Search results for 'Epistemic modality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Andrea Iacona (2012). TxW Epistemic Modality. Logic and Philosophy of Science 10:3-14.score: 81.0
    So far, T×W frames have been employed to provide a semantics for a language of tense logic that includes a modal operator that expresses historical necessity. The operator is defined in terms of quantification over possible courses of events that satisfy a certain constraint, namely, that of being alike up to a given point. However, a modal operator can as well be defined without placing that constraint. This paper outlines a T×W logic where an operator of the latter kind is (...)
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  2. Seth Yalcin (2011). Nonfactualism About Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    When I tell you that it’s raining, I describe a way the world is—viz., rainy. I say something whose truth turns on how things are with the weather in the world. Likewise when I tell you that the weatherman thinks that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I say turns on how things are with the weatherman’s state of mind in the world. Likewise when I tell you that I think that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I (...)
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  3. Anna Papafragou, Epistemic Modality and Truth Conditions.score: 60.0
    Within the linguistics literature it is often claimed that epistemic modality, unlike other kinds of modality, does not contribute to truth-conditional content. In this paper I challenge this view. I reanalyze a variety of arguments which have been used in support of the non-truth-conditional view and show that they can be handled on an alternative analysis of epistemic modality. # 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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  4. M. Willer (2013). Dynamics of Epistemic Modality. Philosophical Review 122 (1):45-92.score: 60.0
    A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known. This essay demonstrates that a dynamic theory about might and must offers elegant explanations of a range of puzzling observations about epistemic modals. The first part of the story offers a unifying treatment of disputes about epistemic modality and disputes about matters of fact while at the (...)
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  5. A. Smirnova (2013). Evidentiality in Bulgarian: Temporality, Epistemic Modality, and Information Source. Journal of Semantics 30 (4):479-532.score: 60.0
    This article presents a formal semantic analysis of the Bulgarian evidential. The analysis is motivated by a number of facts that have gone unnoticed in the literature on evidentiality in Bulgarian and which cannot be explained by previous analyses (Izvorski 1997; Sauerland & Schenner 2007; Koev 2011). First, I show that the same evidential construction in Bulgarian can express direct, reportative and inferential information sources. These data challenge the current analysis of the Bulgarian evidential as indirect (Izvorski 1997), and show (...)
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  6. Brian Weatherson & Andy Egan (2009). Introduction: Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
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  7. Brian Weatherspoon & Andy Egan (2009). Introduction: Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
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  8. Anna Papafragou, Children's Acquisition of Epistemic Modality.score: 52.0
    This paper is concerned with the acquisition of certain aspects of the meaning of epistemic modal verbs. Epistemic modals encode the probability, predictability or certainty of the proposition embedded under the modal verb. The sentences in (1) are examples of epistemic modality1.
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  9. Kai von Fintel, 2. An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality and Anthony S. Gillies Introduction.score: 52.0
    way on the information available in the contexts in which they are used, it’s not surprising that there is a minor but growing industry of work in semantics and the philosophy of language concerned with the precise nature of the context-dependency of epistemically modalized sentences. Take, for instance, an epistemic might-claim like..
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  10. Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies (2007). An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality. In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2. Oxford. 32-62.score: 52.0
    way on the information available in the contexts in which they are used, it’s not surprising that there is a minor but growing industry of work in semantics and the philosophy of language concerned with the precise nature of the context-dependency of epistemically modalized sentences. Take, for instance, an epistemic might-claim like..
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  11. Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.) (2009). Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.score: 51.0
    The ten new essays in this volume explore various answers to these questions, including those offered by contextualism, relativism, and expressivism.
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  12. Brian Weatherson & Andy Egan, Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality.score: 48.0
    There is a lot that we don’t know. That means that there are a lot of possibilities that are, epistemically speaking, open. For instance, we don’t know whether it rained in Seattle yesterday. So, for us at least, there is an epistemic possibility where it rained in Seattle yesterday, and one where it did not. It’s tempting to give a very simple analysis of epistemic possibility: • A possibility is an epistemic possibility if we do not know (...)
