Search results for 'Epistemic Pluralism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  35
    Rik Peels (2010). Epistemic Desiderata and Epistemic Pluralism. Journal of Philosophical Research 35 (1):193-207.
    In this article I argue that Alston’s recent meta-epistemological approach in terms of epistemic desiderata is not as epistemically plural as he claims it to be. After some preliminary remarks, I briefly recapitulate Alston’s epistemic desiderata approach. Next, I distinguish two ways in which one might consider truth to be an epistemic desideratum. Subsequently, I argue that only one truth-conducive desideratum can count as an epistemic desideratum. After this, I attempt to show that none of the (...)
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  2. Of Pluralism (2000). Parti Philosophical Sources of Pluralism. In Maria Baghramian & Attracta Ingram (eds.), Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity. Routledge 15.
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  3.  27
    Martin Kusch (forthcoming). Epistemic Relativism, Scepticism, Pluralism. Synthese:1-17.
    There are a number of debates that are relevant to questions concerning objectivity in science. One of the eldest, and still one of the most intensely fought, is the debate over epistemic relativism. —All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one “epistemic system”, that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to others. I shall call this view “No-metajustification”. (...)
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  4.  41
    Shari Stone-Mediatore (2013). Attending to Others: Simone Weil and Epistemic Pluralism Shari Stone-Mediatore. Philosophical Topics 41 (2):79-95.
    Since the 1980s, feminist epistemologists have traced the cultural biases that have denied epistemic value to certain epistemic styles and agents while they have explored ways to reclaim the devalued epistemic modes--including more practical, emotionally invested, and community-situated modes of knowing--that many of us have found to be meaningful ways of engaging the world. At the same time, feminist critics have sought not merely to reverse received epistemic hierarchies but to explore more pluralistic epistemologies that appreciate (...)
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  5. Berit Brogaard (2008). The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism. Or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press
    Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. After formulating the argument, I will look (...)
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  6.  92
    Eric Christian Barnes (1998). Probabilities and Epistemic Pluralism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):31-47.
    A pluralistic scientific method is one that incorporates a variety of points of view in scientific inquiry. This paper investigates one example of pluralistic method: the use of weighted averaging in probability estimation. I consider two methods of weight determination, one based on disjoint evidence possession and the other on track record. I argue that weighted averaging provides a rational procedure for probability estimation under certain conditions. I consider a strategy for calculating ‘mixed weights’ which incorporate mixed information about agent (...)
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  7.  64
    Jon Williamson (2006). Causal Pluralism Versus Epistemic Causality. Philosophica 77 (1):69-96.
    It is tempting to analyse causality in terms of just one of the indicators of causal relationships, e.g., mechanisms, probabilistic dependencies or independencies, counterfactual conditionals or agency considerations. While such an analysis will surely shed light on some aspect of our concept of cause, it will fail to capture the whole, rather multifarious, notion. So one might instead plump for pluralism: a different analysis for a different occasion. But we do not seem to have lots of different concepts of (...)
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  8.  32
    David Matheson (2011). How to Be an Epistemic Value Pluralist. Dialogue 50 (02):391-405.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend an epistemic value pluralism according to which true belief, justified belief, and knowledge are all fundamental epistemic values. After laying out reasons to reject epistemic value monism in its central forms, I present my pluralist alternative and show how it can adequately explain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over both true belief and justified belief, despite their fundamentality. I conclude with a sketch of how this pluralism might (...)
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  9.  5
    José Medina (2011). Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism. Foucault Studies 12:9-35.
    In this paper I argue that Foucaultian genealogy offers a critical approach to practices of remembering and forgetting which is crucial for resisting oppression and dominant ideologies. For this argument I focus on the concepts of counter-history and counter-memory that Foucault developed in the 1970’s. In the first section I analyze how the Foucaultian approach puts practices of remembering and forgetting in the context of power relations, focusing not only on what is remembered and forgotten, but how , by whom, (...)
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  10.  3
    Paul Ott (2011). Moral Pluralism, Moral Motivation, and Democracy: A Critique of Talisse's Epistemic Justification of Democracy. Contemporary Pragmatism 8 (2):145-162.
