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Profile: Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (College of William and Mary)
  1. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (forthcoming). Moral and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honor of Richard N. Boyd and Nicholas L. Sturgeon. Philosophical Studies:1-1.
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  2. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2013). Moral Sentimentalism and the Reasonableness of Being Good. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 2013 (no. 263):9-27.
    In this paper, I discuss the implications of Hutcheson’s and Hume’s sentimentalist theories for the question of whether and how we can offer reasons to be moral. Hutcheson and Hume agree that reason does not give us ultimate ends. Because of this, on Hutcheson’s line, the possession of affections and of a moral sense makes practical reasons possible. On Hume’s view, that reason does not give us ultimate ends means that reason does not motivate on its own, and this makes (...)
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  3. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2012). Hume and the Passions as Original Existences. In Lorenzo Greco & Alessio Vaccari (ed.), Hume Readings. Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura.
     
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  4. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2012). Reasons From The Humean Perspective. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):777-796.
    Humeans about practical reasoning have tried to explain how some of our desires are reason‐giving and some are not. On one account, we act from reasons only when we act on desires that cohere in a consistent set. On another account, we act on reasons only when we act on desires that do not undermine our values. Both accounts are problematic. First, the notion of a consistent set of desires is vague and introduces a criterion not necessarily rooted in the (...)
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  5. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2011). Ruling Passions. The Philosophers' Magazine 54 (54):85-89.
    A radical implication of Hume’s theory of motivation is that it makes no sense, strictly speaking, to call actions rational or irrational. So, he claims, it is not contrary to reason for me to prefer the destruction of the world to getting a scratch on my finger.
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  6. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (ed.) (2008). A Companion to Hume. Blackwell Pub..
  7. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2008). Reason, Morality, and Hume's "Active Principles" : Comments on Rachel Cohon's Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Hume Studies 34 (2):267-276.
    Rachel Cohon's Hume is a moral sensing theorist, who holds both that moral qualities are mind-dependent and that there is such a thing as moral knowledge. He is an anti-rationalist about motivation, arguing that reason alone does not motivate, but allows that both beliefs and passions are motivating. And he is both a descriptive and a normative moral theorist who, despite having resources for putting checks on our sentimentally-based moral evaluations, does end up with a kind of a relativistic account (...)
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  8. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2008). The Humean Theory of Motivation and its Critics. In , A Companion to Hume. Wiley-Blackwell.
  9. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2007). Moral Naturalism and the Possibility of Making Ourselves Better. In Brad Wilburn (ed.), Moral Cultivation. Lexington Books.
  10. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2007). Review of Michael B. Gill, The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (8).
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  11. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.) (2007). Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell Pub. Ltd..
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  12. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2006). Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics. Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
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  13. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2006). Review of Joyce Jenkins, Jennifer Whiting, Christopher Williams (Eds.), Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette Baier. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (2).
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  14. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2004). Introduction. Utilitas 16 (2):119-123.
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  15. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2004). Love and Benevolence in Hutcheson's and Hume's Theories of the Passions. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):631 – 653.
  16. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2002). Review of DANCY, J.-Practical Reality. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 43 (4):312-312.
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  17. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2002). Francis Hutcheson. In Steven Nadler (ed.), A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy. Blackwell.
     
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  18. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2001). A Cultivated Reason: An Essay on Hume and Humeanism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 110 (3):443-446.
  19. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe & Michael J. Meyer (2001). Carol Jean White, 1946-2000. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74 (5):251 - 253.
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  20. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2000). On Hume. Wadsworth.
     
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  21. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1999). Hume on the Generation of Motives: Why Beliefs Alone Never Motivate. Hume Studies 25 (1-2):101-122.
    Hume’s thesis that reason alone does not motivate is taken as the ground for this theory: Reason produces beliefs only, and beliefs are mere representations of fact, which, without passions for the objects the beliefs concern, cannot move anyone at all. Discussions of the Humean theory of motivation usually begin with the motivating passions in place without asking about their genesis. This emphasis, I think, overlooks a good deal of what Hume’s thesis concerning the motivational impotence of reason is about: (...)
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  22. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1999). Religion and Faction in Hume's Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW] Faith and Philosophy 16 (4):569-573.
  23. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1997). Kantian Tunes on a Humean Instrument: Why Hume Is Not Really a Skeptic About Practical Reasoning. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):247 -.
  24. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1997). Morality (Ethics). In Edward Barbarell Don Garrett (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Empiricism (Greenwood Press). 269-73.
     
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  25. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1997). The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640-1740 (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (3):470-472.
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  26. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1996). How Does the Humean Sense of Duty Motivate? Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (3):383-407.
    On Hume's account, when we lack virtues that would typically prompt moral action, we can instead be motivated by the "sense of duty." Surprisingly, Hume seems to maintain that, in such cases, we are motivated by a desire to avoid the unpleasantness of "self-hatred" evoked in us when we realize we lack certain traits others possess. This account has led commentators to argue that Hume is not a moral internalist, since motivation by duty is motivation by a self-interested desire. This (...)
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  27. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1995). Review of David Fate Norton (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 104:275-77.
     
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  28. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1994). Hume on Motivating Sentiments, the General Point of View, and the Inculcation of "Morality". Hume Studies 20 (1):37-58.
    That Hume's theory can be interpreted in two widely divergent ways-as a version of sentimentalism and as an ideal observer theory-is symptomatic of a puzzle ensconced in Hume's theory. How can the ground of morality be internal and motivating when an inference to the feelings of a spectator in "the general point of view" is typically necessary to get to genuine moral distinctions ? This paper considers and rejects the suggestion that in moral education, for Hume, the inculcation of morality (...)
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  29. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1994). Hume on Passion, Pleasure, and the Reasonableness of Ends. Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):1-11.
  30. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1994). Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment: A Study in the Unity of A Treatise of Human Nature (Review). [REVIEW] Hume Studies 19 (2):324-326.
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  31. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe & Carol J. White (eds.) (1993). Faith in Theory and Practice. Open Court.
     
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  32. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe & Carol J. White (1993). Faith in Theory and Practice Essays on Justifying Religious Belief.
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  33. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1987). Review of D.D. Raphael, Adam Smith (Oxford University Press, 1985). [REVIEW] Philosophical Review:612-15.
     
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  34. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1986). Hutcheson's Perceptual and Moral Subjectivism. History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):407 - 421.
  35. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1984). Kenny's Aquinas on Dispositions for Human Acts. New Scholasticism 58 (4):424-446.
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