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Profile: Elizabeth Fricker (Oxford University)
  1. Elizabeth Fricker (2012). Stating and Insinuating. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):61-94.
    An utterer may convey a message to her intended audience by means of an explicit statement; or by a non-conventionally mediated one-off signal from which the audience is able to work out the intended message; or by conversational implicature. I investigate whether the last two are equivalent to explicit testifying, as communicative act and epistemic source. I find that there are important differences between explicit statement and insinuation; only with the first does the utterer assume full responsibility for the truth (...)
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  2. Elizabeth Fricker (2009). Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  3. Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Varieties of Anti-Reductionism About Testimony: A Reply to Goldberg and Henderson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):618 - 628.
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  4. Elizabeth Fricker (2006). 1. Division of Epistemic Labour Versus the Ideal of Individual Epistemic Autonomy. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. 225.
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  5. Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Martians and Meetings: Against Burge's Neo-Kantian Apriorism About Testimony. Philosophica 78.
    Burge proposes the Acceptance Principle"", which states that it is apriori that a hearer may properly accept what she is told in the absence of defeaters, since any giver of testimony is a rational agent, and as such one can presume she is a ""source of truth"". It is claimed that Burge's Principle is not intuitively compelling, so that a suasive, not merely an explanatory justification for it is needed.
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  6. Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Second-Hand Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.
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  7. Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. 225--253.
  8. Elizabeth Fricker (2004). Testimony: Knowing Through Being Told. In M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer. 109--130.
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  9. Elizabeth Fricker (2003). Understanding and Knowledge of What is Said. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press. 325--66.
  10. Elizabeth Fricker (2002). Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):373-383.
    Testimony is indispensable in the sciences. To deny the propriety of relying on it engenders an untenable scepticism. But this leaves open the issue of what exactly confers a scientist’s epistemic right to rely upon the word of her colleagues. Some authors have suggested a recipient of testimony enjoys an epistemic entitlement to trust the word of another as such, not requiring evidence of her trustworthiness, so long as there is not evidence of her untrustworthiness. I argue that, whether or (...)
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  11. Elizabeth Fricker (2000). Self-Knowledge: Special Access Versus Artefact of Grammar—A Dichotomy. In C. J. G. Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 155.
     
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  12. Elizabeth Fricker (1998). Self-Knowledge: Special Access Vs. Artefact of Grammar -- A Dichotomy Rejected. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & 1998 Self-knowledge: Special access vs. artefact of grammar -- A dichotomy rejected. (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 155--206.
  13. Elizabeth Fricker (1995). Critical Notice. Mind 104 (414):393 - 411.
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  14. Elizabeth Fricker (1995). Critical Notice: Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Mind 104 (414):393-411.
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  15. Elizabeth Fricker (1994). Against Gullibility. In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer.
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  16. Elizabeth Fricker (1993). The Threat of Eliminativism. Mind and Language 8 (2):253-281.
  17. Elizabeth Fricker (1991). Analyticity, Linguistic Practice and Philosophical Method. In Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism. De Gruyter. 218--50.
     
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  18. Elizabeth Fricker (1991). Content, Cause and Funtion. Philosophical Books 32 (3):136-144.
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  19. Elizabeth Fricker & David E. Cooper (1987). The Epistemology of Testimony. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61:57 - 106.
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  20. Elizabeth Fricker (1986). Knowledge and Language. Dissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom)
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This thesis undertakes two interrelated projects. The first is to give an account of the epistemology of testimony. However, as is argued, this cannot be done properly except as an application of a general philosophical account of knowledge. For this reason a partial sketch of such a general account is offered, as a necessary part of the completion of the first project. A complementary second project is also adopted. (...)
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  21. Elizabeth Fricker (1982). Semantic Structure and Speakers' Understanding. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83:49 - 66.
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