Search results for 'Epistemic modality' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  28
    Patrícia Amaral & Fabio Del Prete (2016). On Truth Unpersistence: At the Crossroads of Epistemic Modality and Discourse. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 34.
    We propose a semantic analysis of the particles afinal (European Portuguese) and alla fine (Italian) in terms of the notion of truth unpersistence, which combines both epistemic modality and constraints on discourse structure. We argue that the felicitous use of these modal particles requires that the truth of a proposition p* fail to persist through a temporal succession of epistemic states, where p* is incompatible with the proposition modified by afinal/alla fine, and that the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  81
    Andrea Iacona (2012). TxW Epistemic Modality. Logic and Philosophy of Science 10:3-14.
    So far, T×W frames have been employed to provide a semantics for a language of tense logic that includes a modal operator that expresses historical necessity. The operator is defined in terms of quantification over possible courses of events that satisfy a certain constraint, namely, that of being alike up to a given point. However, a modal operator can as well be defined without placing that constraint. This paper outlines a T×W logic where an operator of the latter kind is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Seth Yalcin (2011). Nonfactualism About Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
    When I tell you that it’s raining, I describe a way the world is—viz., rainy. I say something whose truth turns on how things are with the weather in the world. Likewise when I tell you that the weatherman thinks that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I say turns on how things are with the weatherman’s state of mind in the world. Likewise when I tell you that I think that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   33 citations  
  4.  43
    Seth Yalcin (2015). Epistemic Modality De Re. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2 (19):475-527.
    Focusing on cases which involve binding into epistemic modals with definite descriptions and quantifiers, I raise some new problems for standard approaches to all of these expressions. The difficulties are resolved in a semantic framework that is dynamic in character. I close with a new class of problems about de re readings within the scope of modals.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  75
    Malte Willer (2013). Dynamics of Epistemic Modality. Philosophical Review 122 (1):45-92.
    A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known. This essay demonstrates that a dynamic theory about might and must offers elegant explanations of a range of puzzling observations about epistemic modals. The first part of the story offers a unifying treatment of disputes about epistemic modality and disputes about matters of fact while (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  6.  19
    Anastasia Giannakidou & Alda Mari (forthcoming). Biased Modality and Epistemic Weakness with the Future and MUST: Non- Veridicality, Partial Knowledge. In J. Et al Blaszack (ed.), ense, Mood, and Modality : New Perspectives on Old Questions. Chicago University Press
    We defend the view of epistemic `must' as weak and claim that `must p' is used when the speaker does not know p. Novel arguments for this well-known account are provided. The theory is extended to epistemic future.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  6
    Katarzyna Kijania-Placek (forthcoming). Descriptive Indexicals and Epistemic Modality. Topoi:1-10.
    In this paper I argue for a non-referential interpretation of some uses of indexicals embedded under epistemic modals. The so-called descriptive uses of indexicals come in several types and it is argued that those embedded within the scope of modal operators do not require non-referential interpretation, provided the modality is interpreted as epistemic. I endeavor to show that even if we allow an epistemic interpretation of modalities, the resulting interpretation will still be inadequate as long as (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  55
    Anna Papafragou, Epistemic Modality and Truth Conditions.
    Within the linguistics literature it is often claimed that epistemic modality, unlike other kinds of modality, does not contribute to truth-conditional content. In this paper I challenge this view. I reanalyze a variety of arguments which have been used in support of the non-truth-conditional view and show that they can be handled on an alternative analysis of epistemic modality. # 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  9.  18
    A. Smirnova (2013). Evidentiality in Bulgarian: Temporality, Epistemic Modality, and Information Source. Journal of Semantics 30 (4):479-532.
    This article presents a formal semantic analysis of the Bulgarian evidential. The analysis is motivated by a number of facts that have gone unnoticed in the literature on evidentiality in Bulgarian and which cannot be explained by previous analyses (Izvorski 1997; Sauerland & Schenner 2007; Koev 2011). First, I show that the same evidential construction in Bulgarian can express direct, reportative and inferential information sources. These data challenge the current analysis of the Bulgarian evidential as indirect (Izvorski 1997), and show (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  10. Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.) (2011). Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press Uk.
