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Profile: Elizabeth Fricker (Oxford University)
  1. Elizabeth Fricker (2012). Stating and Insinuating. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):61-94.
    An utterer may convey a message to her intended audience by means of an explicit statement; or by a non-conventionally mediated one-off signal from which the audience is able to work out the intended message; or by conversational implicature. I investigate whether the last two are equivalent to explicit testifying, as communicative act and epistemic source. I find that there are important differences between explicit statement and insinuation; only with the first does the utterer assume full responsibility for the truth (...)
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  2. Elizabeth Fricker (2009). Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  3. Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Varieties of Anti-Reductionism About Testimony: A Reply to Goldberg and Henderson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):618 - 628.
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  4. Elizabeth Fricker (2006). 1. Division of Epistemic Labour Versus the Ideal of Individual Epistemic Autonomy. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. 225.
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  5. Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Martians and Meetings: Against Burge's Neo-Kantian Apriorism About Testimony. Philosophica 78.
    Burge proposes the Acceptance Principle"", which states that it is apriori that a hearer may properly accept what she is told in the absence of defeaters, since any giver of testimony is a rational agent, and as such one can presume she is a ""source of truth"". It is claimed that Burge's Principle is not intuitively compelling, so that a suasive, not merely an explanatory justification for it is needed.
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  6. Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Second-Hand Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.
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  7. Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. 225--253.
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  8. Elizabeth Fricker (2004). Testimony: Knowing Through Being Told. In. In M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer. 109--130.
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  9. Elizabeth Fricker (2003). Understanding and Knowledge of What is Said. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press. 325--66.
  10. Elizabeth Fricker (2002). Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):373-383.
  11. Elizabeth Fricker (2000). Self-Knowledge: Special Access Versus Artefact of Grammar—A Dichotomy. In C. J. G. Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 155.
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  12. Elizabeth Fricker (1998). Self-Knowledge: Special Access Vs. Artefact of Grammar -- A Dichotomy Rejected. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & 1998 Self-knowledge: Special access vs. artefact of grammar -- A dichotomy rejected. (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 155--206.
  13. Elizabeth Fricker (1995). Critical Notice. Mind 104 (414):393 - 411.
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  14. Elizabeth Fricker (1995). Critical Notice: Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Mind 104 (414):393-411.
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  15. Elizabeth Fricker (1994). Against Gullibility. In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer.
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  16. Elizabeth Fricker (1993). The Threat of Eliminativism. Mind and Language 8 (2):253-281.
  17. Elizabeth Fricker (1991). Analyticity, Linguistic Practice and Philosophical Method. In Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism. De Gruyter. 218--50.
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  18. Elizabeth Fricker (1991). Content, Cause and Funtion. Philosophical Books 32 (3):136-144.
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  19. Elizabeth Fricker & David E. Cooper (1987). The Epistemology of Testimony. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61:57 - 106.
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  20. Elizabeth Fricker (1982). Semantic Structure and Speakers' Understanding. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83:49 - 66.
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