Search results for 'Epistemic tools' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tarja Knuuttila (2011). Modelling and Representing: An Artefactual Approach to Model-Based Representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):262-271.score: 45.0
    The recent discussion on scientific representation has focused on models and their relationship to the real world. It has been assumed that models give us knowledge because they represent their supposed real target systems. However, here agreement among philosophers of science has tended to end as they have presented widely different views on how representation should be understood. I will argue that the traditional representational approach is too limiting as regards the epistemic value of modelling given the focus on (...)
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  2. Sara Green (2013). When One Model is Not Enough: Combining Epistemic Tools in Systems Biology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (2):170-180.score: 45.0
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  3. Nina Samuel (2013). Images as Tools. On Visual Epistemic Practices in the Biological Sciences. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (2):225-236.score: 36.0
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  4. Gaile Pohlhaus (2011). Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance. Hypatia 27 (3):715 - 735.score: 30.0
    I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird with attention (...)
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  5. Tarja Knuuttila & Mieke Boon (2011). How Do Models Give Us Knowledge? The Case of Carnot's Ideal Heat Engine. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):309-334.score: 30.0
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  6. John Michael, Simulation as an Epistemic Tool Between Theory and Practice: A Comparison of the Relationship Between Theory and Simulation in Science and Folk Psychology. EPSA07.score: 28.0
    Simulation as an epistemic tool between theory and practice: A Comparison of the Relationship between Theory and Simulation in Science and in Folk Psychology In this paper I explore the concept of simulation that is employed by proponents of the so-called simulation theory within the debate about the nature and scientific status of folk psychology. According to simulation theory, folk psychology is not a sort of theory that postulates theoretical entities (mental states and processes) and general laws, but a (...)
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  7. Thomas W. Simpson (2012). Evaluating Google as an Epistemic Tool. Metaphilosophy 43 (4):426-445.score: 28.0
    This article develops a social epistemological analysis of Web-based search engines, addressing the following questions. First, what epistemic functions do search engines perform? Second, what dimensions of assessment are appropriate for the epistemic evaluation of search engines? Third, how well do current search engines perform on these? The article explains why they fulfil the role of a surrogate expert, and proposes three ways of assessing their utility as an epistemic tool—timeliness, authority prioritisation, and objectivity. “Personalisation” is a (...)
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  8. Matthew Chrisman (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.score: 27.0
    Epistemic expressivism is the application of a nexus of ideas, which is prominent in ethical theory (more specifically, metaethics), to parallel issues in epistemological theory (more specifically, metaepistemology). Here, in order to help those new to the debate come to grips with epistemic expressivism and recent discussions of it, I first briefly present this nexus of ideas as it occurs in ethical expressivism. Then, I explain why and how some philosophers have sought to extend it to a version (...)
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  9. Michele Caponigro & Enrico Giannetto (2012). Epistemic Vs Ontic Classification of Quantum Entangled States? Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (20):137 - 145.score: 27.0
    In this brief paper, starting from recent works, we analyze from conceptual point of view this basic question: can be the nature of quantum entangled states be interpreted ontologically or epistemologically? According to some works, the degrees of freedom (and the tool of quantum partitions) of quantum systems permit us to establish a possible classification between factorizable and entangled states. We suggest, that the "choice" of degree of freedom (or quantum partitions), even if mathematically justified introduces an epistemic element, (...)
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  10. Georg Theiner (2013). Onwards and Upwards with the Extended Mind: From Individual to Collective Epistemic Action. In Linnda Caporael, James Griesemer & William Wimsatt (eds.), Developing Scaffolds. MIT Press. 191-208.score: 27.0
    In recent years, philosophical developments of the notion of distributed and/or scaffolded cognition have given rise to the “extended mind” thesis. Against the popular belief that the mind resides solely in the brain, advocates of the extended mind thesis defend the claim that a significant portion of human cognition literally extends beyond the brain into the body and a heterogeneous array of physical props, tools, and cultural techniques that are reliably present in the environment in which people grow, think, (...)
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  11. Lorenzo Magnani (2006). Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I” The Rationality of Scientific Discovery: Abductive Reasoning and Epistemic Mediators. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 5 (2):213-228.score: 27.0
    Philosophers have usually offered a number of ways of describing hypotheses generation, but all aim at demonstrating that the activity of generating hypotheses is paradoxical, illusory or obscure, and then not analysable. Those descriptions are often so far from Peircian pragmatic prescription and so abstract to result completely unknowable and obscure. The “computational turn” gives us a new way to understand creative processes in a strictly pragmatic sense. In fact, by exploiting artificial intelligence and cognitive science tools, computational philosophy (...)
