49 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Elisabeth Pacherie (Institut Jean Nicod)
Profile: Elisabeth Pacherie (Institut Jean Nicod)
  1. Élisabeth Pacherie, Perceiving Intentions.
    I will concentrate on the 'executive' conception of intentions and intentional actions. I will argue that intentional bodily movements have distinctive observable characteristics that set them apart from non-intentional bodily motions. I will also argue that that when we observe an action performed by someone else, the perceptual representations we form contain information about the dynamics of movements and their relations to objects in the scene that can be exploited in order to identify at least the more basic intentions of (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. John A. Dewey, Elisabeth Pacherie & Guenther Knoblich (2014). The Phenomenology of Controlling a Moving Object with Another Person. Cognition 132 (3):383-397.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Elisabeth Pacherie (2014). Can Conscious Agency Be Saved? Topoi 33 (1):33-45.
    This paper is concerned with the role of conscious agency in human action. On a folk-psychological view of the structure of agency, intentions, conceived as conscious mental states, are the causes of actions. In the last decades, the development of new psychological and neuroscientific methods has made conscious agency an object of empirical investigation and yielded results that challenge the received wisdom. Most famously, the results of Libet’s studies on the ‘readiness potential’ have been interpreted by many as evidence in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Elisabeth Pacherie (2014). How Does It Feel to Act Together? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.
    This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint action that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jean-Rémy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie (2013). Out of Nowhere: Thought Insertion, Ownership and Context-Integration. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):111-122.
    We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a fail- ure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in partic- ular contextual information concerning the different causal factors that may be implicated in their production. Loss of unity (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Elisabeth Pacherie (2013). Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite. Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Elisabeth Pacherie & Jean-Remy Martin (2013). Out of Nowhere: Thought Insertion, Ownership and Context-Integration. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):111-122.
    We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a failure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in particular contextual information concerning the different causal factors that may be implicated in their production. Loss of unity of consciousness, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Elisabeth Pacherie (2012). Action. In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press. 92--111.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Elisabeth Pacherie (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency. In Seemann Axel (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.
    This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in it.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
    Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert’s account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman’s account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control. Social Psychology 42 (1):67-73.
    In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relation- ships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these movements, thus (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Elisabeth Pacherie (2010). Self-Agency. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oup Oxford.
    We are perceivers, we are thinkers, and we are also agents, bringing about physical events, such as bodily movements and their consequences. What we do tells us, and others, a lot about who we are. On the one hand, who we are determines what we do. On the other hand, acting is also a process of self-discovery and self-shaping. Pivotal to this mutual shaping of self and agency is the sense of agency, or agentive self-awareness, i.e., the sense that one (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Elisabeth Pacherie & Patrick Haggard (2010). What Are Intentions? In L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oxford University Press. 70--84.
    The concept of intention can do useful work in psychological theory. Many authors have insisted on a qualitative difference between prospective and intentions regarding their type of content, with prospective intentions generally being more abstract than immediate intentions. However, we suggest that the main basis of this distinction is temporal: prospective intentions necessarily occur before immediate intention and before action itself, and often long before them. In contrast, immediate intentions occur in the specific context of the action itself. Yet both (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Elisabeth Pacherie (2008). The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework. Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
    After a long period of neglect, the phenomenology of action has recently regained its place in the agenda of philosophers and scientists alike. The recent explosion of interest in the topic highlights its complexity. The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework allowing for a more precise characterization of the many facets of the phenomenology of agency, of how they are related and of their possible sources. The key assumption guiding this attempt is that the processes through (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness. [REVIEW] Synthese 159 (3):475 - 491.
    This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). Too Much Ado About Belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):185-200.
    Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinction for consciousness. (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behavior: A Window Onto Agentive Self-Awareness. Functional Neurology 22 (4):211 - 217.
    Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question of whether their combination would yield a full account of agentive self-awareness (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. Psyche 13 (1):1 - 30.