    There is a lot that we don't know. That means that there are a lot of possibilities that are, epistemically speaking, open. For instance, we don't know whether it rained in Seattle yesterday. So, for us at least, there is an epistemic possibility where it rained in Seattle yesterday, and one where it did not. What are these epistemic possibilities? They do not match up with metaphysical possibilities - there are various cases where something is epistemically possible but (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.) (2011). Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press Uk.
    There is a lot that we don't know. That means that there are a lot of possibilities that are, epistemically speaking, open. For instance, we don't know whether it rained in Seattle yesterday. So, for us at least, there is an epistemic possibility where it rained in Seattle yesterday, and one where it did not. What are these epistemic possibilities? They do not match up with metaphysical possibilities - there are various cases where something is epistemically possible but (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Brian Weatherson & Andy Egan (2009). Introduction: Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Brian Weatherspoon & Andy Egan (2009). Introduction: Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  66
    Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.) (2009). Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    The ten new essays in this volume explore various answers to these questions, including those offered by contextualism, relativism, and expressivism.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  15.  82
    Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies (2007). An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality. In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2. Oxford 32-62.
    way on the information available in the contexts in which they are used, it’s not surprising that there is a minor but growing industry of work in semantics and the philosophy of language concerned with the precise nature of the context-dependency of epistemically modalized sentences. Take, for instance, an epistemic might-claim like..
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  16.  61
    Anna Papafragou, Children's Acquisition of Epistemic Modality.
    This paper is concerned with the acquisition of certain aspects of the meaning of epistemic modal verbs. Epistemic modals encode the probability, predictability or certainty of the proposition embedded under the modal verb. The sentences in (1) are examples of epistemic modality1.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17. Brian Weatherson & Andy Egan, Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality.
    There is a lot that we don’t know. That means that there are a lot of possibilities that are, epistemically speaking, open. For instance, we don’t know whether it rained in Seattle yesterday. So, for us at least, there is an epistemic possibility where it rained in Seattle yesterday, and one where it did not. It’s tempting to give a very simple analysis of epistemic possibility: • A possibility is an epistemic possibility if we do not know (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  61
    Kai von Fintel, 2. An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality and Anthony S. Gillies Introduction.
    way on the information available in the contexts in which they are used, it’s not surprising that there is a minor but growing industry of work in semantics and the philosophy of language concerned with the precise nature of the context-dependency of epistemically modalized sentences. Take, for instance, an epistemic might-claim like..
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. David Eferd, Disjunctive Permissions and Epistemic Modality.
    in Modal Content and Modal Knowledge: Essays on the metaphysics and epistemology of modality, Bob Hale (ed), Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  64
    D. Gregory (2013). Epistemic Modality * Edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson. Analysis 73 (1):186-188.
    No categories
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Kai von Fintel & Gillies & Anthony (2007). An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 2. OUP Oxford
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22.  20
    Malte Willer (2013). Epistemic Modality. Philosophical Review 122 (4):641-647.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  8
    John-Jules Ch Meyer (2013). Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, Eds. , Epistemic Modality . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (1):29-30.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  4
    Rosaleen Howard (2012). Shifting Voices, Shifting Worlds: Evidentiality, Epistemic Modality and Speaker Perspective in Quechua Oral Narrative. Pragmatics and Society 3 (2):243-269.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  30
    Fabrizio Cariani, Magdalena Kaufmann & Stefan Kaufmann (2013). Deliberative Modality Under Epistemic Uncertainty. Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (3):225-259.
    We discuss the semantic significance of a puzzle concerning ‘ought’ and conditionals recently discussed by Kolodny and MacFarlane. We argue that the puzzle is problematic for the standard Kratzer-style analysis of modality. In Kratzer’s semantics, modals are evaluated relative to a pair of conversational backgrounds. We show that there is no sensible way of assigning values to these conversational backgrounds so as to derive all of the intuitions in Kolodny and MacFarlane’s case. We show that the appropriate verdicts can (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  26.  13
    Katrina Przyjemski (forthcoming). Strong Epistemic Possibility and Evidentiality. Topoi:1-13.
