Search results for 'Epistemic Normativity' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  66
    John Greco (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface; Part I. Epistemic Normativity: 1. Knowledge as success from ability; 2. Against deontology; 3. Against internalism; 4. Against evidentialism; Part II. Problems for Everyone: 5. The nature of knowledge; 6. The value of knowledge; 7. Knowledge and context; 8. The Pyrrhonian problematic; Part III. Problems for Reliabilism: 9. The problem of strange and fleeting processes; 10. The problem of defeating evidence; 11. The problem of easy knowledge; Bibliography; Index.
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  2. Qilin Li, Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology, Epistemic Normativity and the Gettier Problem.
    In this paper, it is argued that there are (at least) two different kinds of ‘epistemic normativity’ in epistemology, which can be scrutinized and revealed by some comparison with some naturalistic studies of ethics. The first kind of epistemic normativity can be naturalized, but the other not. The doctrines of Quine’s naturalized epistemology is firstly introduced; then Kim’s critique of Quine’s proposal is examined. It is argued that Quine’s naturalized epistemology is able to save some room (...)
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  3.  42
    Christopher Cowie (2014). In Defence of Instrumentalism About Epistemic Normativity. Synthese 191 (16):4003-4017.
    According to epistemic instrumentalists the normativity of evidence for belief is best explained in terms of the practical utility of forming evidentially supported beliefs. Traditional arguments for instrumentalism—arguments based on naturalism and motivation—lack suasive force against opponents. A new argument for the view—the Argument from Coincidence—is presented. The argument shows that only instrumentalists can avoid positing an embarrassing coincidence between the practical value of believing in accordance with one’s evidence, and the existence of reasons so to believe. (...)
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  4. Søren Harnow Klausen (2009). Two Notions of Epistemic Normativity. Theoria 75 (3):161-178.
    The overwhelmingly dominant view of epistemic normativity has been an extreme form of deontology. I argue that although the pull towards deontology is quite understandable, given the traditional concerns of epistemology, there is no good reason for not also adopting a complementary consequentialist notion of epistemic normativity, which can be put to use in applied epistemology. I further argue that this consequentialist notion is not, despite appearances and popular sentiment to the contrary, any less genuinely (...) than the deontological notion and that it may even be considered more genuinely normative. (shrink)
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  5.  50
    Chase Wrenn (2004). Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):273-290.
    In this paper, I consider an argument of Harvey Siegel's according to which there can be no hypothetical normativity anywhere unless there is categorical normativity in epistemology. The argument fails because it falsely assumes people must be bound by epistemic norms in order to have justified beliefs.
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  6.  34
    Harvey Siegel & John Biro (1997). Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies. Argumentation 11 (3):277-292.
    In Biro and Siegel we argued that a theory of argumentation mustfully engage the normativity of judgments about arguments, and we developedsuch a theory. In this paper we further develop and defend our theory.
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  7.  63
    Daan Evers (2015). Street on Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons. Synthese 192 (11):3663-3676.
    Sharon Street argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent’s attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot consistently accept realism. If she does not, then she has no scientifically credible explanation of the fact that our epistemic behaviours or beliefs about (...) reasons align with independent normative truths. I argue that neither horn is very sharp for realists about epistemic normativity. (shrink)
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  8.  62
    John Skorupskispecial Issue On Normativity & Edited by Teresa Marques Rationality (2007). What is Normativity? Special Issue on Normativity and Rationality, Edited by Teresa Marques 2 (23).
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  9.  38
    Guy Axtell (2012). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. By John Greco. (Cambridge UP, 2010. Pp. X + 205. Price £17.99/US$29.99.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):208-211.
    A Review of John Greco's book Acheiving Knowledge. The critical points I make involve three claims Greco makes that represent common ground between the reliabilists (including agent reliabilists like himself) and the character epistemologists (which would include myself): I. Such virtues are often needed to make our cognitive abilities reliable (to turn mere faculties into excellences); II. Such virtues might be essentially involved in goods other than knowledge; III. Such virtues might be valuable in themselves.
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  10.  14
    Pascal Engelspecial Issue On Normativity & Edited by Teresa Marques Rationality (2007). Belief and Normativity. Special Issue on Normativity and Rationality, Edited by Teresa Marques (23).
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  11. Adam C. Podlaskowski & Joshua A. Smith (2011). Infinitism and Epistemic Normativity. Synthese 178 (3):515-527.
    Klein’s account of epistemic justification, infinitism, supplies a novel solution to the regress problem. We argue that concentrating on the normative aspect of justification exposes a number of unpalatable consequences for infinitism, all of which warrant rejecting the position. As an intermediary step, we develop a stronger version of the ‘finite minds’ objection.
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  12. Stephen R. Grimm (2009). Epistemic Normativity. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 243-264.
    In this article, from the 2009 Oxford University Press collection Epistemic Value, I criticize existing accounts of epistemic normativity by Alston, Goldman, and Sosa, and then offer a new view.