    In Democracy and Moral Conflict, Robert Talisse defends a folk epistemological justification of democracy. This is a universalist and non-moral justification that he deems necessary to accommodate moral pluralism. In contrast, I argue that this attempt fails to justify democracy, on three grounds. First, democracy cannot accommodate moral pluralism, as Talisse understands it. Second, Talisse's own conception of democracy is inconsistent with moral pluralism. And third, democracy requires moral justification and motivation, both of which can be made (...)
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  11.  5
    Stephen G. W. Stich (2014). When Democracy Meets Pluralism: Landemore's Epistemic Argument for Democracy and the Problem of Value Diversity. Critical Review 26 (1-2):170-183.
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  12.  66
    Russell Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Methodological Pluralism, Armchair Introspection, and DES as the Epistemic Tribunal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):253.
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  13.  56
    Kelly Ichitani Koide (2012). A Militant Rationality: Epistemic Values, Scientific Ethos, and Methodological Pluralism in Epidemiology. Scientiae Studia 10 (SPE):141-150.
    Technoscientific research, a kind of scientific research conducted within the decontextualized approach (DA), uses advanced technology to produce instruments, experimental objects, and new objects and structures, that enable us to gain knowledge of states of affairs of novel domains, especially knowledge about new possibilities of what we can do and make, with the horizons of practical, industrial, medical or military innovation, and economic growth and competition, never far removed from view. The legitimacy of technoscientific innovations can be appraised only in (...)
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  14.  2
    Jill Cumby (2016). Intellectual Flourishing, The Truth Norm, and Epistemic Norm Pluralism. Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):77-83.
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  15.  5
    Rein Vihalemm (2016). Chemistry and the Problem of Pluralism in Science: An Analysis Concerning Philosophical and Scientific Disagreements. Foundations of Chemistry 18 (2):91-102.
    Chemistry, especially its historical practice, has in the philosophy of science in recent decades attracted more and more attention, influencing the turn from the vision of science as a timeless logic-centred system of statements towards the history- and practice-centred approach. The problem of pluralism in science has become a popular topic in that context. Hasok Chang’s “active normative epistemic pluralism” manifested in his book Is water H2O? Evidence, realism and pluralism, pursuing an integrated study of history (...)
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  16.  3
    Jennifer Lisa Vest (2013). What Would Philosophic Pluralism Look Like?: True Dialogue, Epistemic Credibility, Rational Parity, and Death in the University. Philosophical Topics 41 (2):31-58.
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  17.  13
    Mark S. McLeod (1993). The Limits of Theistic Experience: An Epistemic Basis of Theistic Pluralism. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (2):79 - 94.
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  18.  21
    Klemens Kappel & Karin Jønch-Clausen (2015). Social Epistemic Liberalism and the Problem of Deep Epistemic Disagreements. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):371-384.
    Recently Robert B. Talisse has put forth a socio-epistemic justification of liberal democracy that he believes qualifies as a public justification in that it purportedly can be endorsed by all reasonable individuals. In avoiding narrow restraints on reasonableness, Talisse argues that he has in fact proposed a justification that crosses the boundaries of a wide range of religious, philosophical and moral worldviews and in this way the justification is sufficiently pluralistic to overcome the challenges of reasonable pluralism familiar (...)
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  19. Matthew Kopec, A Pluralistic Account of Epistemic Rationality.
    In this essay, I aim to motivate and defend a pluralistic view of epistemic rationality. At the core of the view is the notion that epistemic rationality is essentially a species of practical rationality put in the service of various epistemic goals. I begin by sketching some closely related views that have appeared in the literature. I then present my preferred version of the view and sketch some of its benefits. Thomas Kelly has raised challenging objections to (...)
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  20. Robert Lockie (2008). Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.
    This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with (...)
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  21.  80
    Mark Newman (2010). Beyond Structural Realism: Pluralist Criteria for Theory Evaluation. Synthese 174 (3):413 - 443.
    In this paper I argue that singularist approaches to solving the Pessimistic Induction, such as Structural Realism, are unacceptable, but that when a pluralist account of methodological principles is adopted this anti-realist argument can be dissolved. The proposed view is a contextual methodological pluralism in the tradition of Normative Naturalism, and is justified by appeal to meta-methodological principles that are themselves justified via an externalist epistemology. Not only does this view provide an answer to the Pessimistic Induction, it can (...)
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  22.  4
    Mark H. van Hollebeke (2009). Through “Thick” and “Thin”: Concerns About Talisse's Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy. [REVIEW] Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1):80-89.
    Robert Talisse argues that a Peircean epistemic basis for democracy is "thin" enough to allow for reasonable pluralism while being "thick" enough to justify the preferability of democracy. This brief critical engagement with Talisse's argument asks, first, whether or not it is fair to employ Peirce's doubt-belief model of inquiry as the basis of a "thin" philosophy of democracy. Additionally, it asks whether such a justification of democracy can do any real work without also employing Peirce's more comprehensive (...)
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  23.  17
    Himal Trikha (2012). Competing World Views: Perspectivism and Polemics in the Satya-Śāsana-Parīkṣā and Other Jaina Works. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 40 (1):25-45.
    Jaina authors use a pluralistic epistemological model as a tool to claim the superiority of Jainism over the other schools of Indian thought. In this article the general tendency of the Jaina’s epistemic pluralism is discussed and it is shown how the Digambara Jaina Vidyānandin tries to establish the Jainas’ pluralism on rational grounds by identifying erroneous epistemic alternatives through methodological falsification.
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  24.  40
    Dunja Šešelja & Christian Straßer (2013). Kuhn and the Question of Pursuit Worthiness. Topoi 32 (1):9-19.
    The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn’s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn’s points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether a theory is (...)
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  25.  71
    Howard Sankey (2014). On Relativism and Pluralism: Response to Steven Bland. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:98-103.
    This paper responds to criticism presented by Steven Bland of my naturalistic approach to epistemic relativism. In my view, the central argument for epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. This opens relativism to an anti-sceptical response. I combine Roderick Chisholm’s particularist response to the problem of the criterion with a reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant. A distinction is made between epistemic norms which provide genuine warrant and those which do not. On the (...)
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  26. Guy Axtell & Philip Olson (2009). Three Independent Factors in Epistemology. Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):89–109.
    We articulate John Dewey’s “independent factors” approach to moral philosophy and then adapt and extend this approach to address contemporary debate concerning the nature and sources of epistemic normativity. We identify three factors (agent reliability, synchronic rationality, and diachronic rationality) as each making a permanent contribution to epistemic value. Critical of debates that stem from the reductionistic ambitions of epistemological systems that privilege of one or another of these three factors, we advocate an axiological pluralism that acknowledges (...)
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  27.  39
    Robert B. Talisse (2011). Pluralism and Liberal Politics. Routledge.
    In this book, Robert Talisse critically examines the moral and political implications of pluralism, the view that our best moral thinking is indeterminate and that moral conflict is an inescapable feature of the human condition. Through a careful engagement with the work of William James, Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, and their contemporary followers, Talisse distinguishes two broad types of moral pluralism: metaphysical and epistemic. After arguing that metaphysical pluralism does not offer a compelling account of value (...)
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  28.  30
    Jeroen van Bouwel, Erik Weber & Leen de Vreese (2011). Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):33-46.
    Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to (...)
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  29.  2
    Paolo Monti (2014). Postsecular Awareness and the Depth of Pluralism. In Ferran Requejo & Camil Ungureanu (eds.), Democracy, Law and Religious Pluralism in Europe: Secularism and Post-Secularism. Routledge 86-105.
    By drawing mainly, but not only, on the work of Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor, I suggest that the postsecular turn provides a more substantial and insightful contribution to the understanding of religious pluralism in contexts of late secularization thanks to its focus on how the self-understanding of religious and secular actors is affected by their co-implication within the same discursive space. The ensuing attention for the processes of self-critique and reciprocal learning allows for a fairer distribution of the (...)
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  30. Fabienne Peter (2008). Pure Epistemic Proceduralism. Episteme 5 (1):pp. 33-55.
    In this paper I defend a pure proceduralist conception of legitimacy that applies to epistemic democracy. This conception, which I call pure epistemic proceduralism, does not depend on procedure-independent standards for good outcomes and relies on a proceduralist epistemology. It identifies a democratic decision as legitimate if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness. My argument starts with a rejection of instrumentalism – the view that political equality is (...)
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  31. Cory D. Wright (2010). Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265-283.
    Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
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  32.  34
    Jeroen van Bouwel & Erik Weber (2008). A Pragmatist Defense of Non-Relativistic Explanatory Pluralism in History and Social Science. History and Theory 47 (2):168–182.
    Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. (...)
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  33. Nancy Daukas (2011). Altogether Now: A Virtue-Theoretic Approach to Pluralism in Feminist Epistemology In. In Heidi Grasswick (ed.), Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge.
    In this paper I develop and support a feminist virtue epistemology and bring it into conversation with feminist contextual empiricism and feminist standpoint theory. The virtue theory I develop is centered on the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness, which foregrounds the social/political character of knowledge practices and products, and the differences between epistemic agencies that perpetuate, on the one hand, and displace, on the other hand, normative patterns of unjust epistemic discrimination. I argue that my view answers important (...)
     
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  34.  32
    Robin Findlay Hendry (2012). Chemical Substances and the Limits of Pluralism. Foundations of Chemistry 14 (1):55-68.
    In this paper I investigate the relationship between vernacular kind terms and specialist scientific vocabularies. Elsewhere I have developed a defence of realism about the chemical elements as natural kinds. This defence depends on identifying the epistemic interests and theoretical conception of the elements that have suffused chemistry since the mid-eighteenth century. Because of this dependence, it is a discipline-specific defence, and would seem to entail important concessions to pluralism about natural kinds. I argue that making this kind (...)
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  35.  13
    Coutellec Léo & Bernard Pintureau (2013). Crop Protection Between Sciences, Ethics and Societies: From Quick-Fix Ideal to Multiple Partial Solutions. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26 (1):207-230.
    Crop protection has a very long history during which new methods have been developed whilst, at the same time, the older ones have retained their usefulness in certain conditions. The diversity of agricultural land and production has meant that it was futile to search for a unique and definitive approach or technical solution and, instead, the central concept has always been one of integration, during all the period of pre-Green Revolution and again today within what we call a sustainable agriculture. (...)
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  36.  3
    Mircea Dumitru (2010). Despre tolerantã, pluralism si recunoasterea celorlalti/ On Tolerance, Pluralism and the Recognition of Others. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 4 (10):12-18.
    The paper examines some presuppositions of toleration and pluralism and explores two models, a deontological and a consequentialist model, that could support the view that rational agents should act in a tolerant way. Within the first model two arguments are given in favor of the view that people are better off and more rational if they are tolerant. The first argument draws upon a principle of charity that one usually makes use of in philosophy of mind and philosophy of (...)
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  37.  79
    James Bohman (1999). Theories, Practices, and Pluralism: A Pragmatic Interpretation of Critical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 29 (4):459-480.
    A hallmark of recent critical social science has been the commitment to methodological and theoretical pluralism. Habermas and others have argued that diverse theoretical and empirical approaches are needed to support informed social criticism. However, an unresolved tension remains in the epistemology of critical social science: the tension between the epistemic advantages of a single comprehensive theoretical framework and those of methodological and theoretical pluralism. By shifting the grounds of the debate in a way suggested by Dewey's (...)
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  38.  19
    David Ludwig (2013). New Wave Pluralism. Dialectica 67 (4):545-560.
    The aim of this paper is to develop a pluralist interpretation of the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS). My starting point is Horgan and Tienson's deconstructive argument according to which proponents of PCS face the following dilemma: either phenomenal concepts or physical concepts allow us to conceive phenomenal states as they are in themselves. If phenomenal concepts allow us to conceive phenomenal states as they are in themselves, then phenomenal states are non-physical states and physicalism is wrong. If physical concepts allow (...)
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  39.  19
    Joseph Margolis (1996). Relativism Vs. Pluralism and Objectivism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:95-106.
    Relativism may take a coherent and self-consistent form, by replacing a bivalent logic with a many-valued logic; “incongruent” propositions may then be valid, that is, propositions that on a bivalent model but not now would be or would yield contradictories. I reject “relationalism,” any relativism in accord with which “true” means “true-for-x” (in accord with the usual reading of Plato’s Theaetetus). I show how epistemic pluralism is an analogue of the “is”/“appears” distinction and presupposes a form of objectivism, (...)
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  40. Amir Dastmalchian (2009). Religious Diversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion: The ‘Ambiguity’ Objection to Epistemic Exclusivism. Dissertation, King's College London
    The topic of the thesis is the challenge that religious diversity poses to religious belief. A key issue to be resolved is whether a reasonable person may believe in the epistemic superiority of any one religious ideology in the light of religious diversity. -/- After introducing the issues, I examine Richard Swinburne’s, and then Alvin Plantinga’s, view on religious diversity. These two philosophers both advocate religious epistemic exclusivism, the view that only one religious ideology is true to the (...)
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  41. María G. Navarro (2004). Pluralidad en la actualidad de la razón. In Aavv (ed.), Congreso Internacional de Hermenéutica filosófica. El legado de Gadamer. Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Granada
  42. Robert Talisse (2011). Pluralism and Liberal Politics. Routledge.
    In this book, Robert Talisse critically examines the moral and political implications of pluralism, the view that our best moral thinking is indeterminate and that moral conflict is an inescapable feature of the human condition. Through a careful engagement with the work of William James, Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, and their contemporary followers, Talisse distinguishes two broad types of moral pluralism: metaphysical and epistemic. After arguing that metaphysical pluralism does not offer a compelling account of value (...)
     
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  43.  89
    Kurt Sylvan (2016). Epistemic Reasons II: Basing. Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.
    The paper is an opinionated tour of the literature on the reasons for which we hold beliefs and other doxastic attitudes, which I call ‘operative epistemic reasons’. After drawing some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of operative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states. I recommend a pluralist non-mentalist view that takes seriously the variety of operative epistemic reasons ascriptions and allows these reasons to (...)
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  44. Hasok Chang (2011). The Persistence of Epistemic Objects Through Scientific Change. Erkenntnis 75 (3):413-429.
    Why do some epistemic objects persist despite undergoing serious changes, while others go extinct in similar situations? Scientists have often been careless in deciding which epistemic objects to retain and which ones to eliminate; historians and philosophers of science have been on the whole much too unreflective in accepting the scientists’ decisions in this regard. Through a re-examination of the history of oxygen and phlogiston, I will illustrate the benefits to be gained from challenging and disturbing the commonly (...)
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  45. Fabienne Peter (2013). Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (5):598-620.
    At the core of political liberalism is the claim that political institutions must be publicly justified or justifiable to be legitimate. What explains the significance of public justification? The main argument that defenders of political liberalism present is an argument from disagreement: the irreducible pluralism that is characteristic of democratic societies requires a mode of justification that lies in between a narrowly political solution based on actual acceptance and a traditional moral solution based on justification from the third-person perspective. (...)
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  46. Jan De Winter (2010). Explanations in Software Engineering: The Pragmatic Point of View. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (2):277-289.
    This article reveals that explanatory practice in software engineering is in accordance with pragmatic explanatory pluralism, which states that explanations should at least partially be evaluated by their practical use. More specifically, I offer a defense of the idea that several explanation-types are legitimate in software engineering, and that the appropriateness of an explanation-type depends on (a) the engineer’s interests, and (b) the format of the explanation-seeking question he asks, with this format depending on his interests. This idea is (...)
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  47. Alvin Goldman (2009). Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement. In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. OUP
    I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try to guide or regulate their members’ credence-forming habits in a variety of different, i.e., incompatible, ways. Although there may be considerable overlap across cultures (...)
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  48.  7
    Michael P. Lynch (2001). Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity. A Bradford Book.
    A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naïve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch (...)
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  49.  30
    Beckett Sterner (2015). Pathways to Pluralism About Biological Individuality. Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):609-628.
    What are the prospects for a monistic view of biological individuality given the multiple epistemic roles the concept must satisfy? In this paper, I examine the epistemic adequacy of two recent accounts based on the capacity to undergo natural selection. One is from Ellen Clarke, and the other is by Peter Godfrey-Smith. Clarke’s position reflects a strong monism, in that she aims to characterize individuality in purely functional terms and refrains from privileging any specific material properties as important (...)
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    Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Meno and the Monist. Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):157-170.
    Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato's Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, and is under closer (...)
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