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  12. Ivano A. Ciardelli & Floris Roelofsen (forthcoming). Inquisitive Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Synthese:1-45.score: 27.0
    Information exchange can be seen as a dynamic process of raising and resolving issues. The goal of this paper is to provide a logical framework to model and reason about this process. We develop an inquisitive dynamic epistemic logic (IDEL), which enriches the standard framework of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), incorporating insights from recent work on inquisitive semantics. At a static level, IDEL does not only allow us to model the information available to a set of agents, like (...)
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  13. Piotr Kulicki, Robert Trypuz, Paweł Garbacz & Marek Lechniak (2010). Epistemic Capacities, Incompatible Information and Incomplete Beliefs. In In proceeding of: ILCLI International Workshop on Logic and Philosophy of Knowledge, Communication and Action (LogKCA-10).score: 27.0
    We investigate a speci c model of knowledge and beliefs and their dynamics. The model is inspired by public announcement logic and the approach to puzzles concerning knowledge using that logic. In the model epistemic considerations are based on ontology. The main notion that constitutes a bridge between these two disciplines is the notion of epistemic capacities. Within the model we study scenarios in which agents can receive false announcements and can have incomplete or improper views about other (...)
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  14. Justin P. Bruner (2013). Policing Epistemic Communities. Episteme 10 (4):403-416.score: 22.0
    I examine how particular social arrangements and incentive structures encourage the honest reporting of experimental results and minimize fraudulent scientific work. In particular I investigate how epistemic communities can achieve this goal by promoting members to police the community. Using some basic tools from game theory, I explore a simple model in which scientists both conduct research and have the option of investigating the findings of their peers. I find that this system of peer policing can in many (...)
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  15. Allan Hazlett (forthcoming). Expressivism and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse. In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press.score: 21.0
    Consider the claim that openmindedness is an epistemic virtue, the claim that true belief is epistemically valuable, and the claim that one epistemically ought to cleave to one’s evidence. These are examples of what I’ll call “epistemic discourse.” In this paper I’ll propose and defend a view called “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse.” In particular, I’ll argue that convention-relativismis superior to its main rival, expressivism about epistemic discourse. Expressivism and conventionalism both jibe with anti-realism about epistemic (...)
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  16. Matthew McGrath (2007). Memory and Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 157 (1):1 - 24.score: 21.0
    Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified (...)
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  17. Helen de Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan de Smedt & Stefaan Blancke (2011). Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification. Dialectica 65 (4):517-535.score: 21.0
    What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary (...)
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  18. Guy Axtell (2001). Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 158--177.score: 21.0
    The presence of luck in our cognitive as in our moral lives shows that the quality of our intellectual character may not be entirely up to us as individuals, and that our motivation and even our ability to desire the truth, like our moral goodness, can be fragile. This paper uses epistemologists'responses to the problem of “epistemic luck” as a sounding board and locates the source of some of their deepest disagreements in divergent, value-charged “interests in explanation,” which epistemologists (...)
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  19. Henk W. de Regt, Modelling Molecules: Beyond the Epistemic-Pragmatic Dichotomy.score: 21.0
    I argue that scientific explanation has a pragmatic dimension that is epistemically relevant. Philosophers with an objectivist approach to scientific explanation (e.g. Hempel, Trout) hold that the pragmatic aspects of explanation do not have any epistemic import. I argue against this view by focusing on the role of models in scientific explanation. Applying recent accounts of modelling (Cartwright, Morgan and Morrison) to a case-study of nineteenth-century physics, I analyse the pragmatic dimension of the process of model construction. I highlight (...)
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  20. Gesa Lindemann (2009). From Experimental Interaction to the Brain as the Epistemic Object of Neurobiology. Human Studies 32 (2):153 - 181.score: 21.0
    This article argues that understanding everyday practices in neurobiological labs requires us to take into account a variety of different action positions: self-conscious social actors, technical artifacts, conscious organisms, and organisms being merely alive. In order to understand the interactions among such diverse entities, highly differentiated conceptual tools are required. Drawing on the theory of the German philosopher and sociologist Helmuth Plessner, the paper analyzes experimenters as self-conscious social persons who recognize monkeys as conscious organisms. Integrating Plessner’s ideas into (...)
