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  1. Ellery Eells (2010). Objective Probability Theory Theory. In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. 3--44.
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  2. Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.) (2010). The Place of Probability in Science. Springer.
  3. Ellery Eells (2004). Bayess Theorem. Mind 113 (451):591-596.
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  4. Ellery Eells (2004). Review: Bayes's Theorem. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (451):591-596.
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  5. Ellery Eells (2002). Propensity Trajectories, Preemption, and the Identity of Events. Synthese 132 (1-2):119 - 141.
    I explore the problem of ``probabilistic causal preemption'' in the context of a``propensity trajectory'' theory of singular probabilistic causation. This involvesa particular conception of events and a substantive thesis concerning events soconceived.
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  6. Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson (2002). Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.
    Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support areconsidered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree ofevidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.
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  7. Ellery Eells (2000). James M. Joyce: The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):893-900.
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  8. Ellery Eells (2000). Prediction, Probability, and Pragmatics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):183-206.
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  9. Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson (2000). Comments and Criticism: Measuring Confirmation and Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.
    Bayesian epistemology suggests various ways of measuring the support that a piece of evidence provides a hypothesis. Such measures are defined in terms of a subjective probability assignment, pr, over propositions entertained by an agent. The most standard measure (where “H” stands for “hypothesis” and “E” stands for “evidence”) is: the difference measure: d(H,E) = pr(H/E) - pr(H).0 This may be called a “positive (probabilistic) relevance measure” of confirmation, since, according to it, a piece of evidence E qualitatively confirms a (...)
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  10. Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson (2000). Measuring Confirmation and Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.
  11. James Joyce & Ellery Eells (2000). Reviews-The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):893-900.
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  12. Martin Barrett, Ellery Eells, Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober (1999). Review: Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):237 - 241.
    Human beings are peculiar. In laboratory experiments, they often cooperate in one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas, they frequently offer 1/2 and reject low offers in the ultimatum game, and they often bid 1/2 in the game of divide-the-cake All these behaviors are puzzling from the point of view of game theory. The first two are irrational, if utility is measured in a certain way.1 The last isn’t positively irrational, but it is no more rational than other possible actions, since there are infinitely (...)
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  13. Ellery Eells (1995). Cartwright on Probabilistic Causality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):169-175.
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  14. Ellery Eells (1995). Review: Cartwright on Probabilistic Causality: Types, Tokens, and Capacities. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):169 - 175.
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  15. Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.) (1994). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a 'state of the art' collection of essays on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides new negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up new areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams' (...)
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  16. Ellery Eells (1991). Probabilistic Causality. CUP.
    In this important first book in the series Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory, Ellery Eells explores and refines current ...
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  17. Ellery Eells & William L. Harper (1991). Ratifiability, Game Theory, and the Principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1):1 – 19.
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  18. Ellery Eells (1989). The Popcorn Problem: Sobel on Evidential Decision Theory and Deliberation-Probability Dynamics. Synthese 81 (1):9 - 20.
    I defend evidential decision theory and the theory of deliberation-probability dynamics from a recent criticism advanced by Jordan Howard Sobel. I argue that his alleged counterexample to the theories, called the Popcorn Problem is not a genuine counterexample.
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  19. Ellery Eells (1988). On the Alleged Impossibility of Inductive Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):111-116.
    Popper and Miller argued, in a 1983 paper, that there is no such thing as 'probabilistic inductive support' of hypotheses. They show how to divide a hypothesis into two "parts," where evidence only 'probabilistically supports' the "part" that the evidence 'deductively' implies, and 'probabilistically countersupports' the "rest" of the hypothesis. I argue that by distinguishing between 'support that is purely deductive in nature' and 'support of a deductively implied hypothesis', we can see that their argument fails to establish (in any (...)
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  20. Ellery Eells (1988). Quentin Smith on Infinity and the Past. Philosophy of Science 55 (3):453-455.
    In a recent commendable article, Quentin Smith (1987) exposes fatal flaws in several recent attempts to demonstrate that it is logically impossible for the past to be infinite. However, his analysis of one of these flawed arguments--involving an interesting version of Russell's "Tristram Shandy paradox"--is off the mark, as I show in this paper.
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  21. Ellery Eells (1987). Cartwright and Otte on Simpson's Paradox. Philosophy of Science 54 (2):233-243.
