Search results for 'Eliza Block' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Eliza Block (2008). Indicative Conditionals in Context. Mind 117 (468):783-794.score: 240.0
    I discuss an argument given by Dorothy Edgington for the conclusion that indicative conditionals cannot express propositions. The argument is not effective against Robert Stalnaker's context-dependent propositional theory. I isolate and defend the feature of Stalnaker's theory that allows it to evade the argument.
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  2. Hans-Johan Glock, Judith Baker, Eliza Block, Sarah Buss, Sara Rachel Chant, Zachary Ernst, Gopal Sreenivasan & Sungho Choi (2008). Index of MIND Vol. 117 Nos 1–4, 2008. Mind 117:468.score: 240.0
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  3. Ned Block (2008). Phenomenal and Access Consciousness Ned Block and Cynthia MacDonald: Consciousness and Cognitive Access. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108:289 - 317.score: 180.0
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  4. Walter Block (2006). Fanatical, Not Reasonable: A Short Correspondence Between Walter Block and Milton Friedman. Journal of Libertarian Studies 20 (3):61-80.score: 180.0
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  5. Cristoph Koch & Ned Block, Marshall M. Weinberg Conference: The Future of Cognitive Science - Friday Afternoon (Oct. 17, 2008) Session: Christoph Koch and Ned Block. [REVIEW]score: 180.0
    Six leading experts speak about the future of cognitive science.
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  6. Irving L. Block (1965). On the Commonness of the Common Sensibles. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (August):189-195.score: 90.0
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  7. Ned Block (1998). Conceptual Role Semantics. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. 242-256.score: 60.0
    According to Conceptual Role Semantics ("CRS"), the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, e.g. in perception, thought and decision-making. It is an extension of the well known "use" theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is its use in communication and more generally, in social interaction. CRS supplements external use by including the role of a symbol inside a computer or a brain. The uses appealed (...)
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  8. Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.score: 60.0
    Much of recent philosophy of perception is oriented towards accounting for the phenomenal character of perception—what it is like to perceive—in a non-mentalistic way—that is, without appealing to mental objects or mental qualities. In opposition to such views, I claim that the phenomenal character of perception of a red round object cannot be explained by or reduced to direct awareness of the object, its redness and roundness—or representation of such objects and qualities. Qualities of perception that are not captured by (...)
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  9. Ned Block (2007). Wittgenstein and Qualia. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.score: 60.0
    (Wittgenstein, 1968) endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed (the "innocuous" inverted spectrum hypothesis) is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected (the "dangerous" kind). The danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an argument for qualia, where qualia are (for the purposes of this paper) contents of (...)
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  10. Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    The first of a planned two-volume collection of Ned Block's writings on philosophy of mind; this volume treats consciousness, functionalism, and representation ...
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  11. Patrick Hayes, Stevan Harnad, Donald R. Perlis & Ned Block (1992). Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind. Minds and Machines 2 (3):217-238.score: 60.0
    When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaningful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called "virtual" systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a "virtual (...)
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  12. Ned Block (1997). Semantics, Conceptual Role. In [Book Chapter] (Unpublished). Routledge. 242--256.score: 60.0
    According to Conceptual Role Semantics ("CRS"), the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, e.g. in perception, thought and decision-making. It is an extension of the well known "use" theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is its use in communication and more generally, in social interaction. CRS supplements external use by including the role of a symbol inside a computer or a brain. The uses appealed (...)
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  13. J. Kevin O'Regan & Ned Block (2012). Discussion of J. Kevin O'Regan's “Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness”. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):89-108.score: 60.0
    Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness” Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-20 DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0090-7 Authors J. Kevin O’Regan, Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS - Université Paris Descartes, Centre Biomédical des Saints Pères, 45 rue des Sts Pères, 75270 Paris cedex 06, France Ned Block, Departments of Philosophy, Psychology and Center for Neural Science, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA Journal Review of Philosophy (...)
