conditions of the accessibility relation in Kripke models for intuitionistic logic are dropped. The accessibility relation which interprets implication in models for the propositional base subintuitionistic logic considered here is neither persistent on atoms, nor reflexive, nor transitive. Strongly complete predicate logical extensions are modeled with a second accessibility relation, which is a partial order, for the interpretation of the universal quantifier.
The encounter of Advaitins with bhakti represented a new departure, in seventeenth century India, and gave birth to a new style in philosophy. It was a time when rational inquiry emancipated itself to a certain extent from the tradition of commentaries and exegesis. But we should not confuse two different ideas of rationality. Using one’s own reason in religious matters is one thing, and this is what the new philosophers did in India; spreading the lights of Reason is another thing, (...) and this was not an issue in India. (shrink)
Hecky is a strange character, a mixture between an elephant and a squirrel, but with distinctly human features, including the gifts of speaking (English) and painting, and some supernatural powers. He once painted an enormous brick bridge leading halfway across a canyon near where his archenemy lives. Hence the following sentence clearly expresses a truth.
We develop a predicate logical extension of a subintuitionistic propositional logic. Therefore a Hilbert type calculus and a Kripke type model are given. The propositional logic is formulated to axiomatize the idea of strategic weakening of Kripke''s semantic for intuitionistic logic: dropping the semantical condition of heredity or persistence leads to a nonmonotonic model. On the syntactic side this leads to a certain restriction imposed on the deduction theorem. By means of a Henkin argument strong completeness is proved making use (...) of predicate logical principles, which are only classically acceptable. (shrink)
Leonhard Euler (1707â1783) treated in his study âDe motu vibratorio tympanorum [6], published in 1766, the theory of the vibrating rectangular and circular membrane mathematically in such a comprehensive way that little more had to be added, considering today's standards. However, he omitted to interprete his results physically. Therefore his uncomparable work found little recognition, especially in the field of musical accoustics.
The main objective of this paper is to give a characterization of those quantiiiers and operators that are freely interchangeable with all other quantiiiers or operators on a possibly different domain. The starting point is a slight generalization of an earlier result on unary extensional quantifiers. These are shown to be scopeless just in case they are ultraiilters with certain strong completeness properties: in many, though not all cases, a quantilier must be trivial or name-like (i.e. principal) in order to (...) be scopeless. Which cases depends on the relative sizes of the domains of quantification. Operators other than unary extensional quantiliers for which the notion of scopelessness also makes sense include quantifiers in threevalued logic, intensional quantiliers and propositional operators in possible worlds semantics, as well as modifiers in natural language. These operators, about which the above results have nothing to say, are the subject of Section 2. The characterization result can in a sense, however, be extended to them. This is done in Section 3. Although the notion of a complete ultrafilter is as central in their case as it is in the case of unary extensional quantifiers, the results for the latter do not generalize as directly as one might think: scopelessness turns out to be even rarer in the more general setting. Finally, in Section 4, we brieiiy turn to notions of scoplessness that do not involve variable-binding, where it can be shown that completeness, but not ultraiilterhood, is irrelevant. (shrink)
Ultimamente bastante atençáo vem sendo dispensada ao estudo do ceticismo moderado na modernidade. O famoso historiador da filosofia Richard Popkin, em sua História do Ceticismo de Erasmo a Espinosa , cunhou a denominaçáo de ceticismo epistemológico para qualificar os membros desta corrente e nela inseriu os filósofos setecentistas Gassendi e Mersenne, considerando-os seus principais representantes. Além disso, no século XVIII temos o denominado ceticismo mitigado de Hume, que chamou a atençáo dos filósofos modernos para definir os limites do ceticismo. Este (...) artigo procura contribuir para o estudo do ceticismo moderado na modernidade, mostrando náo só que Hume, Mersenne e Gassendi podem fazer parte do assim chamado ceticismo epistemológico ou mitigado, mas também que há certos elementos comuns em suas filosofias destinados a mitigar os argumentos dos céticos de seu tempo. (shrink)
In this paper I respond to Gunter Zimmermann's article on doubt and faith in God that was published in this journal last year, by offering some criticisms of his views and elaborating on certain issues that Zimmermann leaves nearly or entirely untouched. First, I argue that Zimmermann's analysis of doxastic doubt is incomplete. Next, I defend the thesis that whether some specific doxastic doubt is compatible with someone's faith depends in at least four regards on the person (...) who has that doubt. Subsequently, I champion the view that some so-called fiducial doubts are compatible with faith in God, whereas certain others are not. Also, I explain why by its very nature having some fiducial doubt entails having some doxastic doubt. Finally, I deal with some biblical passages in order to show why they do not preclude the possibility of someone's having faith and at the same time having certain fiducial doubts. (shrink)
avant propos This paper is basically Keenan (1992) augmented by some new types of properly polyadic quantification in natural language drawn from Moltmann (1992), Nam (1991) and Srivastav (1990). In addition I would draw the reader's attention to recent mathematical studies of polyadic quantiicationz Ben-Shalom (1992), Spaan (1992) and Westerstahl (1992). The first and third of these extend and generalize (in some cases considerably) the techniques and results in Keenan (1992). Finally I would like to acknowledge the stimulating and constructive (...) discussions ofthe earlier paper with many scholars, notably Dorit Ben-Shalom, Jaap van der Does, Hans Kamp, Uwe Mormich, Arnim von Stechow, Mats Rooth, and Ede Zimmermann. And I repeat here the acknowledgment in the earlier paper to Jim Lambek, Ed Stabler and two anonymous referees for Linguistics and Philosophy (the latter responsible for substantial improvements in the proofs - see footnote 10). (shrink)
Analytical philosophy begins with the first mathematical and philosophical works of Bolzano published between 1804 and 1817. There, Bolzano set out a project for the global reform of mathematics by means of the axiomatic method. Having completed the Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano wrote a summary of his logic for the Größenlehre, which he sent to Exner in 1833. The correspondence between Bolzano and Exner covered some of the main subjects treated by analytical philosophy: the status of abstract objects (propositions and objective ideas), (...) intuitions, objectless ideas, the concept of object and many others. While Bolzano argued in favor of abstract entities independent of mind and of language, Exner considered them as abstractions obtained from the subjective judgments and representations. During the XlXth century, Bolzano's philosophy spread over Bohemia and Austria through manuscripts and through the first edition of Zimmermann's textbook of philosophy. The most important Brentanians, Kerry, Twardowski, Meinong and Husserl, discussed his doctrines which may also have influenced Wittgenstein and the Polish school. (shrink)
In this paper, a pragmatic approach to the phenomenon of free choice permission is proposed. Free choice permission is explained as due to taking the speaker (i) to obey certain Gricean maxims of conversation and (ii) to be competent on the deontic options, i.e. to know the valid obligations and permissions. The approach differs from other pragmatic approaches to free choice permission in giving a formally precise description of the class of inferences that can be derived based on these two (...) assumptions. This formalization builds on work of Halpern and Moses (1984) on the concept of ‘only knowing’, generalized by Hoek et al., (1999, 2000), and Zimmermann’s (2000) approach to competence. (shrink)
Given an admissible indexing φ of the countable atomless Boolean algebra B, an automorphism F of B is said to be recursively presented (relative to φ) if there exists a recursive function $p \in \operatorname{Sym}(\omega)$ such that F ⚬ φ = φ ⚬ p. Our key result on recursiveness: Both the subset of $\operatorname{Aut}(\mathscr{B})$ consisting of all those automorphisms which are recursively presented relative to some indexing, and its complement, the set of all "totally nonrecursive" automorphisms, are uncountable. This arises (...) as a consequence of the following combinatorial investigations: (1) A comparison of the cycle structures of f and f̄, where f is a permutation of some free basis of B and f̄ is the automorphism of B induced by f. (2) An explicit description of the permutations of ω whose conjugacy classes in $\operatorname{Sym}(\omega)$ are (a) uncountable, (b) countably infinite, and (c) finite. (shrink)
1This work was supported in part by the projects TRINDI (Task Oriented Instructional Dialogue), EC Project LE4-8314, SDS (Swedish Dialogue Systems), NUTEK/HSFR Language Technology Project F1472/1997, INDI (Information Exchange in Dialogue), Riksbankens Jubileumsfond 1997-0134, and SIRIDUS (Specification, Interaction, Reconfiguration in Dialogue Understanding Systems), EC Project IST-1999-10516, and ILT (Interactive Language Technology), Vinnova Project 2001-6340. To appear in Presuppositions and Discourse ed. by Rainer Bäuerle, Uwe Reyle and Thomas Ede Zimmermann, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