    The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of first-person agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of agency and makes it clear that the experience of agency includes many other experiences as components. This paper examines the possible relations between these components of our experience of acting and the processes involved in action specification and action control. After a brief discussion of our awareness of our goals and means of action, it will focus on (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie, On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference.
    It is widely assumed, both in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences, that perception essentially involves a relative or egocentric frame of reference. Levinson has explicitly challenged this assumption, arguing instead in favour of the 'neo-Whorfian' hypothesis that the frame of reference dominant in a given language infiltrates spatial representations in non-linguistic, and in particular perceptual, modalities. Our aim in this paper is to assess Levinson's neo-Whorfian hypothesis at the philosophical level and to explore the further possibility that perception may (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Timothy J. Bayne (2006). Phenomenology and Delusions: Who Put the 'Alien' in Alien Control? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2005). In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Agency, Simulation and Self-Identification. Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.
    This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Looking for the Agent in Action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):54-55.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions. In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? Mit Press.
    In this paper, I shall offer a sketch of a dynamic theory of intentions. I shall argue that several categories or forms of intentions should be distinguished based on their different (and complementary) functional roles and on the different contents or types of contents they involve. I shall further argue that an adequate account of the distinctive nature of actions and of their various grades of intentionality depends on a large part on a proper understanding of the dynamic transitions among (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Élisabeth Pacherie (2003). La dynamique des intentions. Dialogue 42 (03):447-.
    I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). Emotion and Action. European Review of Philosophy 5:55-90.
    The purpose of this paper is to explore the question whether and in what sense emotions might be said to provide reasons for actions or to rationalize them. This requires that one have a picture of the causal structure of actions that is sufficiently detailed for one to see how emotions can impinge on the proc-ess of action production. I present a two-tiered model of action explanation and try to exploit this model in a tentative account of the modes of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Élisabeth Pacherie (2002). Intention. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):299-317.
    The main aim of this paper is to investigate what becomes of normativity in naturalistic epistemologies. What particular stand a given naturalistic epistemology takes on normativity will depend both on what it thinks is wrong with traditional epistemology and on what level of normativity is at stake. I propose a tentative typology of possible attitudes towards normativity from within naturalistic epistemology. In section I, I give a brief presentation of traditional epistemology, stressing the dimensions of this approach that may appear (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). Reply to Joint Attention and Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). Reply to John Campbell. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. 45--255.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). The Role of Emotions in the Explanation of Action. European Review of Philosophy 5:53-92.
  33. Elisabeth Pacherie (2001). Agency Lost and Found: A Commentary on Spence. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):173-176.
  34. Elisabeth Pacherie (2001). Conscious Experience and Concept-Forming Abilities. Acta Analytica 16 (26):45-52.
    Pierre Jacob's book, What Minds Can Do , is mainly concerned with intentionality. Jacob's primary goal is to explain both how it is possible for a physical system to have intentional mental states and how the intentional content of such mental states can play a role in the causal explanation of behaviour. Yet, he also tackles the issue of the nature of conscious experience. I shall focus here on a claim he makes in connection with this latter topic. The claim (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Elisabeth Pacherie (2000). Levels of Perceptual Content. Philsophical Studies 100 (3):237-54.
    My main thesis is this paper is that, although Dretske's distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. I argue that what is needed in order to give a more accurate account of perceptual phenomena is not a twofold distinction of the kind advocated by Dretske but a threefold (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Elisabeth Pacherie (2000). The Content of Intentions. Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432.
    I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Elisabeth Pacherie (1999). Iesap and Institutional Members I. Dialectica 53 (2).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Elisabeth Pacherie (1999). Qualia and Representations. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer. 119--144.
    Dretske has recently offered a representational theory of perceptual experience - considered as paradigmatic of the qualitative and phenomenal aspects of our mental life. This theory belongs, as do his previous works, to a naturalistic approach to mental representation.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Élisabeth Pacherie (1998). Philosophie et psychologie Pascal Engel Collection «Folio essais» Paris, Gallimard, 1996, 473 p. Dialogue 37 (02):414-.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Élisabeth Pacherie (1998). Philosophie Et Psychologie. Dialogue 37 (2):414-418.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Joëlle Proust, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery & Marc Jeannerod (1997). Looking for the Agent: An Investigation Into Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness in Schizophrenic Patients. Cognition 65 (1):71-86.