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  14. Richard A. Block (ed.) (1990). Cognitive Models of Psychological Time. Lawrence Erlbaum.score: 60.0
    Models of psychological time / Richard A. Block -- Implicit and explicit representations of time / John A. Michon -- The evasive art of subjective time...
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  15. Ned Block (2014). The Defective Armchair: A Reply to Tye. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):159-165.score: 60.0
    Michael Tye's response to my “Grain” (Block ) and “Windows” (Block ) raises general metaphilosophical issues about the value of intuitions and judgments about one's perceptions and the relations of those intuitions and judgments to empirical research, as well as specific philosophical issues about the relation between seeing, attention and de re thought. I will argue that Tye's appeal to what is (§. 2) “intuitively obvious, once we reflect upon these cases” (“intuition”) is problematic. I will also argue (...)
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  16. Walter Block (2002). The Libertarian Minimal State?: A Critique of the Views of Nozick, Levin, and Rand. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 4 (1):141 - 160.score: 60.0
    Walter Block discusses publications by Robert Nozick, the unjustifiably ignored Michael Levin, and Ayn Rand, each of whom has criticized anarcho-capitalism, the system that takes laissez-faire capitalism to its logical extension: here, all goods and services, particularly including courts, police, and armies would be provided by competing private firms and individuals. This paper considers their arguments (for Nozick, that anarcho-capitalism would naturally evolve into minarchism or limited government free enterprise without violating the libertarian nonaggression axiom; for Levin, that the (...)
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  17. Walter E. Block, 4. “Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Two”.score: 60.0
    The two main views on the abortion controversy are pro life and pro choice. In my many previous writings on this subject (Block, 1977, 1978, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2010A, 2010B, 2010C, forthcoming; Block and Whitehead, 2005) I have offered a third alternative, evictionism. Wisniewski (2010A) has offered criticisms of this [...].
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  18. Walter E. Block, 37. “Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Three”.score: 60.0
    Most people are aware of the pro-choice and the pro-life perspectives on abortion. But there is a third one, based on libertarianism called evictionism. I have written on this philosophy on numerous occasions (Block, 1977, 1978, 2004, 2008, 2010A, 2010B, 2010C, 2011, forthcoming, Block and Whitehead, 2005). Wisniewski (2010A, 2010B, [...].
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  19. Walter E. Block, “Objections to the Libertarian Stem Cell Compromise”.score: 60.0
    In Block (2010) I offered a compromise between the pro choice position that fervently supports stem cell research, and the pro life philosophy which bitterly opposes it. The compromise was a contest: allow would be researchers to create as many fertilized eggs as they wished. But, also, these should be [...].
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  20. Walter Block (2007). Rejoinder to Holcombe on the Inevitability of Government. Journal of Libertarian Studies 21 (1):49-60.score: 60.0
    HOLCOMBE (2004) ARGUED THAT government was inevitable. In Block (2005) I maintained that this institution was not unavoidable. Holcombe (2007) takes issue with that response of mine to his earlier paper, and the present essay is, in turn, a response to his latest missive in this conversation.1 In section I, I deal with what I can consider an anomaly in Holcombe’s argument. Section II is devoted to a consideration of his dismissal of my paper on grounds of “fallacy of (...)
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  21. Walter E. Block, “Rejoinder to Borer on the NAP”.score: 60.0
    Borer (2010) launches a spirited attack on my own promulgation and defense of the non aggression principle (NAP) as the lynchpin of libertarianism, as adumbrated in several of my published papers (Block, 2009A, 2010). The two of us, Borer and me, in my opinion, achieve real disagreement, a goal not [...].
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  22. Sid Kouider, Vincent de Gardelle, Emmanuel Dupoux & Ned Block (2007). Partial Awareness and the Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):510-510.score: 60.0
    The dissociation Block provides between phenomenal and access consciousness (P-consciousness and A-consciousness) captures much of our intuition about conscious experience. However, it raises a major methodological puzzle, and is not uniquely supported by the empirical evidence. We provide an alternative interpretation based on the notion of levels of representation and partial awareness.