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  13. Joe Salerno, How to Embed Epistemic Modals Without Violating Modus Tollens.score: 48.0
    Epistemic modals in consequent place of indicative conditionals give rise to apparent counterexamples to Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens. Familiar assumptions of fa- miliar truth conditional theories of modality facilitate a prima facie explanation—viz., that the target cases harbor epistemic modal equivocations. However, these explana- tions go too far. For they foster other predictions of equivocation in places where in fact there are no equivocations. It is argued here that the key to the solution is to drop (...)
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  14. David Eferd, Disjunctive Permissions and Epistemic Modality.score: 48.0
    in Modal Content and Modal Knowledge: Essays on the metaphysics and epistemology of modality, Bob Hale (ed), Oxford University Press.
     
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  15. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2011). A Flexible Contextualist Account of Epistemic Modals. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (14):1-25.score: 47.0
    On Kratzer’s canonical account, modal expressions (like “might” and “must”) are represented semantically as quantifiers over possibilities. Such expressions are themselves neutral; they make a single contribution to determining the propositions expressed across a wide range of uses. What modulates the modality of the proposition expressed—as bouletic, epistemic, deontic, etc.—is context.2 This ain’t the canon for nothing. Its power lies in its ability to figure in a simple and highly unified explanation of a fairly wide range of language (...)
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  16. Matthias Gerner (2009). Assessing the Modality Particles of the Yi Group in Fuzzy Possible-Worlds Semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (2):143-184.score: 46.0
    Of late, evidentiality has received great attention in formal semantics. In this paper I develop ‘evidentiality-informed’ truth conditions for modal operators such as must and may . With language data drawn from Luoping Nase (a Tibeto-Burman language spoken in the P.R. of China and belonging to the Yi Nationality), I illustrate that epistemic modals clash with clauses articulating first-hand information. I then demonstrate that existing models such as Kratzer’s graded possible-worlds semantics fail to provide accurate truth conditions for modals (...)
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  17. Richard Hou & Linton Wang (2013). Relativism and Faultless Disagreement. Philosophia 41 (1):203-216.score: 45.0
    The argument from faultless disagreement employed by the relativist purports to show that contextualism falls short of explaining cases of faultless disagreement. The demonstration is intended to give credence to the relativist semantics of epistemic modality expressions. In this paper we present some cases showing that even though cases of faultless disagreement do reveal some intrinsic features of epistemic modality claims, they do not support the relativist semantics. The sophistication of faultless disagreement goes beyond what the (...)
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  18. Malte Willer (2013). Epistemic Modality. Philosophical Review 122 (4):641-647.score: 45.0
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  19. David Braun (2012). An Invariantist Theory of 'Might' Might Be Right. Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (6):461-489.score: 45.0
    Invariantism about ‘might’ says that ‘might’ semantically expresses the same modal property in every context. This paper presents and defends a version of invariantism. According to it, ‘might’ semantically expresses the same weak modal property in every context. However, speakers who utter sentences containing ‘might’ typically assert propositions concerning stronger types of modality, including epistemic modality. This theory can explain the phenomena that motivate contextualist theories of epistemic uses of ‘might’, and can be defended from objections (...)
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  20. D. Gregory (2013). Epistemic Modality * Edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson. Analysis 73 (1):186-188.score: 45.0
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  21. Fabrizio Cariani, Magdalena Kaufmann & Stefan Kaufmann (2013). Deliberative Modality Under Epistemic Uncertainty. Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (3):225-259.score: 45.0
    We discuss the semantic significance of a puzzle concerning ‘ought’ and conditionals recently discussed by Kolodny and MacFarlane. We argue that the puzzle is problematic for the standard Kratzer-style analysis of modality. In Kratzer’s semantics, modals are evaluated relative to a pair of conversational backgrounds. We show that there is no sensible way of assigning values to these conversational backgrounds so as to derive all of the intuitions in Kolodny and MacFarlane’s case. We show that the appropriate verdicts can (...)
