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Emmanuel J. Genot [6]Emmanuel Genot [3]
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Profile: Emmanuel Genot (Lund University)
  1.  28
    Shahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo & Emmanuel Genot (eds.) (2008). Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox. Springer.
    This volume includes a target paper, taking up the challenge to revive, within a modern (formal) framework, a medieval solution to the Liar Paradox which did ...
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  2.  21
    Staffan Angere, Erik J. Olsson & Emmanuel Genot, Inquiry and Deliberation in Judicial Systems : The Problem of Jury Size.
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  3.  43
    Emmanuel J. Genot (2009). The Game of Inquiry: The Interrogative Approach to Inquiry and Belief Revision Theory. Synthese 171 (2):271-289.
    I. Levi has advocated a decision-theoretic account of belief revision. We argue that the game-theoretic framework of Interrogative Inquiry Games, proposed by J. Hintikka, can extend and clarify this account. We show that some strategic use of the game rules generate Expansions, Contractions and Revisions, and we give representation results. We then extend the framework to represent explicitly sources of answers, and apply it to discuss the Recovery Postulate. We conclude with some remarks about the potential extensions of interrogative games, (...)
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  4.  25
    Emmanuel J. Genot & Justine Jacot (2012). How Can Questions Be Informative Before They Are Answered? Strategic Information in Interrogative Games. Episteme 9 (2):189-204.
    We examine a special case of inquiry games and give an account of the informational import of asking questions. We focus on yes-or-no questions, which always carry information about the questioner's strategy, but never about the state of Nature, and show how strategic information reduces uncertainty through inferences about other players' goals and strategies. This uncertainty cannot always be captured by information structures of classical game theory. We conclude by discussing the connection with Gricean pragmatics and contextual constraints on interpretation.
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  5.  8
    Emmanuel J. Genot (2009). Extensive Questions. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5378:131--145.
    Olsson and his collaborators have proposed an extension of Belief Revision Theory where an epistemic state is modeled as a triple S=⟨K_,E,A_⟩ , where A_ is a research agenda, i.e. a set of research questions. Contraction and expansion apply to states, and affect the agenda. We propose an alternative characterization of the problem of agenda updating, where research questions are viewed as blueprints for research strategies. We offer a unified solution to this problem, and prove it equivalent to Olsson’s own. (...)
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  6.  10
    Emmanuel J. Genot (2011). The Best of All Possible Worlds. In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer
    Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision representation of an epistemic state is defective. In order to adequately model an epistemic state one needs, in addition to a belief set K and an entrenchment relation E, a research agenda A, i.e. a set of questions satisfying certain corpus-relative preconditions the agent would like to have answers to. Informally, the preconditions guarantee that the set of potential answers represent a partition of possible expansions of (...)
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  7.  1
    Emmanuel J. Genot & Justine Jacot (2012). How Can Yes-or-No Questions Be Informative Before They Are Answered? Episteme 9 (2):189-204.
    We examine a special case of inquiry games and give an account of the informational import of asking questions. We focus on yes-or-no questions, which always carry information about the questioner's strategy, but never about the state of Nature, and show how strategic information reduces uncertainty through inferences about other players' goals and strategies. This uncertainty cannot always be captured by information structures of classical game theory. We conclude by discussing the connection with Gricean pragmatics and contextual constraints on interpretation.
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  8.  1
    Emmanuel Genot (2011). The Best of All Possibleworlds: Where Interrogative Games Meet Research Agendas. In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer 225--252.
    Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision representation of an epistemic state is defective. In order to adequately model an epistemic state one needs, in addition to a belief set K and an entrenchment relation E, a research agenda A, i.e. a set of questions satisfying certain corpus-relative preconditions the agent would like to have answers to. Informally, the preconditions guarantee that the set of potential answers represent a partition of possible expansions of (...)
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  9. Emmanuel J. Genot (2009). The Game of Inquiry: The Interrogative Approach to Inquiry and Belief Revision Theory. Synthese 171 (2):271-289.
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