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  23. I. I. Barnett & Walter E. Block (2011). Rejoinder to Bagus and Howden on Borrowing Short and Lending Long. Journal of Business Ethics 100 (2):229-238.score: 60.0
    In Barnett and Block (J Bus Ethics 88(4):711–716, 2009a), the present authors claim that borrowing short and lending long is fraudulent, and thus ought to be prohibited on legal grounds. Bagus and Howden (J Bus Ethics 90(3):399, 2009) take issue with our ethical analysis. The present paper is our response to these authors; it is an attempt to defend Barnett and Block (J Bus Ethics 88(4):711–716, 2009a) against the very interesting and important, although we believe, erroneous, criticisms of (...)
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  24. William Barnett Ii & Walter E. Block (2011). Rejoinder to Bagus and Howden on Borrowing Short and Lending Long. Journal of Business Ethics 100 (2):229 - 238.score: 60.0
    In Barnett and Block (J Bus Ethics 88(4): 711-716, 2009a), the present authors claim that borrowing short and lending long is fraudulent, and thus ought to be prohibited on legal grounds. Bagus and Howden (J Bus Ethics 90(3): 399, 2009) take issue with our ethical analysis. The present paper is our response to these authors; it is an attempt to defend Barnett and Block (J Bus Ethics 88(4): 711-716, 2009a) against the very interesting and important, although we believe, (...)
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  25. Margaret Somers & Fred Block (forthcoming). The Return of Karl Polanyi. Rhuthmos.score: 60.0
    Cet article a déjà paru dans Dissent, Spring 2014. Nous remercions Margaret Somers et Fred Block, ainsi que la revue Dissent, de nous avoir donné l'autorisation de le reproduire sur RHUTHMOS. On le trouvera en ligne également ici. In the first half century of Dissent's history, Karl Polanyi almost never made an appearance in the magazine's pages. On one level this is surprising, because Polanyi was a presence in socialist circles in New York City from 1947 through the mid-1950s, (...)
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  26. Alan A. Block (2009). Ethics and Teaching: A Religious Perspective on Revitalizing Education. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 60.0
    This book studies education and curriculum from the perspective of the teacher’s stance in the classroom. Writing through the lenses offered by autobiography, a lifetime in the classroom serving as teacher, and drawing heavily on Jewish and secular scholarly texts, Block offers a vision of education that serves as an alternative to the increasingly instrumentalist, managerial, standards-driven impersonal nature of contemporary schools. He advocates not for a pedagogy of ethics, but for the original ethical stance every teacher already assumes (...)
     
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  27. Alan A. Block (2007). Pedagogy, Religion and Practice: Reflections on Ethics and Teaching. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 60.0
    This new work from Alan Block explores the contemporary discourses of education, scholarship and learning. Pedagogy, Religion and Practice offers a strong argument for the centrality of ethics in curriculum, scholarship and the classroom, and presents a powerful argument against the present emphasis on standards and quantitative accountability.
     
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  28. Ned Block (1996). What is Functionalism? In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), [Book Chapter]. MacMillan.score: 30.0
    What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? (...)
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  29. Ned Block (2004). Consciousness. In R. L. Gregory (ed.), R. Gregory (ed.) Oxford Companion to the Mind, second edition 2004. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    There are two broad classes of empirical theories of consciousness, which I will call the biological and the functional. The biological approach is based on empirical correlations between experience and the brain. For example, there is a great deal of evidence that the neural correlate of visual experience is activity in a set of occipetotemporal pathways, with special emphasis on the infero-temporal cortex. The functionalist approach is a successor of behaviorism, the view that mentality can be seen as tendencies to (...)
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  30. Ned Block (1978). Troubles with Functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.score: 30.0
    The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state.
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  31. Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.score: 30.0
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  32. Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.score: 30.0
    The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. (Nagel, 1974, Levine, 1983) Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested (...)
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  33. Ned Block (2003). Philosophical Issues About Consciousness. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.score: 30.0
    There are a number of different matters that come under the heading of ‘consciousness’. One of them is phenomenality, the feeling of say a sensation of red or a pain, that is what it is like to have such a sensation or other experience. Another is reflection on phenomenality. Imagine two infants, both of which have pain, but only one of which has a thought about that pain. Both would have phenomenal states, but only the latter would have a state (...)