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  21. Douglas Walton (2006). Epistemic and Dialectical Models of Begging the Question. Synthese 152 (2):237 - 284.score: 21.0
    This paper addresses the problem posed by the current split between the two opposed hypotheses in the growing literature on the fallacy of begging the question the epistemic hypothesis, based on knowledge and belief, and the dialectical one, based on formal dialogue systems. In the first section, the nature of split is explained, and it is shown how each hypothesis has developed. To get the beginning reader up to speed in the literature, a number of key problematic examples are (...)
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  22. Joeri Engelfriet & Jan Treur (1998). An Interpretation of Default Logic in Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (3):369-388.score: 21.0
    When reasoning about complex domains, where information available is usually only partial, nonmonotonic reasoning can be an important tool. One of the formalisms introduced in this area is Reiter's Default Logic (1980). A characteristic of this formalism is that the applicability of default (inference) rules can only be verified in the future of the reasoning process. We describe an interpretation of default logic in temporal epistemic logic which makes this characteristic explicit. It is shown that this interpretation yields a (...)
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  23. Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (2003). Cooperation, Knowledge, and Time: Alternating-Time Temporal Epistemic Logic and its Applications. Studia Logica 75 (1):125-157.score: 21.0
    Branching-time temporal logics have proved to be an extraordinarily successful tool in the formal specification and verification of distributed systems. Much of their success stems from the tractability of the model checking problem for the branching time logic CTL, which has made it possible to implement tools that allow designers to automatically verify that systems satisfy requirements expressed in CTL. Recently, CTL was generalised by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman in a logic known as Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). The key (...)
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  24. Olivier Roy (2010). Interpersonal Coordination and Epistemic Support for Intentions with We-Content. Economics and Philosophy 26 (03):345-367.score: 21.0
    In this paper I study intentions of the form , that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I (...)
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  25. Peter Becker & William Clark (eds.) (2001). Little Tools of Knowledge: Historical Essays on Academic and Bureaucratic Practices. University of Michigan Press.score: 21.0
    This volume brings historians of science and social historians together to consider the role of "little tools"--such as tables, reports, questionnaires, dossiers, index cards--in establishing academic and bureaucratic claims to authority and objectivity. From at least the eighteenth century onward, our science and society have been planned, surveyed, examined, and judged according to particular techniques of collecting and storing knowledge. Recently, the seemingly self-evident nature of these mundane epistemic and administrative tools, as well as the prose in (...)
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  26. Bernardo Pino (2010). Re-Assessing Ecology of Tool Transparency in Epistemic Practices. Mind and Society 9 (1):85-110.score: 21.0
    In this paper, the radical view that transparent equipment is the result of an ecological assembly between tool users and physical aspects of the world is critically assessed. According to this perspective, tool users are normally viewed as plastically organized hybrid agents. In this view, such agents are able to interact with tools (artefacts or technologies) in ways that are opportunistic and fully locked to the local task environment. This intimate and flexible interaction would provide grounds for the thesis (...)
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  27. Giovanna Corsi & Eugenio Orlandelli (2013). Free Quantified Epistemic Logics. Studia Logica 101 (6):1159-1183.score: 21.0
    The paper presents an epistemic logic with quantification over agents of knowledge and with a syntactical distinction between de re and de dicto occurrences of terms. Knowledge de dicto is characterized as ‘knowledge that’, and knowlegde de re as ‘knowledge of’. Transition semantics turns out to be an adequate tool to account for the distinctions introduced.
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  28. Wiebe van Der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (2003). Cooperation, Knowledge, and Time: Alternating-Time Temporal Epistemic Logic and Its Applications. Studia Logica 75 (1):125 - 157.score: 21.0
    Branching-time temporal logics have proved to be an extraordinarily successful tool in the formal specification and verification of distributed systems. Much of their success stems from the tractability of the model checking problem for the branching time logic CTL, which has made it possible to implement tools that allow designers to automatically verify that systems satisfy requirements expressed in CTL. Recently, CTL was generalised by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman in a logic known as "Alternating-time Temporal Logic" (ATL). The (...)
