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Profile: Elia Zardini (university of lisbon)
  1.  20
    Elia Zardini (2011). Truth Without Contra(di)Ction. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.
    The concept of truth arguably plays a central role in many areas of philosophical theorizing. Yet, what seems to be one of the most fundamental principles governing that concept, i.e. the equivalence between P and , is inconsistent in full classical logic, as shown by the semantic paradoxes. I propose a new solution to those paradoxes, based on a principled revision of classical logic. Technically, the key idea consists in the rejection of the unrestricted validity of the structural principle of (...)
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  2.  31
    Elia Zardini (2013). Naive Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):575-593.
    The paper is concerned with a logical difficulty which Lionel Shapiro’s deflationist theory of logical consequence (as well as the author’s favoured, non-deflationist theory) gives rise to. It is argued that Shapiro’s non-contractive approach to solving the difficulty, although correct in its broad outlines, is nevertheless extremely problematic in some of its specifics, in particular in its failure to validate certain intuitive rules and laws associated with the principle of modus ponens. An alternative non-contractive theory is offered which does not (...)
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  3.  80
    Elia Zardini (2008). A Model of Tolerance. Studia Logica 90 (3):337 - 368.
    According to the naive theory of vagueness, the vagueness of an expression consists in the existence of both positive and negative cases of application of the expression and in the non-existence of a sharp cut-off point between them. The sorites paradox shows the naive theory to be inconsistent in most logics proposed for a vague language. The paper explores the prospects of saving the naive theory by revising the logic in a novel way, placing principled restrictions on the (...)
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  4.  15
    Elia Zardini (2015). Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (3):365-392.
    After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that that principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted feasible-knowability principle but that the overall view underlying the new principle still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appealing precisely to the paradox of knowability, the (...)
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  5. Elia Zardini (2013). Higher-Order Sorites Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):25-48.
    The naive theory of vagueness holds that the vagueness of an expression consists in its failure to draw a sharp boundary between positive and negative cases. The naive theory is contrasted with the nowadays dominant approach to vagueness, holding that the vagueness of an expression consists in its presenting borderline cases of application. The two approaches are briefly compared in their respective explanations of a paramount phenomenon of vagueness: our ignorance of any sharp boundary between positive and negative cases. These (...)
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  6.  15
    Elia Zardini (2016). Restriction by Noncontraction. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 57 (2):287-327.
    This paper investigates how naive theories of truth fare with respect to a set of extremely plausible principles of restricted quantification. It is first shown that both nonsubstructural theories as well as certain substructural theories cannot validate all those principles. Then, pursuing further an approach to the semantic paradoxes that the author has defended elsewhere, the theory of restricted quantification available in a specific naive theory that rejects the structural property of contraction is explored. It is shown that the theory (...)
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  7.  13
    Elia Zardini (2014). Context and Consequence. An Intercontextual Substructural Logic. Synthese 191 (15):3473-3500.
    Some apparently valid arguments crucially rely on context change. To take a kind of example first discussed by Frege, ‘Tomorrow, it’ll be sunny’ taken on a day seems to entail ‘Today, it’s sunny’ taken on the next day, but the first sentence taken on a day sadly does not seem to entail the second sentence taken on the second next day. Mid-argument context change has not been accounted for by the tradition that has extensively studied the distinctive logical properties of (...)
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  8.  14
    Elia Zardini (2014). Naive Truth and Naive Logical Properties. Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):351-384.
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  9.  89
    Dan López de Sa & Elia Zardini (2011). No-No. Paradox and Consistency. Analysis 71 (3):472 - 478.
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  10.  73
    Elia Zardini (2013). Luminosity and Determinacy. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):765-786.
    The paper discusses some ways in which the phenomenon of borderline cases may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are fully open to our view. The discussion focusses on a very influential argument (due to Tim Williamson) to the effect that, roughly, no such domains of luminous facts exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts that are best candidates for being luminous plays an (...)
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  11.  33
    Elia Zardini (2015). The Opacity of Truth. Topoi 34 (1):37-54.
    The paper offers a critical examination of a prominent, “quasi-deflationist” argument advanced in the contemporary debate on the semantic paradoxes against non-naive and non-transparent theories of truth. The argument claims that truth unrestrictedly fulfils certain expressive functions, and that its so doing requires the unrestricted validity of naivety and transparency principles. The paper criticises the quasi-deflationist argument by considering some kinds of cases in which transparency and naivety arguably fail. In some such cases truth still fulfils the relevant expressive functions (...)
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  12.  68
    Dan López de Sa & Elia Zardini (2007). Truthmakers, Knowledge and Paradox. Analysis 67 (3):242 - 250.
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  13.  97
    Elia Zardini (2008). Truth and What is Said. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):545-574.
    A notion of truth as applicable to events of assertoric use ( utterances ) of a sentence token is arguably presupposed and required by our evaluative practices of the use of language. The truth of an utterance seems clearly to depend on what the utterance says . This fundamental dependence seems in turn to be captured by the schema that, if an utterance u says that P , then u is true iff P . Such a schema may thus be (...)
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  14.  83
    Daniele Sgaravatti & Elia Zardini (2008). Knowing How to Establish Intellectualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):217-261.
    In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of 'know how'-and 'know wh'-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to 'know wh'-ascriptions, 'know how'-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure principles whose counterparts fail for knowledge-wh and knowledge-that. Thirdly, (...)
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  15.  32
    Elia Zardini (2012). It Is Not the Case That [P and 'It Is Not the Case That P' Is True] nor Is It the Case That [P and 'P' Is Not True]. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):309-319.
    A new semantic paradox developed by Richard Heck and relying on very minimal logical and truth-theoretic resources is rehearsed. A theory of truth restricting the structural metarule of contraction is presented and some of the theory's relevant features are made explicit. It is then shown how the theory provides a principled solution to the paradox while preserving the extremely compelling truth-theoretic principles at stake, thus bringing out a significant advantage that the theory enjoys over virtually all other non-dialetheic theories. It (...)
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  16.  18
    Elia Zardini (2008). Knowledge-How, True Indexical Belief, and Action. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:291-299.
    Intellectualism is the doctrine that knowing how to do something consists in knowing that something is the case. Drawing on contemporary linguistic theories of indirect questions, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have recently revived intellectualism, proposing to interpret a sentence of the form ‘s knows how to F’ as ascribing to s knowledge of a certain way w of Fing that she can F in w. In order to preserve knowledgehow’s connection to action and thus avoid an overgeneration problem, they (...)
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  17.  57
    Elia Zardini (2008). Living on the Slippery Slope : The Nature, Sources and Logic of Vagueness. Dissertation, University of St Andrews
    According to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of the vagueness of an expression ‘F’ consists in its presenting borderline cases in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic, epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes to reconsider the naive theory of vagueness, according to which (...)
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  18.  54
    Elia Zardini (2006). Squeezing and Stretching: How Vagueness Can Outrun Borderlineness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):419–426.
    The paper develops a critical dialectic with respect to the nowadays dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, an approach whose main tenet is that it is in the nature of the vagueness of an expression to present borderline cases of application, conceived of as enjoying some kind of distinctive normative status. Borderlineness is used to explain the basic phenomena of vagueness, such as, for example, our ignorance of the location of cut-offs in a soritical series. Every particular theory of (...)
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  19.  14
    Elia Zardini (2013). Naive Logical Properties and Structural Properties. Journal of Philosophy 110 (11):633-644.
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  20.  33
    Elia Zardini (2012). Luminosity and Vagueness. Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.
    The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts (...)
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  21.  64
    Dan López de Sa & Elia Zardini (2006). Does This Sentence Have No Truthmaker? Analysis 66 (2):154–157.
    Reponse to Peter Milne (2005)'s argument agaist maximalism about truthmaking.
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  22.  78
    Elia Zardini (2013). Knowledge-How, True Indexical Belief, and Action. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):341-355.
    Intellectualism is the doctrine that knowing how to do something consists in knowing that something is the case. Drawing on contemporary linguistic theories of indirect questions, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have recently revived intellectualism, proposing to interpret a sentence of the form ‘s knows how to F’ as ascribing to s knowledge of a certain way w of Fing that she can F in w. In order to preserve knowledgehow’s connection to action and thus avoid an overgeneration problem, they (...)
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  23. Paula Sweeney & Elia Zardini (2011). Vagueness and Practical Interests. In Paul Egre & Nathan Klinedinst (eds.), Vagueness and Language Use. Palgrave MacMillan
    In this paper we focus mainly on a kind of contextualism theory of vagueness according to which the context dependence has its source in the variation of our practical interests. We largely focus on Fara's version of the theory but our observations work at different levels of generality, some relevant only to the specifics of Fara's theory others relevant to all contextualist theories of a certain type.
     
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  24.  34
    Elia Zardini (2014). Possibility, Necessity and Probability: A Meditation on Underdetermination and Justification. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 79 (3):639-667.
    After providing some historical and systematic background, I introduce the structure of a very natural and influential sceptical underdetermination argument. The argument assumes that it is metaphysically possible for a deceived subject to have the same evidence that a non-deceived subject has, and tries to draw consequences about justification from that assumption of metaphysical possibility. I first variously object to the transition from the assumption to its supposed consequences. In the central part of the paper, I then critically consider some (...)
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  25. Elia Zardini (2005). Higher-Order Vagueness and Paradox: The Glory and Misery of S4 Definiteness. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
     
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  26. Elia Zardini, If Every True Proposition is Knowable, Then Every Believed (Decidable) Proposition is True, or the Incompleteness of the Intuitionistic Solution to the Paradox of Knowability.
    Fitch’s paradox of knowability is an apparently valid reasoning from the assumption (typical of semantic anti-realism) that every true proposition is knowable to the unacceptable conclusion that every true proposition is known. The paper develops a critical dialectic wrt one of the best motivated solutions to the paradox which have been proposed on behalf of semantic anti-realism—namely, the intuitionistic solution. The solution consists, on the one hand, in accepting the intuitionistically valid part of Fitch’s reasoning while, on the other hand, (...)
     
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  27.  24
    Elia Zardini (2009). Review of Nathan Salmon, Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers Ii. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
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  28.  30
    Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.) (2014). Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press.
    One of the hardest problems in the history of Western philosophy has been to explain whether and how experience can provide knowledge about the objective world outside the experiencer's mind. A prominent brand of scepticism has precisely denied that experience can provide such knowledge. How, for instance can I know that my experiences are not produced in me by a powerful demon? This volume, originating from the research project on Basic Knowledge recently concluded at the Northern Institute of Philosophy, presents (...)
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  29. Elia Zardini (2015). Getting One for Two, or the Contractors’ Bad Deal. Towards a Unified Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes. In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Netherlands
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