Search results for 'Epistemic possibility' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
See also:
  1.  97
    Isaac Record (2013). Technology and Epistemic Possibility. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (2):1-18.
    My aim in this paper is to give a philosophical analysis of the relationship between contingently available technology and the knowledge that it makes possible. My concern is with what specific subjects can know in practice, given their particular conditions, especially available technology, rather than what can be known “in principle” by a hypothetical entity like Laplace’s Demon. The argument has two parts. In the first, I’ll construct a novel account of epistemic possibility that incorporates two pragmatic conditions: (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2.  23
    Katrina Przyjemski (forthcoming). Strong Epistemic Possibility and Evidentiality. Topoi:1-13.
    The paper distinguishes between weak and strong epistemic possibility and argues that the notion of strong epistemic possibility is the key to solving some of the most vexing puzzles about the semantics of epistemic modality.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Conceivability and Epistemic Possibility. Erkenntnis 67 (3):387-399.
    The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  12
    Pauline Jacobson, Paycheck Pronouns, Bach-Peters Sentences, Inflectional Head, Thomas Ede Zimmermann, Free Choice Disjunction, Epistemic Possibility, Sigrid Beck & Uli Sauerland (2000). Lisa Green/Aspectual Be–Type Constructions and Coercion in African American English Yoad Winter/Distributivity and Dependency Instructions for Authors. Natural Language Semantics 8 (373).
  5.  55
    Benjamin Bayer, A Positive Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Possibility.
    This paper observes that in the midst of a thickening debate over the concept of “epistemic possibility,” nearly every philosopher assumes that the concept is equivalent to a mere absence of epistemic impossibility, that a proposition is epistemically possible if and only if our knowledge does not entail that it is false. I suggest that it is high time that we challenge this deeply entrenched assumption. I assemble an array of data that singles out the distinctive meaning (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  45
    Hylarie Kochiras (2006). Belief Contexts and Epistemic Possibility. Principia 10 (1):1-20.
    Although epistemic possibility figures in several debates, those debates have had relatively little contact with one another. G. E. Moore focused squarely upon analyzing epistemic uses of the phrase, ‘It’s possible that p’, and in doing so he made two fundamental assumptions. First, he assumed that epistemic possibility statements always express the epistemic position of a community, as opposed to that of an individual speaker. Second, he assumed that all epistemic uses of ‘It’s (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2009). Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):123-132.
    If knowing requires believing on the basis of evidence that entails what’s believed, we have hardly any knowledge at all. Hence the near-universal acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology: if it's true that "we are all fallibilists now" (Siegel 1997: 164), that's because denying that one can know on the basis of non-entailing evidence1is, it seems, not an option if we're to preserve the very strong appearance that we do know many things (Cohen 1988: 91). Hence the significance of concessive knowledge (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
  8. Michael Huemer (2007). Epistemic Possibility. Synthese 156 (1):119 - 142.
    Seven proposed accounts of epistemic possibility are criticized, and a new account is proposed, making use of the notion of having justification for dismissing a proposition. The new account explains intuitions about otherwise puzzling cases, upholds plausible general principles about epistemic possibility, and explains the practical import of epistemic modality judgements. It is suggested that judgements about epistemic possibility function to assess which propositions are worthy of further inquiry.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  9. Roy Sorensen (2009). Meta-Agnosticism: Higher Order Epistemic Possibility. Mind 118 (471):777-784.
    In ‘Epistemic Modals’ (2007), Seth Yalcin proposes Stalnaker-style semantics for epistemic possibility. He is inspired by John MacFarlane’s ingenious defence of relativism, in which claims of epistemic possibility are made rigidly from the perspective of the assessor’s actual stock of information (rather than from the speaker’s knowledge base or that of his audience or community). The innovations of MacFarlane and Yalcin independently reinforce the modal collapse espoused by Jaakko Hintikka in his 1962 epistemic logic (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  10.  20
    Raamy Majeed (2016). Conceptual Instability and the New Epistemic Possibility. Erkenntnis 81 (3):613-627.
    We tend to think that our concepts are stable in the sense that, whilst their extensions may vary across distinct epistemic scenarios, the reference-fixing conditions by which we discover these extensions remain fixed. This paper challenges this orthodoxy. In particular, it aims to motivate the position that some concepts are unstable in that their reference-fixing conditions themselves vary across distinct epistemic scenarios. Furthermore, it aims to draw out the implications such instability has for epistemic possibility and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Stephen Yablo (2010). Permission and (So-Called Epistemic) Possibility. In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. OUP Oxford
  12.  38
    Thomas Ede Zimmermann (2000). Free Choice Disjunction and Epistemic Possibility. Natural Language Semantics 8 (4):255-290.