    Richard Otte (1985) has recently criticized the resolution of Simpson's paradox given by Nancy Cartwright (1979). He argues that there are difficulties with the version of the theory of probabilistic causality that Cartwright has developed, and that there is a way in which Simpson's paradox can arise that Cartwright's theory cannot handle. And Otte develops his own theory of probabilistic causality. I defend Cartwright's solution, and I argue that there are difficulties with the theory of probabilistic causality that Otte proposes.
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  22. Ellery Eells (1987). Learning with Detachment: Reply to Maher. Theory and Decision 22 (2):173-180.
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  23. Ellery Eells (1987). Probabilistic Causality: Reply to John Dupré. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):105-114.
    John Dupré (1984) has recently criticized the theory of probabilistic causality developed by, among others, Good (1961-62), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980). He argues that there is a tension or incompatibility between one of its central requirements for the presence of a causal connection, on the one hand, and a feature of the theory pointed out by Elliott Sober and me (1983), on the other. He also argues that the requirement just alluded to should be given up. I (...)
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  24. Ellery Eells & Elliott Sober (1987). Old Problems for a New Theory: Mayo on Giere's Theory of Causation. Philosophical Studies 52 (3):291 - 307.
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  25. Ellery Eells (1986). Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, Eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy IX 1984: Causation and Causal Theories Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 6 (5):214-216.
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  26. Ellery Eells (1986). Probabilistic Causal Interaction. Philosophy of Science 53 (1):52-64.
    It is possible for a causal factor to raise the probability of a second factor in some situations while lowering the probability of the second factor in other situations. Must a genuine cause always raise the probability of a genuine effect of it? When it does not always do so, an "interaction" with some third factor may be the reason. I discuss causal interaction from the perspectives of Giere's counterfactual characterization of probabilistic causal connection (1979, 1980) and the "contextual unanimity" (...)
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  27. Ellery Eells & Elliott Sober (1986). Common Causes and Decision Theory. Philosophy of Science 53 (2):223-245.
    One of us (Eells 1982) has defended traditional evidential decision theory against prima facie Newcomb counterexamples by assuming that a common cause forms a conjunctive fork with its joint effects. In this paper, the evidential theory is defended without this assumption. The suggested rationale shows that the theory's assumptions are not about the nature of causality, but about the nature of rational deliberation. These presuppositions are weak enough for the argument to count as a strong justification of the evidential theory.
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  28. Ellery Eells (1985). Levi's "the Wrong Box". Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):91-104.
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  29. Ellery Eells (1985). Weirich on Decision Instability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):473 – 478.
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  30. Ellery Eells (1984). Causal Decision Theory. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:177 - 200.
    After a brief presentation of evidential decision theory, causal decision theory, and Newcomb type prima facie counterexamples to the evidential theory, three kinds of "metatickle" defenses of the evidential theory are discussed. Each has its weaknesses, but one of them seems stronger than the other two. The weaknesses of the best of the three, and the intricacy of metatickle analysis, does not constitute an advantage of causal decision theory over the evidential theory, however. It is argued, by way of an (...)
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  31. Ellery Eells (1984). Metatickles and the Dynamics of Deliberation. Theory and Decision 17 (1):71-95.
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  32. Ellery Eells (1984). Newcomb's Many Solutions. Theory and Decision 16 (1):59-105.
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  33. Ellery Eells (1983). On a Recent Theory of Rational Acceptance. Philosophical Studies 44 (3):331 - 343.
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  34. Ellery Eells (1983). Objective Probability Theory Theory. Synthese 57 (3):387 - 442.
    I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequateconceptions of objective probability (in connection with such desiderata as causal and explanatory significance, applicability to single cases, etc.), they have failed to satisfy amethodological standard — roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood independently (...)
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  35. Ellery Eells & Elliott Sober (1983). Probabilistic Causality and the Question of Transitivity. Philosophy of Science 50 (1):35-57.
    After clarifying the probabilistic conception of causality suggested by Good (1961-2), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980), we prove a sufficient condition for transitivity of causal chains. The bearing of these considerations on the units of selection problem in evolutionary theory and on the Newcomb paradox in decision theory is then discussed.
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  36. Ellery Eells (1981). Causality, Utility, and Decision. Synthese 48 (2):295 - 329.
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