Search results for 'Empirical tests of theory of consciousness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Arnold Trehub (2007). Space, Self, and the Theater of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):310-330.
    Over a decade ago, I introduced a large-scale theory of the cognitive brain which explained for the first time how the human brain is able to create internal models of its intimate world and invent models of a wider universe. An essential part of the theoretical model is an organization of neuronal mechanisms which I have named the Retinoid Model (Trehub, 1977, 1991). This hypothesized brain system has structural and dynamic properties enabling it to register and appropriately integrate disparate (...)
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  2. David Barrett (2014). Consciousness, Attention, and Working Memory: An Empirical Evaluation of Prinz's Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):7-29.
    A popular issue in mind is to explain why conscious mental states are conscious. Prinz (2012) defends three claims in an effort to make such an explanation: (i)mental states become conscious when and only when we attend to them; (ii)attention is a process by which mental states become available to working memory; so (iii) mental states are conscious when and only when they become available to working memory. Here I attack Prinz's theory, made explicit in (iii), by showing that (...)
     
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  3. Martin Francisco Fricke (2002). A Phenomenological Theory of Self-Consciousness.
    My thesis tests a novel definition of consciousness by applying it to theories of self-consciousness. This definition attempts to distinguish the phenomenon of consciousness from those of knowledge, belief, awareness, and perception by describing it as the noticing of objects and the registering of facts in thought. My investigation of self-consciousness is phenomenological in that it leaves aside questions as to whether selves exist or what their nature is and just examines what the contents of (...)
     
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  4.  27
    Mark Nielsen & R. H. Day (1999). William James and the Evolution of Consciousness. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):90-113.
    Despite having been relegated to the realm of superstition during the dominant years of behaviorism, the investigation and discussion of consciousness has again become scientifically defensible. However, attempts at describing animal consciousness continue to be criticized for lacking independent criteria that identify the presence or absence of the phenomenon. William James recognized that mental traits are subject to the same evolutionary processes as are physical characteristics and must therefore be represented in differing levels of complexity throughout the animal (...)
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  5. Bernard J. Baars (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
    Conscious experience is one of the most difficult and thorny problems in psychological science. Its study has been neglected for many years, either because it was thought to be too difficult, or because the relevant evidence was thought to be poor. Bernard Baars suggests a way to specify empirical constraints on a theory of consciousness by contrasting well-established conscious phenomena - such as stimulus representations known to be attended, perceptual, and informative - with closely comparable unconscious ones (...)
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  6.  48
    Susan Pockett (2012). The Electromagnetic Field Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):191-223.
    The electromagnetic field theory of consciousness proposes that conscious experiences are identical with certain electromagnetic patterns generated by the brain. While the theory has always acknowledged that not all of the electromagnetic patterns generated by brain activity are conscious, until now it has not been able to specify what might distinguish conscious patterns from non-conscious patterns. Here a hypothesis is proposed about the 3D shape of electromagnetic fields that are conscious, as opposed to those that are not (...)
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  7.  13
    Justin Sytsma (2010). Dennetts Theory of the Folk Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):3-4.
    It is not uncommon to find assumptions being made about folk psychology in the discussions of phenomenal consciousness in philosophy of mind. In this article I consider one example, focusing on what Dan Dennett says about the 'folk theory of consciousness'. I show that he holds that the folk believe that qualities like colours that we are acquainted with in ordinary perception are phenomenal qualities. Nonetheless, the shape of the folk theory is an empirical matter (...)
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  8. Hakwan Lau (2008). A Higher Order Bayesian Decision Theory of Consciousness. In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier
    It is usually taken as given that consciousness involves superior or more elaborate forms of information processing. Contemporary models equate consciousness with global processing, system complexity, or depth or stability of computation. This is in stark contrast with the powerful philosophical intuition that being conscious is more than just having the ability to compute. I argue that it is also incompatible with current empirical findings. I present a model that is free from the strong assumption that (...) predicts superior performance. The model is based on Bayesian decision theory, of which signal detection theory is a special case. It reflects the fact that the capacity for perceptual decisions is fundamentally limited by the presence and amount of noise in the system. To optimize performance, one therefore needs to set decision criteria that are based on the behaviour, i.e. the probability distributions, of the internal signals. One important realization is that the knowledge of how our internal signals behave statistically has to be learned over time. Essentially, we are doing statistics on our own brain. This ‘higherorder’ learning, however, may err, and this impairs our ability to set and maintain optimal criteria for perceptual decisions, which I argue is central to perception consciousness. I outline three possibilities of how conscious perception might be affected by failures of ‘higher-order’ representation. These all imply that one can have a dissociation between consciousness and performance. This model readily explains blindsight and hallucinations in formal terms, and is beginning to receive direct empirical support. I end by discussing some philosophical implications of the model. (shrink)
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  9. Kathleen Akins (1996). Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness. Mind and Language 11 (1):1-43.