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  22. Kai von Fintel & Gillies & Anthony (2007). An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 2. Oup Oxford.score: 45.0
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  23. Rosaleen Howard (2012). Shifting Voices, Shifting Worlds: Evidentiality, Epistemic Modality and Speaker Perspective in Quechua Oral Narrative. Pragmatics and Society 3 (2):243-269.score: 45.0
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  24. John-Jules Ch Meyer (2013). Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, Eds. , Epistemic Modality . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (1):29-30.score: 45.0
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  25. John MacFarlane (2009). Epistemic Modals Are Assessment-Sensitive. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.score: 43.0
    By “epistemic modals,” I mean epistemic uses of modal words: adverbs like “necessarily,” “possibly,” and “probably,” adjectives like “necessary,” “possible,” and “probable,” and auxiliaries like “might,” “may,” “must,” and “could.” It is hard to say exactly what makes a word modal, or what makes a use of a modal epistemic, without begging the questions that will be our concern below, but some examples should get the idea across. If I say “Goldbach’s conjecture might be true, and it (...)
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  26. John Hawthorne (2012). Knowledge and Epistemic Necessity. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):493-501.score: 42.0
    Claims of the form 'I know P and it might be that not-P' tend to sound odd. One natural explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core epistemic use, 'Might P' is true in a speaker's mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl and (...)
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  27. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Hard Cases for Combining Expressivism and Deflationist Truth: Conditionals and Epistemic Modals. In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), (unknown). Oxford.score: 42.0
    In this paper I will be concerned with the question as to whether expressivist theories of meaning can coherently be combined with deflationist theories of truth. After outlining what I take expressivism to be and what I take deflationism about truth to be, I’ll explain why I don’t take the general version of this question to be very hard, and why the answer is ‘yes’. Having settled that, I’ll move on to what I take to be a more pressing and (...)
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  28. Joshua D. Crabill (2013). Suppose Yalcin is Wrong About Epistemic Modals. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):625-635.score: 42.0
    In “Epistemic Modals,” Seth Yalcin argues that what explains the deficiency of sentences containing epistemic modals of the form ‘p and it might be that not-p’ is that sentences of this sort are strictly contradictory, and thus are not instances of a Moore-paradox as has been previous suggested. Benjamin Schnieder, however, argues in his Yalcin’s explanation of these sentences’ deficiency turns out to be insufficiently general, as it cannot account for less complex but still defective sentences, such as (...)
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  29. Moritz Schulz (2010). Epistemic Modals and Informational Consequence. Synthese 174 (3):385 - 395.score: 42.0
    Recently, Yalcin (Epistemic modals. Mind, 116 , 983–1026, 2007) put forward a novel account of epistemic modals. It is based on the observation that sentences of the form ‘ & Might ’ do not embed under ‘suppose’ and ‘if’. Yalcin concludes that such sentences must be contradictory and develops a notion of informational consequence which validates this idea. I will show that informational consequence is inadequate as an account of the logic of epistemic modals: it cannot deal (...)
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  30. Eric Swanson (2010). On Scope Relations Between Quantifiers and Epistemic Modals. Journal of Semantics 27 (4):529-540.score: 42.0
    This paper presents and discusses a range of counterexamples to the common view that quantifiers cannot take scope over epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for ‘force modifier’ theories of epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for Robert Stalnaker’s theory of counterfactuals, according to which a special kind of epistemic modal must be able to scope over a whole counterfactual. Finally, some of the counterexamples suggest that David Lewis must countenance ‘would’ counterfactuals in (...)
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  31. Joe Salerno, Epistemic Modal Eavesdropping: A Straight Solution to a Relativist Challenge.score: 42.0
    A primary challenge from the relativist to the contextualist about epistemic modals is to explain eavesdropping data—i.e., why the eavesdropper is inclined to judge the speaker as having uttered an epistemic modal falsehood (when she is so inclined), even though the speaker’s utterance is true according to reasonable contextualist truth conditions. The issue turns in large part on the strength and shape of the data, both of which are in dispute. One complaint is that an eavesdropper’s truth value (...)
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  32. Benjamin Bayer, An Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Possibility.score: 42.0
    Michael Huemer (2007) has articulated a provocative account of the concept of "epistemic possibility" which he hopes will explicate the explanatory value of the concept while also lending support to a broader anti-skeptical strategy. While I think his account has a number of advantages, many of which Huemer himself identifies, there are also significant disadvantages which should prompt us to seek an alternative. In this paper I describe an alternative which builds on some of the better features of Huemer's (...)
