25 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Elinor Mason (University of Edinburgh)
  1. Elinor Mason (2013). Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2).
    In this paper I present a new argument for prospectivism: the view that, for a consequentialist, rightness depends on what is prospectively best rather than what would actually be best. Prospective bestness depends on the agent’s epistemic position, though exactly how that works is not straightforward. I clarify various possible versions of prospectivism, which differ in how far they go in relativizing to the agent’s limitations. My argument for prospectivism is an argument for moderately objective prospectivism, according to which the (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Elinor Mason (2012). Coercion and Integrity. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 2. Oxford.
    Williams argues that impartial moral theories undermine agents’ integrity by making them responsible for allowings as well as doings. I argue that in some cases of allowings, where there is an intervening agent, the agent has been coerced, and so is not fully responsible. -/- I provide an analysis of coercion. Whether an agent is coerced depends on various things (the coercer must provide strong reasons, and the coercer must have a mens rea), and crucially, the coercee’s action is rendered (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Elinor Mason (2009). Review of Slote, Michael,The Ethics of Care and Empathy, London: Routledge, 2007, Pp. Xiv + 133, £17.99 (Paper). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):352-354.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Elinor Mason (2009). What is Consequentialism? Think 8 (21):19-28.
    Elinor Mason explains and contrasts consequentialist and duty-based theories of ethics.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Elinor Mason (2008). An Argument Against Motivational Internalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.
    I argue that motivational internalism should not be driving metaethics. I first show that many arguments for motivational internalism beg the question by resting on an illicit appeal to internalist assumptions about the nature of reasons. Then I make a distinction between weak internalism and the weakest form of internalism. Weak internalism allows that agents fail to act according to their normative judgments when they are practically irrational. I show that when we clarify the notion of practical irrationality it does (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Elinor Mason, Value Pluralism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  7. Elinor Mason (2008). Why Read Mill Today? - By John Skorupski. Philosophical Books 49 (2):154-156.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Elinor Mason (2007). Rationality and Morality: Thoughts on Unprincipled Virtue. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 134 (3):441 - 448.
  9. Elinor Mason (2007). Review of Joseph Mendola, Goodness and Justice: A Consequentialist Moral Theory. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (8).
  10. Elinor Mason (2007). The Nature of Pleasure: A Critique of Feldman. Utilitas 19 (3):379-387.
    In these remarks on Feldman's recent book, Pleasure and the Good Life, I concentrate on Feldman's account of pleasure as attitudinal. I argue that an account of pleasure according to which pleasure need not have any feel is implausible. I suggest that Feldman could avoid this problem but retain the advantages of his attitudinal hedonism by giving an account of the attitude such that the attitude has a feel.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Elinor Mason (2005). Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Books 46 (4):343-353.
    In this account of recent work on moral responsibility I shall try to disen- tangle various different sorts of question about moral responsibility. In brief, the tangle includes questions about whether we have free will, questions about whether moral responsibility is compatible with free will, and questions about what moral responsibility involves. As far as possible I will ignore the first sort of question, be as brief as possible on the second sort of question, and focus on the third question. (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Elinor Mason (2005). Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003), Pp. XI + 312. Utilitas 17 (2):231-233.
  13. Elinor Mason (2005). Recent Work on Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Books 46 (4):343-353.
    In this account of recent work on moral responsibility I shall try to disentangle
    various different sorts of question about moral responsibility. In brief, the
    tangle includes questions about whether we have free will, questions about
    whether moral responsibility is compatible with free will, and questions about
    what moral responsibility involves. As far as possible I will ignore the first sort
    of question, be as brief as possible on the second sort of question, and focus
    on the third question.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Elinor Mason (2005). We Make No Promises. Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):33 - 46.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Elinor Mason (2004). Consequentialism and the Principle of Indifference. Utilitas 16 (3):316-321.
    James Lenman argues that consequentialism fails as a moral theory because it is impossible to predict the long-term consequences of our actions. I agree that it is impossible to predict the long-term consequences of actions, but argue that this does not count as a strike against consequentialism. I focus on the principle of indifference, which tells us to treat unforeseeable consequences as cancelling each other out, and hence value-neutral. I argue that though we cannot defend this principle independently, we cannot (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Elinor Mason (2003). Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, Pp. X + 275. Utilitas 15 (02):250-.
  17. Elinor Mason (2003). Consequentialism and the "Ought Implies Can" Principle. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (4):319 - 331.
    It seems that the debate between objective and subjective consequentialists might be resolved by appealing to the ought implies can principle. Howard-Snyder has suggested that if one does not know how to do something, cannot do it, and thus one cannot have an obligation to do it. I argue that this depends on an overly rich conception of ability, and that we need to look beyond the ought implies can principle to answer the question. Once we do so, it appears (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Elinor Mason (2002). Against Blameless Wrongdoing. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):287-303.
    I argue against the standard view that it is possible to describe extensionally different consequentialist theories by describing different evaluative focal points. I argue that for consequentialist purposes, the important sense of the word act must include all motives and side effects, and thus these things cannot be separated.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Elinor Mason (2002). Review: Dignity and Vulnerability: Strength and Quality of Character. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (443):680-683.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason & Dale Miller (eds.) (2000). Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader. Edinburgh University Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Elinor Mason (1999). Do Consequentialists Have One Thought Too Many? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):243-261.
    In this paper I defend consequentialism against the objection that consequentialists are alienated from their personal relationships through having inappropriate motivational states. This objection is one interpretation of Williams' claim that consequentialists will have "one thought too many". Consequentialists should cultivate dispositions to act from their concern for others. I argue that having such a disposition is consistent with a belief in consequentialism and constitutes an appropriate attitude to personal relationships. If the consequentialist has stable beliefs that friendship is justifiable (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Garrett Cullity, Alex Miller, Duncan McFarland, James Griffin, R. Jay Wallace, Iain Law, Ralph Wedgwood, Maggie Little, Nick Zangwill & Elinor Mason (1998). British Society for Ethical Theory 1998 Conference. Journal of Ethics 2 (189).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. David Estlund, Kok‐Chor Tan, Sophia Reibetanz, Susan J. Brison, Arthur Isak Applbaum, Tamara Horowitz, Elinor Mason & Jeff McMahan (1998). 10. Notes on Contributors Notes on Contributors (P. 460). In Stephen Everson (ed.), Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Elinor Mason (1998). Can an Indirect Consequentialist Be a Real Friend? Ethics 108 (2):386-393.