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  1.  30
    Elizabeth Harman (2015). Transformative Experiences and Reliance on Moral Testimony. Res Philosophica 92 (2):323-339.
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  2.  89
    Elizabeth Harman (2004). Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating? Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):89–113.
    The non-identity problem concerns actions that affect who exists in the future. If such an action is performed, certain people will exist in the future who would not otherwise have existed: they are not identical to any of the people who would have existed if the action had not been performed. Some of these actions seem to be wrong, and they seem to be wrong in virtue of harming the very future individuals whose existence is dependent on their having been (...)
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  3.  56
    Elizabeth Harman (2016). Morally Permissible Moral Mistakes. Ethics 126 (2):366-393.
    Does it ever happen that there are things we shouldn’t do and the reasons we shouldn’t do them are moral reasons, yet doing them is not morally wrong? Surprisingly, yes. I argue for a category that has not been recognized by moral theorists: morally permissible moral mistakes. Sometimes a supererogatory action is the thing a person should do; in failing to act, one makes a morally permissible moral mistake. Recognizing the category of morally permissible moral mistakes solves a puzzle about (...)
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  4. Elizabeth Harman (2011). Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate? Ratio 24 (4):443-468.
    Non-moral ignorance can exculpate: if Anne spoons cyanide into Bill's coffee, but thinks she is spooning sugar, then Anne may be blameless for poisoning Bill. Gideon Rosen argues that moral ignorance can also exculpate: if one does not believe that one's action is wrong, and one has not mismanaged one's beliefs, then one is blameless for acting wrongly. On his view, many apparently blameworthy actions are blameless. I discuss several objections to Rosen. I then propose an alternative view on which (...)
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  5.  42
    Elizabeth Harman (2009). Harming as Causing Harm. In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag 137--154.
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  6.  96
    Elizabeth Harman (2009). "I'll Be Glad I Did It" Reasoning and the Significance of Future Desires. In John Hawthorne (ed.), Ethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 177-199.
    We use “I’ll be glad I did it” reasoning all the time. For example, last night I was trying to decide whether to work on this paper or go out to a movie. I realized that if I worked on the paper, then today I would be glad I did it. Whereas, if I went out to the movie, today I would regret it. This enabled me to see that I should work on the paper rather than going out to (...)
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  7. Elizabeth Harman (2003). The Potentiality Problem. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):173 - 198.
    Many people face a problem about potentiality: their moral beliefs appear to dictate inconsistent views about the significance of the potentiality to become a healthy adult. Briefly, the problem arises as follows. Consider the following two claims. First, both human babies and cats have moral status, but harms to babies matter more, morally, than similar harms to cats. Second, early human embryos lack moral status. It appears that the first claim can only be true if human babies have more moral (...)
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  8. Elizabeth Harman (1999). Creation Ethics: The Moral Status of Early Fetuses and the Ethics of Abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (4):310–324.
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  9. Elizabeth Harman (2007). How is the Ethics of Stem Cell Research Different From the Ethics of Abortion? Metaphilosophy 38 (2-3):207–225.
    It seems that if abortion is permissible, then stem cell research must be as well: it involves the death of a less significant thing (an embryo rather than a fetus) for a greater good (lives saved rather than nine months of physical imposition avoided). However, I argue in this essay that this natural thought is mistaken. In particular, on the assumption that embryos and fetuses have the full moral status of persons, abortion is permissible but one form of stem cell (...)
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  10.  99
    Elizabeth Harman (2009). David Benatar. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Noûs 43 (4):776-785.
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  11.  15
    Elizabeth Harman (2009). "I'll Be Glad I Did It" Reasoning and the Significance of Future Desires. In John Hawthorne (ed.), Ethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 177-199.
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  12.  66
    Elizabeth Harman, Critical Study.
    In this book, David Benatar argues that every person is severely harmed by being brought into existence, and that in bringing any person into existence one impermissibly harms that person. His conclusion is not merely that by bringing a person into existence, one harms him. That claim is compatible with the claim that by bringing a person into existence, one also greatly benefits him, and even with the claim that one never impermissibly harms someone by bringing him into existence. His (...)
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  13. Elizabeth Harman (2003). Moral Status. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    Chapters One through Three present the following view: I explain moral status as follows: something has moral status just in case we have, reasons not to cause harms to it simply in virtue of the badness of the harms for it. Moral status is not a matter of degree. A living thing has moral status just in case it is ever conscious. If something has moral status, then the strength of a moral reason not to harm it is proportional to (...)
     
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  14.  57
    Elizabeth Harman (2007). Sacred Mountains and Beloved Fetuses: Can Loving or Worshipping Something Give It Moral Status? Philosophical Studies 133 (1):55 - 81.
    Part One addresses the question whether the fact that some persons love something, worship it, or deeply care about it, can endow moral status on that thing. I argue that the answer is “no.” While some cases lend great plausibility to the view that love or worship can endow moral status, there are other cases in which love or worship clearly fails to endow moral status. Furthermore, there is no principled way to distinguish these two types of cases, so we (...)
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  15.  10
    Elizabeth Harman (2015). Hare, Caspar.The Limits of Kindness.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 229. $40.00. Ethics 125 (3):868-872.
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  16.  63
    Elizabeth Harman (2007). Discussion of Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue for Philosophical Studies. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 134 (3):433 - 439.
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  17.  3
    Elizabeth Harman (1999). Creation Ethics: The Moral Status of Early Fetuses and the Ethics of Abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (4):310-324.
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  18.  44
    Elizabeth Harman (2011). Fischer and Lamenting Nonexistence. Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):129-142.
    Why do we wish to die later but do not wish to have been created earlier? There is no puzzle here. It is false that if we had been created earlier we would have lived longer lives. Why don’t we wish to have been created earlier but with our actual times of death? That wish simply is not mandated by the more general wish to have lived a longer life. Furthermore, one might prefer one’s actual life to the better, but (...)
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  19.  1
    Elizabeth Harman (2007). Sacred Mountains and Beloved Fetuses: Can Loving or Worshipping Something Give It Moral Status? Philosophical Studies 133 (1):55-81.
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  20. Elizabeth Harman (2007). Discussion of Nomy Arpaly’s Unprincipled Virtue for Philosophical Studies. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):433-439.
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