    This paper offers an explanation of the fact that sentences of the form (1) ‘X may A or B’ may be construed as implying (2) ‘X may A and X may B’, especially if they are used to grant permission. It is suggested that the effect arises because disjunctions are conjunctive lists of epistemic possibilities. Consequently, if the modal may is itself epistemic, (1) comes out as equivalent to (2), due to general laws of epistemic logic. On (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  13.  55
    R. Sorensen (2006). Sharp Edges From Hedges: Fatalism, Vagueness and Epistemic Possibility. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):607 - 626.
    Mights plug gaps. If p lacks a truth-value, then ‘It might be that p’ should also lack truth-value. Yet epistemic hedges often turn an unassertible statement into an assertible one. The phenomenon is illustrated in detail for two kinds of statements that are frequently alleged to be counterexamples to the principle of bivalence: future contingents and statements that apply predicates to borderline cases. The paper concludes by exploring the prospects for generalizing this gap-plugging strategy.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  30
    Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2009). Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):123-132.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  15. Crispin Wright (2007). New Age Relativism and Epistemic Possibility: The Question of Evidence. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):262--283.
    What I am calling New Age Relativism is usually proposed as a thesis about the truth-conditions of utterances, where an utterance is an actual historic voicing or inscription of a sentence of a certain type. Roughly, it is the view that, for certain discourses, whether an utterance is true depends not just on the context of its making—when, where, to whom, by whom, in what language, and so on—and the “circumstances of evaluation”—the state of the world in relevant respects—but also (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  16.  45
    Baron Reed (2013). Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Epistemic Agency. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  74
    Paul Teller (1972). Epistemic Possibility. Philosophia 2 (4):303-320.
  18.  2
    Peter Hawke & Shane Steinert-Threlkeld (forthcoming). Informational Dynamics of Epistemic Possibility Modals. Synthese:1-34.
    We investigate, in a logical setting, the expressivist proposal that assertion primarily functions to express and coordinate doxastic states and that ‘might’ fundamentally expresses lack of belief. We provide a formal model of an agent’s doxastic state and novel assertability conditions for an associated formal language. We thereby prove that an arbitrary assertion always succeeds in expressing a well-defined doxastic state, and propose a fully general and intuitive update operation as a model of an agent coming to accept an arbitrary (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  4
    Michael Huemer (2007). Epistemic Possibility. Synthese 156 (1):119-142.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20.  28
    James H. Fetzer (1974). On “Epistemic Possibility”. Philosophia 4 (2-3):327-335.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21.  16
    W. R. Carter & Richard I. Nagel (1982). Constitutional Necessity and Epistemic Possibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):579 - 590.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  19
    Paul Teller (1974). Professor Fetzer on Epistemic Possibility. Philosophia 4 (2-3):337-338.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  1
    R. Sorensen (2006). Sharp Edges From Hedges: Fatalism, Vagueness and Epistemic Possibility. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):607-626.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Gary Ebbs (2008). Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: Further Reflections on a Puzzle About Doubt. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press
  25. Scott Soames (2011). Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility: Two Routes to the Necessary Aposteriori. In Alan Berger (ed.), Saul Kripke. Cambridge University Press 167-188.
    Saul Kripke’s discussion of the necessary aposteriori in Naming and Necessity and “Identity and Necessity” -- in which he lays the foundation for distinguishing epistemic from metaphysical possibility, and explaining the relationship between the two – is, in my opinion, one of the outstanding achievements of twentieth century philosophy.1 My aim in this essay is to extract the enduring lessons of his discussion, and disentangle them from certain difficulties which, alas, can also be found there. I will argue (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. Matthew Skene (2013). Seemings and the Possibility of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):539-559.
    Abstract I provide an account of the nature of seemings that explains why they are necessary for justification. The account grows out of a picture of cognition that explains what is required for epistemic agency. According to this account, epistemic agency requires (1) possessing the epistemic aims of forming true beliefs and avoiding errors, and (2) having some means of forming beliefs in order to satisfy those aims. I then argue that seeming are motives for belief characterized (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  27.  21
    Hilary Kornblith (2001). Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press 231--248.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  28.  60
    Jonathan E. Adler (2012). Contextualism and Fallibility: Pragmatic Encroachment, Possibility, and Strength of Epistemic Position. Synthese 188 (2):247-272.
    A critique of conversational epistemic contextualism focusing initially on why pragmatic encroachment for knowledge is to be avoided. The data for pragmatic encroachment by way of greater costs of error and the complementary means to raise standards of introducing counter-possibilities are argued to be accountable for by prudence, fallibility and pragmatics. This theme is sharpened by a contrast in recommendations: holding a number of factors constant, when allegedly higher standards for knowing hold, invariantists still recommend assertion (action), while contextualists (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29.  43
    James McBain (2004). Epistemic Analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants. Principia 8 (2):193-211.
    The question as to the appropriate method of epistemic analysis has always been an issue for epistemologists. In recent years, the traditional method utilized in epistemology - conceptual analysis - has come under attack from various perspectives. Yet, often no replacement method is given in its place. In two works, "A Practical Explication of Knowledge" and Knowledge and the State of Nature, Edward Craig proposes a new way of doing epistemology. Craig's epistemic method eschews traditional conceptual analysis in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Jens Christian Bjerring (2012). Problems in Epistemic Space. Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-18.
    When a proposition might be the case, for all an agent knows, we can say that the proposition is epistemically possible for the agent. In the standard possible worlds framework, we analyze modal claims using quantification over possible worlds. It is natural to expect that something similar can be done for modal claims involving epistemic possibility. The main aim of this paper is to investigate the prospects of constructing a space of worlds—epistemic space—that allows us to model (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  45
    Matthew Parrott (2014). Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1):axu036.
    The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, more specifically, they (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  47
    Miguel Ángel Fernández (2013). The Possibility of Epistemic Responsibility. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):109-131.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  7
    Earl McLane (1979). On the Possibility of Epistemic Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (3):559-574.
  34.  6
    Kai Horsthemke (2014). Of Ants and Men: Epistemic Injustice, Commitment to Truth, and the Possibility of Outsider Critique in Education. Ethics and Education 9 (1):127-140.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Mark Jago (2009). Logical Information and Epistemic Space. Synthese 167 (2):327 - 341.
    Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space . Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers’s account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based on Priest’s notion of open worlds yet (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  36.  23
    Jonah Katz & Joe Salerno (forthcoming). Epistemic Modal Disagreement. Topoi:1-13.
    At the center of the debate between contextualist versus relativist semantics for epistemic modal claims is an empirical question about when competent subjects judge epistemic modal disagreement to be present. John MacFarlane’s relativist claims that we judge there to be epistemic modal disagreement across the widest range of cases. We wish to dispute the robustness of his data with the results of two studies. Our primary conclusion is that the actual disagreement data is not consistent with relativist (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Charity Anderson (2014). Fallibilism and the Flexibility of Epistemic Modals. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):597-606.
    It is widely acknowledged that epistemic modals admit of inter-subjective flexibility. This paper introduces intra-subjective flexibility for epistemic modals and draws on this flexibility to argue that fallibilism is consistent with the standard account of epistemic modals.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38.  17
    Joseph Salerno (2016). Epistemic Modals and Modus Tollens. Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2663-2680.
    Epistemic modals in consequent place of indicative conditionals give rise to apparent counterexamples to Modus Tollens. Familiar assumptions behind familiar truth conditional theories of embedded modality facilitate a prima facie explanation—viz., that the target cases harbor epistemic modal equivocations. However, this sort of explanation goes too far. It fosters other predictions of equivocation in places where in fact there are none. It is argued that the solution is to drop the credo that modal claims are inherently relational in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Mark Jago, Imagine the Possibilities: Information Without Overload.
    Information is often modelled as a set of relevant possibilities, treated as logically possible worlds. However, this has the unintuitive consequence that the logical consequences of an agent's information cannot be informative for that agent. There are many scenarios in which such consequences are clearly informative for the agent in question. Attempts to weaken the logic underlying each possible world are misguided. Instead, I provide a genuinely psychological notion of epistemic possibility and show how it can be captured (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40. Daniel Dohrn, The Unthinkable, Might It Be?
