Search results for 'Emotivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Gunnar Björnsson (2002). How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
    Argues that emotivism is compatible with cases where we seem to lack motivation to act according to our moral opinions.
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  2.  48
    Stephen Satris (1987). Ethical Emotivism. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    I THE THEORY OF VALUE AND THE RISE OF ETHICAL EMOTIVISM i. The standard account Historical accounts of recent moral philosophy present the subject as going ...
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  3.  81
    Daniel Stoljar (1993). Emotivism and Truth Conditions. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):81 - 101.
    By distinguishing between pragmatic and semantic aspects of emotivism, and by distinguishing between inflationary and deflationary conceptions of truth conditions, this paper defends emotivism against a series of objections. First, it is not the case (as Blackburn has argued) that emotivism must explain the appearance that moral sentences have truth conditions. Second, it is not the case (as Boghossian has argued) that emotivism presupposes that non-moral sentences have inflationary truth conditions. Finally, it is not the case (...)
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  4.  1
    Anselmo Carvalho de Oliveira (2016). R.M. Hare's Solution to the Problems of Descriptivism and Moral Emotivism. Ideas Y Valores 65 (160):5-28.
    Na primeira parte, argumento que o descritivismo proposto por Moritz Schlick não compreende adequadamente a função dos juízos morais. Na segunda parte, argumento que o emotivismo não apresenta uma explicação adequada para o papel da razão na ética. Na terceira parte, argumento que o prescritivismo universal proposto por R. M. Hare avança na solução dos problemas do emotivismo, porque amplia o papel da razão na ética, e na solução dos problemas do descritivismo, porque compreende a função dos juízos morais na (...)
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  5.  52
    Alexander Miller (1998). Emotivism and the Verification Principle. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):103–124.
    In chapter VI of Language, Truth, and Logic, A.J. Ayer argues that ethical statements are not literally significant. Unlike metaphysical statements, however, ethical statements are not nonsensical: even though they are not literally significant, Ayer thinks that they possess some other sort of significance. This raises the question: by what principle or criterion can we distinguish, among the class of statements that are not literally significant, between those which are genuinely meaningless and those which possess some other, non-literal form of (...)
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  6.  48
    John Lemos (2000). The Problems with Emotivism. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:285-309.
    This article provides a defense of a variety of MacIntyrean arguments against emotivism. In After Virtue MacIntyre explains that emotivism might be understood either as a theory about the meaning or about the function of moral language. He also argues that emotivism is false either way. I argue that MacIntyre is right about this by explaining and then answering the recent defenses of emotivism that have appeared in the literature. I conclude by reminding the reader that (...)
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  7.  58
    Kyle Swan (2002). Emotivism and Deflationary Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):270–281.
    The paper investigates different ways to understand the claim that non-cognitivist theories of morality are incoherent. According to the claim, this is so because, on one theory of truth, non-cognitivists are not able to deny objective truth to moral judgments without taking a substantive normative position. I argue that emotivism is not self-defeating in this way. The charge of incoherence actually only amounts to a claim that emotivism is incompatible with deflationary truth, but this claim is based upon (...)
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  8.  18
    Brian K. Steverson (2008). Biogeography and Evolutionary Emotivism. Ethics, Place and Environment 11 (1):33 – 48.
    Emotivism has enjoined a revival of sorts over the past few decades, primarily driven by a Darwinian interpretation of the Humean metaethic. Evolutionary ethics, the metaethical view that at the heart of our moral sense lies a set of moral sentiments whose existence 'pre-dates' in evolutionary terms our species' ability to engage in more explicit, cognitive moral deliberations and discourse, whether in the discovery of deontological rules or in the crafting of social contracts, figures prominently in Robert Solomon's work (...)
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  9. William Thomas Blackstone (1958). Objective Emotivism. Journal of Philosophy 55 (24):1054-1062.
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  10.  17
    Gunnar Bjömsson (2002). How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.
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  11.  21
    Matthew Chrisman (2013). Emotivism. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
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  12.  41
    Alberto Artosi (2000). The Limits of Emotivism. Some Remarks on Professor von Wright's Paper "Valuations". Ratio Juris 13 (4):358-363.
  13.  8
    Nicholas Unwin (1990). Can Emotivism Sustain a Social Ethics? Ratio 3 (1):64-81.
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  14.  26
    Bruce N. Waller (1986). The Virtues of Contemporary Emotivism. Erkenntnis 25 (1):61 - 75.
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  15.  44
    Robert G. Olson (1959). Emotivism and Moral Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 56 (18):722-730.
  16.  26
    Hector-Neri Castañeda (1967). Ethics and Logic: Stevensonian Emotivism Revisited. Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):671-683.
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  17.  25
    Carl Wellman (1968). Emotivism and Ethical Objectivity. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (2):90 - 99.
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  18.  35
    Peter Kivy (1980). A Failure of Aesthetic Emotivism. Philosophical Studies 38 (4):351 - 365.
  19.  23
    Asher Moore (1958). Emotivism: Theory and Practice. Journal of Philosophy 55 (9):375-382.
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  20.  7
    David Wiggins (1991). Ayer's Ethical Theory: Emotivism or Subjectivism? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30:181-196.
    In 1936, in a chapter of Language, Truth and Logic clearly influenced by Hume and influenced also by Ogden's and Richards's The Meaning of Meaning , Ayer claimed that judgments of value, in so far as they are not scientific statements, are not in the literal sense significant but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false. To say ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’ is not to state any more than one would have stated (...)
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  21.  5
    Craig M. Joseph (2009). Is Emotivism More Authentic Than Cognitivism? Some Reflections on Contemporary Research in Moral Psychology. In Mikko Salmela & Verena Mayer (eds.), Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity. John Benjamins 155--178.
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  22.  24
    Lucius Garvin (1958). Emotivism, Expression, and Symbolic Meaning. Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):111-118.
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  23.  19
    Asher Moore (1961). Emotivism and Intentionality. Ethics 71 (3):175-187.
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  24.  5
    Charles F. Kielkopf (1970). Emotivism as the Solution to the Problem of Evil. Sophia 9 (2):34-38.
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  25.  5
    Berel Lang (1969). Ethical Emotivism and the Burden of Prima Facie Evidence. Man and World 2 (4):574-579.
  26.  4
    Eduardo José Lima de Oliveira (2011). O Lugar Das Emoções E Dos Afetos Na Ética da Responsabilidade de Hans Jonas: Um Contraste Com a Perspectiva Emotivista/the Place of Emotions and Affections in Hans Jonas's Ethics of Responsibility: A Contrast with the Emotivism Perspective. Cadernos Do Pet Filosofia 3 (5):33-40.
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  27.  13
    John L. Barger (1980). The Meaningful Character of Value-Language: A Critique of the Linguistic Foundations of Emotivism. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 14 (2):77-91.
    The above arguments have not conclusively demonstrated the existence of value; nor have they sought to. Rather, they have focused primarily on value-language itself: what it is, what it means, and how men use it. In value-judgements, men intend to speak about reality, and not merely to manifest their feelings to influence others. The conceptual character of value-words gives them a formal objectivity lacking in mere manifestations of feeling; the meaning of value-words contains a “claim to objectivity” arising from the (...)
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  28.  9
    Brian K. Steverson (2003). Evolutionary Emotivism and the Land Ethic. Social Philosophy Today 19:65-77.
    In developing the metaethical foundation for the Land Ethic, J. Baird Callicott has relied on the cognitive plasticity and directionality of the moral sentiments in order to argue for an extension of those sentiments to the environment. As he sees it, reason plays a substantial role in determining which objects we direct those sentiments toward, and ecology has now shown to reason’s satisfaction that we are part of larger, land communities. In this essay, I would like to develop the claim (...)
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  29. Dennis A. Rohatyn (1976). Spinoza's Emotivism. In James Benjamin Wilbur (ed.), Spinoza's Metaphysics: Essays in Critical Appreciation. Van Gorcum
  30.  6
    John Sweigart (1964). The Distance Between Hume and Emotivism. Philosophical Quarterly 14 (56):229-236.
  31.  6
    A. W. Price (1988). Book Review:Ethical Emotivism. Stephen Satris. [REVIEW] Ethics 98 (3):579-.
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  32.  2
    Vladimir J. Konečni (2013). A Critique of Emotivism in Aesthetic Accounts of Visual Art. Philosophy Today 57 (4):388-400.
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  33. Steven Daskal (2011). Logical Empiricism and Emotivism. Philosophical Forum 42 (3):328-328.
     
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  34. Rem B. Edwards (1967). An Emotivist Analysis of the Ontological Argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):25.
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  35. Oliver A. Johnson (1987). Stephen Satris, Ethical Emotivism Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 7 (12):526-528.
     
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  36. Oliver Johnson (1987). Stephen Satris, Ethical Emotivism. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 7:526-528.
     
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  37. Graham Macdonald & Crispin Wright (eds.) (1986). The Legacy of Emotivism. Blackwell.
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  38. Heidi L. Maibom (2010). Rationalism, Emotivism, and the Psychopath. In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. OUP Oxford
  39. Kushal Deo Prasad Singh (2007). Place of Reasoning in Emotivism. In Manjulika Ghosh (ed.), Musings on Philosophy: Perennial and Modern. Sundeep Prakashan
     
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  40. Scott Soames (2003). Chapter 14. Emotivism and Its Critics. In Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis. Princeton University Press 300-319.
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  41. Scott Soames (2003). Chapter 15. Normative Ethics in the Era of Emotivism: The Anticonsequentialism of Sir David Ross. In Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis. Princeton University Press 320-345.
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  42. Nicholas Unwin, Can Emotivism Sustain a Social Ethics?
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  43.  76
    James Edwin Mahon (2013). MacIntyre and the Emotivists. In Fran O'Rourke (ed.), What Happened in and to Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. University of Notre Dame Press
    This chapter both explains the origins of emotivism in C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, R. B. Braithwaite, Austin Duncan-Jones, A. J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson (along with the endorsement by Frank P. Ramsey, and the summary of C. D. Broad), and looks at MacIntyre's criticisms of emotivism as the inevitable result of Moore's attack on naturalistic ethics and his ushering in the fact/value, which was a historical product of the Enlightenment.
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  44. Charles Pigden (2003). Bertrand Russell: Moral Philosopher or UnPhilosophical Moralist? In Nicholas Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge University Press 475-506.
    Until very recently the received wisdom on Russell’s moral philosophy was that it is uninspired and derivative, from Moore in its first phase and from Hume and the emotivists in its second. In my view this is a consensus of error. In the latter part of this essay I contend: 1) that Russell’s ‘work in moral philosophy’ had at least three, and (depending how you look at it) up to six ‘main phases’; 2) that in some of those phases, it (...)
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  45.  92
    Thomas Mormann (2006). Carnap's Logical Empiricism, Values, and American Pragmatism. Journal of General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):127 - 146.
    Abstract. Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were con-sidered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values were banished to the realm of meaning-less me-taphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally (...)
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  46.  84
    Gunnar Björnsson (2001). Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):81 - 108.
    Emotivists hold that moral opinions are wishes and desires, and that the function of moral language is to “express” such states. But if moral opinions were but wishes or desires, why would we see certain opinions as inconsistent with, or following from other opinions? And why should our reasoning include complex opinions such as the opinion that a person ought to be blamed only if he has done something wrong? Indeed, why would we think that anything is conditional on his (...)
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  47. Thomas Mormann (2007). Carnap's Logical Empiricism, Values, and American Pragmatism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (1):127 - 146.
    Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values and value judgments were banished to the realm of meaningless metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question why Carnap abandoned his (...)
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  48. Charles R. Pigden (1996). Bertrand Russell: Meta-Ethical Pioneer. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (2):181-204.
    Bertrand Russell was a meta-ethical pioneer, the original inventor of both emotivism and the error theory. Why, having abandoned emotivism for the error theory, did he switch back to emotivism in the 1920s? Perhaps he did not relish the thought that as a moralist he was a professional hypocrite. In addition, Russell's version of the error theory suffers from severe defects. He commits the naturalistic fallacy and runs afoul of his own and Moore's arguments against subjectivism. These (...)
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  49.  24
    Wouter F. Kalf (2015). Are Moral Properties Impossible? Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1869-1887.
    Perhaps the actual world does not contain moral properties. But might moral properties be impossible because no world, possible or actual, contains them? Two metaethical theories can be argued to entail just that conclusion; viz., emotivism and error theory. This paper works towards the strongest formulation of the emotivist argument for the impossibility of moral properties, but ultimately rejects it. It then uses the reason why the emotivist argument fails to argue that error-theoretic arguments for the impossibility of moral (...)
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  50. R. Jay Wallace (1996). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Harvard University Press.
    R. Jay Wallace argues in this book that moral accountability hinges on questions of fairness: When is it fair to hold people morally responsible for what they do? Would it be fair to do so even in a deterministic world? To answer these questions, we need to understand what we are doing when we hold people morally responsible, a stance that Wallace connects with a central class of moral sentiments, those of resentment, indignation, and guilt. To hold someone responsible, he (...)
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