    The paper distinguishes between weak and strong epistemic possibility and argues that the notion of strong epistemic possibility is the key to solving some of the most vexing puzzles about the semantics of epistemic modality.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. John Hawthorne (2012). Knowledge and Epistemic Necessity. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):493-501.
    Claims of the form 'I know P and it might be that not-P' tend to sound odd. One natural explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core epistemic use, 'Might P' is true in a speaker's mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  28.  77
    Isaac Record (2013). Technology and Epistemic Possibility. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (2):1-18.
    My aim in this paper is to give a philosophical analysis of the relationship between contingently available technology and the knowledge that it makes possible. My concern is with what specific subjects can know in practice, given their particular conditions, especially available technology, rather than what can be known “in principle” by a hypothetical entity like Laplace’s Demon. The argument has two parts. In the first, I’ll construct a novel account of epistemic possibility that incorporates two pragmatic conditions: responsibility (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  29.  21
    Nick Colgrove & Trent Dougherty (2016). Hawthorne’s Might-y Failure: A Reply to “Knowledge and Epistemic Necessity”. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1165-1177.
    In “Knowledge and epistemic necessity,” John Hawthorne gives a defense of what he rightly calls the “standard approach” to epistemic possibility against what he calls a new “competing idea” presented by Dougherty and Rysiew which he notes has been “endorsed and elaborated upon” by Fantl and McGrath. According to the standard approach, roughly, p is epistemically possible for S if S doesn’t know that not-p. The new approach has it that p is epistemically possible if p has a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  49
    Benjamin Bayer, A Positive Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Possibility.
    This paper observes that in the midst of a thickening debate over the concept of “epistemic possibility,” nearly every philosopher assumes that the concept is equivalent to a mere absence of epistemic impossibility, that a proposition is epistemically possible if and only if our knowledge does not entail that it is false. I suggest that it is high time that we challenge this deeply entrenched assumption. I assemble an array of data that singles out the distinctive meaning and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Stephen Yablo (2010). Permission and (So-Called Epistemic) Possibility. In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. OUP Oxford
  32.  41
    Matthias Gerner (2009). Assessing the Modality Particles of the Yi Group in Fuzzy Possible-Worlds Semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (2):143-184.
    Of late, evidentiality has received great attention in formal semantics. In this paper I develop ‘evidentiality-informed’ truth conditions for modal operators such as must and may . With language data drawn from Luoping Nase (a Tibeto-Burman language spoken in the P.R. of China and belonging to the Yi Nationality), I illustrate that epistemic modals clash with clauses articulating first-hand information. I then demonstrate that existing models such as Kratzer’s graded possible-worlds semantics fail to provide accurate truth conditions for modals (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  33
    David Braun (2012). An Invariantist Theory of 'Might' Might Be Right. Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (6):461-489.
    Invariantism about ‘might’ says that ‘might’ semantically expresses the same modal property in every context. This paper presents and defends a version of invariantism. According to it, ‘might’ semantically expresses the same weak modal property in every context. However, speakers who utter sentences containing ‘might’ typically assert propositions concerning stronger types of modality, including epistemic modality. This theory can explain the phenomena that motivate contextualist theories of epistemic uses of ‘might’, and can be defended from objections (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  34.  33
    Richard Hou & Linton Wang (2013). Relativism and Faultless Disagreement. Philosophia 41 (1):203-216.
    The argument from faultless disagreement employed by the relativist purports to show that contextualism falls short of explaining cases of faultless disagreement. The demonstration is intended to give credence to the relativist semantics of epistemic modality expressions. In this paper we present some cases showing that even though cases of faultless disagreement do reveal some intrinsic features of epistemic modality claims, they do not support the relativist semantics. The sophistication of faultless disagreement goes beyond what the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2011). A Flexible Contextualist Account of Epistemic Modals. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (14):1-25.