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  34. Ned Block (2002). Some Concepts of Consciousness. In D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. 206-219.score: 30.0
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses". Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state.
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  35. Ned Block (2009). Comparing the Major Theories of Consciousness. In Michael Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences IV. 1111-1123.score: 30.0
    This article compares the three frameworks for theories of consciousness that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists, the view that consciousness is a biological state of the brain, the global workspace perspective and an account in terms of higher order states. The comparison features the “explanatory gap” (Nagel, 1974; Levine, 1983) the fact that we have no idea why the neural basis of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather than another experience or no experience at all. (...)
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  36. Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor (1972). What Psychological States Are Not. Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.score: 30.0
  37. Ned Block (2002). The Harder Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425.score: 30.0
    consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.
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  38. Ned Block (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.score: 30.0
  39. Ned Block (1980). Functionalism. In , Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology.score: 30.0
    What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? (...)
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  40. Ned Block (2004). Qualia. In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    Qualia include the ways things look, sound and smell, the way it feels to have a pain; more generally, what it's like to have mental states. Qualia are experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions and, in my view, thoughts and desires as well. But, so defined, who could deny that qualia exist? Yet, the existence of qualia is controversial. Here is what is controversial: whether qualia, so defined, can be characterized in intentional, functional or purely (...)
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  41. Ned Block (1986). Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.score: 30.0
  42. Ned Block (1995). What is Dennett's Theory a Theory Of? Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):23-40.score: 30.0
    A convenient locus of discussion is provided by Dennett.
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  43. Ned Block (2008). Consciousness and Cognitive Access. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.score: 30.0
    This article concerns the interplay between two issues that involve both philosophy and neuroscience: whether the content of phenomenal consciousness is 'rich' or 'sparse', whether phenomenal consciousness goes beyond cognitive access, and how it would be possible for there to be evidence one way or the other.
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  44. Ned Block (2006). Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity. Oxford Review of Metaphysics 3:3-78.score: 30.0
    considered an objection (Objection 3) that he says he thought was first put to him by Max Black. He says.
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  45. Ned Block (1981). Psychologism and Behaviorism. Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.score: 30.0
    Let psychologism be the doctrine that whether behavior is intelligent behavior depends on the character of the internal information processing that produces it. More specifically, I mean psychologism to involve the doctrine that two systems could have actual and potential behavior _typical_ of familiar intelligent beings, that the two systems could be exactly alike in their actual and potential behavior, and in their behavioral dispositions and capacities and counterfactual behavioral properties (i.e., what behaviors, behavioral dispositions, and behavioral capacities they would (...)
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  46. Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.) (1997). The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.score: 30.0
    " -- "New Scientist" Intended for anyone attempting to find their way through the large and confusingly interwoven philosophical literature on consciousness, ...
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  47. Ned Block (2008). Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back. Noûs 31 (s11):107-132.score: 30.0
    For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English-speaking countries) that reductionism is a mistake and that there are autonomous special sciences. This consensus has been based on an argument from multiple realizability. But Jaegwon Kim has argued persuasively that the multiple realizability argument is flawed.1 I will sketch the recent history of the debate, arguing that much --but not all--of the anti-reductionist consensus survives Kim's critique. This paper was originally titled "Anti-Reductionism Strikes Back", but in (...)
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  48. Ned Block (1996). Mental Paint and Mental Latex. Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.score: 30.0
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  49. Ned Block (1995). The Mind as the Software of the Brain. In Daniel N. Osherson, Lila Gleitman, Stephen M. Kosslyn, S. Smith & Saadya Sternberg (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science. MIT Press. 170--185.score: 30.0
    In this section, we will start with an influential attempt to define `intelligence', and then we will move to a consideration of how human intelligence is to be investigated on the machine model. The last part of the section will discuss the relation between the mental and the biological.
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  50. Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.score: 30.0
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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