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  13.  20
    Eric T. Kerr & J. Adam Carter (2015). Richard Rorty and Epistemic Normativity. Social Epistemology 30 (1):3-24.
    The topic of epistemic normativity has come to the fore of recent work in epistemology, and so naturally, theories of knowledge, truth and justification have been increasingly held accountable to preserving normative epistemological platitudes. Central to discussions of epistemic normativity are questions about epistemic agency and epistemic value. Here, our aim is to take up some of these issues as they come to bear on the rather unconventional brand of epistemology that was defended by (...)
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  14.  21
    Zachary Silver (2006). Epistemic Side Constraints and the Structure of Epistemic Normativity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):129-153.
    In this paper, I develop the notion of an epistemic side constraint in order to overcome one of the main challenges to a goal-based approach to the structure of epistemic normativity. I argue that the rationale for such side constraints can be found in the work of John Locke and that his argument is best understood as the epistemic analog to David Gauthier’s argument as to the rationality of being moral.
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  15. John Greco (2012). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
    When we affirm that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is (...)
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  16.  70
    David Owens (2000). Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity. Routledge.
    We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. Owens (...)
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  17. Dalibor Renić (2012). Ethical & Epistemic Normativity: Lonergan & Virtue Epistemology. Marquette University Press.
     
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  18. Hilary Kornblith (1993). Epistemic Normativity. Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.
    This paper examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? A semantic approach to this question, due to Alvin Goldman, is examined and found unacceptable. Instead, accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires are argued to be most promising. All of these accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. It is argued that such an account may be offered, grounding (...)
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  19.  8
    Peter J. Graham (2015). Epistemic Normativity and Social Norms. In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press 247-273.
  20. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2001). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
    In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury (...)
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  21. David Owens (2002). Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity. Routledge.
    We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens (...)
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  22.  25
    Christian Onof (2008). Property Dualism, Epistemic Normativity, and the Limits of Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):60-85.
    This paper examines some consequences of the (quasi-)epiphenomenalism implied by a property dualistic view of phenomenal consciousness. The focus is upon the variation of phenomenal content over time. A thought-experiment is constructed to support two claims. The weaker claim exhibits an incompatibility which arises in certain logically possible situations between a conscious subject’s epistemic norms and the requirement that one be aware of one’s conscious experience. This could be interpreted as providing some epistemic grounds for the postulation of (...)
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  23.  20
    Christian J. Onof (2008). Property Dualism, Epistemic Normativity and the Limits of Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):60-85.
    This paper examines some consequences of the (quasi-)epiphenomenalism implied by a property dualistic view of phenomenal consciousness. The focus is upon the variation of phenomenal content over time. A thought-experiment is constructed to support two claims. The weaker claim exhibits an incompatibility which arises in certain logically possible situations between a conscious subjecfs epistemicnorms and the requirement that one be aware of one’s conscious experience. This could be interpreted as providing some epistemic grounds for the postulation of bridging laws (...)
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  24. Hamid Seyedsayamdost (2015). On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication. Episteme 12 (1):95-116.
    In one of the earlier influential papers in the field of experimental philosophy titled Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions published in 2001, Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich reported that respondents answered Gettier type questions differently depending on their ethnic background as well as socioeconomic status. There is currently a debate going on, on the significance of the results of Weinberg et al. (2001) and its implications for philosophical methodology in general and epistemology in specific. Despite the (...)
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  25.  28
    John Turri (2012). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity, by John Greco. [REVIEW] Mind 121 (481):183-187.
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  26.  78
    Eugene Mills (2002). Review: Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (442):462-466.
  27. Thom Brooks (2004). Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (4):513.
     
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  28.  9
    Edgar Valdez (2013). Ethical & Epistemic Normativity: Lonergan & Virtue Epistemology By Dalibor Renic. The Lonergan Review 4 (1):223-227.
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  29.  3
    Christopher Friel (2013). Ethical & Epistemic Normativity: Lonergan & Virtue Epistemology. By Dalibor Renić. Pp. 268, Milwaukee, WI, Marquette University Press, 2012, $29.00. [REVIEW] Heythrop Journal 54 (5):904-905.
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  30.  5
    Joëlle Proust (2011). Epistemic Normativity From the Reasoner's Viewpoint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):265-265.
    Elqayam & Evans (E&E) are focused on the normative judgments used by theorists to characterize subjects' performances (e.g. in terms of logic or probability theory). They ignore the fact, however, that subjects themselves have an independent ability to evaluate their own reasoning performance, and that this ability plays a major role in controlling their first-order reasoning tasks.
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  31. David Owen & Todd Stewart (2002). David Owens, Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 22 (1):63-66.
     
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  32. D. Owens & N. Vassallo (2003). Recensioni/Reviews-Reason Without Freedom. The Problem of Epistemic Normativity. Epistemologia 26 (2):354-355.
     
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  33.  11
    Simon Robertson (2011). Epistemic Constraints on Practical Normativity. Synthese 181 (Supp.1):81-106.
    What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what (...)
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  34.  11
    Barbara Trybulec (2008). The Meaning of “Normativity” Within Naturalized Epistemology. Some Consequences of Naturalizing Epistemic Norms. Dialogue and Universalism 18 (7/8):149-160.
    The paper undertakes the problem of normativity within naturalized epistemology. The following issue is analyzed: can naturalism be developed as a normative enterprise, and if it can, what conditions it must satisfy to achieve a status of epistemology? According to “the standard condition”, in order to give a substantial account of normativity naturalism must present a theory of epistemic norms which are derived from descriptive statements about facts but which are not reduced to them. The thesis is (...)
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  35.  58
    Kurt Sylvan (forthcoming). Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity. Philosophy Compass.
  36. Allan Hazlett (forthcoming). Expressivism and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse. In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press
    Consider the claim that openmindedness is an epistemic virtue, the claim that true belief is epistemically valuable, and the claim that one epistemically ought to cleave to one’s evidence. These are examples of what I’ll call “ epistemic discourse.” In this paper I’ll propose and defend a view called “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse.” In particular, I’ll argue that convention-relativismis superior to its main rival, expressivism about epistemic discourse. Expressivism and conventionalism both jibe with anti-realism about (...) normativity, which is motivated by appeal to philosophical naturalism. Convention-relativism says that epistemic discourse describes how things stands relative to a conventional set of “ epistemic ” values; such discourse is akin to normative discourse relative to the conventional rules of a club. I defend conventionalism by appeal to a “reverse open question argument,” which says, pace expressivism, that epistemic discourse leaves the relevant normative questions open. (shrink)
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  37. Daniel Whiting (2009). On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning: Use, Meaning and Normativity. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):416-434.
    A number of prominent philosophers advance the following ideas: (1) Meaning is use. (2) Meaning is an intrinsically normative notion. Call (1) the use thesis, hereafter UT, and (2) the normativity thesis, hereafter NT. They come together in the view that for a linguistic expression to have meaning is for there to be certain proprieties governing its employment.1 These ideas are often associated with a third.
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  38.  24
    Charles Côté-Bouchard (2015). Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.
    According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic normativity arises from and depends on facts about our ends. On that view, a consideration C is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases in which, intuitively, C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ even though Φ-ing would not (...)
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  39. Sharon Street (2009). Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (sup1):213-248.
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  40. Ernest Sosa (2009). Knowing Full Well: The Normativity of Beliefs as Performances. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):5 - 15.
    Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true (or accurate), a second level if competent (or adroit), and a third if true because competent (or apt). Knowledge on one level (the animal level) is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the (...)
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  41.  59
    Howard Sankey (2012). Kuhn, Normativity and History and Philosophy of Science. Epistemologia:103-111.
    This paper addresses the relationship between the history and philosophy of science by way of the issue of epistemic normativity. After brief discussion of the relationship between history and philosophy of science in Kuhn’s own thinking, the paper focuses on the implications of the history of science for epistemic normativity. There may be historical evidence for change of scientific methodology, which may seem to support a position of epistemic relativism. However, the fact that the methods (...)
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  42.  5
    Dalibor Renić (2010). The Debate on Epistemic and Ethical Normativity. Disputatio Philosophica 12 (1):93-119.
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  43.  21
    Peter MacHamer & Lisa Osbeck (2003). Scientific Normativity as Non-Epistemic: A Hidden Kuhnian Legacy. Social Epistemology 17 (1):3 – 11.
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  44. Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.) (forthcoming). Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
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  45. Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.) (forthcoming). Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
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  46. Simon Robertson (2011). Epistemic Constraints on Practical Normativity. Synthese 181 (S1):81-106.
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  47.  97
    John Turri (2013). Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795.
    I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding all our beliefs. I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism, the original (...)
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  48. Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood (2009). Epistemic Norms Without Voluntary Control. Noûs 43 (4):599-632.
    William Alston’s argument against the deontological conception of epistemic justification is a classic—and much debated—piece of contemporary epistemology. At the heart of Alston’s argument, however, lies a very simple mistake which, surprisingly, appears to have gone unnoticed in the vast literature now devoted to the argument. After having shown why some of the standard responses to Alston’s argument don’t work, we elucidate the mistake and offer a hypothesis as to why it has escaped attention.
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  49. Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
    Epistemic expressivism is the application of a nexus of ideas, which is prominent in ethical theory (more specifically, metaethics), to parallel issues in epistemological theory (more specifically, metaepistemology). Here, in order to help those new to the debate come to grips with epistemic expressivism and recent discussions of it, I first briefly present this nexus of ideas as it occurs in ethical expressivism. Then, I explain why and how some philosophers have sought to extend it to a version (...)
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  50. Daniel Whiting (2012). Epistemic Value and Achievement. Ratio 25 (2):216-230.
    Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be (...)
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