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Profile: Elisabetta Lalumera (università di milano-bicocca, italy)
  1. Elisabetta Lalumera (2010). Concepts Are a Functional Kind. Comment on Machery's Doing Without Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):217-18.
    This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery.
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  2. Elisabetta Lalumera (2010). Introduction. Dialectica 64 (1):1-9.
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  3. Marco Mazzone & Elisabetta Lalumera (2010). Concepts: Stored or Created? [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (1):47-68.
    Are concepts stable entities, unchanged from context to context? Or rather are they context-dependent structures, created on the fly? We argue that this does not constitute a genuine dilemma. Our main thesis is that the more a pattern of features is general and shared, the more it qualifies as a concept. Contextualists have not shown that conceptual structures lack a stable, general core, acting as an attractor on idiosyncratic information. What they have done instead is to give a contribution to (...)
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  4. Elisabetta Lalumera (2009). More Than Words. In Kissine De Brabanter (ed.), Utterance Interpretation and Cognitive Models. Emerald.
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  5. Elisabetta Lalumera (2008). Concepts as Abilities and Concepts as Representations. Epistemologia 31 (1):75-95.
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  6. Elisabetta Lalumera (2007). Reference, Knowledge, and Scepticism About Meaning. Sorites (19):1-18.
    This paper explores the possibility of resisting meaning scepticism – the thesis that there are many alternative incompatible assignments of reference to each of our terms - by appealing to the idea that the nature of reference is to maximize knowledge. If the reference relation is a knowledge maximizing-relation, then some candidate referents are privileged among the others - i.e., those referents we are in a position to know about – and a positive reason against meaning scepticism is thus individuated. (...)
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  7. Elisabetta Lalumera (2005). A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts. Disputatio 1 (19):1-17.
    I argue that a concept is applied correctly when it is applied to the kind
    of things it is the concept of. Correctness as successful kind-tracking is
    fulfilling an externally and naturalistically individuated standard. And the normative aspect of concept-application so characterized depends on the relational (non-individualistic) feature of conceptual content. I defend this view against two objections. The first is that norms should provide justifications for action, and the second involves a version of the thesis of indeterminacy of reference.
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  8. Elisabetta Lalumera (2005). Normativita Del Significato: Una Proposta Naturalista. Epistemologia 28 (2):293-320.
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  9. Elisabetta Lalumera (2005). Normativity of Meaning and Semantic Naturalism. Epistemologia 28 (2).
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