    : In Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett presents the Multiple Drafts Theory of consciousness, a very brief, largely empirical theory of brain function. From these premises, he draws a number of quite radical conclusions—for example, the conclusion that conscious events have no determinate time of occurrence. The problem, as many readers have pointed out, is that there is little discernible route from the empirical premises to the philosophical conclusions. In this article, I try to reconstruct (...)
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  10. Jerome L. Singer (2003). Daydreaming, Consciousness, and Self-Representations: Empirical Approaches to Theories of William James and Sigmund Freud. Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies. Special Issue 5 (4):461-483.
  11. Justin Sytsma, Does Heterophenomenology Concede Too Much? Experiments on the Folk Theory of Consciousness.
    It is fairly common in the modern debates over qualia to find assumptions being made about the views of non-philosophers. It is often assumed that the concept is part of the folk theory of consciousness. In fact, even prominent skeptics about qualia will admit that their views run counter to common sense. I illustrate this by considering the work of Daniel Dennett, focusing on his standard articulation of the debate concerning his heterophenomenological method. While Dennett is often accused (...)
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  12. James H. Liu & Matthew Macdonald (2016). Towards a Psychology of Global Consciousness Through an Ethical Conception of Self in Society. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 46 (1):n/a-n/a.
    Globalization has brought people around the world closer together in ways that have created greater uncertainty in their identity politics. This has sometimes strengthened local identities, despite attempts to create ‘universal’ forms of identity that impose one standard of appropriate conduct in the face of difference. Drawing from Dialogical Self Theory and from cosmopolitanism, we propose that adequately responding to the ethical and identity challenges presented by globalization requires having Global Consciousness: “a knowledge of both the interconnectedness and (...)
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  13.  26
    Justin Sytsma, Experiments on the Folk Theory of Consciousness.
    It is not uncommon to find assumptions being made about folk psychology in the discussions of phenomenal consciousness in philosophy of mind. In this article I consider one example, focusing on what Dan Dennett says about the “folk theory of consciousness.” I show that he holds that the folk believe that the sensory qualities that we are acquainted with in ordinary perception are phenomenal qualities. Nonetheless, the shape of the folk theory is an empirical matter (...)
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  14.  65
    Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Putting Content Into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.
    The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain’s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a (...)
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  15.  33
    Zheng Wang & Jerome R. Busemeyer (2013). A Quantum Question Order Model Supported by Empirical Tests of an A Priori and Precise Prediction. Topics in Cognitive Science 5 (4):689-710.
    Question order effects are commonly observed in self-report measures of judgment and attitude. This article develops a quantum question order model (the QQ model) to account for four types of question order effects observed in literature. First, the postulates of the QQ model are presented. Second, an a priori, parameter-free, and precise prediction, called the QQ equality, is derived from these mathematical principles, and six empirical data sets are used to test the prediction. Third, a new index is derived (...)
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  16.  8
    Imants Baruss (2010). Beyond Scientific Materialism: Toward a Transcendent Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (7-8):7-8.
    Analysis of the social-cognitive substrate of scientific activity reveals that much of science functions in an inauthentic mode whereby a materialist world view constrains the authentic practice of science. But materialism cannot explain matter, as evidenced by empirical data concerning the nature of physical manifestation. Nor, then, should materialism be the basis for our interpretation of consciousness. It is time to move beyond scientific materialism and develop transcendent theories of consciousness. Such theories should minimally meet the following (...)
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  17.  1
    A. Pereira (2013). A Commentary on De Sousa's "Towards an Integrative Theory of Consciousness". Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):210.
    De Sousa's comprehensive two-part review of a diversity of contemporary approaches to the study of consciousness is highly welcome. He makes us aware of a proliferation of theoretical and empirical approaches targeting a common theme, but diverging in many ways. He skilfully accomplishes a classification of kinds of approach, identification of the main representatives, their contributions, and respective limitations. However, he does not show how the desired integration could be accomplished. Besides summarising De Sousa's efficient analytical work, I (...)
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  18. Bartlomiej Swiatczak (2011). Conscious Representations: An Intractable Problem for the Computational Theory of Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 21 (1):19-32.
    Advocates of the computational theory of mind claim that the mind is a computer whose operations can be implemented by various computational systems. According to these philosophers, the mind is multiply realisable because—as they claim—thinking involves the manipulation of syntactically structured mental representations. Since syntactically structured representations can be made of different kinds of material while performing the same calculation, mental processes can also be implemented by different kinds of material. From this perspective, consciousness plays a minor role (...)
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  19.  93
    Ben Phillips (2014). Indirect Representation and the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):273-290.
    According to Uriah Kriegel’s self-representational theory of consciousness, mental state M is conscious just in case it is a complex with suitably integrated proper parts, M 1 and M 2, such that M 1 is a higher-order representation of lower-order representation M 2. Kriegel claims that M thereby “indirectly” represents itself, and he attempts to motivate this claim by appealing to what he regards as intuitive cases of indirect perceptual and pictorial representation. For example, Kriegel claims that it’s (...)
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  20. Shan Gao (2008). A Quantum Theory of Consciousness. Minds and Machines 18 (1):39-52.
    The relationship between quantum collapse and consciousness is reconsidered under the assumption that quantum collapse is an objective dynamical process. We argue that the conscious observer can have a distinct role from the physical measuring device during the process of quantum collapse owing to the intrinsic nature of consciousness; the conscious observer can know whether he is in a definite state or a quantum superposition of definite states, while the physical measuring device cannot “know”. As a result, the (...)
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  21. Dennis J. Sweet (1989). Objective Knowledge and Self-Consciousness: The Role of Kant's Theory of Apperceptive Self-Identity in the "Critique of Pure Reason". Dissertation, The University of Iowa
    Kant's purpose in the Critique of Pure Reason was to describe the nature and set the boundaries of human knowledge. At the heart of this ambitious enterprise is his doctrine of apperceptive self-identity. He insists that in order for us to know anything, there must be a unitary self capable of being aware of its own identity over time. Unfortunately, Kant's descriptions of this unitary 'I think' are extremely obscure, and his accounts of how it functions in the first Critique's (...)
     
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  22.  9
    Preben Bertelsen (1999). Development of Phenomenological Consciousness in Early Childhood. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):195-216.
    This article presents a developmental model of phenomenological consciousness in early childhood . A 3-stage developmental model is constructed, based on the understanding of phenomenological consciousness as modeling activity structured by the directedness at/by the world in general and directedness at/by directedness in particular. Thereby, it is demonstrated that it is in the interaction with other people and the structure and content of their phenomenological consciousness, i.e., their directedness and their modeling of the world, that the development (...)
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  23.  70
    Gerald M. Edelman (1989). The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. Basic Books.
    Having laid the groundwork in his critically acclaimed books Neural Darwinism (Basic Books, 1987) and Topobiology (Basic Books, 1988), Nobel laureate Gerald M. Edelman now proposes a comprehensive theory of consciousness in The Remembered ...
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  24. Johnjoe McFadden (2006). The CEMI Field Theory: Seven Clues to the Nature of Consciousness. In J. Tuszynski (ed.), The Emerging Physics of Consciousness. Springer-Verlag 387--406.
    In this chapter I examine seven clues to the nature of consciousness and explore what they reveal about the underlying physical substrate of consciousness. The consciousness clues are: it impacts upon the world; it is a property of living brains but no other structure; brain activity may be conscious or unconscious; the conscious mind appears to be serial; learning requires consciousness but recall doesn’t; conscious information is bound; and consciousness correlates with synchronous firing of neurons. (...)
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  25.  29
    Susan Pockett (2002). Difficulties with the Electromagnetic Field Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):51-56.
    The author's version of the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness is stated briefly and then three difficulties with the theory are discussed. The first is a purely technical problem: how to measure accurately enough the spatial properties of the fields which are proposed to be conscious and then how to generate these artificially, so that the theory can be tested. The second difficulty might also be merely technical, or it might be substantive and fatal to the (...)
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  26.  11
    Lillian Kennedy & John W. Osborne (1985). An Empirical Validation of Schopenhauer's Theory of Music Through Analysis of Listeners' Experiences of Mahler's Ninth Symphony. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 16 (1):13-38.
    In the end, even the creative achievements of Shakespeare and Bach must be eradicated by death and nothingness, when the earth is burnt up in the sun. But the temporality of human existence and meaning does not invalidate the quest for meaning-for even that future universe, as dead as it must be will have some meaning, in that it contains the artifacts, even in ashes, of the sometime existence of human life and consciousness. We HAVE BEEN. It was towards (...)
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  27. Adam Pautz (2013). The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: New Empirical Evidence for a Brain- Based Theory of Consciousnes. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer 237-298.
  28.  81
    C. M. Heyes (1998). Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):101-114.
    Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, (...)
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  29. J. McFadden (2002). Synchronous Firing and its Influence on the Brain's Electromagnetic Field: Evidence for an Electromagnetic Field Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):23-50.
    The human brain consists of approximately 100 billion electrically active neurones that generate an endogenous electromagnetic field, whose role in neuronal computing has not been fully examined. The source, magnitude and likely influence of the brain's endogenous em field are here considered. An estimate of the strength and magnitude of the brain's em field is gained from theoretical considerations, brain scanning and microelectrode data. An estimate of the likely influence of the brain's em field is gained from theoretical principles (...)
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  30.  53
    Pablo Acuña & Dennis Dieks (2014). Another Look at Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination of Theory Choice. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):153-180.
    In 1991 Larry Laudan and Jarret Leplin proposed a solution for the problem of empirical equivalence and the empirical underdetermination that is often thought to result from it. In this paper we argue that, even though Laudan and Leplin’s reasoning is essentially correct, their solution should be accurately assessed in order to appreciate its nature and scope. Indeed, Laudan and Leplin’s analysis does not succeed in completely removing the problem or, as they put it, in refuting the (...)
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  31. Jean Paul Sartre, R. George Kirkpatrick & Forrest Williams (1957). The Transcendence of the Ego an Existentialist Theory of Consciousness. Noonday Press.
  32.  9
    Robert L. Woolfolk (2011). Empirical Tests of Philosophical Intuitions. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):415-416.
    Experimental philosophy seeks to examine empirically various factual issues that, either explicitly or implicitly, lie at the foundations of philosophical positions. A study of this genre (Miller & Feltz, 2011) was critiqued. Questions about the study were raised and broader issues pertaining to the field of experimental philosophy were discussed.
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  33. Timo Jarvilehto (2000). The Theory of the Organism-Environment System: IV. The Problem of Mental Activity and Consciousness. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science 35 (1):35-57.
  34. Uriah Kriegel (2007). A Cross-Order Integration Hypothesis for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. Consciousness & Cognition 16 (4):897-912.
    b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation (...)
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  35.  32
    Efstratios Manousakis (2006). Founding Quantum Theory on the Basis of Consciousness. Foundations of Physics 36 (6):795-838.
    In the present work, quantum theory is founded on the framework of consciousness, in contrast to earlier suggestions that consciousness might be understood starting from quantum theory. The notion of streams of consciousness, usually restricted to conscious beings, is extended to the notion of a Universal/Global stream of conscious flow of ordered events. The streams of conscious events which we experience constitute sub-streams of the Universal stream. Our postulated ontological character of consciousness also consists (...)
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  36. Howard Shevrin (1998). The Freud-Rapaport Theory of Consciousness. In Robert F. Bornstein & Joseph M. Masling (eds.), Empirical Perspectives on the Psychoanalytic Unconscious. American Psychological Association
  37. Rocco J. Gennaro (2005). The HOT Theory of Consciousness: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):3-21.
    The so-called 'higher-order thought' theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at it . The HOT theory has been or could be attacked from two apparently opposite directions. On the one hand, there is what Stubenberg has called 'the problem of the rock' which, if successful, would show that the HOT theory proves too much. On the other hand, it might also be alleged (...)
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  38.  39
    Christian Lotz (2007). Depiction and Plastic Perception. A Critique of Husserl's Theory of Picture Consciousness. Continental Philosophy Review 40 (2):171-185.
    In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such (...)
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  39.  21
    Einar Marnburg (2001). The Questionable Use of Moral Development Theory in Studies of Business Ethics: Discussion and Empirical Findings. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 32 (4):275 - 283.
    The topic of the article is how moral development theory can enlighten the understanding of ethical behaviour in business. It discusses previous research on the subject, and reports an empirical study of academics (engineers and business economists with a master degree) working in the private sector in Norway.Moral development theory is based on a long research tradition, and many researchers within business ethics have assumed the importance of moral reasoning in business environments. However, the truth of these (...)
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  40.  59
    Myrto I. Mylopoulos (2011). Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness? Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):268-272.
    Mandik (2010) defends a motor theory of control consciousness according to which nonsensory states, like motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness we have of ourselves as being in control of our actions. Along the way, he argues that his theory is to be preferred over Prinz’s (2007) sensory imagery theory, which denies that nonsensory states play any direct role in the generation of control consciousness. I argue that Mandik’s criticisms of Prinz’s theory fall (...)
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  41.  30
    Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez (2013). Précis of "E-physicalism-a physicalist theory of phenomenal consciousness". Ideas Y Valores 152 (152):268-297.
    El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
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  42. Liane Gabora (2002). Amplifying Phenomenal Information: Toward a Fundamental Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):3-29.
    from non-conscious components by positing that consciousness is a universal primitive. For example, the double aspect theory of information holds that infor- mation has a phenomenal aspect. How then do you get from phenomenal infor- mation to human consciousness? This paper proposes that an entity is conscious to the extent it amplifies information, first by trapping and integrating it through closure, and second by maintaining dynamics at the edge of chaos through simul- taneous processes of divergence and (...)
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  43. Bernard J. Baars (1997). In the Theatre of Consciousness: Global Workspace Theory, a Rigorous Scientific Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):292-309.
    Can we make progress exploring consciousness? Or is it forever beyond human reach? In science we never know the ultimate outcome of the journey. We can only take whatever steps our current knowledge affords. This paper explores today's evidence from the viewpoint of Global Workspace theory. First, we ask what kind of evidence has the most direct bearing on the question. The answer given here is ‘contrastive analysis’ -- a set of paired comparisons between similar conscious and unconscious (...)
     
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  44.  22
    May Brodbeck (1949). Coherence Theory Reconsidered: Professor Werkmeister on Semantics and on the Nature of Empirical Laws. Philosophy of Science 16 (1):75-85.
    Werkmeister's new book, The Basis and Structure of Knowledge is the second major attempt in recent years to defend the idealistic theory of knowledge. The first was Blanshard's Nature of Thought; and it is worth noticing that both authors, in undertaking the defense of a position long in the shadows, are well aware of contemporary developments in logic and technical philosophy. Werkmeister freely acknowledges his debt to Blanshard; yet his work differs in scope from the latter's in at least (...)
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  45.  14
    Kathrin Ohnsorge & Guy Widdershoven (2011). Monological Versus Dialogical Consciousness – Two Epistemological Views on the Use of Theory in Clinical Ethical Practice. Bioethics 25 (7):361-369.
    In this article, we argue that a critical examination of epistemological and anthropological presuppositions might lead to a more fruitful use of theory in clinical-ethical practice. We differentiate between two views of conceptualizing ethics, referring to Charles Taylors' two epistemological models: ‘monological’ versus ‘dialogical consciousness’. We show that the conception of ethics in the model of ‘dialogical consciousness’ is radically different from the classical understanding of ethics in the model of ‘monological consciousness’. To reach accountable moral (...)
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  46.  36
    Reinaldo J. Bernal (2012). E-Physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Ontos Verlag.
    This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent (...)
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  47. Jean E. Burns (1996). The Possibility of Empirical Test of Hypotheses About Consciousness. In S. R. Hameroff, A. W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Towards a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press 739--742.
    The possibility of empirical test is discussed with respect to three issues: (1) What is the ontological relationship between consciousness and the brain/physical world? (2) What physical characteristics are associated with the mind/brain interface? (3) Can consciousness act on the brain independently of any brain process?
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  48.  93
    Daniel Kostić (forthcoming). Explanatory Perspectivalism: Limiting the Scope of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Topoi:1-7.
    I argue that the hard problem of consciousness occurs only in very limited contexts. My argument is based on the idea of explanatory perspectivalism, according to which what we want to know about a phenomenon determines the type of explanation we use to understand it. To that effect the hard problem arises only in regard to questions such as how is it that concepts of subjective experience can refer to physical properties, but not concerning questions such as what (...)
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  49.  40
    Ken Wilber (2000). Waves, Streams, States and Self: Further Considerations for an Integral Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12):145-176.
    Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross-cultural literature search on the ‘mind’ side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need (...)
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  50.  58
    Ken Wilber (1997). An Integral Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (1):71-92.
    An extensive data search among various types of developmental and evolutionary sequences yielded a ‘four quadrant’ model of consciousness and its development . Each of these dimensions was found to unfold in a sequence of at least a dozen major stages or levels. Combining the four quadrants with the dozen or so major levels in each quadrant yields an integral theory of consciousness that is quite comprehensive in its nature and scope. This model is used to indicate (...)
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