    On Kratzer’s canonical account, modal expressions (like “might” and “must”) are represented semantically as quantifiers over possibilities. Such expressions are themselves neutral; they make a single contribution to determining the propositions expressed across a wide range of uses. What modulates the modality of the proposition expressed—as bouletic, epistemic, deontic, etc.—is context.2 This ain’t the canon for nothing. Its power lies in its ability to figure in a simple and highly unified explanation of a fairly wide range of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  36.  23
    Barbara Vetter (forthcoming). Counterpossibles for Dispositionalists. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Dispositionalists try to provide an account of modality—possibility, necessity, and the counterfactual conditional—in terms of dispositions. But there may be a tension between dispositionalist accounts of possibility on the one hand, and of counterfactuals on the other. Dispositionalists about possibility must hold that there are no impossible dispositions, i.e., dispositions with metaphysically impossible stimulus and/or manifestation conditions; dispositionalist accounts of counterfactuals, if they allow for non-vacuous counterpossibles, require that there are such impossible dispositions. I argue, first, that there are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  21
    Steve Fuller (2012). The Art of Being Human: A Project for General Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (1):113-123.
    Throughout the medieval and modern periods, in various sacred and secular guises, the unification of all forms of knowledge under the rubric of ‘science’ has been taken as the prerogative of humanity as a species. However, as our sense of species privilege has been called increasingly into question, so too has the very salience of ‘humanity’ and ‘science’ as general categories, let alone ones that might bear some essential relationship to each other. After showing how the ascendant Stanford School in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  6
    M. Huang (2012). Vagueness in Event Times: An Epistemic Solution. In L. Filipovic & K. M. Jaszczolt (eds.), Space and Time in Languages and Cultures: Language, culture, and cognition. John Benjamins 37.
    Vagueness in event times pertains to the observation that one usually finds it difficult to slice the continuous flux of space-time into a series of events with clear-cut temporal boundaries. I argue that such vagueness originates from our ignorance of discrete changing points wherein states of affairs begin or cease to obtain. Applying the epistemic view on vagueness (Williamson 1994) to vagueness in event times, I contend that the lagging nature of knowledge prevents one from knowing the abrupt changes (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. John MacFarlane (2009). Epistemic Modals Are Assessment-Sensitive. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
    By “epistemic modals,” I mean epistemic uses of modal words: adverbs like “necessarily,” “possibly,” and “probably,” adjectives like “necessary,” “possible,” and “probable,” and auxiliaries like “might,” “may,” “must,” and “could.” It is hard to say exactly what makes a word modal, or what makes a use of a modal epistemic, without begging the questions that will be our concern below, but some examples should get the idea across. If I say “Goldbach’s conjecture might be true, and it (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  40.  7
    Joseph Salerno (forthcoming). Epistemic Modals and Modus Tollens. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Epistemic modals in consequent place of indicative conditionals give rise to apparent counterexamples to Modus Tollens. Familiar assumptions behind familiar truth conditional theories of embedded modality facilitate a prima facie explanation—viz., that the target cases harbor epistemic modal equivocations. However, this sort of explanation goes too far. It fosters other predictions of equivocation in places where in fact there are none. It is argued that the solution is to drop the credo that modal claims are inherently relational (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Joe Salerno, How to Embed Epistemic Modals Without Violating Modus Tollens.
    Epistemic modals in consequent place of indicative conditionals give rise to apparent counterexamples to Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens. Familiar assumptions of fa- miliar truth conditional theories of modality facilitate a prima facie explanation—viz., that the target cases harbor epistemic modal equivocations. However, these explana- tions go too far. For they foster other predictions of equivocation in places where in fact there are no equivocations. It is argued here that the key to the solution is to drop (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  11
    Peter Ludlow (forthcoming). Incorporation and Alleged Epistemic Modals. Topoi:1-5.