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  33. Charity Anderson (2014). Fallibilism and the Flexibility of Epistemic Modals. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):597-606.score: 42.0
    It is widely acknowledged that epistemic modals admit of inter-subjective flexibility. This paper introduces intra-subjective flexibility for epistemic modals and draws on this flexibility to argue that fallibilism is consistent with the standard account of epistemic modals.
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  34. Isaac Record (2013). Technology and Epistemic Possibility. Journal for General Philosophy of Science (2):1-18.score: 42.0
    My aim in this paper is to give a philosophical analysis of the relationship between contingently available technology and the knowledge that it makes possible. My concern is with what specific subjects can know in practice, given their particular conditions, especially available technology, rather than what can be known “in principle” by a hypothetical entity like Laplace’s Demon. The argument has two parts. In the first, I’ll construct a novel account of epistemic possibility that incorporates two pragmatic conditions: responsibility (...)
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  35. Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas F. Icard (forthcoming). Measure Semantics and Qualitative Semantics for Epistemic Modals. Proceedings of SALT 23.score: 42.0
    In this paper, we explore semantics for comparative epistemic modals that avoid the entailment problems shown to result from Kratzer’s (1991) semantics by Yalcin (2006, 2009, 2010). In contrast to the alternative semantics presented by Yalcin and Lassiter (2010, 2011), based on finitely additive probability measures, we introduce semantics based on qualitatively additive measures, as well as semantics based on purely qualitative orderings, including orderings on propositions derived from orderings on worlds in the tradition of Kratzer (1991). All of (...)
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  36. Stephen Yablo (2010). Permission and (So-Called Epistemic) Possibility. In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oup Oxford.score: 42.0
  37. Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia (2012). Semantic and Moral Luck. Metaphilosophy 43 (3):204-220.score: 37.0
    The similarities between the philosophical debates surrounding assessment sensitivity and moral luck run so deep that one can easily adapt almost any argument from one debate, change some terms, adapt the examples, and end up with an argument relevant to the other. This article takes Brian Rosebury's strategy for resisting moral luck in “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck' ” (1995) and turns it into a strategy for resisting assessment sensitivity. The article shows that one of Bernard Williams's examples motivating moral (...)
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  38. Jonathan Schaffer (2009). Perspective in Taste Predicates and Epistemic Modals. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.score: 36.0
    Imagine that Ann, asked to name her favorite treat, answers: 1. Licorice is tasty Imagine that Ben, having hidden some licorice in the cupboard, whispers to Ann: 2. There might be licorice in the cupboard. What if any role is played by perspective—whom the licorice is tasty to, whose evidence allows for licorice in the cupboard—in the semantics of such sentences?
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  39. Kai von Fintel, Epistemic Modals: A Linguistic Perspective.score: 36.0
    Expressions of epistemic modality mark the possibility/necessity of the prejacent proposition relative to some body of evidence/knowledge.
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  40. Steve Fuller (2012). The Art of Being Human: A Project for General Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (1):113-123.score: 36.0
    Throughout the medieval and modern periods, in various sacred and secular guises, the unification of all forms of knowledge under the rubric of ‘science’ has been taken as the prerogative of humanity as a species. However, as our sense of species privilege has been called increasingly into question, so too has the very salience of ‘humanity’ and ‘science’ as general categories, let alone ones that might bear some essential relationship to each other. After showing how the ascendant Stanford School in (...)
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  41. Jan Heylen (2013). Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic and the Problem of Quantifying In. Synthese 190 (1):89-111.score: 36.0
    The subject of this article is Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic (MEA), a theory introduced by Horsten to interpret Epistemic Arithmetic (EA), which in turn was introduced by Shapiro to interpret Heyting Arithmetic. I will show how to interpret MEA in EA such that one can prove that the interpretation of EA is MEA is faithful. Moreover, I will show that one can get rid of a particular Platonist assumption. Then I will discuss models for MEA in light of the problems (...)
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  42. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2013). On Merely Modal Epistemic Peers: Challenging the Equal-Weight View. [REVIEW] Philosophia 41 (3):809-823.score: 36.0
    There is a controversy, within social epistemology, over how to handle disagreement among epistemic peers. Call this the problem of peer disagreement. There is a solution, i.e. the equal-weight view, which says that disagreement among epistemic peers is a reason for each peer to lower the credence they place in their respective positions. However, this solution is susceptible to a serious challenge. Call it the merely modal peers challenge. Throughout parts of modal space, which resemble the actual world (...)
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  43. José Tomás Alvarado Marambio (2007). Bidimensionalismo Epistémico y El Espacio Ontológico Modal (Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and the Ontological Modal Space). Crítica 39 (117):3 - 18.score: 33.0
    Este trabajo presenta las líneas centrales del bidimensionalismo epistémico defendido recientemente por David Chalmers, y considera, en particular, las motivaciones a las que la semántica debería servir en la conexión entre modalidad metafísica y epistémica. Después de esta presentación, se indican tres dificultades: (i) no se ha diferenciado suficientemente de las semánticas bidimensionales contextuales tradicionales; (ii) la noción de justificación a priori sobre la que se ha desarrollado requiere urgentemente mayor precisión; y (iii) los defensores del esquema han olvidado completamente (...)
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  44. Valentine Hacquard (2010). On the Event Relativity of Modal Auxiliaries. Natural Language Semantics 18 (1):79-114.score: 33.0
    Crosslinguistically, the same modal words can be used to express a wide range of interpretations. This crosslinguistic trend supports a Kratzerian analysis, where each modal has a core lexical entry and where the difference between an epistemic and a root interpretation is contextually determined. A long-standing problem for such a unified account is the equally robust crosslinguistic correlation between a modal’s interpretation and its syntactic behavior: epistemics scope high (in particular higher than tense and aspect) and roots low, a (...)
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  45. Sonia Roca, The (a)(B)(C) of Modal Epistemology: A Further Attempt to Meet the Epistemic Challenge.score: 30.0
    This paper is about the epistemic challenge for mind-independence approaches of modality. The challenge is to elucidate the possibility conditions for modal knowledge, and arises from acceptance of the following three premises: (a) We have modal knowledge (which, for a mind-independence theorist is knowledge of the extra-mental world); (b) Any knowledge of the extra-mental world is grounded on causal affection; and (c) Any knowledge grounded on causal affection cannot outrun knowledge of mere truths (as opposed to modal truths). (...)
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  46. Fabrizio Cariani (2013). Epistemic and Deontic Should. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):73-84.score: 29.0
    Probabilistic theories of “should” and “ought” face a predicament. At first blush, it seems that such theories must provide different lexical entries for the epistemic and the deontic interpretations of these modals. I show that there is a new style of premise semantics that can avoid this consequence in an attractively conservative way.
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  47. Seth Yalcin (2007). Epistemic Modals. Mind 116 (464):983-1026.score: 28.0
    Epistemic modal operators give rise to something very like, but also very unlike, Moore's paradox. I set out the puzzling phenomena, explain why a standard relational semantics for these operators cannot handle them, and recommend an alternative semantics. A pragmatics appropriate to the semantics is developed and interactions between the semantics, the pragmatics, and the definition of consequence are investigated. The semantics is then extended to probability operators. Some problems and prospects for probabilistic representations of content and context are (...)
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  48. Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne (2013). Embedding Epistemic Modals. Mind:fzt091.score: 28.0
    Seth Yalcin has pointed out some puzzling facts about the behaviour of epistemic modals in certain embedded contexts. For example, conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and it might not be raining, … ’ sound unacceptable, unlike conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and I don’t know it, … ’. These facts pose a prima facie problem for an orthodox treatment of epistemic modals as expressing propositions about the knowledge of some contextually specified individual or group. (...)
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  49. Andy Egan (2007). Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.score: 28.0
    I think that there are good reasons to adopt a relativist semantics for epistemic modal claims such as ``the treasure might be under the palm tree'', according to which such utterances determine a truth value relative to something finer-grained than just a world (or a <world, time> pair). Anyone who is inclined to relativise truth to more than just worlds and times faces a problem about assertion. It's easy to be puzzled about just what purpose would be served by (...)
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  50. Seth Yalcin (2009). More on Epistemic Modals. Mind 118 (471):785-793.score: 28.0
    I respond to comments by David Barnett and Roy Sorensen on my paper ‘Epistemic Modals’.
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