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  29. Vivian M. May (2014). “Speaking Into the Void”? Intersectionality Critiques and Epistemic Backlash. Hypatia 29 (1):94-112.score: 21.0
    Taking up Kimberlé Crenshaw's conclusion that black feminist theorists seem to continue to find themselves in many ways “speaking into the void” (Crenshaw 2011, 228), even as their works are widely celebrated, I examine intersectionality critiques as one site where power asymmetries and dominant imaginaries converge in the act of interpretation (or cooptation) of intersectionality. That is, despite its current “status,” intersectionality also faces epistemic intransigence in the ways in which it is read and applied. My aim is not (...)
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  30. Boaz Miller & Isaac Record (2013). Justified Belief in a Digital Age: On the Epistemic Implications of Secret Internet Technologies. Episteme 10 (02):117 - 134.score: 19.0
    People increasingly form beliefs based on information gained from automatically filtered Internet ‎sources such as search engines. However, the workings of such sources are often opaque, preventing ‎subjects from knowing whether the information provided is biased or incomplete. Users’ reliance on ‎Internet technologies whose modes of operation are concealed from them raises serious concerns about ‎the justificatory status of the beliefs they end up forming. Yet it is unclear how to address these concerns ‎within standard theories of knowledge and justification. (...)
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  31. Allan Hazlett (2012). Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility. Episteme 9 (3):205-223.score: 19.0
    This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or , and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order (...)
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  32. Fabienne Peter (2008). Pure Epistemic Proceduralism. Episteme 5 (1):pp. 33-55.score: 19.0
    In this paper I defend a pure proceduralist conception of legitimacy that applies to epistemic democracy. This conception, which I call pure epistemic proceduralism, does not depend on procedure-independent standards for good outcomes and relies on a proceduralist epistemology. It identifies a democratic decision as legitimate if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness. My argument starts with a rejection of instrumentalism – the view that political equality is (...)
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  33. Thomas Kroedel (2013). Why Epistemic Permissions Don't Agglomerate – Another Reply to Littlejohn. Logos and Episteme 4 (4):451–455.score: 19.0
    Clayton Littlejohn claims that the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox requires an implausible principle in order to explain why epistemic permissions don't agglomerate. This paper argues that an uncontentious principle suffices to explain this. It also discusses another objection of Littlejohn's, according to which we’re not permitted to believe lottery propositions because we know that we’re not in a position to know them.
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  34. Axel Gelfert (2011). Who is an Epistemic Peer? Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.score: 19.0
    Contemporary epistemology of peer disagreement has largely focused on our immediate normative response to prima facie instances of disagreement. Whereas some philosophers demand that we should withhold judgment (or moderate our credences) in such cases, others argue that, unless new evidence becomes available, disagreement at best gives us reason to demote our interlocutor from his peer status. But what makes someone an epistemic peer in the first place? This question has not received the attention it deserves. I begin by (...)
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  35. Martijn Blaauw (2013). The Epistemic Account of Privacy. Episteme 10 (2):167-177.score: 19.0
    Privacy is valued by many. But what it means to have privacy remains less than clear. In this paper, I argue that the notion of privacy should be understood in epistemic terms. What it means to have (some degree of) privacy is that other persons do not stand in significant epistemic relations to those truths one wishes to keep private.
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  36. B. J. C. Madison (2014). Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and Memory. Logos and Episteme 5 (1):33-62.score: 19.0
    Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can (...)
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  37. Robin McKenna (2013). Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Are Possibly Not Governed by the Same Epistemic Norm. Logos and Episteme 4 (4):457-464.score: 19.0
    This paper focuses on Martin Montminy’s recent attempt to show that assertion and practical reasoning are necessarily governed by the same epistemic norm (“Why assertion and practical reasoning must be governed by the same epistemic norm”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly [2013]). I show that the attempt fails. I finish by considering the upshot for the recent debate concerning the connection between the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning.
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  38. Amir Konigsberg (2013). Epistemic Value and Epistemic Compromise, A Reply to Moss. Episteme 10 (1):87-97.score: 19.0
    In this paper I present a criticism of Sarah Moss‘ recent proposal to use scoring rules as a means of reaching epistemic compromise in disagreements between epistemic peers that have encountered conflict. The problem I have with Moss‘ proposal is twofold. Firstly, it appears to involve a double counting of epistemic value. Secondly, it isn‘t clear whether the notion of epistemic value that Moss appeals to actually involves the type of value that would be acceptable and (...)