    Part of what makes working with modals such a tricky business is that apparent modal forms are deployed in all sorts of ways in language. In this paper I explore an interesting example of an apparent modal—the Blofeld case—which was introduced by Gilles and von Fintel as part of their argument against context of assessment accounts of epistemic modals. I argue that the example is subtle, and that the apparent modal may not be an epistemic modal at all—it (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Gila Sher & Cory D. Wright (2007). Truth as a Normative Modality of Cognitive Acts. In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge 280-306.
    Attention to the conversational role of alethic terms seems to dominate, and even sometimes exhaust, many contemporary analyses of the nature of truth. Yet, because truth plays a role in judgment and assertion regardless of whether alethic terms are expressly used, such analyses cannot be comprehensive or fully adequate. A more general analysis of the nature of truth is therefore required – one which continues to explain the significance of truth independently of the role alethic terms play in discourse. We (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  3
    Andrea Rocci (2008). Modality and its Conversational Backgrounds in the Reconstruction of Argumentation. Argumentation 22 (2):165-189.
    The paper considers the role of modality in the rational reconstruction of standpoints and arguments. The paper examines in what conditions modal markers can act as argumentative indicators and what kind of cues they provide for the reconstruction of argument. The paper critically re-examines Toulmin’s hypothesis that the meaning of the modals can be analyzed in terms of a field-invariant argumentative force and field-dependent criteria in the light of the Theory of Relative Modality developed within linguistic semantics, showing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  45.  49
    Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia (2012). Semantic and Moral Luck. Metaphilosophy 43 (3):204-220.
    The similarities between the philosophical debates surrounding assessment sensitivity and moral luck run so deep that one can easily adapt almost any argument from one debate, change some terms, adapt the examples, and end up with an argument relevant to the other. This article takes Brian Rosebury's strategy for resisting moral luck in “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck' ” (1995) and turns it into a strategy for resisting assessment sensitivity. The article shows that one of Bernard Williams's examples motivating moral (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  20
    Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2013). On Merely Modal Epistemic Peers: Challenging the Equal-Weight View. Philosophia 41 (3):809-823.
    There is a controversy, within social epistemology, over how to handle disagreement among epistemic peers. Call this the problem of peer disagreement. There is a solution, i.e. the equal-weight view, which says that disagreement among epistemic peers is a reason for each peer to lower the credence they place in their respective positions. However, this solution is susceptible to a serious challenge. Call it the merely modal peers challenge. Throughout parts of modal space, which resemble the actual world (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. David J. Chalmers (2011). The Nature of Epistemic Space. In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
    There are many ways the world might be, for all I know. For all I know, it might be that there is life on Jupiter, and it might be that there is not. It might be that Australia will win the next Ashes series, and it might be that they will not. It might be that my great-grandfather was my great-grandmother's second cousin, and it might be that he was not. It might be that copper is a compound, and it (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  48. Jonathan Schaffer (2009). Perspective in Taste Predicates and Epistemic Modals. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
    Imagine that Ann, asked to name her favorite treat, answers: 1. Licorice is tasty Imagine that Ben, having hidden some licorice in the cupboard, whispers to Ann: 2. There might be licorice in the cupboard. What if any role is played by perspective—whom the licorice is tasty to, whose evidence allows for licorice in the cupboard—in the semantics of such sentences?
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  49.  58
    Seth Yalcin (forthcoming). Context Probabilism. In M. Aloni (ed.), 18th Amsterdam Colloquium. Springer
    We investigate a basic probabilistic dynamic semantics for a fragment containing conditionals, probability operators, modals, and attitude verbs, with the aim of shedding light on the prospects for adding probabilistic structure to models of the conversational common ground.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50. Michael Huemer (2007). Epistemic Possibility. Synthese 156 (1):119 - 142.
    Seven proposed accounts of epistemic possibility are criticized, and a new account is proposed, making use of the notion of having justification for dismissing a proposition. The new account explains intuitions about otherwise puzzling cases, upholds plausible general principles about epistemic possibility, and explains the practical import of epistemic modality judgements. It is suggested that judgements about epistemic possibility function to assess which propositions are worthy of further inquiry.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000