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  1. Elisabeth Camp, Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus-Independence and the Generality Constraint.
    A venerable philosophical tradition claims that only language users possess concepts. But this makes conceptual thought out to be an implausibly rarified achievement. A more recent tradition, based in cognitive science, maintains that any creature who can systematically recombine its representational capacities thereby deploys concepts. But this makes conceptual thought implausibly widespread. I argue for a middle ground: it is sufficient for conceptual thought that one be able to entertain many of the thoughts produced by recombining one.
     
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  2. Elisabeth Camp, Perspectives in Imaginative Engagement with Fiction.
    I take up three puzzles about our emotional and evaluative responses to fiction. First, how can we even have emotional responses to characters and events that we know not to exist, if emotions are as intimately connected to belief and action as they seem to be? One solution to this puzzle claims that we merely imagine having such emotional responses. But this raises the puzzle of why we would ever refuse to follow an author’s instructions to imagine such responses, since (...)
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  3. Elisabeth Camp, Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Stimulus-Independence and the Generality Constraint.
    A venerable philosophical tradition claims that only language users possess concepts. But this makes conceptual thought out to be an implausibly rarified achievement. A more recent tradition, based in cognitive science, maintains that any creature who can systematically recombine its representational capacities thereby deploys concepts. But this makes conceptual thought implausibly widespread. I argue for a middle ground: it is sufficient for conceptual thought that one be able to entertain many of the thoughts produced by recombining one’s representational capacities, so (...)
     
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  4. Elisabeth Camp, Poesis Without Metaphor (Show and Tell).
    Theorists often associate certain “poetic” qualities with metaphor — most especially, open-endedness, evocativeness, imagery and affective power. However, the qualities themselves are neither necessary nor sufficient for metaphor. I argue that many of the distinctively “poetic” qualities of metaphor are in fact qualities of aspectual thought, which can also be exemplified by parables, “telling details,” and “just so” stories. Thinking about these other uses of language to produce aspectual thought forces us to pinpoint what is distinctive about metaphor, and also (...)
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  5. Elisabeth Camp, Saying and Seeing-As: The Linguistic Uses and Cognitive Effects of Metaphor.
    Metaphor is a pervasive feature of language. We use metaphor to talk about the world in both familiar and innovative ways, and in contexts ranging from everyday conversation to literature and scientific theorizing. However, metaphor poses serious challenges for standard theories of meaning, because it seems to straddle so many important boundaries: between language and thought, between semantics and pragmatics, between rational communication and mere causal association.
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  6. Elisabeth Camp, Version Presented at the 2006 Pacific APA Why Isn't Sarcasm Semantic, Anyway?* Nearly Everyone Assumes That Sarcasm is a Pragmatic Phenomenon. But We Can Also Construct a Prima Facie Plausible..
    Nearly everyone shares the intuition that sarcasm or verbal irony1 is a use of language in which speaker meaning and sentence meaning come apart. Two millennia ago, Quintilian defined irony as speech in which “we understand something which is the opposite of what is actually said.”2 More recently, Josef Stern sharply distinguishes metaphor, which he argues is semantic, from irony: in the latter case, he says, we are not “even tempted to posit an ironic meaning in the utterance in addition (...)
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  7. Elisabeth Camp (2013). Slurring Perspectives. Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):330-349.
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  8. Elisabeth Camp (2012). Sarcasm, Pretense, and The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Noûs 46 (4):587 - 634.
    Traditional theories of sarcasm treat it as a case of a speaker's meaning the opposite of what she says. Recently, 'expressivists' have argued that sarcasm is not a type of speaker meaning at all, but merely the expression of a dissociative attitude toward an evoked thought or perspective. I argue that we should analyze sarcasm in terms of meaning inversion, as the traditional theory does; but that we need to construe 'meaning' more broadly, to include illocutionary force and evaluative attitudes (...)
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  9. Elisabeth Camp (2009). A Language of Baboon Thought? In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. 108--127.
    Does thought precede language, or the other way around? How does having a language affect our thoughts? Who has a language, and who can think? These questions have traditionally been addressed by philosophers, especially by rationalists concerned to identify the essential difference between humans and other animals. More recently, theorists in cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and developmental psychology have been asking these questions in more empirically grounded ways. At its best, this confluence of philosophy and science promises to blend the (...)
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  10. Elisabeth Camp (2009). Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus-Independence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):275-311.
    I argue that we can reconcile two seemingly incompatible traditions for thinking about concepts. On the one hand, many cognitive scientists assume that the systematic redeployment of representational abilities suffices for having concepts. On the other hand, a long philosophical tradition maintains that language is necessary for genuinely conceptual thought. I argue that on a theoretically useful and empirically plausible concept of 'concept', it is necessary and sufficient for conceptual thought that a thinker be able to entertain many of the (...)
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  11. Elisabeth Camp (2009). Two Varieties of Literary Imagination: Metaphor, Fiction, and Thought Experiments. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 33 (1):107-130.
    Recently, philosophers have discovered that they have a lot to learn from, or at least to ponder about, fiction. Many metaphysicians are attracted to fiction as a model for our talk about purported objects and properties, such as numbers, morality, and possible worlds, without embracing a robust Platonist ontology. In addition, a growing group of philosophers of mind are interested in the implications of our engagement with fiction for our understanding of the mind and emotions: If I don’t believe that (...)
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  12. Elisabeth Camp (2008). Showing, Telling and Seeing. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 3:1-24.
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  13. Elisabeth Camp & John Hawthorne (2008). Sarcastic 'Like': A Case Study in the Interface of Syntax and Semantics. Noûs 42 (1):1 - 21.
    The expression ‘Like’ has a wide variety of uses among English and American speakers. It may describe preference, as in (1) She likes mint chip ice cream. It may be used as a vehicle of comparison, as in (2) Trieste is like Minsk on steroids.
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  14. Elisabeth Camp (2007). Introduction. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 3 (1).
    Here, I offer a rapid overview of the theory of metaphor, in order to situate the contributions to this volume in relation to one another and within the field more generally.
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  15. Elisabeth Camp (2007). Prudent Semantics Meets Wanton Speech Act Pluralism. In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press. 194--215.
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  16. Elisabeth Camp (2007). 1. Semantic Methodology. In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press. 194.
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  17. Elisabeth Camp (2007). Showing, Telling and Seeing. Metaphor and “Poetic” Language. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 3 (1).
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  18. Elisabeth Camp (2007). Thinking with Maps. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):145–182.
    Most of us create and use a panoply of non-sentential representations throughout our ordinary lives: we regularly use maps to navigate, charts to keep track of complex patterns of data, and diagrams to visualize logical and causal relations among states of affairs. But philosophers typically pay little attention to such representations, focusing almost exclusively on language instead. In particular, when theorizing about the mind, many philosophers assume that there is a very tight mapping between language and thought. Some analyze utterances (...)
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  19. Elisabeth Camp (2006). Contextualism, Metaphor, and What is Said. Mind and Language 21 (3):280–309.
    On a familiar and prima facie plausible view of metaphor, speakers who speak metaphorically say one thing in order to mean another. A variety of theorists have recently challenged this view; they offer criteria for distinguishing what is said from what is merely meant, and argue that these support classifying metaphor within 'what is said'. I consider four such criteria, and argue that when properly understood, they support the traditional classification instead. I conclude by sketching how we might extract a (...)
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  20. Elisabeth Camp (2006). Metaphor and That Certain 'Je Ne Sais Quoi'. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):1 - 25.
    Philosophers have traditionally inclined toward one of two opposite extremes when it comes to metaphor. On the one hand, partisans of metaphor have tended to believe that metaphors do something different in kind from literal utterances; it is a ‘heresy’, they think, either to deny that what metaphors do is genuinely cognitive, or to assume that it can be translated into literal terms. On the other hand, analytic philosophers have typically denied just this: they tend to assume that if metaphors (...)
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  21. Elisabeth Camp (2006). Metaphor in the Mind: The Cognition of Metaphor. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):154-170.
    Philosophers have often adopted a dismissive attitude toward metaphor. Hobbes (1651, ch. 8) advocated excluding metaphors from rational discourse because they “openly profess deceit,” while Locke (1690, Bk. 3, ch. 10) claimed that figurative uses of language serve only “to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats.” Later, logical positivists like Ayer and Carnap assumed that because metaphors like..
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  22. Marga Reimer & Elisabeth Camp (2006). Metaphor. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oup Oxford.
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  23. Marga Reimer & Elisabeth Camp (2006). 33.1 What is Metaphor?: A Tentative Characterization. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 845.
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  24. Elisabeth Camp (2005). Review: Josef Stern, Metaphor in Context. [REVIEW] Noûs 39 (4):715-731.
    Metaphor is a crucially context-dependent linguistic phenomenon. This fact was not clearly recognized until some time in the 1970’s. Until then, most theorists assumed that a sentence must have a fixed set of metaphorical meanings, if it had any at all. Often, they also assumed that metaphoricity was the product of grammatical deviance, in the form of a category mistake. To compensate for this deviance, they thought, at least one of the sentence’s constituent terms underwent a meaning-changing ‘metaphorical twist’, which (...)
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  25. Elisabeth Camp (2005). Josef Stern, Metaphor in Context (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). Noûs 39 (4):715–731.
  26. Elisabeth Camp (2004). The Generality Constraint and Categorial Restrictions. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):209–231.
    We should not admit categorial restrictions on the significance of syntactically well formed strings. Syntactically well formed but semantically absurd strings, such as ‘Life’s but a walking shadow’ and ‘Caesar is a prime number’, can express thoughts; and competent thinkers both are able to grasp these and ought to be able to. Gareth Evans’ generality constraint, though Evans himself restricted it, should be viewed as a fully general constraint on concept possession and propositional thought. For (a) even well formed but (...)
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