15 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Emer O'Hagan [15]Emer Mary O'hagan [1]
See also:
Profile: Emer O'Hagan (University of Saskatchewan)
  1.  40
    Emer O'Hagan (2004). Practical Identity and the Constitution of Agency. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (1):49-59.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2.  30
    Emer O'Hagan (2009). Moral Self-Knowledge in Kantian Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):525-537.
    Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart - the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  37
    Emer O'Hagan (2014). Shmagents, Realism and Constitutivism About Rational Norms. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):17-31.
    I defend constitutivism against two prominent objections and argue that agential constitutivism has the resources to take normative and ethical deliberation seriously. I first consider David Enoch’s shmagency challenge and argue that it does not form a coherent objection. I counter Enoch’s view that the phenomenology of first-person deliberation pragmatically justifies belief in irreducibly realist normative truths, claiming that constitutivism can respect the practice of moral deliberation without appeal to robustly realist truths. Secondly, I argue that the error theoretic worry (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  33
    Emer O'Hagan (2005). Belief, Normativity and the Constitution of Agency. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):39 – 52.
    In this paper I advance a constitutive argument for the authority of rational norms. Because accountability to reasons is constitutive of rational agency and rational norms are implicit in reasons for action and belief, the justification of rational norms is of a piece with the practice of reasoning. Peter Railton has objected that the constitutive view fails to defend the categorical authority of reason over agents. I respond to his objections, arguing that they presuppose a foundationalist conception of justification that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  11
    Emer O'Hagan (2005). Belief, Normativity and the Constitution of Agency. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):39-52.
    In this paper I advance a constitutive argument for the authority of rational norms. Because accountability to reasons is constitutive of rational agency and rational norms are implicit in reasons for action and belief, the justification of rational norms is of a piece with the practice of reasoning. Peter Railton has objected that the constitutive view fails to defend the categorical authority of reason over agents. I respond to his objections, arguing that they presuppose a foundationalist conception of justification that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  6
    Emer O'Hagan (2005). Belief, Normativity and the Constitution of Agency. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):39-52.
    In this paper I advance a constitutive argument for the authority of rational norms. Because accountability to reasons is constitutive of rational agency and rational norms are implicit in reasons for action and belief, the justification of rational norms is of a piece with the practice of reasoning. Peter Railton has objected that the constitutive view fails to defend the categorical authority of reason over agents. I respond to his objections, arguing that they presuppose a foundationalist conception of justification that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  29
    Emer O'Hagan (2012). Self-Knowledge and Moral Stupidity. Ratio 25 (3):291-306.
    Most commonplace moral failure is not conditioned by evil intentions or the conscious desire to harm or humiliate others. It is more banal and ubiquitous – a form of moral stupidity that gives rise to rationalization, self-deception, failures of due moral consideration, and the evasion of responsibility. A kind of crude, perception-distorting self-absorption, moral stupidity is the cause of many moral missteps; moral development demands the development of self-knowledge as a way out of moral stupidity. Only once aware of the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  5
    Emer O'Hagan (2005). Belief, Normativity and the Constitution of Agency. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):39-52.
    In this paper I advance a constitutive argument for the authority of rational norms. Because accountability to reasons is constitutive of rational agency and rational norms are implicit in reasons for action and belief, the justification of rational norms is of a piece with the practice of reasoning. Peter Railton has objected that the constitutive view fails to defend the categorical authority of reason over agents. I respond to his objections, arguing that they presuppose a foundationalist conception of justification that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9.  11
    Emer O'Hagan (2009). Review of Stephen R. Brown, Moral Virtue and Nature: A Defense of Ethical Naturalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (1).
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  12
    Emer O'Hagan (2001). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency Michael Bratman Cambridge Studies in Philosophy New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Xiii + 288 Pp., $59.95, $18.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 40 (02):393-.
  11.  6
    Emer O'Hagan (2006). The Reasons of Love Harry G. Frankfurt Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, 100 Pp., $19.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 45 (2):398.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  5
    Emer O'Hagan (2005). Welfare and Rational Care Stephen Darwall Princeton Monographs in Philosophy Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, Xi + 135 Pp., $24.95. [REVIEW] Dialogue 44 (3):620.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Emer O'Hagan (2006). Elijah Millgram, Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation of Moral Theory Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 26 (4):273-275.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Emer O'hagan (2005). Generosity And Mechanism In Descartes's Passions. Minerva 9:236-260.
    Descartes’s mechanistic account of the passions is sometimes dismissed as one which lacks the resources toadequately explain the cognitive aspect of emotion. By some, he is taken to be “feeling theorist”, reducing thepassions to a mere awareness of the physiological state of the soul-body union. If this reading of Descartes’spassions is correct, his theory fails not only because it cannot account for the intentional nature of the passions,but also because the passions cannot play the role in Descartes’s moral theory they (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Emer O'hagan (2005). No Title Available: Dialogue. Dialogue 44 (3):620-622.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography