Search results for 'Epistemic Pluralism' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Of Pluralism (2000). Parti Philosophical Sources of Pluralism. In Maria Baghramian & Attracta Ingram (eds.), Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity. Routledge. 15.score: 150.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Rik Peels (2010). Epistemic Desiderata and Epistemic Pluralism. Journal of Philosophical Research 35 (1):193-207.score: 78.0
    In this article I argue that Alston’s recent meta-epistemological approach in terms of epistemic desiderata is not as epistemically plural as he claims it to be. After some preliminary remarks, I briefly recapitulate Alston’s epistemic desiderata approach. Next, I distinguish two ways in which one might consider truth to be an epistemic desideratum. Subsequently, I argue that only one truth-conducive desideratum can count as an epistemic desideratum. After this, I attempt to show that none of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Berit Brogaard (2008). The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism. Or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.score: 51.0
    Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. After formulating the argument, I will look (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jon Williamson (2006). Causal Pluralism Versus Epistemic Causality. Philosophica 77 (1):69-96.score: 48.0
    It is tempting to analyse causality in terms of just one of the indicators of causal relationships, e.g., mechanisms, probabilistic dependencies or independencies, counterfactual conditionals or agency considerations. While such an analysis will surely shed light on some aspect of our concept of cause, it will fail to capture the whole, rather multifarious, notion. So one might instead plump for pluralism: a different analysis for a different occasion. But we do not seem to have lots of different concepts of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. David Matheson (2011). How to Be an Epistemic Value Pluralist. Dialogue 50 (02):391-405.score: 48.0
    ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend an epistemic value pluralism according to which true belief, justified belief, and knowledge are all fundamental epistemic values. After laying out reasons to reject epistemic value monism in its central forms, I present my pluralist alternative and show how it can adequately explain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over both true belief and justified belief, despite their fundamentality. I conclude with a sketch of how this pluralism might (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Eric Christian Barnes (1998). Probabilities and Epistemic Pluralism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):31-47.score: 46.0
    A pluralistic scientific method is one that incorporates a variety of points of view in scientific inquiry. This paper investigates one example of pluralistic method: the use of weighted averaging in probability estimation. I consider two methods of weight determination, one based on disjoint evidence possession and the other on track record. I argue that weighted averaging provides a rational procedure for probability estimation under certain conditions. I consider a strategy for calculating ‘mixed weights’ which incorporate mixed information about agent (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Karin Jønch-Clausen & Klemens Kappel (forthcoming). Social Epistemic Liberalism and the Problem of Deep Epistemic Disagreements. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-14.score: 45.0
    Recently Robert B. Talisse has put forth a socio-epistemic justification of liberal democracy that he believes qualifies as a public justification in that it purportedly can be endorsed by all reasonable individuals. In avoiding narrow restraints on reasonableness, Talisse argues that he has in fact proposed a justification that crosses the boundaries of a wide range of religious, philosophical and moral worldviews and in this way the justification is sufficiently pluralistic to overcome the challenges of reasonable pluralism familiar (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Robert Lockie (2008). Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.score: 42.0
    This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Mark H. van Hollebeke (2009). Through “Thick” and “Thin”: Concerns About Talisse's Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy. [REVIEW] Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1):80-89.score: 42.0
    Robert Talisse argues that a Peircean epistemic basis for democracy is "thin" enough to allow for reasonable pluralism while being "thick" enough to justify the preferability of democracy. This brief critical engagement with Talisse's argument asks, first, whether or not it is fair to employ Peirce's doubt-belief model of inquiry as the basis of a "thin" philosophy of democracy. Additionally, it asks whether such a justification of democracy can do any real work without also employing Peirce's more comprehensive (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Himal Trikha (2012). Competing World Views: Perspectivism and Polemics in the Satya-Śāsana-Parīkṣā and Other Jaina Works. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 40 (1):25-45.score: 39.0
    Jaina authors use a pluralistic epistemological model as a tool to claim the superiority of Jainism over the other schools of Indian thought. In this article the general tendency of the Jaina’s epistemic pluralism is discussed and it is shown how the Digambara Jaina Vidyānandin tries to establish the Jainas’ pluralism on rational grounds by identifying erroneous epistemic alternatives through methodological falsification.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. José Medina (2011). Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism. Foucault Studies 12:9-35.score: 39.0
    In this paper I argue that Foucaultian genealogy offers a critical approach to practices of remembering and forgetting which is crucial for resisting oppression and dominant ideologies. For this argument I focus on the concepts of counter-history and counter-memory that Foucault developed in the 1970’s. In the first section I analyze how the Foucaultian approach puts practices of remembering and forgetting in the context of power relations, focusing not only on what is remembered and forgotten, but how , by whom, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Mark Newman (2010). Beyond Structural Realism: Pluralist Criteria for Theory Evaluation. Synthese 174 (3):413 - 443.score: 36.0
    In this paper I argue that singularist approaches to solving the Pessimistic Induction, such as Structural Realism, are unacceptable, but that when a pluralist account of methodological principles is adopted this anti-realist argument can be dissolved. The proposed view is a contextual methodological pluralism in the tradition of Normative Naturalism, and is justified by appeal to meta-methodological principles that are themselves justified via an externalist epistemology. Not only does this view provide an answer to the Pessimistic Induction, it can (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Kelly Ichitani Koide (2012). A Militant Rationality: Epistemic Values, Scientific Ethos, and Methodological Pluralism in Epidemiology. Scientiae Studia 10 (SPE):141-150.score: 36.0
    Technoscientific research, a kind of scientific research conducted within the decontextualized approach (DA), uses advanced technology to produce instruments, experimental objects, and new objects and structures, that enable us to gain knowledge of states of affairs of novel domains, especially knowledge about new possibilities of what we can do and make, with the horizons of practical, industrial, medical or military innovation, and economic growth and competition, never far removed from view. The legitimacy of technoscientific innovations can be appraised only in (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jeroen van Bouwel, Erik Weber & Leen de Vreese (2011). Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (1):33-46.score: 36.0
    Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Guy Axtell & Philip Olson (2009). Three Independent Factors in Epistemology. Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):89–109.score: 36.0
    We articulate John Dewey’s “independent factors” approach to moral philosophy and then adapt and extend this approach to address contemporary debate concerning the nature and sources of epistemic normativity. We identify three factors (agent reliability, synchronic rationality, and diachronic rationality) as each making a permanent contribution to epistemic value. Critical of debates that stem from the reductionistic ambitions of epistemological systems that privilege of one or another of these three factors, we advocate an axiological pluralism that acknowledges (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Dunja Šešelja & Christian Straßer (2013). Kuhn and the Question of Pursuit Worthiness. Topoi 32 (1):9-19.score: 36.0
    The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn’s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn’s points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether a theory is (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Mark S. McLeod (1993). The Limits of Theistic Experience: An Epistemic Basis of Theistic Pluralism. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (2):79 - 94.score: 36.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Russell Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Methodological Pluralism, Armchair Introspection, and DES as the Epistemic Tribunal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):253.score: 36.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Paul Ott (2011). Moral Pluralism, Moral Motivation, and Democracy: A Critique of Talisse's Epistemic Justification of Democracy. Contemporary Pragmatism 8 (2):145-162.score: 36.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Coutellec Léo & Bernard Pintureau (2013). Crop Protection Between Sciences, Ethics and Societies: From Quick-Fix Ideal to Multiple Partial Solutions. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26 (1):207-230.score: 33.0
    Crop protection has a very long history during which new methods have been developed whilst, at the same time, the older ones have retained their usefulness in certain conditions. The diversity of agricultural land and production has meant that it was futile to search for a unique and definitive approach or technical solution and, instead, the central concept has always been one of integration, during all the period of pre-Green Revolution and again today within what we call a sustainable agriculture. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Robert B. Talisse (2011). Pluralism and Liberal Politics. Routledge.score: 30.0
    In this book, Robert Talisse critically examines the moral and political implications of pluralism, the view that our best moral thinking is indeterminate and that moral conflict is an inescapable feature of the human condition. Through a careful engagement with the work of William James, Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, and their contemporary followers, Talisse distinguishes two broad types of moral pluralism: metaphysical and epistemic. After arguing that metaphysical pluralism does not offer a compelling account of value (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. María G. Navarro (2004). Pluralidad En la Actualidad de la Razón. In Aavv (ed.), Congreso Internacional de Hermenéutica filosófica. El legado de Gadamer. Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Granada.score: 30.0
  23. Fabienne Peter (2008). Pure Epistemic Proceduralism. Episteme 5 (1):pp. 33-55.score: 28.0
    In this paper I defend a pure proceduralist conception of legitimacy that applies to epistemic democracy. This conception, which I call pure epistemic proceduralism, does not depend on procedure-independent standards for good outcomes and relies on a proceduralist epistemology. It identifies a democratic decision as legitimate if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness. My argument starts with a rejection of instrumentalism – the view that political equality is (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Cory D. Wright (2010). Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265-283.score: 27.0
    Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Jan De Winter (2010). Explanations in Software Engineering: The Pragmatic Point of View. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (2):277-289.score: 27.0
    This article reveals that explanatory practice in software engineering is in accordance with pragmatic explanatory pluralism, which states that explanations should at least partially be evaluated by their practical use. More specifically, I offer a defense of the idea that several explanation-types are legitimate in software engineering, and that the appropriateness of an explanation-type depends on (a) the engineer’s interests, and (b) the format of the explanation-seeking question he asks, with this format depending on his interests. This idea is (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Robin Findlay Hendry (2012). Chemical Substances and the Limits of Pluralism. Foundations of Chemistry 14 (1):55-68.score: 27.0
    In this paper I investigate the relationship between vernacular kind terms and specialist scientific vocabularies. Elsewhere I have developed a defence of realism about the chemical elements as natural kinds. This defence depends on identifying the epistemic interests and theoretical conception of the elements that have suffused chemistry since the mid-eighteenth century. Because of this dependence, it is a discipline-specific defence, and would seem to entail important concessions to pluralism about natural kinds. I argue that making this kind (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Jeroen van Bouwel & Erik Weber (2008). A Pragmatist Defense of Non-Relativistic Explanatory Pluralism in History and Social Science. History and Theory 47 (2):168–182.score: 27.0
    Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Meno and the Monist. Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):157-170.score: 27.0
    Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato's Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, and is under closer (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Mircea Dumitru (2010). Despre tolerantã, pluralism si recunoasterea celorlalti/ On Tolerance, Pluralism and the Recognition of Others. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 4 (10):12-18.score: 27.0
    The paper examines some presuppositions of toleration and pluralism and explores two models, a deontological and a consequentialist model, that could support the view that rational agents should act in a tolerant way. Within the first model two arguments are given in favor of the view that people are better off and more rational if they are tolerant. The first argument draws upon a principle of charity that one usually makes use of in philosophy of mind and philosophy of (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Nancy Daukas (2011). Altogether Now: A Virtue-Theoretic Approach to Pluralism in Feminist Epistemology In. In Heidi Grasswick (ed.), Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge.score: 27.0
    In this paper I develop and support a feminist virtue epistemology and bring it into conversation with feminist contextual empiricism and feminist standpoint theory. The virtue theory I develop is centered on the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness, which foregrounds the social/political character of knowledge practices and products, and the differences between epistemic agencies that perpetuate, on the one hand, and displace, on the other hand, normative patterns of unjust epistemic discrimination. I argue that my view answers important (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Jeroen Van Bouwel (2005). The Division of Labour in the Social Sciences Versus the Politics of Metaphysics. Questioning Critical Realism's Interdisciplinarity. Graduate Journal of Social Science 2 (2):32-39.score: 27.0
    Some scholars claim that Critical Realism promises well for the unification of the social sciences, e.g., "Unifying social science: A critical realist approach" in this volume. I will first show briefly how Critical Realism might unify social science. Secondly, I focus on the relation between the ontology and methodology of Critical Realism, and unveil the politics of metaphysics. Subsequently, it is argued that the division of labour between social scientific disciplines should not be metaphysics-driven, but rather question-driven. In conclusion, I (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. James Bohman (1999). Theories, Practices, and Pluralism: A Pragmatic Interpretation of Critical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 29 (4):459-480.score: 24.0
    A hallmark of recent critical social science has been the commitment to methodological and theoretical pluralism. Habermas and others have argued that diverse theoretical and empirical approaches are needed to support informed social criticism. However, an unresolved tension remains in the epistemology of critical social science: the tension between the epistemic advantages of a single comprehensive theoretical framework and those of methodological and theoretical pluralism. By shifting the grounds of the debate in a way suggested by Dewey's (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Tomas Bogardus (2013). The Problem of Contingency for Religious Belief. Faith and Philosophy 30 (4):371-392.score: 24.0
  34. Dennis Potter (2013). Religious Disagreement: Internal and External. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):21-31.score: 24.0
    Philosophers of religion have taken the assumption for granted that the various religious traditions of the world have incompatible beliefs. In this paper, I will argue that this assumption is more problematic than has been generally recognized. To make this argument, I will discuss the implications of internal religious disagreement, an aspect of this issue that has been too often ignored in the contemporary debate. I will also briefly examine some implications of my argument for how one might respond to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Bob Plant (2012). Philosophical Diversity and Disagreement. Metaphilosophy 43 (5):567-591.score: 24.0
    Widespread and lasting consensus has not been philosophy's fate. Indeed, one of philosophy's most striking features is its ability to accommodate “not only different answers to philosophical questions” but also “total disagreement on what questions are philosophical” (Rorty 1995, 58). It is therefore hardly surprising that philosophers' responses to this metaphilosophical predicament have been similarly varied. This article considers two recent diagnoses of philosophical diversity: Kornblith and Rescher (respectively) claim that taking philosophical disagreement seriously does not lead to metaphilosophical scepticism. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Joseph Margolis (1996). Relativism Vs. Pluralism and Objectivism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:95-106.score: 24.0
    Relativism may take a coherent and self-consistent form, by replacing a bivalent logic with a many-valued logic; “incongruent” propositions may then be valid, that is, propositions that on a bivalent model but not now would be or would yield contradictories. I reject “relationalism,” any relativism in accord with which “true” means “true-for-x” (in accord with the usual reading of Plato’s Theaetetus). I show how epistemic pluralism is an analogue of the “is”/“appears” distinction and presupposes a form of objectivism, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. David Ludwig (2013). New Wave Pluralism. Dialectica 67 (4):545-560.score: 24.0
    The aim of this paper is to develop a pluralist interpretation of the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS). My starting point is Horgan and Tienson's deconstructive argument according to which proponents of PCS face the following dilemma: either phenomenal concepts or physical concepts allow us to conceive phenomenal states as they are in themselves. If phenomenal concepts allow us to conceive phenomenal states as they are in themselves, then phenomenal states are non-physical states and physicalism is wrong. If physical concepts allow (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Amir Dastmalchian (2009). Religious Diversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion: The ‘Ambiguity’ Objection to Epistemic Exclusivism. Dissertation, King's College Londonscore: 24.0
    The topic of the thesis is the challenge that religious diversity poses to religious belief. A key issue to be resolved is whether a reasonable person may believe in the epistemic superiority of any one religious ideology in the light of religious diversity. -/- After introducing the issues, I examine Richard Swinburne’s, and then Alvin Plantinga’s, view on religious diversity. These two philosophers both advocate religious epistemic exclusivism, the view that only one religious ideology is true to the (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Robert B. Talisse (2008). Toward a Social Epistemic Comprehensive Liberalism. Episteme 5 (1):pp. 106-128.score: 22.0
    For well over a decade, much of liberal political theory has accepted the founding premise of Rawls's political liberalism, according to which the fact of reasonable pluralism renders comprehensive versions of liberalism incoherent. However, the founding premise presumes that all comprehensive doctrines are moral doctrines. In this essay, the author builds upon recent work by Allen Buchanan and develops a comprehensive version of liberalism based in a partially comprehensive social epistemic doctrine. The author then argues that this version (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Allan Hazlett (forthcoming). Expressivism and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse. In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press.score: 21.0
    Consider the claim that openmindedness is an epistemic virtue, the claim that true belief is epistemically valuable, and the claim that one epistemically ought to cleave to one’s evidence. These are examples of what I’ll call “epistemic discourse.” In this paper I’ll propose and defend a view called “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse.” In particular, I’ll argue that convention-relativismis superior to its main rival, expressivism about epistemic discourse. Expressivism and conventionalism both jibe with anti-realism about epistemic (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Fabienne Peter (2013). Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (5):598-620.score: 21.0
    At the core of political liberalism is the claim that political institutions must be publicly justified or justifiable to be legitimate. What explains the significance of public justification? The main argument that defenders of political liberalism present is an argument from disagreement: the irreducible pluralism that is characteristic of democratic societies requires a mode of justification that lies in between a narrowly political solution based on actual acceptance and a traditional moral solution based on justification from the third-person perspective. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Alvin Goldman (2009). Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement. In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oup.score: 21.0
    I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try to guide or regulate their members’ credence-forming habits in a variety of different, i.e., incompatible, ways. Although there may be considerable overlap across cultures (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Hasok Chang (2011). The Persistence of Epistemic Objects Through Scientific Change. Erkenntnis 75 (3):413-429.score: 21.0
    Why do some epistemic objects persist despite undergoing serious changes, while others go extinct in similar situations? Scientists have often been careless in deciding which epistemic objects to retain and which ones to eliminate; historians and philosophers of science have been on the whole much too unreflective in accepting the scientists’ decisions in this regard. Through a re-examination of the history of oxygen and phlogiston, I will illustrate the benefits to be gained from challenging and disturbing the commonly (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. David Bloor (2005). Toward a Sociology of Epistemic Things. Perspectives on Science 13 (3):285-312.score: 21.0
    : H-J Rheinberger's book Toward a History of Epistemic Things contains a sophisticated account of scientific reference and scientific method worked out in conjunction with a case study of the laboratory synthesis of proteins. This paper offers a detailed critical analysis of Rheinberger's position from the standpoint of the sociology of scientific knowledge. The central thesis is that Rheinberger's account of reference, whether deliberately or unwittingly, assimilates discourse about the natural world to discourse about the social world. The result (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Thomas Schmidt (1999). Religious Pluralism and Democratic Society: Political Liberalism and the Reasonableness of Religious Beliefs. Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (4):43-56.score: 21.0
    Critics of John Rawls' conception of a reasonable pluralism have raised the question of whether it is justified to demand that religious individuals should 'bracket' their essential, identity-constituting convictions when they enter a political discourse. I will argue that the criterion for religious beliefs of being justified as grounds for political decisions should be their ability of being 'translatable' in secular reasons for the very same decisions. This translation would demand 'epistemic abstinence' from religious believers only on the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. H. Vahid (1998). Deontic Vs. Nondeontic Conceptions of Epistemic Justification. Erkenntnis 49 (3):285-301.score: 21.0
    Theories of epistemic justification are usually described as belonging to either deontological or nondeontological categories of justification with the former construing the concept of justification as involving the fulfillment of epistemic duty. Despite being the dominant view among traditional epistemologists, the deontological conception has been subjected to severe criticisms in the current literature for failing, among others, to do justice to the (alleged) truth-conducive character of epistemic justification. In this paper I set out to show that there (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Guy Axtell (2001). Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 158--177.score: 21.0
    The presence of luck in our cognitive as in our moral lives shows that the quality of our intellectual character may not be entirely up to us as individuals, and that our motivation and even our ability to desire the truth, like our moral goodness, can be fragile. This paper uses epistemologists'responses to the problem of “epistemic luck” as a sounding board and locates the source of some of their deepest disagreements in divergent, value-charged “interests in explanation,” which epistemologists (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Ian James Kidd (2012). Feyerabend, Pseudo-Dionysius, and the Ineffability of Reality. Philosophia 40 (2):365-377.score: 21.0
    This paper explores the influence of the fifth-century Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Denys) on the twentieth-century philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend. I argue that the later Feyerabend took from Denys a metaphysical claim—the ‘doctrine of ineffability’—intended to support epistemic pluralism. The paper has five parts. Part one introduces Denys and Feyerabend’s common epistemological concern to deny the possibility of human knowledge of ultimate reality. Part two examines Denys’ arguments for the ‘ineffability’ of God as presented in On (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Robert B. Talisse, Social Epistemic Liberalism.score: 21.0
    The author builds upon recent work by Allen Buchanan and develops a comprehensive version of liberalism based in a partially comprehensive social epistemic doctrine. The author then argues that this version of liberalism is sufficiently accommodating of the fact of reasonable pluralism. The conclusion is that the founding premise of political liberalism admits of a counterexample; there is a version of comprehensive liberalism that is sufficiently pluralistic.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Timothy J. Nulty (2009). Conceptual Schemes Revisited: Davidsonian Metaphysical Pluralism. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 10 (1):123-134.score: 21.0
    Davidson’s 1974 argument denying the possibility of incommensurable conceptual schemes is widely interpreted as entailing a denial of metaphysical pluralism. Speakers may group objects differently or have different beliefs about the world, but there is just one world. I argue there is tension arising from three aspects of Davidson’s philosophy: (1) the 1974 argument against conceptual schemes; (2) Davidson’s more recent emphasis on primitive triangulation as a necessary condition for thought and language; and (3) Davidson’s semantic approach to metaphysics, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000