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  39. Jennifer Nagel (2013). Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):179-199.score: 18.0
    Do epistemic intuitions tell us anything about knowledge? Stich has argued that we respond to cases according to our contingent cultural programming, and not in a manner that tends to reveal anything significant about knowledge itself. I’ve argued that a cross-culturally universal capacity for mindreading produces the intuitive sense that the subject of a case has or lacks knowledge. This paper responds to Stich’s charge that mindreading is cross-culturally varied in a way that will strip epistemic intuitions of (...)
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  40. Allan Hazlett, Limning Structure as an Epistemic Goal.score: 18.0
    In the Phaedrus, Socreates sympathetically describes the ability “to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.” (265e) In contemporary philosophy, Ted Sider (2009, 2011) defends the same idea. As I shall put it, Plato and Sider’s idea is that limning structure is an epistemic goal. My aim in this paper is to articulate and defend this idea. First, I’ll articulate the (...)
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  41. Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman (2007). Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.score: 18.0
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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  42. Bryan Frances (2012). Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):1 - 21.score: 18.0
    Suppose you know that someone is your epistemic peer regarding some topic. You admit that you cannot think of any relevant epistemic advantage you have over her when it comes to that topic; you admit that she is just as likely as you to get P's truth-value right. Alternatively, you might know that she is your epistemic superior regarding the topic. And then after learning this about her you find out that she disagrees with you about P. (...)
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  43. J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2013). Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck. Noûs 47 (4).score: 18.0
    Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson ; Stanley ; ; Brogaard ; ; ) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with (...)
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  44. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2013). Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to holding that only true beliefs could be justified, which most epistemologists regard as sufficient reason to reject the account. In this paper I defend the view that epistemic justification aims at truth, not by denying that it is committed to epistemic justification being factive, but by showing that, when we focus (...)
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  45. J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon (2013). A New Maneuver Against the Epistemic Relativist. Synthese (8):1-13.score: 18.0
    Epistemic relativists often appeal to an epistemic incommensurability thesis. One notable example is the position advanced by Wittgenstein in On certainty (1969). However, Ian Hacking’s radical denial of the possibility of objective epistemic reasons for belief poses, we suggest, an even more forceful challenge to mainstream meta-epistemology. Our central objective will be to develop a novel strategy for defusing Hacking’s line of argument. Specifically, we show that the epistemic incommensurability thesis can be resisted even if we (...)
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  46. Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood (2009). Epistemic Norms Without Voluntary Control. Noûs 43 (4):599-632.score: 18.0
    William Alston’s argument against the deontological conception of epistemic justification is a classic—and much debated—piece of contemporary epistemology. At the heart of Alston’s argument, however, lies a very simple mistake which, surprisingly, appears to have gone unnoticed in the vast literature now devoted to the argument. After having shown why some of the standard responses to Alston’s argument don’t work, we elucidate the mistake and offer a hypothesis as to why it has escaped attention.
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  47. J. Adam Carter & Matthew Chrisman (2012). Is Epistemic Expressivism Incompatible with Inquiry? Philosophical Studies 159 (3):323-339.score: 18.0
    Expressivist views of an area of discourse encourage us to ask not about the nature of the relevant kinds of values but rather about the nature of the relevant kind of evaluations. Their answer to the latter question typically claims some interesting disanalogy between those kinds of evaluations and descriptions of the world. It does so in hope of providing traction against naturalism-inspired ontological and epistemological worries threatening more ‘realist’ positions. This is a familiar position regarding ethical discourse; however, some (...)
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  48. Christy Mag Uidhir (2013). The Epistemic Misuse & Abuse of Pictorial Caricature. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):137-152.score: 18.0
    I claim that caricature is an epistemically defective depiction. More precisely, when employed in service to some epistemic uptake, I claim that caricature can have a non-negligible epistemic effect only for a less than ideally rational audience with certain cognitive biases. An ideally rational audience, however, would take all caricature to be what I refer to as fairground caricature, i.e., an interesting or entertaining form of depiction that is at best only trivially revelatory. I then argue that any (...)
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  49. John Hawthorne (2012). Knowledge and Epistemic Necessity. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):493-501.score: 18.0
    Claims of the form 'I know P and it might be that not-P' tend to sound odd. One natural explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core epistemic use, 'Might P' is true in a speaker's mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl and (...)
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