    A basic intuition about epistemic possibility is the following: It might be that p iff it is open whether p. The standard way of cashing out this intuition is: It might be that p iff it is reconcilable with one’s informational state that p. However, there are certain examples which point to a lacuna in this conception. They indicate that epistemic possibility is restricted to what one can conceive as an alternative, what one can have a (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  80
    George Bealer (2008). Intuition and Modal Error. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press
    Modal intuitions are not only the primary source of modal knowledge but also the primary source of modal error. An explanation of how modal error arises — and, in particular, how erroneous modal intuitions arise — is an essential part of a comprehensive theory of knowledge and evidence. This chapter begins with a summary of certain preliminaries: the phenomenology of intuitions, their fallibility, the nature of concept-understanding and its relationship to the reliability of intuitions, and so forth. It then identifies (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Alex Worsnip (2015). Possibly False Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 112 (5):225-246.
    Many epistemologists call themselves ‘fallibilists’. But many philosophers of language hold that the meaning of epistemic usages of ‘possible’ ensures a close knowledge- possibility link : a subject’s utterance of ‘it’s possible that not-p’ is true only if the subject does not know that p. This seems to suggest that whatever the core insight behind fallibilism is, it can’t be that a subject could have knowledge which is, for them, possibly false. I argue that, on the contrary, subjects (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43. Alexander Dinges (2016). Epistemic Invariantism and Contextualist Intuitions. Episteme 13 (2):219-232.
    Epistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44.  30
    Nick Colgrove & Trent Dougherty (2016). Hawthorne’s Might-y Failure: A Reply to “Knowledge and Epistemic Necessity”. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1165-1177.
    In “Knowledge and epistemic necessity,” John Hawthorne gives a defense of what he rightly calls the “standard approach” to epistemic possibility against what he calls a new “competing idea” presented by Dougherty and Rysiew which he notes has been “endorsed and elaborated upon” by Fantl and McGrath. According to the standard approach, roughly, p is epistemically possible for S if S doesn’t know that not-p. The new approach has it that p is epistemically possible if p has (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  10
    David Sackris (2015). An Invariant Content Theory for Epistemic Uses of Modal Terms. Topoi:1-10.
    I propose and defend an account on which the semantic content of propositions expressed by utterances making use of modals epistemically is constant; i.e., invariant. Although such proposals are typically considered non-starters, I aim to show that combining such a semantics with a performative account in which such utterances perform two speech acts is quite promising. I argue that a performative account, when combined with an invariant semantic content theory, does a good job of accounting for ordinary intuitions in some (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  45
    Didier Dubois, Petr Hájek & Henri Prade (2000). Knowledge-Driven Versus Data-Driven Logics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (1):65--89.
    The starting point of this work is the gap between two distinct traditions in information engineering: knowledge representation and data - driven modelling. The first tradition emphasizes logic as a tool for representing beliefs held by an agent. The second tradition claims that the main source of knowledge is made of observed data, and generally does not use logic as a modelling tool. However, the emergence of fuzzy logic has blurred the boundaries between these two traditions by putting forward fuzzy (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47. Timothy Williamson (2013). Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):1-14.
    The possibility of justified true belief without knowledge is normally motivated by informally classified examples. This paper shows that it can also be motivated more formally, by a natural class of epistemic models in which both knowledge and justified belief (in the relevant sense) are represented. The models involve a distinction between appearance and reality. Gettier cases arise because the agent's ignorance increases as the gap between appearance and reality widens. The models also exhibit an epistemic asymmetry (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  48. J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon (2013). A New Maneuver Against the Epistemic Relativist. Synthese (8):1-13.
    Epistemic relativists often appeal to an epistemic incommensurability thesis. One notable example is the position advanced by Wittgenstein in On certainty (1969). However, Ian Hacking’s radical denial of the possibility of objective epistemic reasons for belief poses, we suggest, an even more forceful challenge to mainstream meta-epistemology. Our central objective will be to develop a novel strategy for defusing Hacking’s line of argument. Specifically, we show that the epistemic incommensurability thesis can be resisted even if (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2013). Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press
    A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to holding that only true beliefs could be justified, which most epistemologists regard as sufficient reason to reject the account. In this paper I defend the view that epistemic justification aims at truth, not by denying that it is committed to epistemic justification being factive, but by showing that, when we focus (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50. Adam Morton (2010). Epistemic Emotions. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press 385--399.
    I discuss a large number of emotions that are relevant to performance at epistemic tasks. My central concern is the possibility that it is not the emotions that are most relevant to success of these tasks but associated virtues. I present cases in which it does seem to be the emotions rather than the virtues that are doing the work. I end of the paper by mentioning the connections between desirable and undesirable epistemic emotions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 1000