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Emmett L. Holman [14]Emmett Holman [2]
  1. Emmett L. Holman (2013). Phenomenal Concepts as Bare Recognitional Concepts: Harder to Debunk Than You Thought, …but Still Possible. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.
    A popular defense of physicalist theories of consciousness against anti-physicalist arguments invokes the existence of ‘phenomenal concepts’. These are concepts that designate conscious experiences from a first person perspective, and hence differ from physicalistic concepts; but not in a way that precludes co-referentiality with them. On one version of this strategy phenomenal concepts are seen as (1) type demonstratives that have (2) no mode of presentation. However, 2 is possible without 1-call this the ‘bare recognitional concept’ view-and I will argue (...)
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  2. Emmett Holman (2008). Panpsychism, Physicalism, Neutral Monism and the Russellian Theory of Mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):48-67.
    As some see it, an impasse has been reached on the mind- body problem between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism. So lately another view has been gaining popularity, a view that might be called the 'Russellian theory of mind' (RTM) since it is inspired by some ideas once put forth by Bertrand Russell. Most versions of RTM are panpsychist, but there is at least one version that rejects panpsychism and styles itself as physicalism, and neutral monism is also a possibility. (...)
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  3. Emmett Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately "secondary quality eliminativism"- the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated.
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  4. Emmett L. Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229-56.
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately.
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  5. Emmett L. Holman (2003). Sense Experience, Intentionality, and Modularity. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:143-57.
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  6. Emmett L. Holman (2002). Color Eliminativism and Color Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quareterly 83 (1):38-56.
  7. Emmett L. Holman (1989). Empirical Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 42 (4):832-834.
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  8. Emmett L. Holman (1988). Language and Truth. Review of Metaphysics 42 (2):383-385.
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  9. Emmett L. Holman (1988). Qualia, Kripkean Arguments, and Subjectivity. Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-29.
    The subjectivity of consciousness is widely regarded as a major stumbling block for materialist theories of mind. In this paper I show how Kripkean arguments against identity theories (Kripke, 1972), and in particular a Kripkean argument against qualia-material property identity developed by Frank Jackson (1980) are a way of highlighting this problem. (And such arguments are not the quasi-historical curiosities they are sometimes pictured as being, because problems confronting functionalism have led to a modest revival of identity theory.) As such, (...)
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  10. Emmett L. Holman (1986). Maxwell and Materialism. Synthese 66 (March):505-14.
    In a recent article, Grover Maxwell presents a case for a kind of mind-brain identity theory which he claims precludes materialism. His case is based on some views about meaning which I find plausible. However, I will argue that, by adopting certain assumptions about the nature of sensory experience, and extending some of Maxwell's views about meaning in a plausible way, the issue of a materialistic identity theory is reopened. Ultimately, I will agree that such a theory is not true, (...)
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  11. Emmett L. Holman (1984). Continuity and the Metaphysics of Dualism. Philosophical Studies 45 (March):197-204.
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  12. Emmett L. Holman (1981). Intension, Identity, and the Colourless Physical World: A Revision and Further Discussion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):203 – 205.
    (1981). Intension, identity, and the Colourless Physical World: A revision and further discussion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 203-205.
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  13. Emmett L. Holman (1979). Is the Physical World Colourless? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (December):295-304.
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  14. Emmett L. Holman (1979). The Problem of Theory-Laden Perception. Philosophical Studies 35 (1):91 - 99.
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  15. Emmett L. Holman (1977). Sensory Experience, Perceptual Evidence and Conceptual Frameworks. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April):99-108.
  16. Emmett L. Holman (1975). Sensory Experience, Epistemic Evaluation and Perceptual Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 28 (September):173-187.