    The abilities to attribute an action to its proper agent and to understand its meaning when it is produced by someone else are basic aspects of human social communication. Several psychiatric syndromes, such as schizophrenia, seem to lead to a dysfunction of the awareness of one’s own action as well as of recognition of actions performed by other. Such syndromes offer a framework for studying the determinants of agency, the ability to correctly attribute actions to their veridical source. Thirty normal (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Elisabeth Pacherie (1997). Ipast EVENTS I. Dialectica 51 (4).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Elisabeth Pacherie (1996). Isteering COMMITTEE I. Dialectica 50 (4).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Élisabeth Pacherie (1996). Pensée, langage et communauté Michel Seymour Collection «Analytiques», vol. 7 Montréal, Bellarmin; Paris, Vrin, 1994, 342 p. [REVIEW] Dialogue 35 (03):641-.
  45. Elisabeth Pacherie (1995). Attitudes propositionnelles, intentionnalité et évolution. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 100 (3):339 - 371.
    La question du statut ontologique des attitudes propositionnelles et, corrélativement, celle de l'efficacité causale des contenus mentaux sont parmi les principaux problèmes actuellement débattus en philosophie de la psychologie. La théorie des systèmes intentionnels de Dennett, tout en accordant une valeur prédictive aux attributions d'attitudes propositionnelles, refuse aux croyances et désirs droit d'entrée dans une ontologie scientifique. Le but de cet article est de proposer une analyse critique de cette théorie et des arguments darwiniens qui la sous-tendent. The question of (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Elisabeth Pacherie (1995). Do We See with Microscopes? The Monist 78 (2):171-188.
    Trying to understand better the role played by epistemic artifacts in our quest for reliable knowledge, it is interesting to compare their contribution with the one made by the epistemic organs or systems with which we are naturally endowed. This comparative approach may yield the further benefit of an improved understanding of the nature and epistemic functions of our natural epistemic equipment. In this paper, I shall concern myself with comparing the role of a family of instruments, microscopes, with that (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Élisabeth Pacherie (1995). Externalisme, Rationalité Et Explanandum de la Psychologie Intentionnelle. Dialogue 34 (02):237-.
    In The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor attempts to reconcile the idea that psychological laws are characteristically intentional with the idea that their implementation is typically computational. In order to do so, Fodor must show that narrow contents are superfluous for the purposes of psychological explanation and that Frege cases are rare and constitute unsystematic exceptions. The paper contends that the argument Fodor offers in order to establish his claim is flawed. It argues that the principle of informational equilibrium (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Elisabeth Pacherie (1995). Théories Représentationnelles de l'Intentionnalité Perceptive Et Leibhaftigkeit de l'Objet Dans la Perception. Archives de Philosophie 58.
    Cet article examine un problème particulier posé par une approche naturaliste et représentationnaliste de la perception: lui est-il ou non possible de rendre compte d'une caractéristique que Husserl considérait comme constitutive de la perception, à savoir le fait que l'objet dans la perception est comme donné en personne (leibhaftig). La première section donne un bref aperçu des motivations qui sont à l'origine de l'intérêt actuellement suscité dans les sciences cognitives par l'intentionnalité perceptive. La deuxième section aborde le problème de la (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Elisabeth Pacherie (1994). Holophobia. Acta Analytica 12 (12):105-112.
    Holophobia can be defined as the 'neurotic' fear that semantic holism, if not instantly extirpated by the most radical means, might be a deadly threat to intentional realism. I contend that Fodor exaggerates the threat that meaning holism poses to intentional realism and to a viable account of narrow content in terms of conceptual roles. He particular, he overestimates the relevance for intentional psychology of Quine's demonstration that a substantial analytic/synthetic distinction is out of reach.I argue that all that is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation