Search results for 'Epiphenomenalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Brian P. Mclaughlin (2006). Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.score: 24.0
    Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility.
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  2. Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.score: 24.0
    Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson's understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term 'property' in an ontological sense, the second (...)
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  3. Volker Gadenne (2006). In Defence of Qualia-Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.score: 24.0
    Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism.
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  4. Francis W. Dauer (2001). McGinn's Materialism and Epiphenomenalism. Analysis 61 (2):136-139.score: 24.0
    Colin McGinn urged that while a brain state P explains consciousness, a conception P is cognitively inaccessible to us. This paper argues that McGinn's argument for his form of materialism is committed to P (and consciousness which P explains) being epiphenomenal or causally inert relative to such things as the movements of our bodies. As a result, McGinn's materialism creates a duality in the brain and thereby faces the same problem of epiphenomenalism which plagues the Cartesian dualist.
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  5. William S. Robinson, Epiphenomenalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 24.0
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley (1874), who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work (...)
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  6. Alexander Staudacher (2006). Epistemological Challenges to Qualia-Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):153-175.score: 24.0
    One of the strongest objections to epiphenomenalism is that it precludes any kind of knowledge of qualia, since empirical knowledge has to include a causal relationship between the respective belief and the object of knowledge. It is argued that this objection works only if the causal relationship is understood in a very specific sense (as a 'direct' causal relationship). Epiphenomenalism can, however, live well with other kinds of causal relationships ('indirect' causal relationships) or even with a reliability account (...)
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  7. Neil Campbell (2001). What Was Huxley's Epiphenomenalism? Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375.score: 24.0
    Thomas Huxley is often identified as the originator of the doctrineknown as ``epiphenomenalism,'' but there appears to be littleappreciation for the details of Huxley's theory. In particular,conflicting interpretations show that there is uncertainty about twoaspects of his position: whether mental states are completelywithout causal powers or simply have no influence on the behavior theyare typically taken to explain, and whether conscious epiphenomena arethemselves physical states of the brain or immaterial items. I clarifythese issues and show that Huxley's brand of (...)
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  8. Rex Welshon (1999). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.score: 24.0
    I argue that, on plausible assumptions, anomalous entails monism epiphenomenalism of the mental. The plausible assumptions are (1) events are particulars; (2) causal relations are extensional; (3) mental properties are epiphrastic. A principle defender of anomalous monism, Donald Davidson, acknowledges that anomalous monism is committed to (1) and (2). I argue that it is committed to (3) as well. Given (1), (2), and (3), epiphenomenalism of the mental falls out immediately. Three attempts to salvage anomalous monism from (...) of the mental are examined and rejected. I conclude with reflections on the status of non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)
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  9. Paul Raymont (1999). An Idle Threat: Epiphenomenalism Exposed. Dissertation, University of Torontoscore: 24.0
    In this doctoral dissertation I consider, and reject, the claim that recent varieties of non-reductive physicalism, particularly Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, are committed to a new kind of epiphenomenalism. Non-reductive physicalists identify each mental event with a physical event, and are thus entitled to the belief that mental events are causes, since the physical events with which they are held to be identical are causes. However, Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa and others have argued that if we follow the non-reductive (...)
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  10. Hans Muller (2009). More Troubles for Epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 37 (1):109-112.score: 24.0
    I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously (...)
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  11. Neil Campbell (2005). Explanatory Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.score: 24.0
    I propose a new form of epiphenomenalism, 'explanatory epiphenomenalism', the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behaviour. I arrive at this view by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behaviour. I then formalize (...)
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  12. Albert Newen & Rimas Cuplinskas (2002). Mental Causation: A Real Phenomenon in a Physicalistic World Without Epiphenomenalism or Overdetermination. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):139-167.score: 24.0
    The so-called problem of mental causation as discussed in the recent literature raises three central challenges for an adequate solution from a physicalist perspective: the threat of epiphenomenalism, the problem of externalism (or the difficulty in accounting for the causal efficacy of extrinsic mental properties) and the problem of causal exclusion (or the threat of over determination). We wish to account for mental causationas a real phenomenon within a physicalistic framework without accepting epiphenomenalism or overdetermination. The key ideas (...)
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  13. Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani (2009). Dynamical Agents: Consciousness, Causation, and Two Specters of Epiphenomenalism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):225-243.score: 24.0
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain (...)
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  14. Norman Bacrac (2010). Epiphenomenalism Explained. Philosophy Now 81:10-13.score: 24.0
    Epiphenomenalism expressed as a form of materialism in two key axioms; distinguished from Cartesian dualism, physicalism, eliminativism; shown to be compatible with a subjective experience of free choice but not with libertarian free will - the social consequences of this view.
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  15. Sven Walter (2014). Willusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Feeling of Conscious Will. Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.score: 24.0
    While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, (...)
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  16. Richard Double (1979). Taylor's Refutation of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Critical Analysis 8 (1):23-28.score: 24.0
    In "metaphysics" richard taylor argues that epiphenomenalism is implausible because it leaves open the possibility that human behavior occurs without the presence of mental events. in my paper i examine the sort of possibility involved and conclude that the logical possibility of "mind-less behavior" which epiphenomenalism must allow is an equal possibility for all competing theories of mind. thus, epiphenomenalism is seen to be no worse off in this respect than other theories and taylor's objection fails.
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  17. Danilo Suster (2001). Semifactuals and Epiphenomenalism. Acta Analytica 16 (26):23-43.score: 24.0
    Semifactuals and Epiphenomenalism -/- Mental properties are said to be epiphenomenal because they do not pass the counterfactual test of causal relevance. Jacob (1996) adopts the defence of causal efficacy of mental properties developed by LePore and Loewer (1987). They claim that those who argue for the epiphenomenalism of the mental place too strong a requirement on causal relevance, which excludes causally efficacious properties. Given a proper analysis of causal relevance, the causal efficacy of mental properties is saved. (...)
     
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  18. Peter Bieri (1992). Trying Out Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):283-309.score: 21.0
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  19. Alvin Plantinga (2004). Evolution, Epiphenomenalism, Reductionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):602-619.score: 21.0
  20. Brian P. McLaughlin (1989). Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical. Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.score: 21.0
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  21. Denis Robinson (1993). Epiphenomenalism, Laws, and Properties. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.score: 21.0
  22. Sven Walter, Epiphenomenalism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 21.0
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  23. Neil Campbell (1998). Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.score: 21.0
  24. Alec Hyslop (2000). Methodological Epiphenomenalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):61-70.score: 21.0
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  25. Peter Smith (1984). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism: A Reply to Honderich. Analysis 44 (2):83-86.score: 21.0
  26. Dwayne Moore (2011). Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 39 (3):511-525.score: 21.0
    The type-type reductive identity of the mental to the physical was once the dominant position in the mental causation debate. In time this consensus was overturned, largely due to its inability to handle the problem of multiple realizability. In its place a nonreductive position emerged which often included an adherence to functionalism. Functionalism construes mental properties as functional states of an organism, which in turn have specific physical realizers. This nonreductive form of functionalism, henceforth called role functionalism, has faced a (...)
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  27. Mark Eli Kalderon (1987). Epiphenomenalism and Content. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):71-90.score: 21.0
  28. Paul Noordhof (2003). Epiphenomenalism and Causal Asymmetry. In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.score: 21.0
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  29. John Lachs (1963). Epiphenomenalism and the Notion of Cause. Journal of Philosophy 60 (March):141-45.score: 21.0
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  30. Stephen Law (2006). Honderich and the Curse of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):61-70.score: 21.0
  31. Amir Horowitz (1999). Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.score: 21.0
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  32. Dieter Birnbacher (1988). Epiphenomenalism as a Solution to the Ontological Mind-Body Problem. Ratio 1 (1):17-32.score: 21.0
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  33. D. Pecnjak (1989). Epiphenomenalism and Machines: A Discussion of Van Rooijen's Critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (September):404-8.score: 21.0
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  34. Gerhard D. Wassermann (1979). Reply to Popper's Attack on Epiphenomenalism. Mind 88 (October):572-75.score: 21.0
  35. Mark B. Woodhouse (1974). A New Epiphenomenalism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):163-69.score: 21.0
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  36. Kam-Yuen Cheng (1997). Davidson's Action Theory and Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):81-95.score: 21.0
  37. Keith Campbell (1974). Comments On: Mark Woodhouse, A New Epiphenomenalism?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):170-173.score: 21.0
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  38. Eric Russert Kraemer (1980). Imitation-Man and the 'New' Epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (September):479-487.score: 21.0
  39. Wilbur Long (1953). Comments on the Alleged Proof of Epiphenomenalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (February):355-58.score: 21.0
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  40. Karl R. Popper (1977). Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 31 (1‐2):177-86.score: 21.0
  41. Nicholas P. Power (1996). Fodor's Vindication of Folk Psychology and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.score: 21.0
    Jerry Fodor has long championed the view, recently dubbed “scientific intentional realism” (Loewer and Ray, 1991, p. xiv), that “a scientifically adequate psychology will contain laws that quantify over intentional phenomena in intentional terms.” On such a view our belief/desire psychology will be “vindicated” through empirical investigation; that is, it will be shown to denote the explanatory (or causally salient) states or events in the production of thought and behavior. That intentional properties, states, or events have causal efficacy---are not mere (...)
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  42. Jan Sleutels (1998). Phenomenal Consciousness: Epiphenomenalism, Naturalism and Perceptual Plasticity. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):21-55.score: 21.0
  43. Richard Swinburne (2011). Could Anyone Justifiably Believe Epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):196--216.score: 21.0
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  44. Richard E. Creel (1980). Radical Epiphenomenalism: B.F. Skinner's Account of Private Events. Behaviorism 8 (1):31-53.score: 21.0
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  45. Robert van Gulick (1992). Three Bad Arguments for Intentional Property Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):311-331.score: 21.0
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  46. Jason A. Beyer (1999). Epiphenomenalism and the Eliminative Strategy. Kinesis 26 (1):18-36.score: 21.0
     
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  47. Glenn Braddock (2000). Against Chalmers' Epiphenomenalism. Auslegung 24 (1):45-63.score: 21.0
     
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  48. Tyler Burge (2003). Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.score: 21.0
  49. Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger (1998). Consciousness, Adaptation, and Epiphenomenalism. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.score: 21.0
  50. Michael Pauen, Alexander Staudacher & Sven Walter (2006). Epiphenomenalism: Dead End or Way Out? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):7-19.score: 21.0
     
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